DISSEYATION SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF ENGLISH
IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MAGISTER IN CIVILISATION

U.S. - RUSSIAN RELATIONS: A NEW COLD WAR OR A
CONTINUATION OF THE OLD COLD WAR

Candidate: SADAOUl Lamia
Supervisor: Dr. TOULGUI Ladi

Board of Examiners
Chairman: Pr. MANAA Mohamad (Maître de Conférence “A”: Université de Annaba)
Supervisor: Dr. TOULGUI Ladi (Maître de Conférence “A”: Université de Guelma)
Examiner: Dr. ELAGGOUNE Abdelhak (Maître de Conférence “A”: Université de Guelma)

2011
Acknowledgements

This dissertation would not have been possible without the continuous encouragement and guidance of so many people. I would not have been able to undertake this project without their support. First and foremost I owe my deepest gratitude to my respectable supervisor Dr. Toulgui Ladi who took on the great effort to read the manuscript very closely and provided me with a detailed and fair critique of its content. He made available his support in spite of his numerous academic duties. He was relentlessly supportive and enthusiastically committed to the accomplishment of this work from the initial to the final level and helped in developing a better understanding of the subject. For that I am very much indebted to him.

I am grateful to the honorable examiners who took the task of reading and correcting the work. I also thank my teachers especially the gentle Mrs H. Nia and Mr. H. Boudechiche from the University of Guelma, and my teachers in the postgraduate studies at Annaba University: Dr. N. Hamlaoui, Mr. A. Habes, and Mr. N. Bouladroua.
Dedication

I dedicate this work to my beloved parents. May Allah bless them for their unconditional love, support and encouragement; to my dear brothers and sisters, to my sweet nieces and nephews, my beloved cousin Louisa, all my adorable friends and mates in the Doctoral School. For all those who supported and encouraged me throughout, I express sincere thanks and gratitude.
Abstract

Russo-American relations are hostage to Cold War mind. Both countries still perceive the other’s moves with great mistrust. Rivalry is on the rise especially in the area of the Former Soviet Union. In the aftermath of the Russian-Georgian War (2008) there was a great debate on whether a new Cold War was ensuing between the two countries. Russia’s strategic resurgence became clearer especially in its near abroad. So is there a new Cold War between the United States and Russia or is the present confrontation a continuation of the old one? This is the question that this dissertation intends to answer by exploring the main issues of contention that are negatively affecting the bilateral relationship mainly NATO enlargement and the Missile Defense system. Both issues show a continuation in the strategic underpinnings of the old Cold War. The containment policy, sphere of influence, balance of power, regime change and arms race are key concepts of the Cold War era that are still influencing their current foreign policies. They demonstrate a persistence of relationship very similar to that of the Cold War despite claims that the latter is over. The contradictory points of view of both countries about the aims of each issue are scrutinized in order to illustrate the degree and extent of mistrust and rivalry if not confrontation that do not appear to end soon. The United States announced several times that it would pursue its open door policy concerning the eastward expansion of NATO and the establishment of the Missile Defense system in the heart of Europe. Russia, on the other hand, showed an ardent opposition to both issues. The Medvedev Doctrine, also called the Russian Monroe Doctrine, had envisioned a red line for the alliance’s expansion (especially to Georgia and Ukraine) and Russia had even threatened of targeting the countries that would host the system. Thus Europe has so much to worry about if the bilateral relations are not normalized soon.
Résumé

Les relations Russo-américaines sont toujours hottes de l’esprit de la guerre froide. Chacun des deux pays rivaux perçoit toujours les mouvements de l’autre avec beaucoup de méfiance. Leur rivalité a également pris beaucoup d’ampleur particulièrement dans l’espace de l’ex-Union Soviétique. Durant la guerre russo-géorgienne (2008), il y eut un grand débat sur la possibilité d’une nouvelle guerre froide. La résurgence stratégique de la Russie était devenue plus claire surtout dans les pays limitrophes. Peut-on donc admettre qu’il y a une Nouvelle Guerre Froide entre les États-Unis et la Russie ou doit-on croire que la présente confrontation n’est qu’une extension de la précédente guerre froide? C’est la question principale à laquelle ce mémoire a essayé de répondre en explorant les points essentiels de contention qui influent négativement sur les relations bilatérales entre les deux nations principalement l’élargissement de l’OTAN et le système de défense antimissile. Ces points reflètent une continuité dans les fondements stratégiques de la Guerre Froide. La politique d’endiguement, les zones d’influence, la balance des pouvoirs, le changement de régime, et la course aux armements sont toujours des idées clés qui influencent sur leur politique étrangère actuelle. Ils démontrent aussi la persistance d’une relation très similaire à celle de la Guerre Froide en dépit des affirmations que celle-ci appartient désormais au passé récent. Les points de vue contradictoires dévoilent le degré de méfiance, de rivalité et même de confrontation qui ne semblent pas prendre fin dans un futur proche. Les États-Unis ont annoncé à maintes reprises qu’ils poursuivront l’élargissement de l’OTAN et la mise en place d’un système de défense antimissile. Bien entendu, la Russie a montré une opposition farouche aux intentions américaines. La Doctrine Medvedev, également appelée la Doctrine Monroe russe, avait tracé une ligne rouge que l’alliance ne devait pas dépasser (en particulier la Géorgie et l’Ukraine). La Russie avait également menacé de cibler les pays qui seraient hôtes du système de défense antimissile. En conséquence, l’Europe est déjà inquiète quant aux relations bilatérales entre ces deux pays qui tardent à se normaliser.
ملخص


وقد أصبح نفوذ روسيا الاستراتيجي أكثر تجليا في الدول المجاورة. فهل هناك حرب باردة جديدة بين الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية وروسيا أم أن الصراع الحالي بينهما هو استعداد للحرب الباردة القديمة؟ هذا ما تحول هذه المذكرة استقصاء من خلال تحليل قضايا الخلاف الرئيسية التي تؤثر سلبا على العلاقات الثنائية وحالة توسع حلف الناتو وانشاء منظمة الدفاع الصاروخي. فسياسة الاحتراء، وعليه كانت مناطق النفوذ، و موازين القوى، وتغيير نظام الحكم والسباق نحو التسلح من ضمن المفاهيم الرئيسية التي ميزت فترة الحرب الباردة ولا تزال تؤثر على السياسة الخارجية للبلدين وتظهر أن هناك استمرارية في علاقات الثنائية تشبه إلى حد كبير تلك التي سارت خلال الحرب الباردة على الرغم من الاعتراف بأن هذه الأخيرة انتهت منذ فترة. وتبين الأراء المتضاربة لكلا البلدين حول الموضوعات مدى عدم الثقة والمنافسة إذ لا تكمن المواجهة التي لا يبدو أنها ستنتهي قريبا. قد أعلنت الولايات المتحدة أكثر من مرة أنها ستواصل سياسة الباب المفتوح بشأن توسع حلف الشمال الأطلسي. وكذلك عن تصميمها على إنشاء منظمة الدفاع الصاروخي في قلب أوروبا. من جهة أخرى، أظهرت روسيا معارضتها الشديدة لكلا الموضوعين حيث وضع مبدأ مبدئي خطأ أحراً يمنع التحالف تجاوزه (خاصة جورجيا وأوكرانيا). كما أظهرت روسيا تهديها باستهداف الدول التي ترغب في تبني نظام الدفاع الصاروخي. سيزداد حتما فلق أوروبا إذا لم يتم تطبيع العلاقات بين الدولتين في القريب العاجل.
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Abbreviations/Acronyms

**ABM**: Anti-Ballistic Missile

**BMD**: Ballistic Missile Defense

**BM**: Ballistic Missiles

**BP**: British Petroleum

**BTC**: Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan

**CIA**: Central Intelligence Agency

**CSCE**: Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe

**CIS**: Commonwealth of Independent States

**CPSU**: Communist Party of the Soviet Union

**CFE**: Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty

**CSTO**: Collective Security Treaty Organization

**CST**: Collective Security Treaty

**EEC**: Eurasian Economic Community

**EU**: European Union

**FRS**: Foreign Registration Service

**FSU**: Former Soviet Union

**GCS**: Global Control System for the Non-Proliferation of Missiles & Missile Technology

**ICBM**: Intercontinental Ballistic Missile

**IRBM**: Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile

**INF**: Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty

**IMF**: International Monetary Fund

**LTBT**: Limited Test Ban Treaty

**MRBM**: Medium-Range Ballistic Missile

**MAP**: Membership Action Plan
MD: Missile Defense

MTCR: Missile Technology Control Regime

MIRV: Multiple Independently- targetable Re-entry Vehicle

MAD: Mutual Assured Destruction

NMD: National Missile Defense

NSC: National Security Council

NACC: North Atlantic Cooperation Council

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NGO: Non Governmental Organization

NPT: Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty

PfP: Partnership for Peace

PJC: Permanent Joint Council

SCP: South Caucasus Pipeline

SCO: Shanghai Cooperation Organization

SRBM: Short-Range Ballistic Missile

SEATO: South-East Asia Treaty Organization

SALT: Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

SDI: Strategic Defense Initiative

SLBM: Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile

TMD: Theater Missile Defense

UN: United Nations

UNSC: United Nations Security Council

USSR: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

WMD: Weapons of Mass Destruction

WTO: World Trade Organization
Introduction

Evoking both the United States of America and Russia systematically triggers reminiscence of the long and bitter Cold War struggle that characterized the two countries’ relationship during the 20th Century. The concerned era was marked by staunch rivalry and mistrust. It resulted in dividing the world into two Western and Eastern poles, one led by the United States and the other by the former Soviet Union. The creation of military alliances (NATO and the former Warsaw Pact), competing ideologies (Capitalism vs. Communism), a massive conventional and nuclear arms race, proxy wars, and espionage were among its main characteristics. America greatly committed itself to this war because it wanted to contain the spread of communism in Europe. The struggle’s persistence faded away when Mikhail Gorbachev and George W.H. Bush mutually declared that the Cold War was over at the historical Malta Conference in December 1989. But did the Cold War truly end?

By the year 2006 some analysts started to talk about a “New Cold War” ensuing between the United States and Russia. After the Russia-Georgia War of 2008 the debate has broadened between those asserting and refuting that the United States and Russia have entered into a new Cold War. The issue is intriguing as many questions arise from this subject. Is there actually a new Cold War between Russia and the United States? Is it the old Cold War that has been renewed/continued, or is it a new Cold War? Was the Cold War truly over or was it only a rhetorical declaration?

Strategic analysts maintained that the fall of the Berlin Wall, the reunification of Germany and the dismantlement of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact were events that signalled the end of the Cold War. As the Soviet Union lost its power and leverage the Eastern European satellites started to free themselves from Moscow, Russia drowned in economic
decay and social and political problems. Its influence diminished regionally and internationally leaving the world stage to the sole superpower, the United States of America.

Tackling the Cold War from another point of view primarily the containment policy, the establishment of spheres of influence and the balance of power concepts, it becomes obvious that the struggle has never come to an end. This dissertation consequently traces the continuity of the Cold War mentality and practices in influencing the post Cold War foreign policies of Russia and the United States. Containment, the spheres of influence, and balance of power concepts have remained milestone features that have persisted in the decades following its assumed end. The rivalry between the United States and Russia is focused on the former Soviet Union area (or the ex-Soviet Republics). Russia has a clear ambition to revive, if not maximize, its influence within this space. The United States as well is greatly involved in spreading its power and advancing its interests into this strategic area.

Ideology is no longer a matter of conflict because Russia has converted to some extent to Western economic and political systems. The current rivalry represents a geopolitical contest to secure spheres of influence and balance the other’s rising power and influence. Cold War bipolarity gave rise to America’s hegemony in the aftermath of the Cold War. But political analysts’ prediction is based on the assumption that the world is moving toward a multi-polar system where many powers are emerging. Knowing that it cannot face America’s hegemony alone, Russia pursues a policy of counterbalancing the latter through establishing partnerships with emerging powers like China and India.

The area of competition has been driven further east to the FSU. The new rivalry is about the future security alignments of some of the former Soviet republics and about who will control oil and gas industries and the pipelines transporting these precious commodities from the East to the West. Both countries are interested in establishing friendly regimes in the area of contention through the establishment of pro-Russian or pro-American regimes.
Political analysts have tackled the new Cold War between Russia and the United States since 2006. It became greatly discussed in the aftermath of the Russian-Georgian War of August 2008. This incident represents the climax of a long conflict of interests between the two countries and it has become a turning point in the American-Russian relationship through which Russia tries to reassert itself as a regional power after decades of weakness.

To clarify how the balance of power and the sphere of influence are still key concepts that affect and guide both countries’ foreign policies, the dissertation treats the main points of controversy that are growing into an imminent confrontation. They are the enlargement of the NATO organization to incorporate former Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe and former Soviet Republics and America’s quest to build a Missile Defense system.

This dissertation is divided into four chapters. The first chapter will be a historical overview on U.S.-Soviet relations during the Cold War era. It deals with the major historical events and Cold War concepts and how the two superpowers managed their relationship in the period following WWII to the declaration at the Malta Summit of 1989. It discusses how the United States and Russia tried to establish a strategic partnership in the aftermath of Cold War end. “Historical Background: Overview of U.S.-Russian Relations during the Cold War and its Aftermath” is its title.

The second chapter tackles the eastward enlargement of NATO alliance. Entitled “NATO Enlargement: America’s Reasons and Russia’s Reaction”, the chapter traces how the United States, the leader of the alliance, has vigorously pursued the expansion of the alliance in the aftermath of the disbanding of the Warsaw Pact and Russia’s weakness to incorporate chunks of the former Soviet empire. This gradual enlargement brought the alliance nearer to Russia’s borders; hence raising the latter’s security concerns and more specifically its apprehension about the American presence in what used to be Russia’s sphere of influence.
“Reverberations of NATO Enlargement on U.S.-Russian Relations” is the title of the third chapter. It analyzes the outcomes of the enlargement on the American-Russian relations. It highlights Russia’s keen attempts to re-establish itself as a great power in the FSU through establishing regional alliances with some former Soviet republics. China and Russia are intensifying their bilateral relations into a strategic partnership in a clear attempt to restrain America’s influence in the region and especially in Central Asia. The Georgian War of 2008 and the “Russian Monroe Doctrine” are also analyzed as the latter represents Russia’s official foreign policy objectives towards the near-abroad.

The fourth and last chapter “The United States Missile Defense Plans and their Military and Political Repercussions on U.S.-Russian Relations” discusses another contentious problem between Russia and the United States. It is that of America’s quest to build a Missile Defense system that will protect the American mainland and that of its allies from future missile attacks by “rogue states”. The chapter shows how this issue remains a priority for the United States. This is a critical subject as many analysts have predicted that it will lead to the abrogation of some of the most important arms control treaties signed between Russia and the United States like the ABM treaty.

This work is conducted through a qualitative research methodology which focuses on studying the key aspects of the current confrontation between Russia and the United States. Because the “new Cold War” issue is still discussed and the views are divided between those who confirm or refute its existence, this work will focus on a third view; that the present confrontation represents a continuation of the old Cold War struggle. It focuses mainly on the NATO alliance and investigates why this Cold War alliance has endured and expanded long after the Cold War was assumed to be ended. The Missile Defense, known as the ‘Son of Stars Wars’ is analyzed to explain the causes of America’s staunch quest for realising it and
Russia’s ardent opposition to its establishment in Europe and how it affects the securities of the United States, Russia and Europe.

Both issues are analyzed to trace the similarities and continuities of the current confrontation with the old Cold War and how they affect the current relationship in an attempt to approve or refute one of the above questions. A wide range of resources is used to analyze NATO expansion and the Missile Defense system. The dissertation made use of primary sources like national security concepts, foreign policy documents, speeches, testimonies, governmental reports, official statements and declarations, and opinion of leading American and Russian politicians as well as data collected from newspapers and scholarly journals. In depth analyses by pundits, political and security analysts are also used. The time scope of the inquiry extends from 1993 to 2008 to cover two post-Cold War administrations that of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush. This scope gives the possibility to trace the continuity and also the changes in the foreign policy objectives and perceptions of both countries.

The new Cold War is a recent phrase used to refer to the deteriorating and strained relationship between the United States and Russia especially after Vladimir Putin became president in 2000. The issue is greatly debated by specialists, politicians and journalists who are either denying or affirming its existence. Two books have tackled the theme. Both are written by journalists. The first author is Mark Mackinnon of the *Globe and Mail*. In his book, *The New Cold War: Revolutions, Rigged Elections and Pipeline Politics in the Former Soviet Union*, he favors the idea of a new Cold War between the United States and Russia but with different strategies. Nuclear standoffs and proxy armies have been replaced by rigged elections, stage-managed revolutions and wrangling over pipeline routes. Mackinnon puts the blame on the United States because of its provocative policies towards Russia. These include America’s sponsoring of the famous Colored Revolutions in Russia’s neighboring countries and its quest to drive out Russia from the burgeoning Caspian oil game through the
establishment of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline. This has put Washington and Moscow on a collision course.

Edward Lucas of The Economist, wrote a book entitled The New Cold War: Putin’s Russia and the Threat to the West. Unlike Mackinnon who blames the United States and its provocative policies towards Russia for the spiraling of the relationship, Lucas charges the Putin administration of repressing its own citizens and behaving aggressively and threateningly towards its neighbors. He stresses that Russia, the heir to the Soviet Union, is reverting to Soviet behavior at home and abroad, and has shown contemptuous disregard for Western norms. For Lucas, the new Cold War is fought with cash, natural resources, diplomacy, and propaganda. It is a struggle for market share as Russia is building its power as an energy supplier. Russia uses the energy weapon to bully its enemies and bribe its allies, and utilizes its financial clout to buy friends and influence. The battle lines of the new Cold War, Lucas affirms, are America, Britain, and some European countries, mostly ex-communist that are trying to stand up against the Kremlin.

Stephen Cohen, Professor of Russian studies at New York University, discerns the main essential problems antagonizing the bilateral relationship between Russia and the United States in a Nation magazine article: “The New American Cold War”. According to Cohen, the gravest threats to America’s national security are still in Russia especially those connected with its nuclear arsenals. The proliferation of Russia’s nukes, chemical and biological materials, ill-maintained nuclear reactors, an impaired early-warning system controlling missiles on hair-trigger alert remain among the gravest dangers.

Cohen charges the United States of waging an “undeclared” cold war against post-Communist Russia during the past fifteen years. Since the early 1990s Washington has simultaneously conducted, under Democrats and Republicans, two fundamentally different policies toward Russia. One has been decorative and outwardly reassuring, the other real and
exceedingly reckless. The decorative policy has replaced America’s previous cold war intentions with a generous relationship of “strategic partnership and friendship”. The public image of this approach has featured happy-talk meetings between American and Russian presidents, first Clinton and Yeltsin and then Bush and Putin. Conversely, the real American policy has been a relentless winner-take-all exploitation of Russia’s post-1991 weakness through growing military encirclement of Russia near its borders, America’s denial that Russia has any legitimate national interests outside its own territory, and the clear support of the Color Revolutions in Russia’s neighborhood. For Cohen the Cold War ended in Moscow, but not in Washington.

M. K. Bhadrakumar, a former Indian career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service elaborated an *Asia Times* article entitled “In the Trenches of the New Cold War: The U.S., Russia and the Great Game in Eurasia”. Its focal points are the missile defense controversy that led to America’s withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, which in turn is risking an initiation of an arms race with Russia. The program makes Russia highly skeptical that the United States wants to replace the balance of terror with total military superiority. Concerning the steady expansion of NATO alliance eastward, Bhadrakumar emphasizes that the United States is determined at any cost to surround Russia with a ring of countries that are hostile to it.

Houman A. Sadri, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Central Florida and Nathan L. Burns, Masters degree in the International Studies from UCF, in their article entitled “The Georgia Crisis: A New Cold War on the Horizon” analyze the outcomes of the war and affirm that Georgia has become the frontline of rivalry between the United States and Russia. Tensions have escalated between the two countries. The United States has a strategic interest in weakening Russia’s monopolization of the energy sector, an asset that may give Moscow an OPEC-like ability to manipulate market prices and consequently exercise political dominance in its former Soviet republics. Georgia has a great ambition to
become a NATO member state; something highly resented by Russia that has officially announced its opposition to such a step. Russia is regaining once again the reins of power in the Caucasus because the Kremlin sees this area as its natural sphere of influence.

George Friedman’s “The Coming Conflict with Russia” foresees that Russia, in the next decade, will become increasingly wealthy but geographically insecure. As a result, Russia will be concerned with recovering influence and effective control in the FSU, recreating the system of buffers that the Soviet Union provided for it as a reaction to America’s growing presence and influence in the region. Friedman anticipates that Russia will try to re-absorb Belarus and Ukraine into the Russian sphere of influence in the next five years, roughly returning to its borders with Europe between the two world wars. For Friedman, Russia’s next move, will be an agreement with Belarus for an integrated defense system that will bring the Russian army to the Baltic and Polish frontiers and will start the confrontation in its full intensity. By the end of the next decade, Freidman expects, this confrontation will be the dominant global topic.

Dr. Subhash Kapila, an International Relations and Strategic Affairs analyst, discusses the new Cold War in his article entitled “Russia: The Inevitability of a New Cold War with the United States”. Kapila maintains that both countries are destined to become inevitably engulfed in a new Cold War as Russia is attempting to reclaim the “strategic space” it lost with the disintegration of the USSR. The stakes are great, Kapila argues, as the global strategic balance is determined by the health of the strategic relations between the United States and Russia and any strains in this relationship is a cause for global concern.

William Engdahl, an American freelance journalist, historian and economic researcher, wrote about the geopolitics of this new conflict. “Putin and the Geopolitics of a New Cold War: or what Happens when Cowboys Don’t Shoot Straight Like They Used to” focuses on the controversial Missile Defense program and totally rejects America’s official assertion that
the system is intended to neutralize North Korean and Iranian missile threats. Engdahl maintains that this shield is intended to protect it from limited attack by Russia, the only other nuclear power with the capacity to launch a credible nuclear counterpunch. The United States seeks to establish “Nuclear Primacy” because such a system will indeed enable the U.S. to dictate the entire world on its terms, not only to Russia. The U.S. quest for nuclear supremacy is making the possibility of nuclear war ‘thinkable’. The Cold War concept of Mutual Assured Destruction that kept nuclear war unthinkable is under threat because of the abrogation of key arms control treaties like the ABM.

This dissertation ultimately analyzes the NATO eastward expansion and the Missile Defense system that constrain American-Russian relations. The focus is on the causes and consequences of each of them. Both NATO and the Missile Defense have their roots back to the Cold War. Their persistence and reemergence in the post-Cold War era as the main security issues antagonizing the former Cold War rivals; that is Russia (heir to the Soviet Union) and the United States, suggests that their old struggle and rivalry were not shelved as history and claims that the Cold War ended with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the Malta Summit declaration can be questioned. NATO enlargement and the Missile Defense system show to what extent the relationship remains hostage to Cold War mentalities and practices.

When the Cold War was “assumed” to be over, the United States carried its open door policy of free trade and liberal democracy to areas previously closed to its influence through enlarging the NATO alliance. Even when Russia was weak and decrepit the United States was considering a hypothetical Russian resurgence and revival of its expansionist policies. Such a theoretical threat would be neutralized through expanding membership to former Soviet satellites and even former Soviet republics. Russia, on the other hand, after recovering to a certain extent from the political and economic turmoil of the 1990s, returned to its Soviet
expansionist inclinations in the near-abroad. It officially announced that the FSU space was and should remain a Russian sphere of privileged interests.

The Missile Defense system elucidates how Russia and the United States are entering an era of a new arms race because of uncalculated steps. America’s quest for invulnerability towards missile attacks has led to the abrogation of a key arms control treaty (ABM Treaty) and to serious repercussions on Europe’s security. Russia, on its turn, has expressed its opposition through threatening rhetoric and warnings that it will withdraw from key treaties like the INF and the CFE. The new Cold War is real and the old Cold War did not end. It has been continued in the latter’s aftermath and the Russian-Georgian War has become its culminating if not a turning point that will change the American-Russian relations in the coming decades.
Chapter One

Historical Background: Overview of U.S.-Russian Relations during the Cold War and its Aftermath

During the 20th century the United States witnessed many conflicts. One of the most imminent was the long American-Soviet struggle known as the Cold War. This period was marked by mutual rivalry and mistrust that plagued the relations between the two superpowers. Contention started in Europe but later spread all over the world.

For Arthur Schlesinger Jr., the Cold War was “a presumably mortal antagonism, arising in the wake of the Second World War, between two rigidly hostile blocs, one led by the Soviet Union, the other by the United States. This animosity dominated the political relations of the antagonists and in some cases escalated to blowing up the planet” (1). The struggle was complex and multifaceted. It was “the divergent aspirations, needs, histories, governing institutions, and ideologies of the United States and the Soviet Union that turned unavoidable tensions into the epic four-decade confrontation that we call the Cold War” (R. McMahon 5).

The origins of this enduring conflict go back to the aftermath of the Second World War (1939-1945). Although the United States and the Soviet Union were allies against the Axis powers, this alliance started to crumble in the aftermath of the war. The rift emerged when the victorious Allies started discussing the future of world order after the end of the war, mainly in Eastern Europe. The disagreement was between America’s idealist and universalist foreign policy views known as Wilsonianism[^1] which advocated self-determination, spread of democracy and the capitalist system, and more importantly anti-isolationism; that is, an active role that entailed America’s intervention whenever and wherever needs arose to keep peace and spread freedom. The Soviets on the other hand embraced a different realist view based on the concept of sphere of influence[^2]. The former holds that the national security of the world’s
nations would be assured by an international organization and the latter holds that each of the
great powers would be assured by its counterparts the right of predominance in the area it
considers of special interest (Schlesinger 26).

The Russians were staunch believers in the sphere of influence view. They were
obsessed with the idea of securing their western border that brought them many invaders, the
last of which was the Nazi invasion that cost Russia twenty million of its people (Hoffman
and Fleron 235). Russia was very keen on enlarging and securing its eastern sphere of
influence. This concept was a cornerstone in its foreign policy aims. The Soviets were
expecting consent from their American counterparts because they were not objecting to
America’s privileged role in Latin America. George Kennan clarified the Soviet opinion about
its neighbors:

As far as border states are concerned the Soviet government has never ceased to
think in terms of spheres of interests. They expect us to support them in whatever
action they wish to take in those regions, regardless of whether or not that action
seems to us or to the rest of the world to be right or wrong…and they would be
equally prepared to reserve moral judgment on any actions which we might wish
to carry out, i.e., in the Caribbean area. (qtd. in Divine, *Causes and Consequences
of World War II* 360)

The Cold War, as a historical event, is revised by generations of historians who try to analyze
America’s and Russia’s commitment to the war. The views are divided between those who
attribute the war guilt to either the United States or the Soviet Union. The two most prominent
schools of Cold War historiography are the traditionalist and the revisionist.

The traditionalist and revisionist schools are considered the most significant in the field
of Cold War historiography. The former endorses the viewpoint held by the American
government which claimed that Soviet actions in Eastern Europe were immoral and
unjustifiable, consequently, placing the Cold War guilt on the Soviet Union. The result was that the United States was forced to respond to communist expansion, aggression and usurpation of freedom from the East Europeans. America’s aim was to stop the Soviet aggression and quest for world domination. Therefore, the containment strategy and the Marshall Plan were devised to prevent the communists from “absorbing all of Europe and the rest of the world” (Hoffman and Fleron 266).

This stance was criticized as being too idealistic and led America to entangle itself in a moral crusade to “protect democracy” from the threat of dictatorship. The Soviet presence in Eastern Europe was first a result of Russia’s victory over Nazi forces. But later, Stalin gradually made it clear for the West that his long term objective would be to establish pro-Soviet governments along Russia’s western periphery. Norman Graebner concludes “the Kremlin gave the United States and Britain the ultimate choice of recognizing Soviet political and strategic interests in Eastern Europe or accepting the postwar disintegration of the Grand Alliance as the price of clinging to their principles of self-determination” (124). Eventually, the Americans clearly refused to recognize the Soviet sphere of influence at the Potsdam Conference of July-August 1945.

By the sixties, there emerged a group of scholars who rejected the views of the orthodox school. William Appleman Williams, one of the significant revisionists, admitted that at the end of the Second World War the United States deliberately quitted the wartime collaboration with the Soviet Union and was seeking to expel any Russian influence in Eastern Europe with the intention of establishing democratic capitalist systems instead. Williams undermined the view that America was forced to follow its Cold War diplomacy because of Russia’s aggression. For Williams the United States “cannot with any real warrant or meaning claim that it has been forced to follow a certain approach policy”. It was pursuing its “open door” policy of political, commercial and cultural expansion with a long term goal of extending
America’s influence to every corner of the world (112). Williams acknowledged that the Soviet Union’s pursuit of friendly states on its periphery was legitimate because it had security concerns and their offensive policy in Eastern Europe was one of weakness, not offensive strength.

The United States, the revisionists argued, used its postwar financial and economic strength to extend its reach for overseas markets and investment opportunities to areas considered by the Soviet Union as its sphere of influence. America’s objectives of expanding its open door principles of trade and investment placed it at odds with the communist Soviet Union and its exclusive sphere of influence diplomacy (Graebner 129). The greatest concern of America’s statesmen was to assure economic prosperity of their country. Dean Acheson, Under Secretary of State once emphasized, “We cannot have full employment and prosperity in the United States without the foreign markets” (qtd. in Jorgensen). President Truman summed up the path that would lead to such a result. In April 1945 he announced that the United States should “take the lead in running the world in the way that the world ought to be run” (qtd. in Kegley and Blanton 104). The United States, accordingly, had a pre-determined policy of running the world in a way that would benefit its interests and in the way that America wanted it to be run.

This anti-communist move, as it was perceived as such by the Soviet Union, left Moscow with no choice but to take defensive measures, through the use of force, to establish friendly, similar regimes on its borders to stop the American capitalist penetration into the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Critics mentioned America’s double standard policy, as American passion for universalism was overlooked when it would be applied in its backyard, that is, Latin America. Conversely, universalism was strongly advocated as the guiding principle for the post-war settlement in Eastern Europe. Skeptics doubted that universalism
was just a pretext which America was using to pursue its interests of opening the whole war-torn Europe as market for American products and investments.

Pragmatists in the American government who recognized Russia’s sphere of influence view were not welcomed. This was the case of Henry A. Wallace, Secretary of Commerce, who legitimized the Soviet Union’s quest for a sphere of influence. In September 1946 Wallace announced:

> On our part, we should recognize that we have no more business in the political affairs of Eastern Europe than Russia has in the political affairs of Latin America, Western Europe, and the United States…Whether we like it or not, the Russians will try to socialize their sphere of influence just as we try to democratize our sphere of influence. (“The Way to Peace”)

Wallace was dismissed by President Harry Truman after this speech. The United States, at the official level, did not want to recognize any sphere of influence to the Soviet Union.

In the aftermath of the WWII, Soviet expansionism over Eastern Europe started. Stalin aimed at establishing communist regimes in neighboring countries. Poland particularly was an obsession for the Russians because it was the corridor from where they were continually attacked throughout history. It was a Russian priority, consequently, that this corridor should be closed. Stalin noted that neither the British nor the Americans had experienced the German invasions that Russia had endured and which were not “easily forgotten”. Poland, Stalin argued, had served “as a corridor for the German attacks on Russia…It is therefore in Russia’s vital interest that Poland should be both strong and friendly” (qtd. in H. Jones 227-228). The Polish government’s political future became a priority for the Soviet Union.

By the end of the war, the Red Army managed to roll back the Nazis further west to Poland’s western borders. Then the Soviets obliged the Polish government to accept the Curzon line as Poland’s new eastern border, that is, it would have had to accept the loss of
half of Poland’s prewar territory. The Polish leaders, exiled in London, refused the Soviets’ demands. This refusal led Stalin to view the London Poles as hostile and the government as unfriendly.

In the Yalta Conference Franklin Roosevelt, Winston Churchill and Joseph Stalin agreed that the Provisional Government functioning in Poland should “be reorganized on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad” (“Protocol of Proceedings of Crimea…”). At the summit, Stalin reiterated his country’s concern over Poland. “Throughout history, Poland has always been a corridor for attack on Russia...It is not only a question of honor but of life and death for the Soviet State” (“The Yalta Story: Poland”). Stalin’s greatest concern was to establish a pro-communist government in Poland. In the 1947 elections, the Polish communist party won the elections. They were denounced by the Americans and the British as rigged. Poland came under the tight grip of the Soviet Union eventually (“The Yalta Story: Poland”). The Soviet pledge to form a Polish “national unity” government in which all the parties (communist and non-communist) would be represented was evaded.

The Americans, from both realist and idealist approaches opposed Russia’s sphere of influence ambitions in Eastern Europe. They were determined that the U.S. should play a key role in the postwar future of all nations, Eastern Europe being no exception. For them, the sphere of influence view, staunchly held by Russia, was inherently unstable. If it were applied, each power would be tempted to alter the balance of power in its favor. Joyce and Gabriel Kolko asserted that the United States’ aim was “to reconstitute the world so that American business could trade, operate and profit without restriction everywhere” (6). America’s objective to establish a low tariff, freely trading world would evaporate if the Soviet Union insisted on establishing its domination over Eastern Europe. More critical for the West was Russia’s long term ambitions. Would Eastern Europe be enough for it, or would
the Russians look forward to attain the control over all the area that lies between the Pacific and the Atlantic?

The war collaboration that tied Russia with the West was coming to an end after the German surrender. The Cold War became inevitable as both the United States and the Soviet Union were mutually skeptical about the other’s intentions and ambitions in Eastern Europe. Schlesinger illustrates:

It was a product not of a decision but of a dilemma. Each side felt compelled to adopt policies which the other could not but regard as a threat to the principles of the peace. Each then felt compelled to undertake defensive measures. Thus the Russians saw no choice but to consolidate their security in Eastern Europe. The Americans, regarding Eastern Europe as the first step toward Western Europe, responded by asserting their interest in the zone the Russians deemed vital to their security. (“Origins of the Cold War” 45)

Neither side was considering a reversal of its policy objectives or giving up their long term goals in Central and Eastern Europe. Confrontation was inevitable.

Ideology played an outstanding role in developing the rift between the United States and the Soviet Union. A state which cherished democracy and freedom would surely come at odds with a totalitarian one that perceived opposition as treason. Vladimir Lenin, Head of the Soviet Union, admitted that it was impossible for the two systems to coexist because the other was perceived as a threat, and threat implied a sense of enmity. “As long as capitalism and socialism exist, we cannot live in peace: in the end, one or the other will triumph - a funeral dirge will be sung either over the Soviet Republic or over world capitalism” (qtd. in Steinberg 161). The West perceived the communist Manifesto of 1848 as a clear threat to its economic and political existence as the latter preached for the global overthrow of the bourgeoisie to lay
the foundations for the domination of the proletariat (Emsley 318). Countering communism became a priority for the United States.

The realpolitik historians of the Cold War such as Louis Hallé, Norman Graebner, and Hans J. Morgenthau prefer to downgrade the role of ideology in shaping American and Soviet policies during the Cold War. For them, ideology is only a means used to legitimize and justify their policies. It was just an “additional weapon” and a “propaganda tool” vigorously used to make their people supportive to their country’s policies and at the same time to undermine the rival’s appeal (Dockrill and Hopkins 5). Ideology was set aside as the Cold War represented a traditional conflict of interests between two great powers. According to the realists, Cold War conflicts were of interest, not of ideology.

Post-Vietnam War revisionists, mainly John Lewis Gaddis, had melded the traditionalist and the revisionist views and reached a post-revisionist synthesis which attributed the war guilt equally to both the United States and the Soviet Union. According to Gaddis, the Cold War arose because of the mutual misunderstandings and misperceptions of the United States and the Soviet Union of each other’s policies. Miscalculations of the threat led to defensive over-reaction by both of them. This had eventually led to a redefinition of international relations and the rise of bipolarity by which the world was divided into two hostile political and military blocs.

George F. Kennan was the architect of the strategy that would guide American foreign policy toward the Soviet Union for the next four decades. His 1946 *Long Telegram* reshaped America’s foreign policy towards the Soviet Union. Stalin’s communist ideology irrevocably perceived the capitalist West as hostile, Kennan noted, and the USSR “still lives in antagonistic ‘capitalist encirclement’ with which in the long run there can be no permanent peaceful coexistence” (1). As a consequence the friction between the United States and the
Soviet Union was not the result of misunderstanding, faulty communications or miscalculations but was inherent in the Soviet perception of the outside world.

The Kremlin perceived the outside world as hostile, a conception that resulted in a perpetuate sense of insecurity. Russian rulers, according to Kennan, feared the West because the latter was economically more advanced and more powerful and socially highly organized. For this reason they feared “foreign penetration, feared direct contact between Western world and their own”. They learned to seek security “only in patient but deadly struggle for total destruction of rival power, never in compacts and compromises with it” (Kennan 5-6). The United States, Kennan asserted, had to prepare itself for a long struggle with the Soviet Union whenever Soviet maneuvers ascended especially in areas of vital interest to the United States.

In his famous X article Kennan envisioned the policy that the United States should pursue in dealing with the Soviet Union. “It is clear that the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.” Soviet expansionism and hostility towards western free institutions, according to Kennan, could be contained by “the adroit and vigilant application of counter-force at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet policy” (X 575-576). His advice was that nothing should be expected from negotiations with the USSR but the United States should remain confident and healthy. Kennan wrote that the United States:

Must continue to regard the Soviet Union as a rival, not a partner, in the political arena. It must continue to expect that Soviet policies will reflect no abstract love of peace and stability, no real faith in the possibility of a permanent happy coexistence of the Socialist and capitalist worlds, but rather a cautious, persistent pressure toward the disruption and weakening of all rival influence and rival power. (X 580-581)
Kennan urged the United States to take the lead in organizing the Western world in facing the communist threat as no improvements in the American-Soviet relations were expected unless a “new set” of Soviet leaders would come into the Kremlin. These new leaders, according to Truman’s advisor Clark Clifford, “would work out with us a fair and equitable settlement when they realize that we are too strong to be beaten and too determined to be frightened” (qtd. in Gaddis 21). The United States should show firmness in opposing the Soviet expansion especially to further areas.

As a result the United States, through Kennan’s “X article” got the strategic framework that would guide its political as well as military policies towards the Soviet Union. It would “serve as the bible of the containment policy” (Kissinger 120). Kennan foresaw the demise of the Soviet Union and the eventual transformation of the system. The interpretation of his strategy, however, entangled his country in opposing the communist threat at every time and in every place for the indefinite future. The United States was to commit itself to preserve the status quo globally.

Practically, under the Truman administration, containment was carried through two complementary policies which were economic as well as military. The economic policy was carried through the Marshall Plan to bring political stability through ending economic hardship in Europe. For Secretary of State George Marshall, America’s aid was needed because Europe was unable to recover by its own. “Europe’s requirements are so much greater than her present ability to pay that she must have substantial additional help or face economic, social, and political deterioration of a very grave character” (“Marshall Announces His Plan”). The United States feared that the poverty and unemployment of the postwar period would be seized by the communists to reinforce their appeal in Western Europe.

The cash grants were meant to aid war-torn European countries in returning to normal economic health and thus, bring back stability and peace. This American aid, however, was
not done just out of sympathy and concern for Europe’s future. “Increasing prosperity in the U.S. was one goal of the Marshall Plan. As a way of boosting exports, the plan had wide appeal to American business people, bankers, workers, and farmers” (“Benefits for the U.S. Economy”). The plan represented a great outlet for America’s products.

Economic aid was offered to the Soviet Union as its economy was nearly ruined after the war. But Josef Stalin refused the West’s offer. The Marshall Plan was incompatible with Stalin’s economic, political and foreign policy goals because it would lead to establishing an integrated European market with considerable freedom of movement of goods, services, information, and people. The plan was meant to create a united Western European market based on elimination of customs barriers and tariffs (“A Communist Critique of the Marshall Plan”). Vyacheslav M. Molotov, the Soviet Foreign Minister announced that his government “rejects this plan as totally unsatisfactory” (“Soviet Opposition to the Marshall Plan”). Michel Pablo, a Marxist writer explained the Soviet bureaucracy’s opposition to the Marshall Plan as stemming from the latter’s “economic, political and military implications, which go counter to its own international policy, to its interests in the ‘buffer-zone,’ to the security of the USSR itself” (“The Marshall Plan-II…”). The Soviet satellites were prevented from participating in the plan which was denounced as strengthening the hold of U.S. capitalism on Western Europe (Duignan and Gann). Only Western Europe benefited from the Marshall Plan.

The military side of the strategy was carried through the creation of alliances with Western European and Asian countries. Alliances were meant to form a “protective shield against Soviet and Chinese Communist expansion in Europe and Asia” (“Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance”). The NATO alliance was established to protect America and its Western European allies from any aggression by the Soviets. It was created on April 4, 1949. The members were the United States, Great Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Italy, Portugal, Denmark, Iceland, Norway and Canada. The principal provision
in the treaty was Article Five\textsuperscript{7} of its charter (“NATO Created”). The head of NATO’s military operations was the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, a position always held by an American so their troops never came under foreign command (Wilde). The United States was the NATO’s creator and enjoyed, without doubt, a leadership role. The alliance brought together the West European countries and the United States in fighting the Soviet threat in Europe.

NATO’s greatest achievement was the denationalization of Europe’s defense policies. Ever since 1949, the nations of Europe, “which in the past had always been at each other’s throats, no longer had to worry about, let alone arm against, one another” (Joffe). This was achieved through the military integration of the member states: a common command, control and communication structure, common maneuvers and equipment, and even a common language; English.

Lord Ismay, NATO’s first Secretary General, summed up the purpose of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in one short sentence: To keep America in, to keep Russia out and to keep Germany down (Herzog). Keeping the Americans in Europe became definite as the United States sealed its presence in Europe and its vital role in Europe’s security architecture. As far as Russia was concerned, the United States represented Europe’s irreplaceable indemnity against a resurgent Russia. All Europeans wanted to keep the U.S. in as a counterweight to the Russian bear. As for Germany, The United States wanted to balance power in Europe not only on the outside, but also on the inside. It acted as twin counterweight. With its enormous power it reassured Europe against the Soviet Union and also against a rising Germany.

The United States founded other alliances and regional pacts to encircle the Soviet Union. These include the Australia, New Zealand and United States Treaty (ANZUS in1951) and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO in 1954) which included the United
States, France, Great Britain, New Zealand, Australia, the Philippines, Thailand and Pakistan. The ANZUS pact did not commit the U.S. to intervening in the event of an attack on Australia or New Zealand. It only committed it to consultation whenever the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties was threatened in the Pacific. The SEATO, however, was created specifically to combat the threat of spreading communism in South-East Asia. Article VI of the treaty bound each member to come to the others’ aid in the event of external aggression (“The ANZUS Treaty and the SEATO Alliance”).

The Pact of Rio bound the United States with twenty Latin American countries in 1947. This regional security pact incorporated the principle that an attack against one was to be considered an attack against all and the signatories would decide by a two-thirds majority what kind of collective action might be taken against aggression (“Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal…”). A defense treaty was also signed with Japan in 1951 by which the United States maintained its armed air and sea forces in and about Japan “to deter armed attack upon Japan” (“Security Treaty between the United…”). It became obvious that American commitment to face the communist tide was becoming global.

This system of alliance building had intensified the division of Europe as the Soviet Union followed the same path with its satellites to counterweight the most imminent of all the alliances: NATO. By 1955 it established the Pact of Mutual Assistance and Unified Command better known as the Warsaw Pact. It was a military alliance of mutual defense with its Eastern and Central European satellites. It included the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic (East Germany), Hungary, Poland, and Romania. This Eastern alliance declared that the Warsaw Pact’s function was collective self-defense of the member states against external aggression. Article 4, just as NATO’s Article V, declared joint action in case of aggression on any of the signatories (“The Warsaw Pact, 1955”). The Warsaw Pact gave the Soviet Union an equal status with the United States
making it the leader of the other pole. The Soviet Union became the head of an alliance of independent nations uniting against any probable aggression from the West.

On March 12, 1947 Truman announced to Congress what would later become the Truman Doctrine ("Truman Doctrine"). He asserted America’s commitment to support free people who were resisting “subjugation” by “outside pressures” through “economic and financial aid which is essential to economic stability and orderly political processes” ("Aid to Greece and Turkey…"). The policy of containment proved to be long, global and costly. Successive American presidents were highly committed to it. The first trial of the policy was in Greece and Turkey.

A guerrilla war was sparked in Greece where the Greek Communist Party, helped by Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, struggled to take hold of the government ("Greek Civil War"). Britain played a major role in helping Greece economically as well as militarily since the end of the war to stop any Soviet territorial ambitions toward the Mediterranean (Cooper and Tselepidis). By 1947, the Attlee government announced to the Truman administration that it was no more able to do the task ("Harry Truman and the Truman Doctrine"). Fearing armed subjugation by the communists, the Greek government requested urgent aid from the United States (Cooper and Tselepidis). Truman was very keen and zealous to take on Britain’s role.

Dean Acheson, Assistant Secretary of State, took charge of persuading the Republican controlled Congress of the importance to support Greece and Turkey. He advocated America’s support to Greek and Turkey as a struggle between democracy and dictatorship and urged the United States to “take steps to strengthen countries threatened with Soviet aggression or communist subversion”. Through this policy, Acheson argued, America would not be protecting its security but it was “to protect freedom itself” (qtd. in Zinn 44). Congress, consequently, ratified a $ 400 million bill in aid to Greece and Turkey ("Greek Civil War").
Right after the approval of the Truman Doctrine military and economic aid started pouring into Greece and Turkey.

The settlement of Germany soon became a very contentious issue. After the Potsdam Conference (December 1945), Germany was divided into four military zones, the United States, Britain, France and the Soviet Union each holding an occupation zone (“Germany and Berlin at the End…”). The objective was to prevent its reemergence as a military power and represent a threat to its neighbors. But it became obvious that a joint settlement of the German issue was both crucial and tough. Daniel Yergin, an American author and economic researcher, clarifies:

Two great unknowns confronted the United States and the USSR, and the resolution of either could have decisively shifted the balance of power between them. One was Germany; the other, nuclear weapons. Neither the Soviet Union nor the United States could willingly run the risk that the other would carry the day in either area. (Shattered Peace: The Origins 240)

The only solution seemed that “each would have its own Germany, and each, its own atomic arsenal. In that way a kind of stability would be introduced into their relationship” (Yergin 240). The division of Germany became an unavoidable outcome.

The United States and the Soviet Union had different views about the future of Germany. But essentially both of them sought a Germany in which it would have the upper hand. Different military and economic perceptions for the future of Germany led to a stalemate. Concerning the security problem, Germany did not present an equal threat to the United States and the Soviet Union. The Soviet situation was different. “The threat posed by Germany was significantly greater, and the opportunities for direct action to limit that threat over the long run were also greater” (Wagner 173). The United States enjoyed more security because of its
distance from Europe and its protection was enhanced in the aftermath of WWII because of the atomic bomb.

The United States envisioned the establishment of an economically strong Germany in which the American corporations would thrive and consequently many other countries would find themselves economically dependent. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, sought a militarily weak Germany and was interested in Germany’s economic resources that could be exploited to revive the war-torn Soviet economy. The deadlock started when the Soviets asked for $10 billion as reparations from Germany (“Reparations - Complications of Cold…”). The United States insisted on the signing of the four-power treaty and its principles to govern a future unified Germany as a precondition to any agreements. Tension arose when the Americans threatened if “such common policies proved impossible, then the Western zones of Germany would be organized independently of the Russians” (Wagner 182).

The three Western zones of Berlin lied within the Soviet occupation zone of Germany. On July 1948, the Soviet Union decided to cut off all road and rail traffic between West Berlin and the Western zones. The Berlin Blockade was a reaction to the Western countries’ decision to introduce a new German currency as the first step towards restoring the German economy (“The Berlin Blockade and Airlift”). The blockade (from June 24, 1948 to May 12, 1949) was a kind of pressure to persuade the West to abandon the plan. General Lucius D. Clay, the military governor of the American zone, told the Pentagon, “If we mean that we are to hold Europe against communism, we must not budge. If we withdraw, our position in Europe is threatened. If America does not understand this now, then communism will run rampant” (qtd. in Eisenberg 394). Resolved to supply the Berliners with fuel and food requirements the Western countries (mainly Britain and the United States) started an airlift to Berlin (“Berlin Airlift”). Military planes were used to fly coal, food, and medicine to the city.
For almost a year, they provided almost 2.5 million tons of supplies on about 280,000 flights (“Cold War”).

The division of Germany into two hostile camps became more apparent after each side started to revive the German political parties in their respective zones, pro-communist in the East and pro-Western in the West. The three Western occupation zones became the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), and the Soviet zone became the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) (Solsten 73-74). In 1961 the Berlin Wall was erected. East German Politburo wanted to stop people leaving for West Germany (Solsten 104). This “Iron Curtain” concretely marked the hard division between the East and West and sealed the two parts of the country.

The Cold War was to develop further after the Soviets would break America’s nuclear monopoly. In 1949 they managed to explode their A-bomb (Hanhimaki and Westad 445). A new level of rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union was at its utmost in the nuclear weapons field. Truman urged that the United States should maintain nuclear supremacy over the Soviet Union. He urgently ordered the development of the H-bomb which was more destructive than its predecessor. On November 1, 1952, the United States detonated a 10.4-megaton hydrogen device in the Pacific in the Marshall Islands (“The Mike Test”). The Soviet Union followed suit by exploding its H-bomb on November 22, 1955 (“The Soviet Response”). Consequently, a dangerous arms race was starting.

Matters worsened for the United States after China became communist. The Soviets had just won a precious ally. Richard Powers comments “The most dramatic failure of containment - if by failure we mean the inability to preclude the expansion of adjectively unmodified communism - was, of course, Mao Zedong’s revolutionary success in China” (855). Under Mao’s leadership, the communists seized power from Chiang Kai-Shek, the leader of the nationalists, after a bloody civil war in October 1949 (“Chinese Civil War”). In
1950 the Republic of China and the Soviet Union signed the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance (“Conclusion of the Sino-Soviet Treaty…”). It seemed that communism was on the march. The United States played a great role in supporting the nationalists through massive economic loans. It did not recognize the new regime and chose to support the exiled nationalist regime that flew to Formosa, now Taiwan ("Chinese Civil War").

The East-West confrontation would become ‘hot’ by 1950. The Far East was its playground, however. The Korean War started when communist North Korea aggressively attacked South Korea in an attempt to unite the divided peninsula that was once one country. This act highly alarmed the United States that perceived it as a communist aggression that could have started a “third world war” especially after China joined the war. Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson argued before Congress that this aggression represented:

An undeniable proof that the forces of international communism possess not only the willingness, but also the intention, of attacking and invading any free nation within their reach at any time that they think they can get away with it. The real significance of the North Korean aggression lies in this evidence that, even at the resultant risk of starting a third world war, communism is willing to resort to armed aggression, whenever it believes it can win. (qtd. in Jervis 579)

The Korean War resulted in the rise of the military budget. The United States tripled its defense budget in order to be prepared to confront the Soviet challenge wherever it might appear (Dijk et. al 520). NATO was militarized after it was just a “paper organization” committing the Western powers against the Soviet threat (Jervis 580). NATO members were considering the rearmament of Germany. Therefore, the Korean War showed how containment developed into a “rollback” strategy. Communists who attacked others ran the risk of being attacked themselves. Each of the two superpowers supported the conflicting
sides in Korea. North Korea got the aid from the Soviet Union and China, and South Korea was helped by the Western powers headed by the highly committed United States.

After the North Korean aggression over South Korea, Truman appealed to the United Nations Security Council for a reaction. He obtained an affirmation of collective security reaction to the North Korean aggression (Dijk et. al 520). The United States was the largest contributor to the war effort. On June 26, 1950, Truman ordered the use of American planes and naval vessels against North Korean forces, and on June 30 U.S. ground troops were dispatched ("Korean War"). On July 27, 1953 an armistice was reached between the U.S.-led United Nations Command and North Korea. The document was signed by U.S. Lieutenant General William K. Harrison and his counterpart from the North’s army, General Nam Il ("The Korean War Armistice"). The 38th parallel, the dividing line between North and South Korea, was restored.

For Stephen Ambrose, the Korean War was an occasion through which the NSC-68 was "sold" and America’s military commitments in Asia Pacific justified. He emphasized that the North Korean aggression provided a strong reason for maintaining American forces overseas but more importantly it justified the decision of military buildup to face the rising Soviet threat. The Truman administration had a crisis to sell the NSC-68. But a series of crises brought a perfect opportunity to enact the policy. Ambrose illustrates:

Chiang could not hold on in Formosa nor Rhee in South Korea without an American commitment; the U.S. Air Force and Navy needed a justification to retain their bases in Japan; the Democrats had to prove to the McCarthyites that they could stand up to the communists in Asia as well as in Europe. The needs were met on 25 June 1950.

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The NSC-68 recommendations had stimulated the United States to take vigorous action to oppose the Soviet expansionist ambitions. The Soviet efforts were directed toward the
“domination of the Eurasian land mass” hence the United States, as the principal center of power in the non-Soviet world and the country that most opposed Soviet expansionism, had become “the principal enemy” (“The Soviet Threat According to NSC”).

The Hungarian anti-communist rebellion, led by Imre Nagy, showed the Soviets’ readiness to end even by military intervention any anticommunist moves within its “sphere of influence” in Central and Eastern Europe. In 1956, Nagy formed a new government consisting of both communists and noncommunists, abolished the one-party system, and promised free elections (Burant). He withdrew Hungary from the Warsaw Pact and ended its alliance with the Soviet Union. The Soviets reacted by sending 200,000 troops that crushed the Hungarian Revolution and brought “Hungary back within limits tolerable to the Soviet Union” (Curtis, “The Warsaw Pact”). Janos Kadar, a pro-Soviet, was placed as the new Prime Minister. Nagy’s refusal to step down from his post in favor of Kadar after the successful Soviet military intervention led to his condemnation as a traitor and execution on June 16, 1958 (Benziger). For Moscow, the military intervention was aimed at crushing the forces of reactionary conspiracy against the Hungarian people (“Soviet Troops Overrun Hungary”).

President Dwight Eisenhower did not consider any military intervention in Hungary. He recognized that Hungary was under the Soviet sphere of influence. He only managed to pass UN resolutions to order the Soviet troops withdrawal from Hungary as he understood that any American military intervention in the conflict would lead to a “global war.” Malcolm Byrne, Research Director of the National Security Archive in Washington D.C. argued that Eisenhower did not have so many options to change the course of action in Hungary:

There is little doubt that he was deeply upset by the crushing of the revolt, and he was not deaf to public pressure or the emotional lobbying of activists within his own administration. But he had also determined…that there was little the
United States could do short of risking global war to help the rebels. And he was not prepared to go that far. ("The 1956 Hungarian Revolution…")

America’s military buildup continued under the Eisenhower Administration’s “New look”\(^{10}\) policy. According to this policy, America’s defense should be based on increasing the deterrent effect of the nuclear arsenal (hydrogen and atomic bombs) that would enable a reduction in the conventional forces and expenses which would lead to a healthier economy.

For Secretary of State John F. Dulles:

> The free nations should not attempt to match the Soviet bloc man for man and gun for gun. The best way to deter aggression is to make the aggressor know in advance that he will suffer damage out-weighing what he can hope to gain…To apply this deterrent principle the free world must maintain and be prepared to use effective means to make aggression too costly to be tempting. (qtd in Platig 122-123)

The American nuclear weapons became a means to dissuade the Soviet enemy from taking unwise steps and ultimately risk annihilation.

The Kennedy Administration faced a crisis that brought nuclear danger to America’s “backyard.” Cuba was the spot of the standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union that put the world on the verge of a nuclear war. On October 14, 1962 American reconnaissance planes detected the presence of a launching pad and medium range ballistic missiles on the Cuban soil (Knightley and Pringle). The Soviet move was intended to be used in future negotiations with the United States to extract complete withdrawal of Western forces from Berlin. It was a reaction to the American placement of Medium Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBM)s in Turkey and in Italy. The Soviets were interested in protecting communist Cuba against any further American invasions especially after the failed Bay of Pigs Invasion in April 1961. The latter was a covert operation by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and
Cuban refugees in the United States that sought to overthrow President Fidel Castro (“The Cuban Missile Crisis”). The goal of overthrowing Castro and establishing a non-communist government friendly to the United States ultimately failed.

The act was intolerably perceived by the United States as a Soviet intrusion in its “backyard.” From James Monroe’s era on, Latin America became a kind of an American protectorate under the influence of the United States. Kennedy was in a dilemma because he was obliged to choose the best way to solve the crisis. Different views were suggested for him. One hawkish view was to start an air strike on the missile sites in Cuba, or even an invasion of the island. A second option which seemed more dovish preferred a naval quarantine on the island and to negotiate with the Soviets America’s removal of its missiles in Turkey for Soviet missiles dismantling in Cuba (Blight et. al 174). Kennedy warned that any attack by the Soviets on the United States or any country of the Western Hemisphere would lead to a retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union:

This sudden, clandestine decision to station strategic weapons for the first time outside of Soviet soil is a deliberately provocative and unjustified change in the status quo which cannot be accepted by this country…The purpose of these bases can be none other than to provide a nuclear strike capability against the Western Hemisphere. (“The World on the Brink…”)

Kennedy called the United Nations to supervise over the “dismantling and withdrawal of all offensive weapons in Cuba” (“The World on the Brink”). His speech included a message sent to the “captive people of Cuba” stating that their current leaders are “no longer Cuban leaders inspired by Cuban ideals. They are puppets and agents of an international conspiracy which has turned Cuba against your friends and neighbors in the Americas” (“Cuban Missile Crisis Address…”). Kennedy did not believe that Soviet missiles in Cuba were purely defensive and did not represent a threat to the United States.
Cuba was placed under a naval quarantine. The Soviet vessels were to be searched and those carrying any missiles were to be turned back (“The World on the Brink”). American negotiators insisted on the quick withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba. By October 27, Khrushchev agreed to dismantle the missile sites in Cuba and to withdraw all the missiles back to the Soviet Union in return for an end to the blockade, and a promise not to invade the island (Hershberg). In an additional secret understanding, the United States agreed to eventually remove the Jupiter missiles from Turkey (“The World on the Brink…”). The Cuban missile crisis was the most serious U.S.-Soviet confrontation of the Cold War.

The crisis, however, brought a major change in American-Soviet relations. To prevent misunderstanding and miscalculations in case of crisis, a ‘hotline’ was established between White House and the Kremlin in June 1963 (“U.S. - Soviet Hot Line Set up”). This was meant to substitute the use of written communiqués and television and radio speeches as means of negotiations (“The Cuban Missile Crisis Briefing Room”). In addition to the hotline, the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT)\(^\text{11}\). The treaty’s goal was meant to “put an end to the armaments race and eliminate the incentive to the production and testing of all kinds of weapons, including nuclear weapons” (“Treaty Banning Nuclear…”). But the treaty did not prohibit underground nuclear explosions and test of nuclear weapons, thus, giving a legal space for both superpowers and other powers to carry out their tests to acquire nuclear weapons.

By 1964 two new leaders entered the White House and the Kremlin respectively, Lyndon B. Johnson and Leonid Brezhnev. Like Truman, Johnson’s containment was in Southeast Asia. This time containment entangled the United States in Indochina. America’s challenge under Johnson was to be in Vietnam. Johnson strongly believed in the “domino theory”\(^\text{12}\). The United States had deliberately entangled itself in Vietnam. The French defeat at Dien Bien Phu culminated in the signing of the Geneva Peace Accords between France and
Vietnam in 1954. These accords traced the way to a unified Vietnam as the country was divided at the 17th Parallel ("The Geneva Peace Accords"). The 1956 elections were to be held under international supervision and the hope was that a democratic government for all of Vietnam would be established.

When the United States found out that Ho Chi Minh, the Communist revolutionary, was the most probable winner, the United States (under Eisenhower) devised a way to intrude into the area in an attempt to avoid the “disaster”. Although the United States had announced its support for the Geneva Accords, “Washington secretly planned to sabotage them amid reports that elections would sweep the Communist revolutionary hero, Ho Chi Minh, to a land-slide victory” (Cuddy 354). The United States used its leverage to create a southern anti-communist Vietnamese government under the leadership of Ngo Dinh Diem, a pro-Western leader (Brigham). The southern half of Vietnam came to be called the Republic of Vietnam and the SEATO treaty extended its defense commitments to the new republic ("The Geneva Peace Accords"). Vietnam, however, proved to be a very costly tangle.

The United States military intervention in the Vietnam War was initiated after a North Vietnamese torpedo boat bombed an American destroyer conducting a routine intelligence-gathering mission in the Gulf of Tonkin off the coast of North Vietnam. Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution which authorized a bombing campaign on North Vietnam. Congress supported “the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repeal any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent any further aggression” (“Tonkin Gulf Resolution”). The resolution gave President Lyndon Johnson the authority to conduct military operations against North Vietnam (Nastasi). American ground forces, consequently, were introduced into South Vietnam and air strikes became widely and extensively used against the North. Unexpectedly, the North Vietnamese
proved to be undefeatable and the war became very costly and popularly resented in the United States. Anti-war protests spread all over the country demanding an end to the war.

It became clear the war was unwinnable and proved to be leading to a total and humiliating defeat. By the spring of 1968 peace talks between the United States and North Vietnam started in Paris. On January 23, 1973 the Vietnam War came to an end (“The Vietnam War: An Overview”). American Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Hanoi’s principal negotiator Le Duc Tho agreed on a complete withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam (“Vietnam Online”). A ceasefire in the South would leave North and South Vietnamese forces in their existing positions in the South. Future elections were planned to determine the future of the country (“The Vietnam War and its Impact”). The Vietnam War ended in a humiliating defeat for the United States which had extremely committed itself financially and militarily to contain communist Northern Vietnam from expanding to the South. Heavy losses in lives and military equipment had resulted in no dividends. Once America was out, the northern communists invaded and seized the South. By 1975 Indochina was reunited into the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (“The Vietnam War (1945 -1975)”). In 1975 and after thirty years of conflict a united communist Vietnam became a reality.

It became a tendency in U.S.-Soviet relations that after every major crisis there followed a kind of thaw. In July 1968 they signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)\textsuperscript{13}. After two and a half years (1969-72) of negotiations and at the Moscow Summit of May 1972 Richard Nixon and Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev signed the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) (“President Nixon Arrives in Moscow”). The United States and the Soviet Union agreed to place limits and restraints on some of their central and most important armaments and to freeze for five years the number of their missiles; mainly ICBMS, SLBMs and long-range bombers.
They agreed to make efforts to reach an Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty (ABM). The treaty was signed at Moscow on May 26, 1972 and was of unlimited duration. It permitted each side to have one limited ABM system to protect its capital and another to protect an ICBM launch area. The aim was to prevent both of them from establishing a nationwide ABM defense. The treaty required the two sites defended to be at least 1,300 kilometers apart to prevent the creation of any effective regional defense zone or the beginnings of a nationwide system ("Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic...”). The ABM Treaty was a landmark agreement with the main purpose of constraining the parties from deploying nationwide defenses against strategic ballistic missiles. Each country left unchallenged the penetration capability of the other’s retaliatory missile forces.

In October 1972, the Soviet Union was given the status of “Most Favored Nation” by the United States (Woodward). MFN is a designation by the U.S. government that lowers tariffs and other restrictions on imports from that nation. This new conferred status enabled the Soviet Union to expand its economic relations with the United States. As a result, trade between them began to witness a rapid rise. Among the most prominent bilateral achievements was the Wheat Sales Agreement of July 1972. The Soviet Union bought U.S. grain worth $750 million over three years (D. Kennedy, Cohen and Bailey). America’s aim behind these agreements was political rather than economic.

During this period, the United States linked the economic and political aspects in an attempt to reach a long-term stable relationship with the Soviet Union. This policy became known as the concept of “linkage”. For Kissinger, “progress in one area adds momentum to progress in other areas”. Involving the Soviet Union in a “network of relationships with the West,” Kissinger reasoned, would render the Soviet Union “more conscious of what it would lose by a return to confrontation” (qtd. in White 168). The policy aimed at linking economy
and politics in American and Soviet relations in a way that made the latter conscious of the negative repercussions that would result from a return to conflict.

Détente also marked the American-Chinese relations during the 1970s. In 1971 China became a member of the United Nations. For the first time since 1949, Richard Nixon became the first American President to visit communist China in February 1972 (“The Nixon Visit”). The United States also recognized China’s claim to Formosa and by 1979 they established embassies in their respective capitals. The United States also ended its defense treaty with Formosa (“A Review of the Decades Long…”). These were important steps that formally normalized relations between the two countries. The political status of Taiwan was set aside because it was the fundamental question obstructing the normalization of relations between the two states and thus leaving space to the initiation of trade and other contacts.

But Détente was short-lived. In August 1974, U.S.-Soviet economic ties came under attack. Senator Henry Johnson argued that “U.S.-Soviet economic agreements should be tied to the Soviet performance on human rights” and the Soviet Union was prevented from having the Most Favored Nation Status (Dockrill and Hopkins 121). Soviet resumption of its aggressive expansionist moves led to the unraveling of Détente. Although James Carter’s policy started as a continuation of the Nixon-Ford Détente policy the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (December 1979) led him to go back to the containment policy to control further expansionist moves by the Soviet Union in southwest Asia (Garthoff 1077). Carter, as a result, initiated a tough policy toward the Soviet Union. First, he withdrew SALT II Treaty from senatorial consideration. He also enacted a partial grain embargo and boycotted the Moscow Olympics and extended the number of Soviet sites targeted by U.S. missiles (“Doctrines - The Carter Doctrine”). Under Carter Détente gave way to a more aggressive stance toward Moscow as it merely allowed the Soviets to continue their expansionist thrust under the cover of superpower cooperation.
Carter announced in his State of the Union Address of January 23, 1980 referring specifically to the Soviet invasion, that “an attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force” (“Doctrines - The Carter Doctrine”). Carter, conscious that the Middle East was the primary source of cheap oil for Western countries, stressed America’s obligations to defend by any means its vital interests in the area. He considered the probability that Russia’s ambitions, if not properly contained, would extend to this important area. The Carter Doctrine committed the United States militarily to the defense of the Persian Gulf oil.

The 1980 presidential elections brought a tougher president to the White House, Ronald Reagan. Both his political rhetoric and military strategies showed his determination to roll back the Soviet power and expansion. Reagan even dubbed the Soviet Union as the “evil empire” (“President Reagan’s Speech…”). In pursuit of “peace through strength” Reagan initiated a huge military buildup and committed the United States to support all anti-communist insurgencies all over the world.

He raised the military budget in order to establish America’s strategic superiority by increasing defense spending by 35 percent (“Ronald Reagan”). Reagan committed the United States to more defense spending by increasing it from $142 billion in 1980 to $222 billion in 1982 and the administration planned for the strategic modernization of U.S. forces. In Reagan’s view, “[t]he Soviet Union would either have to renounce the arms race or bankrupt itself into collapse in the vain effort to keep up” (qtd. in Walker 267). Reagan expanded America’s aid to freedom fighters who challenged communist domination in different spots of the world through covert assistance to a variety of movements including those in Angola, Ethiopia, Cambodia, and Central America (Maddux). The new strategy entailed American
moral and material support for insurgent movements attempting to oust Soviet-backed regimes in various Third World nations.

On March 23, 1983 Reagan announced his Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), better known as the Star Wars program. The aim of the project was to establish a space program that would enable the United States to destroy any incoming nuclear missiles from the Soviet Union towards the United States. If achievable, the Soviet deterrent system would crumble. The long term aim of Reagan’s defense strategy was the neutralization of the Soviet nuclear deterrence and rendering the United States invulnerable. Fareed Zakaria explained:

The Soviet Union feared that SDI would give the United States a survivable offensive capability and did not want to enter into a high-technology arms race (that it would lose) in response. This perception of a potential advantage for the United States explains in part Moscow’s readiness to negotiate and its unusually accommodating positions on a series of arms-control issues. (386)

In 1985 the Kremlin welcomed a new president. Mikhail Gorbachev who became the new General Secretary of the Soviet Union following the death of Konstantin Chernenko (“Gorbachev Becomes Soviet Leader”). The government was facing numerous problems among them a costly and failing war in Afghanistan and an economy heavily exhausted by the extremely expensive military spending on the arms race with the United States.

Gorbachev had brought the concept of New Thinking to Soviet foreign policy which entailed core propositions of his new vision about conducting foreign policy. Celeste Wallander, director and senior fellow of the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, recognized the main aspects of New Thinking. It disavowed the view that capitalist and socialist states “had intrinsically zero-sum interests and that the existence of one meant a fundamental threat to the security and well-being of the other”. It challenged the idea that “military parity was necessary for security”, and that “the
purpose of military policy must be to prevent conflict and war, rather than to prosecute it” ("Lost and Found: Gorbachev’s…” 118-119). The concept, therefore, developed a policy of non-confrontation and compromise.

Gorbachev’s policy had resulted in key decisions such as the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan; a decision taken after it had become clear that the Soviet Union was losing the war. Oles Smolansky, Professor at the Department of International Relations at the Lehigh University, Pennsylvania, comments “the Kremlin gradually recognized that the continuing war in Afghanistan had proved to be economically more costly than had been anticipated originally” (“Soviet Foreign Policy…”). The Soviet war on Afghanistan was failing due to foreign support from the United States, China, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, that rendered the Afghan Mujahedeen very difficult to crush. Because of the undesirable economic repercussions of the war on Soviet economy, Gorbachev decided to evacuate the Soviet troops from Afghanistan.

Gorbachev, unlike all his predecessors, was keen to concede in his negotiations. He wanted to relax tensions with the United States so that he would have more space to address the internal problems. Reagan and Gorbachev apparently had congenial relationship. In 1987, they reached a paramount agreement known as the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty\(^\text{16}\). The treaty was rapidly ratified by the Senate. It led to the destruction of 1,846 Soviet nuclear weapons and 846 U.S. weapons within three years. It also gave both countries the right of close and unprecedented inspection of the other side’s nuclear sites (R. McMahon 163). This was the first time when the superpowers agreed not only to limit but also eliminate part of their nuclear arsenals. The treaty brought more security and stability to Europe.

Gorbachev took a step further to show his commitment to military cuts. In 1988, a year after ratifying the INF Treaty, Gorbachev announced that he would cut Soviet forces in Eastern Europe unilaterally by a half-million soldiers (Wallander, “Lost and Found” 119). He
announced the withdrawal from Eastern Europe of 10,000 tanks (“Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate…”).

Gorbachev focused on restructuring the Soviet economic and political systems through his Perestroika\(^\text{17}\) and Glasnost\(^\text{18}\) programs. He urged Eastern European communist parties to initiate similar policies. Reagan, through time, became convinced that Gorbachev wanted to establish a different Soviet Union. Gorbachev knew that a solution to the economic crisis could not be reached without the reduction of expenditure on arms race that was exhausting the already decaying economy. In the long term, easing relations with the United States would justify smaller, less costly military and better relations with the West that would allow the technology transfers and various commercial deals needed to help the Soviet economy.

Gorbachev knew that the Soviet declining economy and the burdens involved in maintaining the Cold War status quo would soon become unbearable because the United States was likely to respond to any “Soviet assault on its global interests”. Therefore, “a strategy aimed at winding down the Cold War confrontation won widespread acceptance within the Soviet leadership, since this appeared to be a precondition for efficient domestic economic reform” (Njolstad xiii). The Soviet empire was grotesquely overextended and became unable to bear this responsibility especially because of the decadence of its economy.

Gorbachev recognized that the old Soviet system was leading nowhere but to a dead end, and only collapse was foreseeable if pursued. He called on the Soviets to settle a reasonable sufficiency in strategic arms and urged the West and NATO to start genuine deep cuts in nuclear and conventional weapons. Most important was Gorbachev’s repudiation of the Brezhnev Doctrine\(^\text{19}\) that asserted the Soviet Union’s right to intervene, even through use of force, to protect and maintain socialist governments wherever and whenever they were threatened especially in the Warsaw Pact countries (“Brezhnev Doctrine”). Gorbachev became convinced that Soviet foreign policy under this doctrine required massive
expenditures. Soviet commitment to spreading communist ideas around the world led to an intolerable burden of military expenditure.

Western observers were divided upon how to respond to Gorbachev’s New Thinking. Some considered Gorbachev a revolutionary and his rule a historic chance to end the Cold War. Reagan was more cautious because the previous Soviet peace deals proved that the motive was only to seduce the West in order to open up trade and technology and expand the project of the proletariat revolution. In his first press conference, on January 29, 1981 Reagan renounced détente as “a one-way street that the Soviet Union has used to pursue its own aims” that is, the promotion of world revolution (“Cold War Termination…”). Reagan never endorsed the strategy of détente. He considered the idea that the Soviet Union could be dealt with as a normal negotiating partner as naïve and preferred that the United States needed take an outspoken position towards the Soviet leaders.

Gorbachev, however, faced a greater challenge that threatened the integrity of the Eastern bloc. His liberal thinking emboldened liberalization movements in Eastern Europe. Repressed ethnic groups at home and in Eastern Europe started to organize and express their opposition to communist rule. This represented a great dilemma for Gorbachev. Crushing these nationalist moves (as was the case for Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968) would destroy the progress in East-West relations reached so far. On the other hand, if Moscow tolerated the independence movements that started in the Eastern bloc the process might spread from the satellites to the subject nationalities inside the USSR which indeed happened. Glenn Curtis emphasized that the issue Gorbachev understood “least of all was that of the nationalities.” His liberal policies “loosened authoritarian controls over society, facilitated and fueled the airing of national grievances in the republics.” As a result the peoples of the Soviet Union began to assert their respective national characters.
Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary were the first satellite countries to renounce and reject communist rule and establish independent and democratic regimes free from the Kremlin’s hold. The 1989 June elections showed an end to the communist dominance in the Polish government. Moscow did not react violently to the event. Rather, Gennady Gerasimov, Gorbachev’s press spokesman, announced what he called the ‘Frank Sinatra Doctrine’. “We now have the Frank Sinatra doctrine. He has a song, ‘I (Did) It My Way’. So every country decides on its own which road to take” (“Sinatra Doctrine at Work…”). Such a sweeping and bold change in Eastern Europe would not have been possible had Gorbachev maintained the Brezhnev doctrine. Dockrill and Hopkins illustrate:

In the space of a few months five states had witnessed the collapse of their pro-Soviet communist regimes. Poland, Hungary, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Romania were then joined by Bulgaria in the middle of 1990. This was achieved, in the main, by peaceful means. In essence, unpopular, economically inefficient governments collapsed under the weight of popular protest when Gorbachev made it clear that he would not apply the Brezhnev Doctrine, which involved armed intervention to maintain the communists’ control of power. (155)

Unlike what the Western leaders were expecting, the independence of Eastern and Central Europe was a peaceful process and no violent interventions to repress the independence movement were taken by the Kremlin. Archie Brown, Professor of Politics at Oxford University, Great Britain, comments “Not a shot was fired by a Soviet soldier as the Central and East Europeans took their countries’ destinies into their own hands”. At the Malta Summit (1989) Gorbachev and George Bush declared the end of the Cold War. For Bush the Soviet Union and the United States “can realize a lasting peace and transform the East-West relationship to one of enduring co-operation” (“Malta Summit Ends Cold War”). Gorbachev on the other hand asserted that the two countries “are at the beginning of a long road to a
lasting, peaceful era” and that “the threat of force, mistrust, psychological and ideological struggle should all be things of the past” (“Malta Summit Ends Cold War”). The summit was regarded by many as the official end of the Cold War though little of substance was actually agreed.

The liberalization movement later spread even to the Soviet republics. It became clear that the Soviet empire and the Soviet Union itself started to fragment. Gorbachev’s toleration for the liberalization movement in Eastern Europe resulted in dangerous repercussions at home. Popular revolt had spread into the nationalities within the USSR itself. Lithuania was the first republic to secede. At the end of 1989 the Communist Party of Lithuania declared secession from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU); in March 1990 the Lithuanian popular movement, the Sajudis won the elections, and Lithuania proclaimed independence in March 1990 (Haran). The Soviet Union, as a result, started to disintegrate from within.

German reunification which proved to be one of the most complicated Cold War problems signaled the end of the Cold War. The reunification of Germany was initiated by the fall of the Berlin Wall that divided the country and Europe into two blocs became the symbol that showed that the enduring East-West struggle was coming to a peaceful end. The Berlin Wall had been breached after nearly three decades keeping East and West Berliners apart. On November 9, 1989 the Politburo announced that East Germans are allowed to move freely into West Germany. As a result of such a decision, tens of thousands flocked to the Berlin Wall (Binyon). At midnight East Germany’s Communist rulers gave permission for gates along the Wall to be opened after hundreds of people converged on crossing points. Before this date many of those who attempted to escape were mercilessly shot dead by border guards. More than 130,000 East Germans moved westward after the fall of the wall (“Berliners Celebrate the Fall…”). The Iron Curtain collapsed.
The Soviets as well as the Western countries, mainly France and Great Britain, feared the German might. Germany became one of Europe’s colossal economic powers. If augmented by the East it might dominate the European Community. They feared the probable German aspiration for military power and hegemony in the power vacuum that arose in Eastern Europe. Margaret Thatcher expressed her concern over the German unification issue by telling Gorbachev “I am convinced that reunification needs a long transition period. All Europe is watching this not without a degree of fear, remembering very well who started the two world wars” (qtd. in Binyon). However, the Allies could not deny Germany the right to self-determination they claimed for all the peoples especially after the East Germans publicly announced their approval for unification. In November 1989, about 200,000 demonstrators marched through the streets of East Germany chanting, “Germany united fatherland,” and carrying signs reading, “Unity-Justice-Freedom” and “Reunification” (Protzman). The German public watchword became unification after long decades of division.

The year 1990 was marked by key events. On July 1, 1990 the federal assembly of Western Germany, the Bundestag, approved the economic unification between East and West Germany. Gorbachev and Kohl announced their agreement in principle to permit a united Germany that would belong to NATO on July 16 (“Background Note: Germany”). They signed the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany in Moscow on September 12 (“Germany Regains Full Sovereignty”). According to the treaty the Soviet forces would completely withdraw from Germany by the end of 1994 and the British, French, and American troops were to remain in Berlin during the period of the Soviet withdrawal. The Germans renounced nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and stated their intention to reduce German armed forces to 370,000 within three to four years (“Treaty on the Final Settlement…”). German unification that was considered impossible proved to be an imminent reality.
The two German governments signed Unity Treaty that contained the terms of their political union on August 31 (Lipchitz and McDonald 51). By October 1990 the Germans celebrated their unification. In addition to that the new unified Germany would be incorporated into NATO. Robert McMahon noted that “The two Germanies would henceforth constitute a single, sovereign country that would remain anchored to the NATO alliance” and one, of the “greatest Cold War worries disappeared” (168). With the reunification of Germany, one of the hardest chapters of the Cold War came to an end.

The year 1990 clearly marked the end of the long and enduring struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union. In November a second Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) summit was convened in Paris during which the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE)20 was ratified and resulted in important reductions in conventional forces. The liberation of Eastern Europe, unification of Germany, armaments reductions were among the symptoms that showed the change of superpower relations and a tendency to bring this enduring rivalry into a peaceful end.

George Kennan’s prophecy that the Soviet expansionism and empire would ultimately fail proved true. The Soviet Union’s Cold War commitment constituted serious obligations that strained its economic resources. Its world entanglement to promote communism, and arms race with the United States led to a huge military buildup in conventional and nuclear armies. Its satellites in the third world proved also to be expensive and of doubtful value. The failure to manage the empire had led the Soviets to disgorge it.

The liberalization movement that swept Eastern Europe spread to the Soviet Republics as well. The Soviet Union was a multinational state that encompassed many nationalities such as the Balts, Ukrainians, Moldavians, Georgians, Uzbeks, Armenians and many other peoples. Their nationalist sentiments were repressed under the firm hold of the Soviet Union but Gorbachev’s Glasnost released the inherent nationalist sentiments of all these peoples that
sought independence from the Soviet domination. Gorbachev did not foresee, to a great extent, that free expression would go out of hand first in Eastern Europe and then even within the Soviet Union itself. By 1990 the Soviet command structure over the constituent republics broke down. The republics started to devise their own economic systems and passed legislations that subordinated the laws of the Soviet Union to their local laws.

Disintegration started in the Baltic States that sought full independence from the Soviet Union. Lithuania was the first of the Baltic States to declare its independence in March 1990 followed by Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova (Dockrill and Hopkins 159). The Soviet breakdown culminated in the coup against Gorbachev. Eight senior Soviet officials, including Vice President Gennady Yanayev, Defense Minister Dmitri Yazov, and KGB Chairman Vladimir Kryuchkov, launched a coup on August 19, 1991 while Gorbachev was on vacation in Crimea in his summer residence. The state of emergency was declared and a State Committee had been established to run the country (“The Fall of the Soviet Union…”). Boris Yeltsin denounced the coup as unconstitutional and was among the political figures who protested it in front of the Russian White House.

Gorbachev returned to his post after the failure of the coup but he found out that the political landscape had changed to a great extent. On December 8, 1991 Boris Yeltsin and the newly elected presidents of Belarus and Ukraine jointly announced the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In a joint communiqué they declared that the USSR “is ceasing its existence as a subject of international law and a geopolitical reality”. The signatories also pledged that they would respect each other’s territorial integrity and the “inviolability of existing borders” (Dobbs). The Soviet Union started to disintegrate.

Gorbachev announced his resignation on the Russian television on December 25, 1991. “Due to the situation which has evolved as a result of the formation of the Commonwealth of Independent states I hereby discontinue my activities at the post of president of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics” (“End of the Soviet Union; Text…”). He, nevertheless, enumerated some of his administration’s achievements. “Free elections have become a reality. Free press, freedom of worship, representative legislatures and a multi-party system have all become a reality” (“Gorbachev Resigns as Soviet…”). The hammer-and-sickle flag was lowered from the Kremlin and was replaced by the white, blue, and red flag of Russia.

The union came to disintegrate into fifteen independent states: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan, in addition to the three Baltic States: Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia. The Eastern bloc together with its communist political and economic dogma crumbled and the Kremlin lost its control over its dominions within the Union and in Eastern Europe. Yeltsin succeeded Gorbachev and the control over the Soviet Union’s nuclear forces passed to his hands. Professor Archie Brown from the British Oxford University comments on the peaceful disintegration of the Soviet Union as one of the great success stories of the 20th century. “Seldom, if ever, has a highly authoritarian political system, deploying military means sufficient to destroy life on earth, been dismantled so peacefully. Never has an empire disintegrated with so little bloodshed...the way Soviet communism came to an end was one of the great success stories of 20th century politics”.

The Cold War struggle ended in an American victory, since the latter was the most committed Western country in containing the communist threat. As a defeated rival crumbling to the utmost, facing economic distress, corruption and political unrest, Russia, or what remained of the giant Soviet Union, entered into an uncertain, dark and critical era in its history. Its leading role in the world affairs shrank and its political weight lessened to end in its marginalization from world politics.

The greatest challenge for the West was what would be its strategic objective toward its former Cold War rival. Zbigniew Brzezinski a former National Security Adviser to President
Carter stressed that the West should support Russia’s socioeconomic recovery to achieve two long-term objectives. First, Russia should be aided to become a member of the world’s leading democratic nations and the newly independent states should be supported as they were in the early stages of their nation-building process. Their successful independence would assure the creation of an “enduring geopolitical context that by itself reinforces Russia’s transformation into a post-imperial state” (“The Cold War and Its Aftermath” 48).

When Yeltsin ascended to power and became the president of Russia in 1992, the United States and Russia entered in a “honeymoon” period. Yeltsin and his foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev proceeded to follow the U.S. lead on arms control, economic reform, and global politics. In return, the United States promised to help Russia and the other CIS countries integrate into the global economy and into European security structures (Feffer). The United States, under Clinton, initiated a “shock therapy” in Russia’s economy and politics that attempted to replace the old communist system by capitalism and neo-liberalism. The American assistance, however, did not result in better conditions for Russia. The Yeltsin, era was characterized by low incomes, inflation and the destruction of personal savings.

The optimist expectation that American-Russian relationship would ameliorate and become a “strategic partnership” did not surpass rhetoric. The American aid did not manage to withdraw Russia from its crisis during the 1990s. The miserable conditions that the country witnessed during that decade made many Russians to believe that the expert assistance given by the United States to Russia as cooperation to support its conversion into a capitalist economy was a Western conspiracy. Despite the Western immense financial and technical assistance to Russia “to facilitate its transition to free markets and democracy”, the population “perceived privatization as theft” (A. Cohen and Dale 2). Cooperation with the United States and economic reforms to shift into capitalism remained a negative experience for the Russians.
Financial aid and loans to Russia came from other world economic institutions such as the G7 and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In April 1993 the G7 secretaries conferred in Tokyo. The members pledged to support Russia’s conversion into a democratic capitalist country. The meeting was attended by Russian foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev and Deputy Prime Minister, Boris Fedorov. It was decided to set aside a total of $43.4 billion as an emergency aid package to Russia (“Towards the Meeting of Boris…”)

The United States was interested in supporting important programs that aimed at developing Russian market institutions, foster economic reform and privatization, and enhance the rule of law and democratic politics. American assistance also focused on dismantling the former Soviet nuclear arsenal since reducing the Russian strategic threat was a worthwhile investment in U.S. security (A. Cohen, “The Purposes of Russian Aid…”). But Clinton’s policies in Europe as far as NATO was concerned became a sticking point in U.S.-Russian relations. The future of American-Russian relations became a controversial issue since the American political and strategic views were divided. Russia now was not perceived as an adversary, but it was also not considered as an ally either. This undefined situation led to an inconsistent American policy.

The settlement of the future status of the newly independent states in Central and Eastern Europe proved to be a contentious theme. America’s ambitions to include them in the NATO alliance became a hotly debated subject. The end of the Cold War in Europe brought some difficult questions to the fore mainly the future of the institutions built up during the Cold War such as the NATO alliance. Should it remain vigorous in the absence of the Soviet threat or should it dissolve? NATO clearly suffered an identity crisis as the threat it was devised to oppose disappeared.

Some experts started to call for disbanding the alliance because the Cold War ended and with it ended the period of confrontation with the Soviet Union. Steven Meyer, Professor
of Political Science at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense
University (Washington D.C.) reasoned that “during the Cold War, NATO provided the
proper linchpin of American-and West European-security policy, and served as a useful, even
fundamental deterrent to Soviet military might and expansionism. However, NATO’s time
has come and gone, and today there is no legitimate reason for it to exist” (83). Unless a
reason that would justify the alliance persistence would be found, the alliance existence
seemed awkward.

At the end of the Cold War NATO included 16 members. By 2008, the number became
26. NATO did not dissolve, it persisted and expanded. The suspension of the alliance was out
of question. Anthony Lake, Clinton’s National Security Adviser, asserted that America’s new
policy in Europe “must combine our traditional goals of fostering democracy and markets
with our more strategic interests…If NATO is to remain an anchor for European and Atlantic
stability…it’s members must commit themselves to updating NATO’s role in this new era.
Unless NATO is willing over time to assume broader role then it will lose public support”
(qtd. in Matei). NATO would be assigned a new role in European affairs, that of spreading
western democracy and market economy to the whole of Europe.

Under the Clinton and Bush administrations, there would be two rounds of
enlargement of the NATO alliance and ten new members were given membership. Russia, on
the other hand, under the Yeltsin and Putin presidencies expressed its great opposition to
enlarging the alliance. The issue resulted in a great rift in the bilateral relationship of the two
countries. Throughout the period extending from 1993 to 2008, the issue of NATO brought
the relationship into a serious amplification that escalated to the 2008 Russian-Georgian War;
a conflict that some analysts dubbed a new Cold War.

Russia’s assertion about this issue would become more evident with regard to its
near-abroad\textsuperscript{21}, that is, the former Soviet republics. In the aftermath of the Russian-Georgian

War, Moscow announced a “Russian Monroe Doctrine” that Subhash Kapila, an International Relations and Strategic Affairs analyst at the South Asia Analysis Group, suggested that it represented “a serious Russian attempt to re-define the existing international order which had excluded Russia from global strategic decision-making ever since 1991”.

After the disastrous political and economic abyss that Russia witnessed in the aftermath of the Cold War, a resurgent Russia stood boldly against NATO enlargement especially when the alliance sent signs of consent to include Georgia and Ukraine. Russia was resolved to reestablish its leading role in the region of the former Soviet space. NATO enlargement came to be perceived as a threat and resulted in heightened mistrust between Russia and the United States. The sphere of influence concept that was one of the most important causes of the Cold War came to the fore again.

The late Russian-Georgian war represents the culmination of a critical and fragile relationship between Russia and the West. Russia, through this war, intends to reinvigorate its role as a great power in its near-abroad as well as the international arena. The American marginalizing policy towards Russia during the 1990s, when Russia has been a follower with no real voice or key role in European affairs, has been reversed. America’s constant intrusion into this former superpower’s immediate neighborhood is among, if not the chief, causes that have led to this war.

The end of the Cold War has not brought a great change in U.S.-Russian relations. Russia since 1992 has not been integrated within the European Union, still not a member of the World Trade Organization, and most important not a member of the NATO alliance after two rounds of enlargement. Under Putin, Russia has become one of the world nations that opposes and attacks America’s unilateralist policies. A resurgent Russia, recovering economically from the crisis of the 1990s is insisting to play its former role as a major world power that should not be marginalized in world decision making.
The cold War was officially ended in the historical Malta Conference in December 1989. However, this late conflict brought its spirit. Richard Sakwa acknowledges that “Cold War patterns of thinking have once again surfaced in discussion about Russia and its role in the world. Putin’s second term was accompanied by ever more insistent suggestions that a new Cold War was in the making” (241). Because NATO eastward expansion represents the most contentious issue in the U.S/NATO-Russia new confrontation, it will be the first theme to be analyzed. The reasons of maintaining the alliance after the Cold War, the aims of expanding it eastward, and Russia’s perception and reaction to it will be the main questions that the following chapter will focus on.
Endnotes


2 In international politics, sphere of influence refers to “the claim by a state to exclusive or predominant control over a foreign area or territory”. This claim to exclusive control or preferential status may or may not be recognized by other nations. Influence may refer to a military, political, or economic claim to exclusive control or influence. Daniel H. Deudney, “Sphere of Influence,” Encyclopedia Britannica, 14 Aug. 2009 <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/287778/sphere-of-influence>. Raymond S. Esthus, “Protectorates and Spheres of Influence,” Encyclopedia of the New American Nation, 23 Aug. 2009 <http://www.americanforeignrelations.com/O-W/Protectorates-and-Spheres-of-Influence.html>.

3 The Curzon Line is a line that demarcated the border between Poland and Soviet Russia. It was proposed as an armistice deal during the Russo-Polish war (1919-1920) and became the Soviet-Polish border after WWII. “Curzon Line,” Encyclopedia Britannica, 20 Sep. 2009 <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/147270/Curzon-Line>.

4 In international relations, balance of power refers to conditions of power equilibrium among key states. The aim of balancing is to prevent a rising power form assuming hegemony through increasing their military strength or forming alliances. If that prevention effort succeeds, then, a balance of power is expected to be present. T.V. Paul, James J. Wirtz and Michel Fortman, Balance of Power and Practice in the 21st Century, (California: Stanford UP, 2004) 2-3.

5 Realpolitik is a German political concept dating from the mid-19th century and often thought to be especially characteristic of Karl Otto von Bismarck’s policies, both domestic and foreign. At its strongest it suggests that no moral values should be allowed to affect the single-minded pursuit of one’s own or one’s country’s self-interest, and an absolute assumption that any opponent will certainly behave in this way. David Robertson, The Routledge Dictionary of Politics, (London: Routledge, 2004) 420.


7 Article Five of NATO charter states that the parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that in case of attack, each of them will assist the Party or Parties attacked by taking action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. “What is Article 5?” NATO, 2 Nov. 2009 <http://www.nato.int/terrorism/five.htm>.

8 Arms race is “a situation in which two or more states involved in a conflictual relationship compete with each other over the strength of their armed forces...The competition may be quantitative, over the

9 NSC-68 is a top secret report by the State Department completed in April 1950. According to its authors, the most pressing threat confronting the U.S. was the Soviet Union which would soon be greater by the latter’s acquisition of nuclear weapons. Thus they argued that the best course of action was a massive build-up of the U.S. military and its weaponry. “NSC 68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security,” Federation of American Scientists, 30 Apr. 2009 <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsc-hst/nsc-68.htm>.

10 New Look policy entailed reducing the army from 1,500,000 men in 1953 to 900,000 in 1960. The navy experienced smaller reductions, while air force expenditures rose. Eisenhower was primarily interested in deterring a nuclear attack and to that end promoted expensive developments in nuclear weaponry and long-range missiles. “New Look,” Encyclopedia Britannica, 30 Apr. 2009 <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/411786/New-Look>.

11 The Limited Test-Ban Treaty is a trilateral agreement that was negotiated by the US, USSR, and UK and was signed in 1963. It prohibits tests of nuclear devices in the atmosphere, in outer space, and underwater. It allows nuclear testing to continue underground, so long as radioactive debris is not allowed “outside the territorial limits” of the testing state. “Limited Test Ban Treaty (1963),” Atomicarchive.com, 10 Jan. 2009 <http://www.atomicarchive.com/Treaties/Treaty3.shtml>.

12 The Domino theory is a metaphor popular during the Cold War that predicted that if one state fell to communism, its neighbors would also fall in a chain reaction, like a row of falling dominoes. Charles Kegley and Shannon L. Blanton, World Politics: Trend and Transformation (California: Wadsworth Engage Learning, 2006): 572.

13 The Non-Proliferation Treaty obligates the five acknowledged nuclear-weapon states (the United States, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, France, and China) not to transfer nuclear weapons or their technology to any non-nuclear-weapon state. “Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,” Federation of American Scientists, 12 Jun. 2009 <http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/npt/>.

14 Détente is a French word which means relaxing or easing. In international politics the term refers to the de-escalation of tension between previously hostile countries through diplomacy and confidence building measures. During the cold war, détente referred to the general reduction in the tension between the US and the SU from the late 1960s until the start of the 1980s. “Détente,” New World Encyclopedia, 12 Apr. 2009 <http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Detente>.


16 The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty was the first nuclear weapons agreement requiring the United States and the Soviet Union to reduce, rather than merely limit, their arsenals of nuclear weapons. It was signed by President Ronald Reagan and General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev on December 8, 1987. It eliminated all land-based nuclear missiles with ranges of between 300 and 3,400 miles. It required the removal of 1,752 Soviet and 859 U.S. short-and intermediate-range missiles, most of which were located in Europe. The INF Treaty also contained unprecedented verification

17 Perestroika technically means ‘restructuring’. It was, initially, a plan to reform the existing economic system of state control, and not to replace it. The policies were aimed at increasing the incentives to operate the current system more efficiently. David Robertson, The Routledge Dictionary of Politics, (London: Routledge, 2004) 375.

18 Glasnost, actually intended to mean something more like the English word ‘publicity’, came to mean an opening of discussion, a freeing of all the constraints on expression, whether in journalism, literature or the arts, that Stalin and his heirs had imposed on the Soviet Union. Above all it involved freedom of the press, freedom to criticize and freedom of religious worship, which had for so long been denied. David Robertson, The Routledge Dictionary of Politics, (London: Routledge, 2004) 208.

19 The Brezhnev Doctrine is a Soviet foreign policy named after Leonid Brezhnev. It was announced in a speech he delivered at the Fifth Congress of the Polish United Workers’ Party on November 13, 1968. Brezhnev declared that “When forces that are hostile to socialism try to turn the development of some socialist country towards capitalism, it becomes not only a problem of the country concerned, but a common problem and concern of all socialist countries”. The Soviet invasions of Hungary (1956) and of Czechoslovakia (1968) represent concrete implementation of the doctrine. “Brezhnev Doctrine,” Farlex Free Dictionary, 12 Apr. 2009 <http://encyclopedia.thefreedictionary.com/Brezhnev+Doctrine>.

20 The Conventional Forces Treaty was signed in Paris on November 19, 1990 by 22 states. These were divided into two groups: the NATO group, composed of 16 members, and the Group of Six, which encompassed the former Warsaw Pact states. The treaty set limits on specified military equipment—referred to as treaty-limited equipment (TLE) in the Atlantic-to-the-Urals Zone. A solid verification and information exchange was agreed upon. According to the treaty neither group of states may have more than 20,000 tanks, 20,000 artillery pieces, 30,000 armored combat vehicles, 6,800 combat aircraft and 2,000 attack helicopters. “Russia and the CFE Treaty,” Berlin Information Center for Transatlantic Security, 11 Mar. 2009 <http://www.bits.de/NRANEU/Conventional.html>.

Chapter Two

NATO Enlargement: America’s Reasons and Russia’s Reaction

The end of the Cold War was supposed to bring an easing if not a minimization of security concerns to the former Cold War antagonists, that is, the United States and the Soviet Union’s successor: Russia. However, it brought dramatic change into world politics. The Soviet Union disintegrated and due to political and economic domestic problems it weakened and retreated from global affairs. The international political system became unipolar and the United States became the world’s superpower with no rival to constrain its hegemony.

Charles Krauthammer, a syndicated columnist at Foreign Affairs, affirms that “The immediate post-Cold War world is not multipolar. It is unipolar. The center of world power is the unchallenged superpower, the United States, attended by its Western allies” (23). American preeminence, Krauthammer clarifies, “is based on the fact that it is the only country with the military, diplomatic, political and economic assets to be a decisive player in any conflict in whatever part of the world it chooses to involve itself” (25). The United States, consequently, gained the supreme position as the world’s only superpower, a status it achieved due to its supremacy on all the levels.

The Cold War end was officially declared at the Malta Summit in December 1989 by the American and Soviet leaders George Bush Sr. and Mikhail Gorbachev. As a result, so much rhetoric was delivered by American officials. President George Bush, Sr. noted that it was time to move beyond containment. The phrase was originally coined by Condoleezza Rice, then, a member of the National Security Council staff. Rice’s secret National Security Directive (NSD - 23) confirmed that “a new era may now be upon us. We may be able to move beyond containment to a new U.S. policy that actively promotes the integration of the Soviet Union into the international system” (“National Security Directive 23…”). President
Bush Sr. further stressed the change in America’s perception of the Soviet Union (and later Russia) and announced that his country’s objective “is to welcome the Soviet Union back into the world order” (“Commencement Address at Texas…”).

The West publicly announced that Europe should move out of the period of division and a collective security for the whole of Europe should be devised in which Russia was supposed to play a vital role. This was supposed to be achieved through NATO enlargement to include those newly independent states that sought membership and even Russia if it would consider the option. This, however, proved to be only superficial rhetoric to show that Russia was no more considered to be a threat to its European neighbors. From the period stretching from 1993 to 2008, there were two rounds of enlargement but Russia did not become a member in any of them.

1. The United States’ Rationales for Enlarging NATO Alliance

Because of the enlargement, a number of former Soviet satellites and republics\(^\text{23}\) were included. Russia, in addition to being a member of the Partnership for Peace (PfP)\(^\text{24}\) became also a member in the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC)\(^\text{25}\). The latter was created under the Founding Act on Relations between Russia and NATO which was signed in Paris on May 27, 1997 (“Founding Act”). Among the most prominent declarations in the Act was:

Russia and NATO do not consider each other as adversaries they share the goal of overcoming the vestiges of earlier confrontation and competition and of strengthening mutual trust and cooperation. The present act reaffirms the determination of Russia and NATO to give concrete substance to their shared commitment to build a stable, peaceful and undivided Europe, whole and free, to the benefit of all its people. (“Founding Act on Mutual…”)

\(^\text{23}\)\footnote{The United States’ Rationales for Enlarging NATO Alliance}

\(^\text{24}\)\footnote{The United States’ Rationales for Enlarging NATO Alliance}

\(^\text{25}\)\footnote{The United States’ Rationales for Enlarging NATO Alliance}
However, if it is supposed that Cold War antagonism has ended and a new era in which Cold War enmity, mistrust and rivalry have become only history then this is a superficial if not a naive expectation. NATO’s future in particular will turn to be the issue that will bring to the fore, again, many of the Cold War concepts. Cold War policy of containment will come back to the official rhetoric as Russian officials have started to perceive the alliance enlargement as a policy that pursues the encirclement of Russia with new NATO member countries. Russian nationalists further claim that America and its allies have broken their pledges and devoured its former empire taking advantage of its weakness during the 1990s.

Under the presidency of Vladimir Putin, Russia’s economy has revived and the country has regained its sense of confidence. This economic revival, however, has invigorated Russia’s foreign policy concepts of the sphere of influence and the balance of power; typical of Soviet foreign policy during the Cold War. This tendency has become apparent after the Russo-Georgian War that erupted in August 2008. Russia has revised its foreign policy toward the former Soviet Republics through a “Russian Monroe Doctrine” in its near-abroad and a new military doctrine as well that asserts its unilateral action in case of an imminent threat to its interests.

The outbreak of the Russian-Georgian war in 2008 led some observers to start talking about the eruption of a New Cold War. Others like Ariel Cohen, Edward Lucas and Mark Mackinnon have already talked about a “New Cold War” ensuing between Russia and the United States since 2006. In trying to find the causes that led to this conflict, two mainly imminent issues stand as the direct reasons for the renewal of a Cold War-like relationship between Russia and the United States especially under the presidencies of George Bush Jr. and Vladimir Putin. The reasons are NATO expansion and the National Missile Defense. NATO enlargement will be the first issue to be analyzed.
The military bodies that emerged during the Cold War did not have the same fate. The Warsaw Pact that embodied the Soviet Union and its former Central and Eastern European satellites disbanded. However, NATO did not split up but rather it survived, strengthened and also enlarged in the post Cold War era. In realist terms it was expected that with the disappearance of the communist threat, the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the disbanding of the Warsaw Pact, NATO lost its raison d’être and consequently would follow suit.

Celeste Wallander, Director of the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, USA argues that “alliances should not outlive the threats they were created to address…When threats disappear, allies lose the reason for their cooperating, and the coalition will break apart” (“Institutional Assets and Adaptability” 705). Kenneth Waltz expected “NATO to dwindle at the Cold War’s end and ultimately to disappear.” Glenn Snyder stressed that “alliances have no meaning apart from the adversary threat to which they are a response” (192). NATO, consequently, had no reason to remain as the communist threat ceased to exist. Through time it became clear that the idea of disbanding the alliance was out of question. NATO would not only survive, it should enlarge.

A hot debate over the future of NATO followed. Two political factions discussed the issue in an attempt to convince Congress of maintaining the alliance and enlarging it or disbanding it altogether. The first anti-NATO faction was represented by politicians and commentators who called for the dissolution of the alliance since it had no imminent purpose to remain. They argued that the alliance should be suspended because the threat it was facing, that is, Soviet expansionism had now disappeared.

Another reason was that eastward expansion would antagonize Russia and would threaten arms control treaties that bound it with the West. The Russian pro-Western and democratic reformers who were trying to establish a democratic political system and a
market-oriented economy would be undermined, opponents of NATO expansion added. As a result, nationalist political tendencies would come to the fore again. The nationalists, the opponents of expansion believed, would take the issue as a proof that the West was taking advantage of Russia’s weakness and its fall from superpower status to penetrate into areas that used to be under the Soviet empire and hence would revive the imperial tendencies of the country (“The Debate on Enlargement”). In addition, enlargement might weaken the alliance and reduce its effectiveness. The “isolationists” opposed the expansion mainly for the financial costs it would entail. They did not want the United States to further commit itself financially in Europe. When the idea of disbanding the alliance became out of question, opposing the issue of expansion turned out to be the new subject of debate.

A formal request was made to the Clinton Administration on June 26, 1997 by a group of fifty prominent foreign policy experts that included former senators, military officers, diplomats and academicians. The group wrote a letter to President Clinton in which they stated their reasons for opposing the alliance’s expansion. They asserted that NATO expansion would strengthen the nondemocratic opposition in Russia, undercut those who favor reform and cooperation with the West, bring the Russians to question the entire post-Cold War settlement, and galvanize resistance in the Duma to the START II and III treaties. In Europe, more seriously, NATO expansion would “draw a new line of division between the “ins” and the “outs,” foster instability, and ultimately diminish the sense of security of those countries which are not included” (“Opposition to NATO Expansion”). The group had rightly anticipated most of the negative repercussions of enlargement on Europe’s security. After two rounds of enlargement, Russia did not become a member. The ideal of rendering Europe whole and free without dividing lines did not materialize. Instead, a dividing line (even at the theoretical level) persisted all along.
The pro-NATO faction, on the other hand, argued that NATO enlargement would make America and Europe more secure. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, in a testimony before the Senate Appropriation Committee, endorsed the idea that a larger NATO would make the United States safer “by expanding the area in Europe where wars simply do not happen”. She further stressed the importance of keeping NATO and enlarging it because it would make it “stronger and more cohesive”. Albright noted that the promise to incorporate new members (mainly Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic) had pushed them to make democratic reforms and “strengthened their democratic institutions”. More important was the signing of the aspirants of “major accords that taken together resolve virtually every potential ethnic and border dispute in the region”. For Albright, a larger NATO “will make America safer, NATO stronger, and Europe more peaceful and united” (“Expanding NATO Natural…”). Declaring that Russia and NATO were no longer adversaries, NATO, still a military alliance between America and its allies was there to protect them from apparently a ‘phantom threat’. With the demise of the Soviet Union and communism no imminent danger was facing Europe. Russia, the heir to the Soviet Union, collapsed into economic turmoil and deep weakness.

Albright added that not to accept the aspirant countries would entail the acceptance of the division of Europe even after the demise of the Warsaw Pact. For Albright, the failure to expand the alliance “would mean freezing NATO at its Cold War membership and preserving the old Iron Curtain as its eastern frontier” (“Albright Testimony on NATO…”). It would be said that the United States and its allies “blocked the aspirations of our would-be allies because Russia objected”, Albright added. Russia expressed its opposition to enlargement but was not in a situation that made its objections taken into consideration. The issue was out of its hand, it was something that the aspirants and the alliance were deciding regardless of Russia’s opinion about it.
When the Soviet Union started to disintegrate in 1989 there was no immediate and clear public discussion about what the future of the newly independent states of Eastern and Central Europe would be. The West, under the U.S. leadership preached that the United Nations would revive and play the role it was originally devised for. It would be “reborn to preside over a ‘New World Order’, based on respect for international law, justice and social progress, all equitably distributed” (Eyal 700). Such statements seemed to be ideal and to some extent appeasing for the Soviet Union because they sent an indirect message that the triumphant West, mainly the United States, would not profit from the Soviet defeat and weakness to tilt the balance of power in its favor. The Soviet Union thought that the “winner takes all” option would not be taken by the West. However, in January 1994 the Allies declared at the Brussels Summit that the alliance was open to membership for other European states.

Enlargement gradually proceeded to include some of the newly independent Eastern and Central European countries that showed avid aspiration to become members. Robert Hunter confirms that “the newly free nations of central Europe have convinced the West that they must be fully engaged in all Euro-Atlantic institutions, including the premier military alliance” (190). In the course of enlargement NATO got nearer to Russian borders and made the latter very concerned about its security. Russia started to feel itself gradually encircled and ringed by NATO members. The latter remained a military alliance and Russia started to question the aim of its eastward enlargement.

Russia started to perceive the alliance expansion as a continuation of the West’s containment policy that was pursued during the whole Cold War era. John Feffer, co-director of Foreign Policy in Focus at the Institute for Policy Studies, asserted “Containment remains the centerpiece of U.S. policy toward Russia. But it is a “soft” containment or what he referred to “Containment Lite”. For Feffer, the Clinton administration foreign policy toward Russia consisted of a “three-tiered effort to isolate Russia: from its neighbors, from Europe,
and from international community more generally”. The United States and its allies during the 1990s were not under pressure to enlarge the alliance. Russia was not an imminent threat and was “contained, quite literally, by its own weakness” (Feffer). But Russia’s weakness was also an opportunity that should be exploited to fulfill a broad range of objectives.

Between 1994 and 1997 the issue of enlargement was a paramount subject in the United States. President Bill Clinton argued that expansion of NATO was intended to stabilize the eastern part of Europe and establish democratic and free market values to all of Europe. In a letter to Congress about NATO enlargement, Clinton announced:

> Inclusion of new members into NATO’s ranks is an indispensable element of a broader American strategy to create an undivided, democratic Europe for the 21st century…NATO can strengthen democratic and free market reforms for all of Europe, just as it has done for Western Europe in the decades since 1949.

(“Clinton’s Letter to Congress…”)

Clinton’s endorsement of enlargement was backed by a group of outstanding politicians who shared his interest. Their reasons were different but they all supported enlargement. The two main groups were the “Wilsonians” and the “hedgers” as James Goldgeier, director of the Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies, categorized them. The Wilsonians such as President Clinton and National Security Adviser Anthony Lake envisioned that NATO enlargement would encourage the adoption of market economy and respect of human rights in Central and Eastern Europe. The hedgers such as Senate Foreign Relations Chair Jesse Helms and prominent former officials Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski stressed that NATO expansion should be fervently pursued since Russia might resurge and reassert its power in the region once again.

Brzezinski stressed that enlargement would reinforce America’s status as a European power. “NATO’s enlargement is about America’s role in Europe - whether America will
remain a European power and whether a larger democratic Europe will remain organically linked to America”. Through enlargement, NATO would close any opportunity for renewing Russia’s imperialist attitudes towards its Western neighbors. “It is about Russia’s relationship to Europe…NATO’s enlargement helps a democratizing Russia by foreclosing the revival of any self-destructive imperial temptations regarding Central Europe”. The West, therefore, did not give up its perception of Russia as a potential threat to the newly independent neighbors.

This threat would be neutralized through incorporating them into NATO. After all, the threat perception of the alliance did not change drastically after the euphoric post-Cold War era and the constant declarations that the West/NATO and Russia did not consider each other as adversaries. NATO was, in the first place, a Cold War alliance created to contain the Soviet communist threat to Western Europe. In the post-Cold War era and after the ‘end’ of the Cold War, NATO would enlarge to spread democracy and market economy to Central and Eastern Europe but also to contain the latent threat that Russia might pose to these countries. The Cold War perception of the other as a threat did not actually end. Brzezinski reasoned that “The progressive expansion of NATO can similarly resolve the question of disproportionate Russian power in Europe”. NATO expansion “is not principally about the Russian threat, for currently it does not exist, though one cannot exclude its reappearance and hence some insurance against it is desirable” (“Brzezinski Testifies on NATO…”). Containment of the Russian threat persisted as a guiding concept of the United States policy and its NATO alliance’s policy toward Russia.

Senator Jesse Helms acknowledged that enlargement would make “fire walls” that would close any future options for Russia to try to restore its power on its neighbors. An expanded NATO would:
Shut off Russia’s avenues to more destructive patterns of behavior… Russia will no longer have the option, should the temptation ever arise, of seeking to restore its hegemony in Central Europe. With that avenue shut off, Russia is more likely to seek constructive options in its relations with the West. (‘‘Statement by Senator Jesse Helms…”’’)

Henry Kissinger emphasized this rationale by stating that enlargement would break a Russian historical tendency that conditioned Russian security with the establishment of friendly and dependent countries on its borders. Expansion would “encourage Russian leaders to break with the fateful rhythm of Russian history… and discourage Russia’s historical policy of creating a security belt of important, and, if possible, politically dependent states around its borders” (“The Debate over NATO Expansion…”’’). The security belt Kissinger was speaking about was the former Soviet Eastern and Central European satellites of the Cold War that were also members of the Warsaw Pact.

It is reasonable to claim that expansion was inevitable since the Soviet Union’s disintegration and the resulting Soviet weakness and chaos left the area that lied between Russia and Germany a security vacuum as analysts dubbed it. This security vacuum might have resulted in new confrontations between the newly independent states. Enlargement was a logical outcome and the expected step to be taken by the triumphant West over the defeated Soviet Union. Because the Warsaw Pact that used to incorporate them together with the Soviet Union disbanded the member states became nonaligned to any alliance. The option to remain neutral was possible, but these states had retained their sense of fear from a threatening Russia. In the aftermath of the Cold War, these countries switched sides of alliance from the east to the West. Russia, however, had never given up the policy concept of creating dependent neighbors in its immediate neighborhood. It would become an objective to be fulfilled after two rounds of NATO enlargement.
Enlargement, according to the United States and its allies, was to erase any dividing lines in the European continent and to establish a European security architecture for the whole of Europe where Russia should play a vital role. However the procedure brought the long feared outcome: a new division of Europe had just started. From 1999 to 2008 Russia remained out of the alliance’s full membership. Neither did Russia ask officially for membership (possibly for its self-esteem) nor did the West (because of mistrust and Russia’s threat to the alliance consensus spirit) invite it officially into the alliance. There were only some statements from the United States that the alliance would pursue an open door policy of enlargement hinting that new members would be welcomed in the future. On the Russian side both Yeltsin and his successor Putin had announced that they might not exclude the option of Russia becoming a NATO member.

The first body which was created to integrate some of the former members of the Warsaw Pact was the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) that was established in November 1991. It was meant to bring the members into a single consultative forum. In March 1992, the NACC was expanded to include all members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). This body did not surmount being a forum for discussions of military and security problems of the members.

To calm the Eastern European countries which started to feel a sense of rejection and indifference on the part of the alliance, NATO launched a new project that sought to establish a more practical relationship with Central and Eastern European states and the CIS countries. This step was intended to avoid, for the time being, raising the issue of full NATO membership to any country. The project was called the Partnership for Peace (PfP). Through this program official cooperation agreements were signed between NATO and the Partners. The program proved to be the intermediary step that prepared for the idea of enlargement and the offer of NATO full membership to qualified countries.
Between late 1993 and early 1994 the idea of enlargement became discussed publicly as something inevitable. This was officially confirmed by a public statement by President Bill Clinton that “the question was no longer whether NATO will take in new members, but when and how” (“The President’s News Conference…”). The Clinton Administration embraced enlargement on the basis that the Eastern European countries were unable to devise the necessary provisions that would guarantee their security.

It is worthy to note that NATO’s treaty permits the possibility of enlarging the alliance membership. This is confirmed by the 10th Article of its charter. “The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of the Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty” (“The North Atlantic Treaty”). This is the clause that extended membership from the original twelve members to Greece and Turkey in 1951, the Federal Republic of Germany in 1955 and Spain in 1982. Central and Eastern European countries can therefore be viable for membership under this article.

There was, however, no ultimate consensus about how the process of enlargement should be conducted and more importantly which countries would be incorporated. The allies realized that Russia would oppose the idea and would fight it “tooth and nail” (Eyal 705). As a result the alliance ordered for a detailed study over the issue. This was fulfilled through a report entitled the “Study on NATO Enlargement” that was published in September 1995.

The study concluded that a major reason why the alliance should expand lied in the new opportunity to build a collective and genuine European security. The end of the Cold War resulted in the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. This could be an opportunity to erase any dividing lines in Europe and spread peace to the whole continent. The study found that:
With the end of the Cold War and the disappearance of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, there was both a need for and a unique opportunity to build improved security in the whole of the Euro-Atlantic area, without recreating dividing lines...NATO will remain a defensive Alliance whose fundamental purpose is to preserve peace in the Euro-Atlantic area and to provide security to its members. ("The 1995 Study on NATO’s Enlargement")

The study stressed that enlargement was needed since it would enhance stability and good neighborly relationships among the new members. The countries that aspired for membership were required to make major reforms including the establishment of civilian control over military forces. The incorporation of new members in the alliance, as a result, would enhance the transparency of defense planning and military budgets between the members. The likelihood of instability that might be caused by an exclusively national approach to defense policies would be reduced to a great extent. Confidence and stability would be greatly reinforced. The new members would enjoy all the rights and assume all obligations of membership under the Washington Treaty. The study pointed out that the new members would “need to accept and conform with the principles, policies and procedures adopted by all members of the Alliance at the time that they join” ("The 1995 Study on NATO’s Enlargement"). The most important point was the military standardization of the new members to that of the original members.

A whole section in the NATO Study on Enlargement (1995) entitled “What Will Be Expected Militarily of New Members” focused on the objectives of standardization. As a minimum, new members should “accept NATO doctrine and policies relating to standardization and in addition aim at achieving a sufficient level of training and equipment to operate effectively with NATO forces” ("Study on NATO Enlargement: What…"). The equipments would be purchased, obviously, from the United States and its allies.
A keynote made by the alliance, however, was that “No country outside the Alliance has a veto or ‘droit de regard’ over the process of enlargement or decisions relating to it”. This was a clear reference to Russia since it was the only country that will perceive enlargement in a negative and threatening way. The Central and Eastern European countries sought fervently membership to protect themselves from any future Russian military threat. The Central and Eastern European countries had become independent and sovereign countries; and thus had the right to choose with whom to integrate themselves. “The reason why we want to join the alliance is that we share the values of civilization which it protects, and that we want to take part in protecting them. We realize that it is neither possible nor desirable to isolate Russia. However, we are independent states, and we decide ourselves about our affiliations and our policies” (“The President’s News Conference…”). The new affiliation these countries had taken was to shift their alliance from the east with Russia to the West with NATO and the United States. These states could have remained neutral with no alliance affiliations or could have integrated into European political organizations such as the European Union instead of membership in a military alliance.

The line separating pro-Russia and pro-NATO countries in fact persisted. During the Cold War, these states used to be under the Soviet sphere of influence and were members of the Warsaw Pact. In the post-Cold War era, these same states wanted to shift sides of alliance because they shared the “values of civilization which it protects” and they, once becoming members, would be protected by NATO from any foreign aggression. Aggression, if there would be any, was expected to be from the part of Russia. Becoming NATO members would include them into the NATO zone of protection that Russia would not dare to threaten. They would become, in a way, under the American and NATO sphere of influence.
By the end of the Cold War Eastern and Central European countries’ urge for membership increased. Western Europe was interested to open the main European institutions to their Eastern counterparts so that Europe could grow together. Klaus-Peter Klaiber, NATO Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs, argued that expansion became inevitable. He maintained that:

Not to offer our Eastern neighbors the prospect of joining NATO and the European Union (EU) would have amounted to the continuation of an implicit division of Europe—a division between a self-confident, secure West, and an uncertain, insecure East. The enlargement of NATO was thus both necessary and inevitable. (“The Membership Action Plan”)

After the deliberations that took place at the Madrid Summit in July 1997, the Allied Heads of State and Government invited the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to begin accession talks with NATO. This formal invitation came after Congress voted in favor of enlargement. The Senate voted 80-19 on April 30, 1998 in favor of admitting the three states into the alliance (Gallis 1). These were the first former Soviet satellites to be invited for membership.

Two-thirds Senate majority was necessary to admit new states because enlargement was considered as an amendment to the original North Atlantic Treaty. The aspirants spent almost three years in making the necessary political and military reforms in order to bring their standards up to those of the old members. The Accession Protocols were ratified by the sixteen allies and the three new members and the formal accession took place on March 12, 1999 (Meyer 85). They became the first former members of the Warsaw Pact to join NATO.

Because other Central European countries applied for membership (such as Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia and Slovakia) and as membership was granted only to three countries the alliance appeased them by stating that this enlargement was only one in a series and that enlargement would be “an open, continuing process, not a single event” (“The 1995 Study on
NATO’s Enlargement”). At the 1997 Madrid summit the alliance reiterated its promise that it would revisit the issue of further enlargement at its next summit. Indeed, at the NATO’s Council summit that convened on April 23, 1999 NATO heads of state and government announced that “Our Alliance remains open to all European democracies, regardless of geography, willing and able to meet the responsibilities of membership, and whose inclusion would enhance overall security and stability in Europe” (“The Washington Declaration”).

The Alliance considered a second round in which membership would be granted to other countries aspiring for membership. On March 29, 2004 under the administration of George Bush, seven Eastern European countries were incorporated. They were Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. Strange enough, the Baltic States, previously integral parts of the Soviet Union, joined the alliance and became new NATO members. This brought the number of members from 19 to 26. The alliance simultaneously started discussing the probable countries to be given membership in the near future. Albania, Croatia, Georgia and Ukraine were on the list.

Membership this time was considered to be granted for the second time, after the Baltic States, to two former Soviet republics: Georgia and Ukraine. These were countries that used to be part of the Soviet Union itself. By 2008 almost all the Soviet satellites of Central and Eastern Europe had gradually moved into the Western camp becoming full members of a Western alliance undeniably led by the United States. It was over these two states that Russia’s stance became more hawkish as the probable inclusion of Georgia and Ukraine was considered to be intolerable and unacceptable.

The rationales for expanding NATO stated previously were the ones that the United States promoted as the leading reasons for enlargement but what about the undeclared causes and reasons for expanding the alliance to Russia’s borders? Firstly, the early criticism to NATO’s persistence came from the realists who argued that although NATO lost its function
it persisted simply to serve as a means of maintaining “America’s grip” on the foreign and military policies of its European allies (Waltz). It would be used to carry other interests for the American economy.

Among these interests was the creation of new markets for American weaponry firms because the new members were expected to bring their armies up to the original members’ status. Albright emphasized that through enlargement “America will gain strong new partners in security and trade” (“Albright’s Statement before the Senate…”). Economic experts expected that the arms industry was going to gain a great deal from NATO expansion because the new aspirants would create a new market worth up to $30 billion. “For 50 years, this has been the only region of the world that has been denied Western military products, and so you are starting at ground zero,” said Joel Johnson, vice president for international affairs at the Aerospace Industries Association (“The Arms Exporter’s Wish…”). These markets became a field of fierce competition domestically among American weaponry firms and between the United States and its European brethren to have the lion’s share from this new deal. The U.S. arms industry cited “$10 billion in potential fighter sales” (“The Arms Exporter’s Wish…”). Future members, hence, represented a lucrative market for American and European firms whose production was boosted by NATO enlargement.

In addition to the thrifty arms market that would arise because of NATO expansion, America had also made great geopolitical gains in a territory that was previously closed for its economic, political and military influence. Petar Kuricic emphasized that NATO was still a military alliance that “was and still is an expression of American triumph in the Cold War and the rising of the USA to a status of the world’s only superpower” (25). By enlarging the alliance, NATO acquired new territories and new populations that would abide the alliance’s rule. Kuricic noted that by the inclusion of new members “NATO enlarged its territory for over a million square kilometers, and the population of its members grew by approximately
103 million inhabitants” (13-32). By including Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, NATO heightened the security of its eastern borders and enhanced the alliance’s abilities to intervene in areas of crisis at their early stages. The Central and Eastern European states represented “a good and reliable land bridge towards the regions where interventions are and could be necessary, on the large area from the Baltic over to the Black sea, Caucasus, and the Middle East” (23). The United States’ geo-strategic reach further expanded.

The new member states, especially Bulgaria and Romania, served well the United States in its wars against Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003) by accepting to host American military bases on their territories. They had played a key role in the deployment of American forces to its conflict areas by using their territories and air spaces. Saffet Akkaya, a member of the International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies (Slovenia), stressed the geostrategic importance of Bulgaria and Romania. “The Black Sea region provides an excellent base for power projection towards the heart of the Middle East, the Caucasus and the Balkans”. Reaching the Black Sea, a step forward for the military superiority long sought by the United States in this region was vital for its global position. An undeniable reason for America’s staunch support for an expanded NATO and new military bases was the extension of its power projection to parts that it had not yet reached.

Some authors, such as Chalmers Johnson, a retired professor of international Relations (University of California) and author of Nemesis: The Last Days of the American Republic, argues that America is seeking to build an empire and George Bush, specifically, has become an imperial president. In an interview with Amy Goodman, Johnson warned that the United States, as the imperialists that preceded it, will ultimately suffer from overstretch, bankruptcy, and the rise of coalitions of nations hostile to its imperialism. “A nation can be one or the other, a democracy or an imperialist, but it cannot be both”. The United States, according to Johnson, has by now 737 American military bases on every continent in over 130 countries.
Its appetite is growing as it seeks to build bases in Central Asia in the Caspian Basin oil-rich countries (“Chalmers Johnson on Nemesis…”). The military bases became the tool of spreading America’s power and influence all over the world.

It was expected from the beginning that Russia would not accept the idea of enlargement. A military alliance that was but years earlier the greatest enemy to the Eastern bloc was steadily approaching the Russian borders. For the Russians the expansion of the alliance eastward meant that the Americans were coming closer to its borders. Although successive American officials announced that enlargement was not intended to threaten Russia’s security but the latter could not digest the move. Waltz tried to clarify Russia’s critical stance by putting the issue the other way round. Americans, Waltz argued, should be able to imagine “what their fears would be if they had lost the Cold War” and Russia expanded the Warsaw Treaty Organization into the Americas, “all the while claiming that it was acting for the sake of stability in Central America with no threat to the United States implied”. If the United States could tolerate such a possibility, though they would not even at the theoretical level, they might comprehend Russia’s situation and perception of a real world state of affairs. Enlargement was real and the alliance was at the doors of Russia’s borders.

Containment, the core policy that shaped the Cold War period relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States lingered to influence America’s and the NATO alliance policies towards Russia in the post-Cold War era. NATO enlargement was a strategic step taken by the United States, in the first place, to contain in the future a resurgent Russia that might aspire to regain its losses. For Bruce Russett and Allan C. Stam “Whatever Westerners may say, that kind of expansion is directed against at least a hypothetical danger from Russia. It has no compelling purpose otherwise” (362). Stuart Croft confirmed that “one of the central concerns for NATO planners at that time was the ‘danger’ of a possible reconstitution of Soviet/Russian military force over the next couple of years” (105). The alliance’s greatest
concern was when and how Russia may threaten Europe’s security. Waltz asserted that “even while American leaders were assuring Russia that NATO’s expansion was not motivated by animosity toward Russia, American and NATO estimates of the costs entailed depended in large measure on speculations about when Russia would once again pose a military threat to Europe” (“The Balance of Power and NATO…”). The United States and NATO avoided the open discussion of the geopolitical implications of enlargement. Russia, however, came to perceive enlargement as changing the balance of power in Europe toward NATO.

NATO pursued an open door policy in its enlargement process. Enlargement was initiated under the Clinton administration and was vigorously carried out by the Bush administration. The reaction and response of Russia under Yeltsin would be very different from that of Putin. This might have resulted from the different domestic and international environments of the two administrations. The Yeltsin Administration did not have any other options but to complain about NATO’s new policy but Putin and later Medvedev would show a more self-confident Russian reaction.

2. Russia’s Reaction to NATO Enlargement

2.a. The Yeltsin Administration:

As soon as the West announced the step of NATO enlargement the Yeltsin administration and a great majority of Russian politicians were greatly alarmed. There was almost a complete consensus over the issue. Russian political leaders across the political spectrum, from pro-Western democrats to centrists to communists and extreme nationalists have been strongly opposed to NATO enlargement (Woehrel 1). President Yeltsin showed his alarming sensitivity toward the alliance’s decision to expand on a Russian television, when he commented on President Clinton’s assertion that NATO was open to everyone but “omitted to say: except Russia. And this is the whole crux of the matter. But to us, in a narrower circle, he
said this” (‘NATO: The Only West…”). Russia’s sense of marginalization by NATO started to emerge.

Yeltsin was both pro-Western and a reformer who sought the long term integration of his country within the Western political and economic systems. He was, in fact, pursuing an Atlanticist foreign policy since he showed a leaning to integrate in the Western institutions such as the WTO and the IMF. When the issue of NATO enlargement came to the fore he expressed his willingness and eagerness to incorporate his country within the alliance. Yeltsin sent NATO a message in which he stated that Russia was considering membership in the alliance as a long term objective (T. Friedman). There were no imminent Western overtures to respond to Yeltsin’s claim. This was due to the West’s perception that Russia was still not “qualified” or was still representing a “threat” the alliance was enlarging, in the first place, to minimize. On August 25, 1993 Yeltsin made a joint declaration with President Lech Walesa of Poland where he declared that Polish entry into NATO would not be considered as anti-Russian as long as it was in a context of an overall European integration in which Russia would be included. The Russian opposition at home harshly criticized Yeltsin’s statement and argued that this would be considered by the West as a green light to proceed in enlargement.

But even when Russia was considering alliance membership it was referring to political and not military integration. Russia was not considering the capitulation of its control over the Russian armies to the alliance which was considered as one led by the United States, a country which was just few years earlier its enemy. Yeltsin stressed Russia’s aspiration to join the political part of NATO. Dr Ira Straus, from the Committee on Eastern Europe and Russia in NATO, clarified that “Russia was still against expansion of a Russia-less NATO. It was still for inclusion of Russia. But Yeltsin spoke only for eventual inclusion on the political side and structures of the alliance, not the military structures” (‘The Evolution of the Discussion on NATO…”). According to Yeltsin, such an inclusion would keep Russia’s presence in the
discussion of European issues. Not to be in the alliance even politically entailed that Russia had become if not had remained an outsider especially if the alliance might carry on its open door policy toward all the former countries that used to be under the Soviet control.

The Russian opposition (mainly the nationalists and communists) showed their total refusal of enlargement because they were sure that NATO would not open its doors to Russia. Russia’s negative tendency toward the issue became clearer when Yevgeny Primakov replaced Andrei Kozyrev as Yeltsin’s Prime Minister. Primakov deviated from his predecessor’s integrationist policy and criticized American expansionism through NATO as an attempt to world domination. Primakov preached multipolarism\(^\text{30}\) as the best system for the international order.

When the first round of enlargement was initiated, it became clear that Russia was not among the new members. Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic were accepted to join NATO. Russia expressed its resentment to the issue because it started to perceive the alliance as moving eastward with an open door policy that was only closed to her. Russia, from the beginning, was not genuinely considered for NATO membership as the tradition of consensus within the alliance would disappear would Russia enter the alliance. The members knew that Russia would not be easygoing to reach consensus on the alliance’s policies and decisions. They were considering the ultimate division in the alliance if Russia would become a member. The problem lied in the veto right that would be given to each new member. Straus stressed that since Russia was not trusted to avoid using the veto, “the idea of Russian membership has been dropped”.

Russia’s full membership was consequently dropped and the alliance devised another body. The NATO - Russia Permanent Joint Council was a forum in which representatives of all NATO members and that of Russia would discuss European security and political issues. Before ratifying the amendment to expand NATO, Senator Jesse Helms insisted that the
ratification resolution should contain a condition that Russia would have neither a voice, nor a veto in NATO affairs, and that the joint Russia - NATO council would not have a consultative role with Moscow, but would nearly inform the Russians of decisions taken by NATO (“Press Briefing by Mike…”). A Russian veto over NATO decisions in the PJC was out of question.

Congress ratified the Senate Resolution on NATO Ratification on April 30, 1998 (“Senate Resolution of Ratification…”). This body was meant for discussion and Russia had no veto power over any decision taken by the alliance since it was not a full member. Russia became in a way linked to the alliance through this PJC but with no real power of vetoing any resolution. This was indeed a genius but incoherent Western plan to include and exclude Russia at the same time. White House spokesman Michael McCurry once explained that “NATO would retain its full prerogatives, and while Russia will work closely with NATO, it will not work within NATO” (“Press Briefing by Mike…”). The point was also emphasized by Albright who asserted that Russia “will not have the power to dilute, delay or block NATO decisions”. The PJC “will give Russia a voice, but not a veto - a chance to work in partnership with NATO, not within NATO. Both sides will retain complete freedom of action when we cannot agree” (“Albright Prepared Statement…”). The PJC was simply a forum of discussion.

However this incoherent policy led to a critical dilemma for both NATO and Russia. In NATO every member could veto any decision. In the PJC, Russia was given a voice (that is, it could express its point of view in an independent manner) but not a veto power. Its opposition to any decision made by the alliance would be meaningless since it could not veto any of them. The Russian potential membership was seen as a direct cause that would lead to the alliance’s division and weakness if not its demise. The members were sure that Russia, if incorporated, would act as a rival and not as a partner.

Clinton and Yeltsin met at the Helsinki Summit that convened in Finland on March 20, 1997 (Parrish). The meeting was meant to discuss issues of bilateral arms control,
technological cooperation and economic development in Russia. But most important was the discussion of the issue of NATO enlargement. Yeltsin went to the meeting with a firm opposition to the alliance to expand. However, at the closing of the summit he declared that “We believe that the eastward expansion of NATO is a mistake and a serious one…” Nevertheless, in order to minimize the negative consequences for Russia, we decided to sign an agreement with NATO” (qtd. in Lippman). Yeltsin even declared that he no longer considered any realistic hope of halting NATO enlargement and that his current aim was to lessen the negative outcomes of enlargement on Russia. Yeltsin reiterated Russia’s opposition to NATO expansion in the American - Russian Summit in Moscow 1998 when he noted that enlargement was “a blunder, a big mistake, and one day this will be a historic error” (“U.S. - Russia Summit”).

At the Helsinki Summit (1997), Yeltsin’s resolve faded away and a legally - binding treaty was dropped. Yeltsin and Clinton ratified a Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation. As a result, the Russia - NATO Permanent Joint Council was created. One of the most rhetorical declarations was that Russia and NATO “do not consider each other as adversaries” (“Founding Act on Mutual…”). The act’s provisions looked ideal and promising but lines after the early statement came “Provisions of this Act do not provide Russia or NATO, in any way, with a right of veto over the actions of the other nor do they infringe upon or restrict the rights of Russia or NATO to independent decision-making and action” (“Founding Act on Mutual…”). Thus Russia and NATO would discuss issues. It could voice its opinions about any European security matter but it had no right to veto any NATO resolution.

The shift in Yeltsin’s position could be the result of Clinton’s promise that he would support Russia’s integration into global economic institutions and to give it a more formal role in the Group of Seven leading industrialized nations, the WTO and the Paris Club.
But Clinton’s promise of economic aid to Russia and support for its membership to world economic organizations was conditioned by the latter’s economic and legal system reforms that would provide the healthy and necessary environment for Western investment in Russia.

Yeltsin’s bold agenda to improve the investment climate and stimulate growth included comprehensive tax reform, new energy laws and tough anti-crime legislation, all paramount for any future Western investments in Russia. Feffer noted that the Clinton administration, pressured by business interests, wanted “to establish a playing field in Russia that benefited U.S. commercial interests, particularly in the energy and mining sectors”. Future integration of Russia into world economic institutions and promises of American aid and investment were among the carrots given to Russia to make it lenient to the issue of enlargement.

The other cause leading to Yeltsin’s changed position was Clinton’s promise that NATO enlargement would not pose any threat to Russia’s security. While expanding, the alliance would not disturb the military balance achieved in the aftermath of the Cold War between the Soviet Union and Europe. Russia’s mistrust was shown through its demands of fulfilling some conditions on the part of the alliance. On March 1996, Primakov asked for “legally-binding guarantees that no nuclear weapons, foreign forces, or any NATO military infrastructure would be moved onto the territory of new members” (qtd. in Woehrel 2).

Primakov also insisted on a Western commitment not to consider an immediate second round of enlargement and rather to postpone it as long as possible. The Russian insistence on a legally-binding commitment to not deploy troops or nukes in the new member states stemmed from the West’s broken promises if not a betrayal of a previous pledge given to former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev. For the Russians, Gorbachev consented over the reunification of Germany and its incorporation into NATO because there was a Western promise made by
U.S. Secretary of State James Baker that NATO would not “expand one inch to the east” of unified Germany (Adomeit 3). This pledge would not be kept.

The Clinton-Yeltsin summit’s outcome was for the most part unenthusiastically if not badly received by the Russian parliamentarians. The only political parties that received its outcomes positively were the Liberal Yabloko Party and the Democratic Russia Party. The leader of the Communist Party, Gennady Zyuganov, condemned Yeltsin of “betraying the national interests of the country”. He called the summit a “crushing defeat” and compared it with the Treaty of Versailles of 1919 that imposed humiliating conditions on defeated Germany (“Reactions to U.S.-Russia Summit”). For the Russian communists, Russia appeared weak and submissive.

Vladimir Lukin, Chairman of the Duma’s Committee on International Affairs, expressed his dissatisfaction about the summit’s outcomes in a press conference on March 24, 1998. “Of course we are offended”, in reference to NATO enlargement, he considered the issue as “dangerous” since it would isolate Russia and revive nationalist tendencies at home. Lukin warned “We will become stronger, and we are still a nuclear power. It is a danger to us and a danger to you. A few years ago there was the idea of partnership, now there is a strong hesitation in the United States” (“The Russian Reaction to NATO Summit”).

Expansion had repercussions that Russia could not bear. Ira Straus discerned the areas on which Russia had perceived NATO enlargement as harmful to its interests. At the diplomatic level, Russia would be isolated from European security decision-making as it had not become a full member yet. The addition of former Soviet satellites added a dose of “anti-Russian” sentiment to the alliance and thus further weakening Russia’s bargaining power in European affairs. At the psychological level Russia would always remember its defeat in the Cold War as the reason behind NATO’s aggressive penetration in its former space (“The
Evolution of the Discussion on NATO…”). Isolation and encirclement by unfriendly if not anti-Russia new NATO members was the new fact that enlargement brought.

Yeltsin’s Atlanticism was not embraced by all his cabinet. There were members who were greatly alarmed by America’s quest for hegemony and sought a global role for Russia and reassertion of its power especially in its near-abroad. The shift from Yeltsin’s pro-American policy toward a much more anti-American one was the result of the continued contraction of the economy and impoverishment of a great majority of the population. Yeltsin’s popularity dwindled and the Duma, the Russian lower house of Parliament, came to be dominated by communists and nationalists from the mid to late 1990s. This might have obliged him to change his pro-Western foreign minister, Andrei Kozyrev, by Yevgeni Primakov.

The landslide victory of the communists and ultranationalists in the Russian parliamentary elections of December 1995 brought the U.S.-Russian relations to a delicate position. Stanly Kober, from the CATO institute, warned earlier that the United States should not take steps that would provoke Russia. Enlarging NATO would be an “unwise step” because it would “undermine Russia’s already beleaguered democrats, intensify Russian suspicions about Western designs to weaken their country, and play into the hands of militaristic elements that argue that Moscow must restore the Soviet empire to protect Russia’s national security” (“NATO Expansion and the Danger…”). For the nationalists Russia should revive and restore its position as a great power and end.

The United States was taking advantage of Russia’s weakness to proceed with its project of enlarging the alliance because Russia would have no powerful leverage to stop it. Desisting from taking the step when Russia was weak entailed that the step would not be thinkable if Russia regained its power. Henry Kissinger argued that Russia should not be allowed, under current status, to veto the expansion. “If Russia can veto NATO membership...
now, when it is in need of economic support, what it will veto when it has been strengthened through reform and American economic assistance?” (qtd. in Kober). The opportunity to enlarge, thus, should be seized and exploited to its utmost while Russia was still weak and lenient.

In a more frank statement, Kober stressed that the West could not foul Russia by declaring that expansion was not pursued against it. He criticized the rationales behind enlargement given by the West as characterized by dishonesty. The constant Western claim that NATO expansion “is not directed against Russia…is not serious-and frequently it is not even sincere”. He asserted that such a claim would not be believed by the Russians because they were not “that gullible”. Kober emphasized that a sincere and meaningful debate should proceed to face the reality. Fear is the chief motive behind the Eastern and Central European countries’ request for NATO membership. But the most important thing is whether expansion is the right thing to do. Kober admitted that the countries of Central and Eastern Europe wanted to be admitted to NATO “because they are afraid of Russia…Their fears are not wholly unjustified”. He questioned whether NATO expansion “is the proper way of addressing their fears or whether it would make the situation worse” (“NATO Expansion and the Danger…”). Some Russian analysts raised the idea that the Cold War was still played. Andrei Filipov, a foreign affairs expert in Russia’s communist party wondered “Maybe the Cold War was in fact the Cold Peace…Maybe what we have now is a Cold War” (qtd. in Kober). Indeed mutual suspicion remained a characteristic of U.S.-Russian relations even after the assumed end of the Cold War.

Although Russia under Yeltsin resented NATO eastward expansion to its borders the alliance managed to fulfill its objective and the Visegrad countries (Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary) eventually became members. Yeltsin was followed by a more resolved president who would bring a major shift in U.S.-Russian relations. A clear
deterioration in the bilateral relationship led some political analysts to call the Bush/Putin presidencies as a New Cold War.

2.b. The Putin Administration:

Yeltsin’s successor to the Kremlin was his former Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. When Yeltsin resigned on December 31, 1999 Putin became acting president. In 2000 Putin won the presidential elections (‘Yeltsin’s Resignation Speech’). This former KGB agent would revitalize Russia’s great power status to a great extent. His accession to the presidency brought extreme change to the U.S.-Russian relationship and the bilateral relations deteriorated to their lowest status since the end of the Cold War.

Putin ascended to power with the intention of carrying Russia’s path to become a capitalist and democratic nation fully integrated in the Western leading institutions. Richard Sakwa stated that Putin pursued a new realist agenda that “sought to craft a policy that asserted Russia’s national interests while integrating it into the world community” (242). Putin’s terms were characterized by an economic revival not witnessed since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The economy boosted causing resurgence in Russia’s foreign policy aims and aspirations. Putin managed to strengthen economic growth, reduce the rate of unemployment and inflation, and the government had “paid off most of its foreign debt” (Malofeeva and Brenton). But analysts argued that this economic revival did not stand on a strong basis because Russia depended for the most part on its hydrocarbon exports and not on a strong economic infrastructure. Putin himself admitted that there were two huge problems that have to be solved. The “diversification of the economy and conferring on it an innovative development character” (“Putin’s Boasts of Russia’s…”). Russia had economically revived but its growth did not stand on a solid base.
Putin, initially, focused on the normalization of Russian foreign policy by following a policy that would make Russia neither a “supplicant” nor a “disruptor” as Sakwa commented (243). He sought to reestablish Russia’s status as a great power exercising its relations in an independent manner of American leverage. More importantly Russia started to refuse the Western tutelary relationship on its economic and political systems. Putin’s new realist vision of Russia’s foreign policy was centered on the principle that “Russia is part of a European civilizational identity and should be accepted on its own terms as an equal member of the international community” (Sakwa 245). For Petr Kratochvil from the Institute of International Relations (Prague), Putin was a pragmatist who “cooperates with the United States in those fields where it is beneficial for his country and where it helps Russia reassert its great power status” (13-14). A clear manifestation of Putin’s tendency towards reasserting Russia’s engagement with the West was the considerable Russian assistance to the United States in the aftermath of September 11 attacks in 2001.

Russia expressed its sympathy to the United States claiming that it shared the same concern over the same threat to international peace, that is, terrorism. Putin concretely showed Russia’s commitment to help the United States in its military campaign against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Hours after the attacks on the World Trade Center, Putin was the first president to express his condolences to President George Bush. He even consented that the United States could make use of some Central Asian countries in its war against Afghanistan.

Russia, by helping the United States, had a long term objective. The Taliban was a thorny issue for Russia because of the destabilizing role that regime could play especially in spreading radical Islam into Russia’s Central Asian neighbor countries and even destabilizing Russia’s Muslim population. Goldman pointed out that American operations in Afghanistan after September 11 “served a double interest for Moscow: the opportunity to demonstrate concrete strategic cooperation with Washington, and the elimination of a serious security
threat on its vulnerable southern flank” (5). Terrorism was a common threat that made cooperation possible if not desirable.

To show his inclination to ameliorate relations with the United States Putin unilaterally decided in August 2000 to reduce Russia’s strategic nuclear forces from nearly 6,000 deployed warheads to 1,500. The Russian Ministry of Defense announced in 2001 its plan of reducing the Russian military manpower from 1.2 million to 850,000 (Goldman 7). Putin announced on October 17, 2001 that Russia would be closing its intelligence base at Lourdes, Cuba established in 1964 (Miroff). The base was a strategic asset for Russia because this listening post “was Moscow’s largest and most important intelligence facility outside its borders and was considered a thorn in the side by the United States”. The base provided more than 60 percent of Russia’s “electronic intelligence data on the United States” (Goldman 6).

Whether because of inability to maintain its military stature or willingness to show positive behavior for the West, Russia started to show goodwill in enhancing cooperation with the United States.

Putin knew that Russia’s economic well-being was dependent on its good and cooperative relationship with the West and mainly the United States. His top priority was the revitalization of the Russian economy, an aim that could not be achieved without cooperation with the United States. Putin asserted in a speech delivered in a conference of Foreign Ministry Officials that convened in Moscow on July 12, 2002 that the confident partnership between Russia and the United State was “not only in the interests of our people. It exerts a positive influence on the entire system of international relations and therefore remains one of our absolute priorities” (“Speech at Enlarged Conference…”). The United States has a key role in the global economy. It is the world’s largest market, generates the most investment capital, and has a leading role in the policies of international financial and economic
institutions such as the IMF, World Bank and WTO (Goldman 19). Thus, for Russia economic collaboration with the United States remains a priority.

Putin was expecting rewards from his American counterpart for Russia’s cooperation. In return for the Russian cooperation in the war on terrorism, the White House had folded Russia’s war on Chechnya as a war on terrorism. This recognition would automatically relieve Russia from the American criticism of Russia’s policies and human rights abuses in this region. The U.S. Department of Commerce officially certified Russia as a “market economy”, a step that would enhance the bilateral trade relations between the two countries and more importantly would “bring Russia a step closer to WTO membership” (Goldman17).

Putin’s cooperative policies started to result in gratifying rewards from the part of the United States.

At the security level, mainly over further enlargement of the alliance, the points of view remained contradictory. Initially, Putin showed a similar inclination to that of Yeltsin about Russia’s possible membership in NATO. In a BBC interview, Putin was asked by David Frost whether Russia would ever join NATO. “Why not?” was his answer. “I do not rule out such a possibility…on condition that Russia’s interests are going to be taken into account, if Russia becomes a full - fledged partner” (“Putin’s Interview with the BBC”). However, Putin’s aspirations that Russia would be fully integrated into NATO as an equal partner did not materialize.

The United States declared, in December 2001, that it would withdraw from the ABM Treaty (“America Withdraws from ABM Treaty”). For Russia, this treaty represented the basis of strategic stability. More provocative if not humiliating was America’s announcement that formal NATO membership invitation would be given to new countries in the Prague Summit of 2002 (“NATO Transformed: New…”). The alliance decided to welcome seven new members. Among the aspirants were the former Soviet Republics of Estonia, Latvia and
Lithuania (also known as the Baltic States). This was the second round of post-Cold War enlargement and Russia, obviously, was not on the list.

Bush enthusiastically announced America’s great pleasure with such a decision. “By welcoming seven members, we will not only add to our military capabilities, we will refresh the spirit of this great democratic Alliance. We believe today’s decision reaffirms our commitment to freedom and our commitment to a Europe which is whole and free and at peace” (“Prague Summit 2002…” 15). The Russian reaction was, as expected, greatly negative. Russian policymakers “felt betrayed by the West” and Putin was accused of “conceding far too much during the first few years of his presidency” (J. Smith 7). Obviously, Russian cooperation did not bring the results the Putin administration had aspired for especially over the future enlargement of NATO.

Enlarging the alliance to include former Soviet Republics heightened Russia’s sensitiveness and security concerns. Parts of the former Soviet Union would become parts of NATO, its Cold War rival. The Russian official circle reaction unanimously condemned the step and warned of its negative repercussions. Anton La Guardia from the Daily Telegraph cited Sergei Lavrov, the Russian Foreign Minister, as saying “We did not want this enlargement, and we will continue to maintain a negative attitude”. This step had created “a kind of paranoia in Russia” because of the idea that American soldiers would be present “on our borders,” Lavrov added (“NATO is No Problem in Baltics…”). Russia could not stand further expansion, its sense of threat and mistrust were increasing as the appetite for further expansion continued and the open door proved to be closed only for her.

For Russia, NATO’s advance to the Baltics was posing numerous strategic problems. Their accession entailed that NATO forces could get closer to its borders since the three states shared direct borders with Russia. Such an action would undermine the attempts to strengthen stability in the European continent because it would antagonize Russia’s relations with NATO
as well as its approximate neighbors. Enlargement would further weaken Russia’s influence in
the Baltic States and would limit its access to Baltic Sea. Admiral Feliks Gromov, Commander in Chief of the Russian Navy, considered the American assertion that NATO’s advance into Russian borders was increasing European security to be “naïve”. The ultimate aim of such consolidation, for Gromov, was “the securing of unilateral political, economic, and military advantages and, as a result, crowding Russia out from the community of Baltic States” (qtd. in Blank, “The Baltic States: What…”). By the inclusion of the Baltic States in NATO, Russia sense of encirclement increased.

NATO expansion brought the Europe “free and undivided” rhetoric under question. The states which were fervently seeking membership were doing so in the first place because they were afraid of a resurgent and expansionist Russia in the future. Stephen Blank, the Douglas MacArthur Professor of Research at the U.S. Army War College, confirmed that the chief reason was their certainty that Russia might seek to bring them back into its sphere of influence. “Fear of Russia still drives much of the region’s foreign policy”. This could be countered only through “integration with the West”. Otherwise, Russia’s “gravitational force” which the Baltic States perceived as an anti-European force and as “a threat to their national survival” would most probably succeed (“Russia and the Baltics in the Age…”). The Baltic States and four other countries (Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia) became officially NATO members in 2004 (Schrader). The alliance by now included twenty six members.

In a symbolic gesture, President George Bush welcomed the Prime Ministers of all the new member states to the White House in March 2004 (“President Bush Welcomes Seven…”). At the celebration Bush delivered a speech in which he announced that the new members were “friends before they were allies, and they were allies in action before becoming allies by treaty” hinting to their role in supporting America’s wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. He emphasized that the alliance’s open door policy would be carried out until the
“whole of Europe is united in freedom and in peace” (“Bush Welcomes Seven...”). The United States, consequently, gained new allies that would support its missions and duties all over the world and mainly in its war on terror. In its resolution on NATO’s inclusion of new members the Duma commented that America’s global challenges do not necessarily entail a military buildup in Russia’s neighborhood. “Common responses to modern global challenges do not require a build - up of weapons on the territories of Russia’s neighbors” (“Russia Condemns NATO...”). In an attempt to soften Russian resentment and opposition toward the issue of NATO expansion, the PJC was replaced by the NATO-Russia Council (NRC)\textsuperscript{32} in 2002.

The Bush administration proposed this new council to grant Russia a more genuine role in European affairs. Under the NRC, Russia and NATO member states would meet as equals “at 27” instead of the bilateral “NATO+1” format under the PJC. The NRC was intended to enhance co-operation in a number of areas, including the struggle against terrorism, Afghanistan, crisis management, non-proliferation, arms control, theatre missile defense, military-to-military cooperation and civil emergencies (“NATO-Russia”).

If Putin’s first term was characterized by a Russian inclination to cooperate with the West and the United States more particularly, his second term would witness a great deterioration in the bilateral relationship that escalated to open confrontation. Putin would start it with a new agenda in Russia’s foreign policy goals. It would bring a more confident if not resurgent Russia into the European affairs. Russia would show a clear assertiveness in its foreign policy especially in the near-abroad and over the inclusion of two other former Soviet Republic: Georgia and Ukraine. Yevgeny Gusarov, former deputy foreign minister, warned that the former Soviet republics were considered a “red line” that the alliance should not cross or risk “destruction of the existing world order” (Feffer). But NATO’s second round of enlargement traversed the Russian red line despite Russia’s reservations.
Russia’s anger heightened when Georgia and Ukraine declared their aspirations to join NATO. Russia’s imperialist tendencies over its neighbors would become clearer as the provocative policies of NATO to expand more continued. Unless Russia showed a strong disposition the alliance would further expand resulting in greater marginalization and loss of influence. Oksana Antonenko, Senior Fellow at the International Institute of Security Studies (London) argued that Russia’s foreign policy was still hostage to the “zero sum game” political perception which entailed that Russia’s retreat from its former Soviet space would be seized by the United States as an opportunity to insert its power and influence. “Russia still views security in terms of geography and realpolitik. Its leaders remain worried about the influence of external actors in what they consider to be Russia’s security space”. James Sherr, Head of the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Chatham House (London) confirms that the Russians have a “pre-Cold War, pre-1940 view of things” (“Russia: A New Confrontation” 6). Russia maintained the idea that there should be neighboring space where no security threats were present. For Russia, NATO presence in the FSU space was considered as an imminent and intolerable threat.

This represents an analogy of Russia’s current objections over NATO enlargement with its Soviet era security concerns about the Soviet Union’s Western border. Soviet expansion at that time was mainly driven by an urge to secure the county’s Western boundaries by establishing friendly and similar regimes. In the Cold War era the neighbors were Eastern and Central European states. In the post-Cold War era, the neighbors became the former Soviet republics.

NATO, by now would represent the most imminent threat for Russia. Although the latter repeated its assurances that it was not an offensive but defensive military alliance Russia perceived the alliance, its expansion and policies with malaise and suspicion. Thomas Graham, senior director at Kissinger Associates (Washington D.C.) attributed the
deterioration in U.S.-Russian relations to the lingering Cold War stereotypes. To overcome Cold War thinking and mistrust was not an easy task because “ingrained suspicion and distrust do not vanish overnight” (2). Putin clearly announced Russia’s apprehension by stating “We are concerned over the process of NATO expansion. This organization has been and remains a military and political bloc with all the set of threats that any formation of this type involves” (qtd. in Adomeit 2). No longer satisfied by its minor role in its immediate neighborhood as well as in European affairs, Russia showed a determination to become a great power with a certain droit de regard in the FSU, that is, a sphere of influence.

Martin McCaulay, former lecturer at the University of London stresses that Russia is seeking to reassert its power regionally and in world affairs due to nostalgia for the old days when its predecessor, the Soviet Union, was one of the world’s power centers. Russia, hence, “wishes to become like the Soviet Union. Its end goal is to become a superpower” (Russia: A New Confrontation” 8). But is Russia only wishing to become a superpower or does it already have potentials that entitle it to this status? The potentials of Russia are undeniable. Russia has still the ability to influence regional and global affairs and stability. The potentials range from forming strategic alliances with anti-American and non-NATO members, to intimidating neighbors that aspire for membership in organizations that Russia perceives as a threat (mainly NATO), to destabilizing peace and territorial integrity in near-abroad countries. The new aspirants, that is, Georgia and Ukraine can be easily subjected to Russian destabilizing policies by welcoming their large pro-Russian territories into the Russian Federation or supporting their demands for independent statehood (S. Cohen, “The New American Cold War”).

Sensitivity toward America’s policies took a dramatic change in the aftermath of the Orange Revolution in Ukraine (2004). This was a turning point in U.S.-Russian relationship. The Putin administration concluded that cooperation with the United States after the terrorist
attacks in 2001 had not brought concrete benefits for Russia. Instead the United States had taken policies that Russia perceived as harmful to its interests starting from NATO’s expansion, the missile defense system and America’s interference in Russia’s domestic affairs. The War in Chechnya was criticized as violating human rights and Russia’s policies toward its neighbors through the cutting of oil supplies as leverage were harshly condemned.

During a press conference in Vilnius, Lithuania in 2006, U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney accused Russia of running against democracy, limiting human rights and using its energy riches to blackmail the world. Cheney hinted to Russia’s cuts of oil and gas supplies to Ukraine; the main corridor from where almost 80 percent of Europe’s Russian gas supplies were running through. Cheney attacked the Putin administration’s policies as hindering Russia’s path to become a healthy and vibrant democracy. He asserted:

In Russia today, opponents of reform are seeking to reverse the gains of the last decade…the government has unfairly and improperly restricted the rights of her people…No legitimate interest is served when oil and gas become tools of intimidation or blackmail, either by supply manipulation or attempts to monopolize transportation. (”Vice President’s Remarks…”)

The Russian official circle started to denounce America’s unwillingness to accept and respect Russia as a major world power if not to prevent it from playing that role. The American criticism of its political system was greatly resented as interference in domestic affairs.

Putin’s famous address in the Munich conference in 2007 was regarded by some critics as a Russian declaration of a new Cold War. William Engdahl, an economist and author, commented “A visitor from another planet might have the impression that the Russian president had abruptly decided to launch a provocative confrontation policy with the West reminiscent of the 1943-91 Cold War” (”Russia and the New Cold War…”). In the speech, Putin boldly criticized American unilateralism and quest for hegemony.
Putin denounced the United States’ unilateralist policies that disregarded multilateral decision-making. It was doing the opposite of what it was preaching. It claimed that its aims were the spread of democracy to every corner of the world; democracy which entailed the rule of the majority, a concept violated by the United States in numerous foreign policy decisions that defied UN resolutions. “We are constantly being taught about democracy. But for some reason those who teach us do not want to learn themselves” (“Putin’s Speech in Munich…”). Confrontational rhetoric increased as both countries criticized the others policies in an aggressive manner not common since the end of the Cold War.

Putin, in the same speech, reiterated the bad effects of America’s policies and unrestricted use of military power to further America’s interests. “Today we are witnessing an almost uncontained hyper use of …military force - in international relations, force that is plunging the world into an abyss of permanent conflicts…We are seeing a greater and greater disdain for the basic principles of international law”. For Putin, the preservation of world peace and law should be the duty of the United Nations and no other institution (hinting to NATO) because force could be legitimately used only if the decision was sanctioned by the United Nations.

On the issue of NATO enlargement Putin confirmed it did not have any relation with the modernization of the Alliance or with ensuring security in Europe. On the contrary, expansion represented “A serious provocation that reduces the level of mutual trust. And we have the right to ask: Against whom is this expansion intended? And what happened to the assurances our Western partners made after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact? Where are those declarations today?” (“Putin’s Speech in Munich…”).

Putin then moved to criticize NATO’s policy of expansion by arguing that it was leading to the creation of new dividing lines in Europe; a division that Europe got rid of only after Russia had chosen the path of “democracy, freedom, openness and partnership” with its
European counterparts. “Now they are trying to impose new dividing lines and walls on us - these walls may be virtual but they are nevertheless dividing ones that cut through our continent” (“The Unipolar Governance is Illegal…”). Russia came to consider that its western partners did not consider it to be part of Europe but an outsider. But Russia did not apply for membership either. Lord Robertson, NATO Secretary General, stated in a joint speech with President Putin in Brussels (2001) that “There will be an enlargement of NATO next year…At the moment there is no application from Russia but there is a partnership which is growing in depth and relevance” (“Speech by NATO Secretary…”). The partnership was giving way to confrontation.

Russia’s wishes for NATO’s transformation had been dashed at the Riga Summit of 2006. In that summit the connotation of NATO transformation in the Western opinion proved to be totally different if not opposite to that of Russia. Adomeit clarifies “Transformation in NATO’s understanding should contribute to increase in military effectiveness of the alliance. It envisages further improvements in NATO’s command structure and more flexible, more technologically advanced and more readily deployable forces” (10). NATO was interested in modernizing the militaries of its member states, hence, further increasing Russia’s concerns.

The issue of NATO expansion became more contentious when the alliance initiated the procedure of incorporating Georgia and Ukraine. Russia’s tone and rhetoric became more assertive if not aggressive. The alliance wanted to absorb two CIS countries and former Soviet republics. NATO was an alliance originally created and led by the United States. And all the military actions it took from its early establishment in 1949 till the invasion of Iraq in 2003 were American driven. Its continuous unilateralist and aggressive policies in the post-Cold War period confirmed Russia’s fears that the alliance was not benign and unthreatening.

In a press conference in March 2008, President Bush reasserted America’s commitment to grant NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP)\textsuperscript{34} to aspirant Georgia and Ukraine. He
stressed the importance of including these two counties as beneficial. “I believe that NATO benefits, and Ukraine and Georgia benefit, if and when there is membership” (“President Bush Participates…”). The issue resulted in a grave division among the members of the alliance since some were in favor of welcoming Georgia and Ukraine (mostly the United States and the post-Cold War new members). Others, like Germany, France, Belgium and Italy were against it. It was over Georgia and Ukraine that Russia’s stance would surpass rhetoric.

Russia’s sense of threat was heightened and the idea of maintaining the former Soviet space and more particularly the CIS countries as its sphere of influence became an urgency. Putin stressed that Russia should not allow a political vacuum to occur in the CIS space because this would be taken as an opportunity by other states (clearly hinting to the United States) to insert their position and influence there. “The absence of an effective Russian policy in the CIS or even an unsubstantiated pause in the pursuit of such a policy will inevitably result in a situation where other, more energetic states will fill this vacuum” (“Address at the Plenary Session…”). Russia consequently should assertively reestablish its power over its neighbors.

The ideal cause for further enlarging the alliance promoted by the West, and mainly the United States, was that Georgia and Ukraine were independent and sovereign countries, thus, capable of pursuing their policies of integrating themselves with European institutions such as the EU and NATO without having to be intimidated by Russia. Roderic Lyne (former British ambassador to Russia, adviser to BP and HSBC Bank), Strobe Talbott (president of the Brookings Institution) and Koji Watanabe (Senior Fellow at the Japan Center for International Exchange and former Japanese ambassador to Russia) argued that the West should oppose Russian “coercion” of Ukraine and that the latter should maintain its sovereign right to determine its own future. “The West should defend the right of the Ukrainians to make a free
decision,” they insisted (92). The United States knew that both Georgia and Ukraine had great aspirations to become future NATO members. It also knew that these ambitions would be thwarted by Russia whenever possible.

A bolder declaration was announced at the Bucharest Summit in April 2008. The NATO Heads of State and governments welcomed Georgia and Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations and announced that MAP would be granted to both of them. The Heads of State of NATO declared that “We agreed today that these countries will become members of NATO. Both nations have made valuable contributions to Alliance operations. We welcome the democratic reforms in Ukraine and Georgia…MAP is the next step for Ukraine and Georgia on their direct way to membership (“Bucharest Summit Declaration”). Before any new country becomes a member, there should be a kind of referendum on NATO membership in the aspirant countries to detect the public opinion about the issue. In the case of Ukraine opinion polls showed that only 22 to 25 percent of the population supported accession to NATO (Larabee). The majority was against future membership.

Russia’s sensitivity toward Ukraine’s accession to NATO was immediately echoed by Russian officials. The Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stressed the historical and cultural bounds that had long tied the two countries together. Lavrov explained:

For Russia, the accession of Ukraine would be especially sensitive…Ukraine has formed a single whole with Russia for centuries…shared historical and cultural values, the unity of interests, and numerous family ties give a special character to relations between our peoples. The attempt at a sharp and hardly justified switchover to Western values may become a serious destabilizing factor primarily for Ukrainian society itself. (qtd. in Adomeit 27)

The reasons of Russia’s opposition to Ukraine’s and Georgia’s aspirations to NATO membership show to a great extent that Russia still sees Georgia, Ukraine and the other
former Soviet republics as part of the Russian motherland. Yuri Zarakhovich from the Time points out the importance of Ukraine to Russia. “Ukraine’s prospective NATO membership is particularly painful to Russia in terms of security and emotions: Ukraine is the site of Kievan Rus, the original state from which both Russia and Ukraine sprang”. This objection, however, has been used to attack Russia on the ground that Russia still maintains imperialist tendencies over its neighbors.

As independent countries Georgia and Ukraine have the right to choose with whom to ally themselves. However, these two countries have been destined to be in between two rivals: Russia and NATO. The former still perceives them to be its backyard and should not line themselves with foreign institutions especially if these are perceived to be dangerous for its political, military and economic interests. The latter, under the American leadership, is claiming that it will maintain its commitment to the spread of democracy and free market values. Both countries, however, have publicly declared their aspirations to become full members of the alliance and even stressed that if their applications are rejected this will mean that Russia has indeed managed to veto NATO’s enlargement to include them.

Georgia and Ukraine represent a long-term strategic interest for NATO and the United States. Oil pipelines that will break Russian power and monopoly is one of the reasons why the alliance eastward expansion is pursued. Ukraine’s future alignment with the West or with Russia could bring a great change to the balance of power. Brzezinski acknowledges Ukraine’s importance by affirming “it cannot be stressed enough that without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be an empire, but with Ukraine suborned and then subordinated, Russia automatically becomes an empire” (‘The Premature Partnership” 80). Craig Nation, Director of Russian and Eurasian Studies at the U.S. Army War College, explains that Ukraine’s Eastern or Western alignment tendencies have become a key issue in the competition over energy transportation from the Caspian Sea to European markets; an industry still greatly
monopolized by Russia. Nation notes that Ukraine’s future affiliation will be of great importance. “Whether Ukraine will provide alternative routes helping to diversify access, as the West would prefer or ‘find itself forced to play the role of a Russian subsidiary,’ remains to be seen”. But its relevance in exploiting the Caspian energy and diversifying transit facilities will be of paramount importance.

Ukraine, however, seems to have a clear Western alignment preference. It has expressed its aspiration to draw closer to the West and its institutions. The United States’ interest in Ukraine is shown through the aid that the latter started to receive since 1996. It has been the third leading recipient of American aid after Israel and Egypt and has also been receiving considerable aid from the world’s largest economic institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF (Nation 8). The United States and NATO’s enthusiasm towards Ukraine can result in greater Russian antagonism and can lead to undesirable repercussions. Nation argues “By cultivating a special relationship with Ukraine with excessive zeal, the Alliance would risk to reinforce Russia’s sense of alienation and exposure” (7). Though the United States knows this very well, its objective remains the total integration of Ukraine to the West. The ideal rhetoric of spreading democracy through incorporating new members into NATO is used to cover its expansionist tendencies in the FSU and in Ukraine more specifically. For Kissinger, “it is not that important whether Ukraine becomes a democratic state or not: what matters is that it is on our side” (qtd. in Kropacheva 15). Ukraine’s probable integration in NATO will surely invoke Russia’s assertive behavior toward it, something the West claims it wants to prevent in the first place. At the same time, the West wants Ukraine to become on its ‘side’ and not on Russia’s.

Ivan Eland, Senior Fellow and Director of the Center on Peace & Liberty at the Independent Institute, Washington D.C., warned that Ukraine’s admission to a “hostile alliance” (referring to NATO) could permanently cripple U.S. relations with Russia and
Russia’s sense of encirclement would be heightened (“Do not Admit the Ukraine”). Some analysts warned that this step would be extremely provocative to Russia. Ukraine was still unqualified for NATO membership since it still had to make great reforms to become an eligible member. The step of full membership, at this stage, was neither “practicable” nor “politically desirable” (Nation 18). Eland argued that the United States should not further deteriorate its bilateral relations with Russia only for the sake of a country that was not strategically paramount for America’s security. “In any honest assessment of U.S. security goals, the faraway Ukraine is not strategic to the United States”. Second, if Ukraine was incorporated, both the United States and NATO would be obliged under Article V of the NATO treaty to defend it against any aggression. Eland noted that “For the United States, any showdown with Russia over the NATO-inducted Ukraine ultimately could go nuclear” (“Do not Admit the Ukraine…”). For Russia, NATO had reached a point that it could not tolerate or bear.

The scene in Georgia is very similar to that in Ukraine. Georgia, under its pro-American leader Mikhail Saakashvili, clearly showed clear pro-Western inclinations. On May 11, 2006 the Georgian Parliament passed a resolution expressing support for the country’s aspirations to NATO membership (Fuller). Accession to NATO and the EU has been the cornerstone of Georgian foreign policy ever since Saakashvili came to power.

Georgia was also one of the countries that received high attention from the United States. Under the leadership of former president Eduard Shevardnadze the United States started, at Georgia’s request in 2002, training, equipping, and modernizing the Georgian military for counterterrorism operations (“Georgia Train and Equip…”). In an American symbolic gesture George Bush visited Georgia in 2005 and declared it to be a “beacon of liberty” and promised his counterpart that he had “a solid friend in America” (“Bush: Georgia
a ‘Beacon…’). The American-Georgian partnership was growing and Russia watched this military cooperation and reciprocal friendly rhetoric with great unease.

Inclusion of Georgia and Ukraine, unlike the previous rounds, was not a unanimous decision. France and Germany greatly opposed the idea of integrating both countries to NATO. The first and most important reason was the avoidance of irritating Russia. German Foreign Minister Frank Walter Steinmeier warned that extending MAP to Ukraine and Georgia would be unwise and would “further burden” relations with Moscow. The French Prime Minister, Francois Fillon, expressed France’s opposition by stating “it would upset the balance of power…between Europe and Russia” (qtd. in Baran). The issue of additional expansion of the alliance became divisive.

Zeyno Baran, a Senior Fellow and Director of Hudson’s Center for Eurasian Policy, argued that both countries were against America’s bid for Georgia and Ukraine’s membership because their energy interests with Russia would be affected. “Those countries that have a long-term energy partnership with Russia…are often reluctant to take foreign policy stances that may irritate Moscow - and endanger their energy security”. He emphasized that this same reason should be an impetus to defend America’s aim of incorporating these two countries. They would become the corridor that would break Russian monopoly, thus, freeing Europe from Russia’s grip. Baran argued that the long-term goal would be the diversification of Europe’s energy supply “so that America’s European allies do not shy away from doing the right thing because of their dependence on Russian hydrocarbons”. In a more hawkish tone, Baran provocingly argued that not giving Georgia and Ukraine MAP status would entail a victory for Russia.

But what Russia is claiming and doing with its neighbors is not a strange thing since the United States itself is pursuing a similar policy in its backyard, that is, Latin America. A former superpower having great power ambitions, Russia’s pressures on Georgia and Ukraine
to change their course of action are legitimate as it is placing itself on a par with the United
States. Benjamin H. Friedman, a research fellow in Defense and Homeland Security Studies
and Justin Logan, associate director of Foreign Policy Studies, at the CATO Institute argue
that “What Russia wants is pliant neighbors. That desire is typical of powerful states: The
long U.S. history of violent interventions in Latin America undermines whatever lectures we
might direct at Moscow” (“Do not Expand NATO”). Russia’s quest for pliant neighbors,
consequently, is legitimate.

Many analysts argue that the best policy, at least currently, is to stop any further
enlargement of the alliance. Ted Galen Carpenter, vice president for defense and foreign
policy studies at the CATO Institute and Justin Logan believe that the United States and
NATO should “stop poking” the Russian bear by “swallowing up former members of the
Soviet bloc as fast as it can”. They add “The Russian bear is beginning to growl…Russia-like
any other country-tends to get alarmed when the world’s sole superpower extends security
guarantees and military cooperation to countries on its borders” (“NATO Insists on Poking
Russian Bear”). They warn that a crisis could be triggered if Russia concludes that a Western
military presence as intolerable intrusion.

Statements by Russian officials had been delivered in more assertive tones. Russian
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov had clearly announced Russia’s resolution to stop both
countries from getting membership. “We will do all we can to prevent Ukraine’s and
Georgia’s accession into NATO and to avoid an inevitable serious exacerbation of our
relations with both the alliance and our neighbors” (“Russia Talks Tough…”). Alexander
Gruschko, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister, added “Georgia’s and Ukraine’s membership in
the alliance is a huge strategic mistake which would have most serious consequences for pan-
European security” (“NATO Denies Georgia…”). Lavrov denounced NATO’s expansionist
policy as reminiscent of the Cold War containment policy. “The problem of overcoming the
legacy of the Cold War is particularly acute in Europe. Bloc politics, based on the logic of containment, dominated in Europe for too long. And now we are confronted with what can only be interpreted as the restoration of a sanitary cordon to the west of Russia’s borders” (“Russia Talks Tough…”). The United States and NATO, on one hand, and Russia on the other, had been exchanging charges of being hostage to a Cold War mindset.

Lavrov argued that the only obvious explanation of enlarging the alliance to Russia’s borders was the ongoing attempt to “contain Russia in any way possible”. He questioned the claim that enlargement would “proliferate democracy” and wondered “How can democracy be promoted by a military - political alliance that, within the framework of its “transformation,” had been consistently increasing the number of scenarios for the possible use of force? (“Containing Russia: Back…”). For Russia, enlargement meant containment.

Russia’s official resentful statements were not welcomed by the United States that reiterated its commitment to the spread of democracy and peace in all of Europe without any exceptions. Condoleezza Rice, the American Secretary of State, had officially condemned the Russian stance towards Georgia and Ukraine and asserted the United States absolute devotion to the independence and sovereignty of Ukraine and of other states that were once a part of the Soviet Union. Rice noted that “The Soviet Union had all of these parts, but that was another point in time. It is gone forever, and I hope that Russia understands that” (qtd. in Gollust). In the Bucharest Summit (April 2008), Rice insisted that “NATO will do what it has to do as an alliance, while Russia does not have veto right” (qtd. in Strokan). This was a clear defiance and opposition to the Russian reservations about granting MAP status to Georgia and Ukraine.

Duma Member Sergey Markov once warned that Georgia’s accession to NATO would be seen as “an attempt to trigger a war in the Caucasus” (qtd. in Baran). Indeed his anticipation would become a reality in August 2008. Russia and Georgia would start a war
that the media portrayed as a New Cold War. In the aftermath of the war, Dimitri Medvedev, Putin’s successor, would issue a foreign policy declaration that would reassert Russia’s privileged role in the former Soviet space, thus claiming it to be its sphere of influence.
Endnotes

22 Unipolarity in international politics refers to the distribution of power in which there is one state with most of the cultural, economic and military influence. Krauthammer defines the term as a system with only one pole. Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment,” Foreign Affairs 70. 1 (1991): 24. JSTOR. 21 Jun. 2010 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20044692>. Samuel Huntington defines it as a system with “one superpower, no significant major powers, and many minor powers”. The dominant power in such a system will be able to “effectively resolve important international issues alone, and no combination of other states would have the power to prevent it from doing so”. Samuel P. Huntington, “The Lonely Superpower,” Foreign Affairs 78. 2 (1999): 35. Web. Saint Martin’s University. <http://homepages.stmartin.edu/Fac_Staff/rlangill/PLS%203000/the%20Lonely%20Superpower.htm>.


24 Partnership for Peace is a NATO program aimed at creating trust between NATO and other states in Europe and the former Soviet Union. Each Partner country makes a number of far-reaching political commitments to preserve democratic societies, to refrain from the threat or use of force against other states; to respect existing borders; and to settle disputes peacefully. Specific commitments are also made to promote transparency in national defense planning and budgeting and to develop the capacity for joint action with NATO in peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. “What is NATO?” Georgia-NATO, Web. 23 Apr. 2009 <http://eu-nato.gov.ge/index.php?que=eng/NATO_W_I_N_E/What_I_N_E>.


26 In a NATO summit that convened in Rome on November 7-8 1991, the members declared the establishment of a new forum, the NACC. The council included all 16 NATO allies as well as representatives of 9 other countries (which were members of the then already-dissolved Warsaw Pact): Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, the Soviet Union, and the three Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania). Subjects discussed in regular meetings between allies and partner states include defense planning and budgeting, democratic concepts of civil-military relations and scientific and environmental topics. “North Atlantic Cooperation Council,” NATO, 2 Nov. 2009 <http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb020201.htm>.

27 The Commonwealth of Independent States was created in December 1991 after the dissolution of the former Soviet Union. It is a free association between Russia and eleven former Soviet republics (Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan). The CIS’s functions are to coordinate its members’ policies regarding their economies, foreign relations, defense, immigration policies, environmental protection, and law enforcement. “Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS),” Encyclopedia Britannica, 12 Apr. 2009 <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/128945/Commonwealth-of-Independent-States-CIS>. 
The concept of civilian control over the military entails that every decision of government about national security, in peace and in war, is made or approved by officials outside the professional armed forces. “No decision or responsibility falls to the military unless expressly or implicitly delegated to it by civilian leaders. All matters great and small…emanate from civilian authority or are decided by civilians”. Richard Kohn, An Essay on Civilian Control of the Military,” American Diplomacy. 1997. Web. 21 Jun. 2010. <http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/AD_Issues/amdipl_3/kohn.html>.


Hegemony is a social, economic and political structure expressed in “universal norms, institutions and mechanisms which lay down general rules of behavior for states”. The hegemon’s conception of the world becomes universalized and the rules, practices and ideologies of a “hegemonic order conform to the interests of the dominant power” (243-245). Robert Cox and Timothy Sinclair, Approaches to World Order, (New York, Cambridge University Press, 1996) 137-245.

The NRC was established at the NATO-Russia Summit in Rome on 28 May 2002. It is “a mechanism for consultation, consensus-building, cooperation, joint decision and joint action”. “NATO-Russia Council,” NATO, 12 Mar. 2009 <http://www.nato-russia-council.info/htm/EN/nrc.shtml>.

Zero sum game in game theory is a contest in which one person’s loss is equal to the other person’s gain. “Zero-sum Game,” Reverso, 12 Mar. 2009 <http://dictionnaire.reverso.net/anglais-definition/zero-sum%20game>.

NATO launched the action plan in 1999 to help aspiring countries meet NATO standards and prepare for possible future membership. MAP is a “program of advice, assistance, and practical support” to countries wishing to join the alliance. In the military sphere, MAP countries must both upgrade their military up to NATO standards and show proof that their armed forces are under democratic control. Participant countries are requested to settle any ethnic or territorial disputes by peaceful means, demonstrate their commitment to human rights and the rule of law. Claire Bigg, “NATO: What is A Membership Action Plan?” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. 2 Apr. 2008. Web. 12 Jul. 2010. <http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1079718.html>. 
Chapter Three
Reverberations of NATO Enlargement on U.S.-Russian Relations

NATO enlargement has proved to be a very controversial issue. It has resulted in a great deterioration in the bilateral relationship between Russia and the United States. It has negatively affected Russia’s relations with its neighbors in the FSU especially Georgia and Ukraine and has escalated to the Russian-Georgian (or the Five Day) War of August 2008. The growing American commitment to further expand the alliance has made Russia more resolved to limit the latter’s influence especially in the near-abroad.

Among the steps taken by Russia to counterbalance America’s power and influence are the establishment of strategic partnerships with its neighbors (like China and India) and the creation of regional alliances with some of the CIS countries. Russia’s opposition to include Georgia and Ukraine into NATO has accentuated after the Russian-Georgian war which has signaled its assertiveness in using military power against its neighbors especially those which pursue foreign policy orientations that Russia deems harmful to its interests and security. In the aftermath of the war, Russia announced a new foreign policy concept that analysts have dubbed the “Russian Monroe Doctrine”. These issues will be the focus of this chapter.

Russia has revived its ambition to become a great power again. America’s unilateralism and pursuit of hegemony has become of great concern as Russia wants to reassert its influential position regionally if not globally. The revitalization of Russia’s foreign policy has resulted from the economic recovery it has witnessed under the Putin administration. Putin’s presidency has shown Russia’s great enthusiasm to bring back its lost pride and end the period of weakness, marginalization and neglect of its interests especially by the United States.

The post-Cold War era has brought America to primacy. It has become the world’s superpower and its authority and influence have spread to every corner of the world. It has
assumed the mission of the world’s policeman that has to react whenever peace is disrupted, rights violated, and freedom jeopardized. The United States has indulged itself into the duty of expanding the ideals of freedom, equality and opportunity all over the world. Shortly, it has sought to imprint its political and economic values if not way of life on other nations. Bacevic asserts “No people on earth have been more eager to see the world remade in their own image” (“First Things: The Irony…” IV). The values the United States wants to spread all over the world are liberal democracy and capitalism, that is, its own political and economic values.

This stratagem is constantly used by the United States to spread and intrude into regions which have not been yet reached by its influence and power. The linkage of interests with the spread of American ideals remains a cornerstone of its foreign policy that provides the guise for continuous expansionism. The end of the Cold War, however, has deprived the United States of the “evil empire”, the threat it has spent decades fighting. The collapse of its strenuous communist enemy has brought a great dilemma for American foreign policy professionals as the rationale for its global role has disappeared. To retreat and isolate itself from world affairs was out of question because the United States wanted to preserve its primacy. Bacevich explains:

America has ascended to the status of global hegemon, with far flung interests and responsibilities and without a challenger worthy of name. The implicit, if officially unacknowledged, grand strategy…today is to consolidate and preserve its world supremacy, with the clear understanding that doing so may well require the further extension of American influence. (“First Things: The Irony…” IV)

The ambition to maintain its primacy in the post Cold War era can be traced in official American foreign policy documents such as the 1992 initial draft from the Pentagon entitled
“Defense Planning Guidance for fiscal years 1994-99”. The document was leaked to the New York Times. It contained key foreign policy objectives and challenges facing the United States in the aftermath of the Cold War. The most important concern was to prevent the emergence of any competitor to America’s power and influence “either on the territory of the former Soviet Union or elsewhere”. The aim was to maintain “the mechanisms for deterring potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role”. This required the prevention of “any hostile power from dominating a region whose resources would, under consolidated control, be sufficient to generate global power” (Tyler).

The expansion of trade and investment was another important aim. According to policy makers, America’s economic well being depended on continuous economic growth and expansion. Any suspension of trade would lead to the weakening of the American economy. Secretary of State Warren Christopher noted in 1996 that Americans had passed the point where they “can sustain prosperity on sales within the United States” and Madeleine Albright agreed that “Our own prosperity depends on having partners that are open to our exports, investment, and ideas” (qtd. in Bacevich IV). Continuous economic expansion and the preservation of its supremacy remained the basic elements of America’s foreign policy in the post Cold War era. But would the United States remain the world’s only superpower without any rival?

Charles Krauthammer, a syndicated columnist in Foreign Affairs, wrote in a 1990 article that “No doubt, multipolarity will come in time. In perhaps another generation or so there will be great powers coequal with the United States, and the world will, in structure, resemble the pre-World War I era. But we are not there yet, nor will we be for decades. Now is the unipolar moment” (23-24). Michael Mastanduno, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, emphasized that “Balance-of-power theory is very clear about the behavioral implications of unipolarity. States seek to balance power, and thus the
preponderance of power in the hands of a single state will stimulate the rise of new great powers, and possibly coalitions of powers determined to balance the dominant state” (54). The United States pursuit of primacy and maintenance of unipolarity, consequently, would be challenged in the future.

1. Russia’s Attempts to Counterbalance America’s Hegemony in the FSU:

Russia, being a former empire, has developed a sense of nostalgia for its prestigious superpower status of the Cold War. The latter’s end has deprived it from this title and rendered its rival, the United States, the world’s only superpower. Russia’s behavior and reaction to unipolarity differs from that of other nations because it belongs to the category of revisionist states. Hans Morgenthau discerns two types: status quo and imperialist states. “A nation whose foreign policy tends toward keeping power and not toward changing the distribution of power in its favor pursues a policy of the status quo. A nation whose foreign policy aims at acquiring more power than it actually has, through a reversal of existing power relations - whose foreign policy, in other words, seeks a favorable change in power status - pursues a policy of imperialism” (36-37). Russia’s policies in the near-abroad will prove that it does not want to maintain the status quo.

Mastanduno emphasizes that imperialist or revisionist states tend to be unhappy with the rules governing the international system and the distribution of benefits within that system (61). Russia, indeed, fits this classification because it considers balancing America’s hegemony as one of its foreign policy aims. Mastanduno stresses that “Since 1993 Russia has pursued a more assertive foreign policy, most evident in its coercive and interventionist behavior in the ‘near-abroad’” (64). Russia knows that to be able to reestablish its great power status it should revive Russia’s influence in its immediate neighborhood mainly the
FSU. Russian diplomats have revived the spheres of influence concept to restore Russia’s domination in the near-abroad.

Even with the demise of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact the United States has maintained great concerns over Russia’s future foreign policy orientations. The Pentagon’s draft pointed out that the United States “do not dismiss the risks to stability in Europe from a nationalist backlash in Russia or effort to re-incorporate into Russia the newly independent republics of Ukraine, Belarus and possibly others” (Tyler). Russia, hence, may return to its imperialist tendencies towards its neighbors.

America’s foreign policy concerns after the Cold War were not only focused on Russia as the latter was weakening and losing its leverage on international affairs. The United States was also considering how to maintain the status quo, that is, to maintain its primacy and prevent the rise of new competitors even among its allies. Christopher Layne observed that the fear that Japan and Germany “will become great powers pervades the thinking of American strategists (“The Unipolar Illusion: Why…”).

Russia, even during its years of economic decay that followed the end of the Cold War was highly concerned over its loss of power and influence at the regional level. Its influence in the near-abroad had been gradually overshadowed by the rising American presence in a number of former Soviet republics as well as by NATO’s PfP plan. Its recognition of the sovereignty of the former Soviet republics was a decision taken by the mind and not the heart as Richard Pipes, Professor of History at Harvard University commented. Russia was considering how to reintegrate the republics under its leadership at the same time that the Soviet Union was disintegrating. Establishing the CIS was the initial step in a long term objective of keeping the new independent states linked to Russia and if possible under its leverage.
Moscow decision-makers started to represent the near-abroad as crucial to Russian geopolitical interests. The space became important for Russia to reestablish itself and restore its leading role. It planned to take the traditional role of the “elder brother” for the former Soviet republics (Petermann and Tkachenko 7). The increasing mistrust of the West’s intentions led Moscow to think about playing a more assertive role as NATO was steadily approaching its borders and taking chunks of its former sphere of influence.

Russia and its neighbors created the CIS (the Baltic States were not members) on December 8, 1991. The charter was adopted on January 22, 1993. The CIS charter endorsed the fundamental principles of international law as the basis of relations among the member States. Among them are respect of sovereignty, right to self-determination, inviolability of state borders, territorial integrity, non-use of force and the threat to use force against political independence of Member States, settlement of disputes by peaceful means and non-interference in internal and external affairs of each other (Korkelia, “The CIS Peacekeeping Operations” 4). Article 1 of the organization’s charter stipulates that “Member-states are sovereign and equal subjects of international law” (“Charter of the Commonwealth of Independent States” 59). The CIS, however, proved to be a grouping through which the former Soviet Republics would continue to work together and thus make the breakup of the Soviet Union as peaceful as possible.

Yeltsin came to regret the waning of Russia’s influence in the FSU. By 1995, the policy of keeping the CIS within the Russian sphere of influence was made the centerpiece of Russia’s policy (Rywkin 4). Russia regarded itself as “the successor state to the USSR” and expected the other states to accept its leadership (D. Smith 4). But the new republics had new aspirations and submission to Russia’s influence was not among them. The Cold War end brought them independence from the grip of the Former Soviet Union, an experience that they did not enjoy.
The attempt to incorporate the CIS countries to facilitate closer economic and political integration within the post Soviet space proved to be difficult if not a remote aim. The CIS was originally meant to have a single military for all its members, but this plan was later abandoned and each member created its own armed forces. Many members rejected the idea of continuing to use the ruble, the Soviet monetary unit, as their own official currency and chose to create their own currencies (Lubin). The CIS summits were not effective and its decisions were rarely enforced.

There were even statements by the member states about establishing closer cooperation with NATO and even talks about probable application to join the alliance especially by Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine. It became popular to discuss the upcoming collapse of the CIS. The political elite of Russia had also become more skeptical about the future of the Commonwealth since some member states started to quit the treaty (like Azerbaijan, Georgia and Uzbekistan). As they became greatly disenchanted with the CIS, they wanted to create another “pole of integration” without Russia as a leader. Consequently, GUUAM was created in 1997 by Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova. Uzbekistan joined the organization in April 1999 (Petermann and Tkachenko 7-25). The FSU would prove to be a geopolitical space for competition among the great powers.

The post Soviet space was discussed geopolitically by some American policy makers and strategists as paramount in rendering Russia a “normal” country. Brzezinski stressed that this area should become a space for “geopolitical pluralism”. He insisted that the FSU should become a key component in America’s grand strategy and the long term goal was to guarantee that the newly independent states would not be subject to Russia’s domination. Brzezinski explains:

Geopolitical pluralism will foster the best context for the emergence of a Russia that, democratic or not, is encouraged to be a good neighbor to states
with which it can cooperate in a common economic space but which it will not seek or be able, politically and militarily, to dominate. The consolidation of geopolitical pluralism would inhibit the temptation to reinvent the empire, with its pernicious effects. (“Premature Partnership” 79)

This goal was meant to be achieved through the encouragement of western foreign policy orientations within the FSU. In the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union the CIS countries started to show different foreign policy inclinations that Taras Kuzio classified into “Pragmatic Westernizers” and “Pragmatic Russophiles”.

The Pragmatic Westernizers wanted a future integration into transatlantic and European structures such as NATO, PfP, and the EU and to get “divorce” and independence from any kind of Russian domination. Such a vision was initiated by creating the GUUAM organization whose states believed that integration into Western structures would be a “means of buttressing their security” versus Russia. A major factor uniting these countries was their “distrust of Russia as a country which has still not completely abandoned its ‘imperialistic’ tendencies vis-à-vis them and the former USSR” (Kuzio 81-100). Yet, Russia had not lost all its leverage over the CIS countries. Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Belarus belonged to the CIS “Pragmatic Russophiles”; countries whose common national interests were still more or less converging with Russia.

The pragmatic Russophiles had close security, political and economic links with Russia (Kuzio 83). Belarus, for example, increased its calls for the enhancement of the military integration with Russia and turning the Union of Russia and Belarus into powerful and effective military alliance with joint army and military planning system. Both countries advocated the development of European security architecture around the OSCE and firmly opposed any expansion of NATO to the East (Petermann and Tkachenko 32). Moscow and
Washington, apparently, continued their rivalry and struggle for getting more influence this time not in Central and Eastern Europe but further east in the CIS region.

Under the presidency of Vladimir Putin Russia’s interest in the CIS was reinvigorated. Russia’s rising commitment to restore the ties with its neighbors and to renovate its leading role in the region could be traced in its official foreign policy concepts. In a speech to the Federal Assembly in April 2005, Putin called the dissolution of the USSR as a “major geopolitical disaster of the century” (“Annual Address to the Federal…”). Putin was conscious that Russia’s revival as a great power should start by mounting its role and influence in the near-abroad. If Russia would remain “a great power able both to defend itself and to assert some influence globally, it needs to retain its sphere of influence in the CIS” (Buzan and Waever 410). This Russian objective was openly expressed by President Putin when he said that Russia was the “natural nucleus” of integration among the CIS states (“RFE/RL Newsline 29 January 2010”).

The CIS, Putin told a meeting of the Russian Security Council in 2004, should choose between turning itself into an “effectively functioning, influential regional organization” or cease to exist as a geo-political player (qtd. in Torbakov, “Wanted: A New CIS…”). Creating the CIS was meant to restrain America’s growing influence from reaching the region as no guarantees would be given to Russia to preserve its vital interests. Iskander Khisamov, a regional analyst in the Journal Ekspert writes:

There is no country or even a group of countries or an international institution that can or would want to give Russia some guarantees that its security, territorial integrity or at least its economic interests will be respected. Thus, no matter how weak or disintegrated the Commonwealth of Independent States might be it remains Russia’s main strategic priority. (qtd. in Torbakov, “Russia Moves to Reassert…”)

Putin’s policies towards the region show the extent to which he wanted to integrate the region more closely to Russia through security and economic regional groupings.

At the economic level, Russia created the EEC with some Central Asian countries in October 2000 (Laruelle 19). The plan of the EEC was to adopt free trade, a single currency, and a united labor market by 2011 (Buszynski, “Russia and the CIS in 2003” 162). Uzbekistan joined the community in January 2006 (“Uzbekistan Joins Eurasian…”). The latter used to be a member of the anti-Russian GUUAM organization which it joined in 1999 and left in 2002. Uzbekistan’s membership in the EEC represented, therefore, a great victory for Moscow which eventually managed to bring another Central Asian country to its orbit.

The National Security Concept and the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation of the year 2000 show Russia’s growing dedication to reestablish its leadership role in the CIS and to renovate the Commonwealth into a coherent geopolitical organism. The former contained a section about the fundamental threats facing Russia in the international sphere. Among them were the strengthening of “military-political blocs and alliances, above all NATO’s eastward expansion and the possible emergence of foreign military bases and major military presences in the immediate proximity of Russian borders” (“Russia’s National Security…””). It also mentioned, though implicitly, that some states (referring to the United States) sought to weaken Russia’s role in global affairs and attempted “to oppose a strengthening of Russia as one of the influential centers of a multipolar world, to hinder the exercise of its national interests and to weaken its position in Europe, the Middle East, Transcaucasus, Central Asia and the Asia-Pacific Region” (“2000 Russian National…”).

The Foreign Policy Concept on the other hand emphasized Russia’s priorities and aims as a great power in world affairs. The uppermost priority was “to ensure reliable security of the country, to preserve and strengthen its sovereignty and territorial integrity, to achieve firm and prestigious positions in the world community…as a great power, as one of the most
influential centers of the modern world”. It emphasized Russia’s interest in forming “a goodneighbor belt along the perimeter” of its borders and to promote elimination if not pacifying the existing and potential hotbeds of tension and conflicts in regions adjacent to the Russian Federation (“The Foreign Policy Concept…”). In sum, Russia aspired to become a great power again despite the attempts to prevent it from achieving that goal and it wanted stable and friendly countries on its borders.

Russia’s opposition to America’s unipolarity and pursuit of hegemony resulted from the latter’s dwarfing of the UN role. It was greatly alarmed by NATO’s new strategy of “out of area” operations under the guise of humanitarian intervention in order to justify unilateral power actions bypassing the UN. The series of unilateral decisions taken by the United States during the Clinton administration circumvented the UN twice in a matter of six months when it started the air strikes against Iraq (Desert Fox in 1998) and when it launched the war against Serbia in 1999 (Preble 28). The NATO air campaign against Serbia, in response to the Milosevic government ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, negatively affected the American-Russian relations. President Yeltsin was deeply outraged because of the campaign on Serbia and subsequently suspended Russian participation in a broad range of cooperation with NATO and NATO member countries (“From Friendship to Cold…”).

Russia echoed its total objection to the use of force without the consent of the UN and more specifically its concern over NATO’s unchartered interventionist operations in regions outside its area of missions. The alliance showed a preparedness to intervene in any spot of the world whenever and wherever the United States perceived a threat to its security and interests. Bush once declared that “NATO is no longer a static alliance focused on defending Europe from a Soviet tank invasion, it is now an expeditionary alliance that is sending its forces across the world” (qtd. in Wolf). Through the Foreign Policy Concept, Russia rejected America’s unilateralist military interventions especially those conducted without UN
approval. NATO’s new political and military guidelines, the document noted “do not coincide with security interests of the Russian Federation and occasionally directly contradict them”. It confirmed that the use of force in violation of the UN Charter was “unlawful and poses a threat to the stabilization of the entire system of international relations” (“The Foreign Policy Concept…”). Russia advocated that international disputes should be solved in and by the United Nations and not by any other body.

In 2002 Russia devised the CSTO with some of its CIS neighbors. Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan signed the founding document of the organization which was based on the CIS Collective Security Treaty (or the Tashkent Treaty). The CSTO charter stressed the commitment of its members to fight international terrorism and extremism, organized transnational crime, illegal migration and illegal trade of arms and narcotics (Hedenskog and Larsson 21). Byszinski commented that “It was a response to what was perceived as American intrusion into Russia’s security zone in Central Asia” (“Russia and the CIS in 2003…” 161).

Putin announced that Russia’s ultimate objective would be the fusion of the CSTO, on the strategic level, with the EEC, on the economic level and to coordinate the two institutions in an attempt to form a common political, economic and military agenda (Laruelle 19). Bertil Nygren stressed that Putin was aiming “not only at restoring a strong Russian state…but also at restoring Russia as a strong regional political, military and economic power, as the indisputable leader of the Russia-led security complex of Eurasia and the major ‘orderer’ of the countries in the CIS region” (3). The revival in Russia’s interest in the CIS region and the creation of new security organizations tying it with some of the former Soviet Republics were a reaction to the United States’ increasing influence in the region.

The CSTO members agreed that a united headquarter for the organization would be formed in Moscow in January 2004 (McDermott 12). On November 23, 2004 the Duma
ratified an agreement on military-technological cooperation within the CSTO. This would create a base for increased deliverances of military hardware to the signatory states. Interestingly, the charter of the new organization contained a NATO-like provision. Article 4 of the CSTO stated that the aggression against CSTO member states would be considered by other participants as aggression against everyone (“Collective Security Treaty…”).

Russia’s interest in Central Asia had intensified after America’s presence heightened in the region in the aftermath of September 11 attacks. These represented “the catalyst without which Russia’s security interests in the region might have remained at a fairly low level, as it definitely was in the Yeltsin years” (Nygren 33). The Russian military was the most concerned about America’s growing presence in Russia’s neighborhood. The United States involvement in Central Asia was perceived as part of a wider strategy to emasculate Russia. The stationing of American military units in Poland and the Baltic countries, the creation of new bases in Romania and Bulgaria and the new bases the United States leased in Central Asia for its war on Afghanistan heightened the concerns of the Russian military.

Russian generals demanded the neutralization of America’s growing influence in the post-Soviet space and ending the cooperation with the United States. They claimed that the campaign on Afghanistan was the first step in an American effort to oust Russia from Central Asia (Buszynski, “Russia’s New Role…” 548-549). America’s influence, hence, should be decreased if not neutralized as Russia clearly wanted to restore its leverage and power in the region. The CSTO proved to be a priority in Russian diplomacy intended to restrain if not counteract NATO’s engagement policies in this region (McDermott, “Russia Using CSTO to Counterbalance NATO”). The United States managed to get support for its Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan through a series of agreements it made with some Central Asian countries.
Uzbek President Islam Karimov agreed to give the United States the right to use its airspace and airfields in the aftermath of September 11. Karimov agreed to grant America the use of Khanabad Airport. In 2002, Kyrgyz President Askar Akaev granted NATO the right to use Manas Airport for post- Afghanistan security operations and Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev gave the United States access to use three of its airports (Buszynski, “Russia’s New Role…” 547). America’s military presence in Central Asia increased as a result of these agreements.

The reintegration of Uzbekistan in the CSTO in 2006 confirmed the depth of the break between Uzbekistan and the West and further reinforced its strategic orientation towards Russia. Marléne Laruelle, from the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute emphasized that the organization reinforced Russia’s position and increased its influence in Central Asia and led to the decline of America’s and Western leverage. For Laruelle, Moscow aspires to weaken America’s military partnerships in the region and “aims in effect for the CSTO to be on a par with NATO, so that it can speak to the latter as an equal and oblige the Central Asian regimes to go through Moscow before engaging in any common military initiatives with the West (“Russia’s Central Asia…” 17-18). Some analysts started to draw the resemblance between CSTO and the Cold War Warsaw Pact that joined the USSR and some of its Central and Eastern European satellites. Behind the establishment of the organization, they claimed, was Russia’s aspiration to revive a similar pact with some of the CIS states.

Major John A. Mowchan from the U.S. Army War College acknowledges that Russia can, in the future, develop and enhance this organization to an extent that it might halt any American influence in Eurasia. “The militarization of the CSTO alliance and its transformation into a credible security organization could bolster the Kremlin’s ability to limit U.S. and Western influence in Eurasia”. It can “allow Russia an enhanced ability to increase its control over former Soviet-controlled states and recreate an alliance similar to the Warsaw
Pact” (1). But Russia is more interested in strengthening this organization to assure that, at the regional level, Russia maintains a certain leadership role; a position it may lose because other countries have ambitious security, economic, and geopolitical interests in this region too.

Russia initially accepted America’s military presence in some of its neighbor countries during the war on Afghanistan. This acquiescence was a forced one since Russia did not have any effective means to thwart them (Kimura 62). Russia sympathized with the United States because terrorism was a shared threat. But the rising American military presence combined with its withdrawal from the ABM treaty and planning to establish a missile defense system led Moscow to change its disposition from coalition to a one of resentment and competition.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the CIS region (especially oil and gas rich countries) was opened for global markets. The Clinton administration’s primary interest was in the security field. It was interested in promoting military-to-military cooperation in an attempt to reduce regional instability and promote mutual security. By 1994 Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan joined NATO’s PfP program (Wishnick, “Growing U.S. Security Interests…” 3). Central Asia proved to be a new area of great importance and an arena of competition between the great powers because of its hydrocarbon riches. Competition started among firms from the United States, Turkey, Iran and China.

In the CIS, the Clinton administration was interested in developing alternative energy sources to reduce reliance on the Middle East and also to project America’s influence into this region (Steinberg 39). The resources of the region were considered as the key to securing the long-term development of these states. Building pipelines to export oil and gas through Turkey would increase the flow of hydrocarbons to world markets while it would also contain the influence of Russia and Iran (Rutland and Dubinsky 8). Texaco and BP were among the first firms to sign contracts with Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan to develop some of their oil fields
Under the Bush administration the State Department identified a more diverse array of interests in Central Asia. At the security level, it was interested in anti-terrorism, nonproliferation and narcotics trafficking. Central Asia was a predominantly Muslim region with troubled economic and political systems. The administration was considering the development of democratic political systems and market-oriented economies in these states (Cornell 240). The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review identified the region as a “geostrategic crossroads” and an area where the United States would “seek to shape not only the choices of countries in those regions, but choices of countries outside them that have interests or ambitions within them”. At the energy level, the administration was interested in ensuring reliable access of regional supplies to global markets (Wishnick, “Russia, China, and the United States…” 5). This was a continuation of the Clinton administration policy that had explicitly stated that ensuring the safe export of Caspian oil and gas to world markets remained a priority (Talbott). Additionally, the region constituted a vital land bridge between Asia and Europe linking the Caspian Sea region and Central Asia with the Black Sea and Western Europe.

To break Russia’s monopoly in hydrocarbon transportation many projects were devised to bypass it and directly link the region with international markets. In May 2005 the BTC oil pipeline came on stream transporting oil from Azerbaijan via Georgia to Turkey. The SCP run parallel to the BTC but transported gas. The construction of the BTC was immensely backed by the United States to weaken Russian domination in the field. Dr. Tracey C. German, Lecturer at the Defense Studies Department of King’s College (London) affirms that the BTC construction “has significantly altered the balance of power in the region, strengthening the political and economic autonomy of Azerbaijan and Georgia, reducing Russian dominance and cementing the involvement of Western actors such as Europe and the U.S.” (“Corridor of Power” 70). The United States also supported a planned trans-Afghanistan pipeline (the
TAPI) which would export gas from Turkmenistan across Afghanistan to Pakistan and India. This would both weaken Russia’s grip on Turkmenistan’s gas and undermine the prospects for a parallel Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline which the United States opposed (Bohr 113). For Leszek Buszynski, Professor of International Relations at the International University of Japan “America’s interest in Caspian Sea oil reserves and Central Asian energy held out the prospect of lucrative contracts and benefits that could relegate Moscow to the sidelines” (“Russia’s New Role…” 548). At the economic level and especially in the energy transportation field the United States and Russia’s interests were at odds.

The American quest for diversifying oil pipelines and breaking Russia’s monopoly has become of lurid concern for the Kremlin. Alternative pipeline routes will eventually reduce Russia’s leverage over Central Asia and decrease its ability to retain its monopoly in this field. Some analysts argue that there is a “Great Game”38 ensuing between the Western powers and Russia in the scramble for energy along the Caspian Basin. Moscow feels threatened by Western energy projects that may significantly weaken its influence and is determined to defend its monopolies.

This battle over energy is paramount in determining the future of Europe and its political orientation. Jeff M. Smith, the Kraemer Strategy Fellow at the American Foreign Policy Council, indicates that “Washington understands full well that a Europe beholden to Russia for light and heat is more inclined to follow Moscow’s lead when the United States and Russian interests collide. This is why successive administrations have made energy diversification for Europe a top priority, generating friction with the Kremlin in the process”. For the United States, Russia’s hydrocarbon leverage on Europe should be neutralized.

The aim of counterbalancing the United States was also envisioned through allying Russia with rising great powers like China. Evgeni Primakov, the former Russian foreign Minister, once advocated that Russia and China (and probably India) should ally themselves
to counterbalance American pursuit of world hegemony and unrestrained use of force in its foreign policy. Primakov stated to the Kremlin News Broadcast in 1996 that Russia “should play the role of a counterweight to the negative trends that are appearing in international affairs. In the course of this transition not all power centers…have yet formed. And somebody wants to dominate in this situation” (qtd. in Turner 163). Primakov was hinting to the United States and clearly advocating the return to a multipolar world order.

America’s pursuit of hegemony was emphasized by President Bush when he asserted that “America will never seek a permission slip to defend the security of our country” (George W. Bush 2004 State…”). The Bush administration’s unilateralist foreign policy decisions especially over the Iraq war (2003) led Russia and China to come closer as they shared common foreign policy tendencies. As its Russian counterpart, the Chinese foreign Ministry endorsed multipolarity as the best system that would guarantee peace and order in the world. “Multipolarity helps weaken and curb hegemonism and power politics⁴⁰, serves to bring about just and equitable order and contributes to world peace and development”. It also disapproved America’s militaristic foreign policy that used its economic, technological and military advantages to pursue a new “gunboat policy”⁴¹ in contravention of the UN Charter and the universally acknowledged principles governing international relations in an attempt to establish a unipolar world under its guidance” (“China’s View on the Development…”).

Besides Russia and China, numerous poles of power are emerging, thus, increasingly confronting the United States hegemony like Germany, Japan, the European Union, India, Brazil, Iran and Indonesia (Balaban 58). These new poles want to have a key role in the world’s most prominent organizations especially the UNSC whose ability and impact on solving international security issues is waning. For Milos Balaban, Head of the Center for Security Policy in the Faculty of Social Sciences at Charles University (Prague), the present shape of the UNSC has long “ceased to reflect the political and economic facts of the world”
which have significantly changed since the UN’s creation under the auspices of the World War II victors. “In terms of their political and economic influence and sheer size of population, it is legitimate for India, Japan, Brazil and Germany to claim seats on the Security Council. However, this is not accepted by the current permanent members” (72).

For Balaban, by the year 2020 the traits of the new multipolar international system will become clearer. He anticipates that the main trend in international relations will resonate around the competition between states over securing sufficient resources of raw materials especially oil, gas and water. “Conflict between great powers may lead to an unmitigated struggle for resources and the carving out of spheres of influence” (Balaban 60-61). The main international actors besides the United States will be China, Russia, India, the European Union and the Middle East.

Russia and China’s growing concern over the United States rising power and their eventual rapprochement make it obvious that the Primakov Doctrine is seriously taken into account to challenge America’s hegemony. The traits of a rising alliance between the two neighbors are becoming clearer. Some analysts have already warned that expanding NATO further east will isolate Russia leaving it no choice but to seek an alliance with China. Boris Yeltsin emphasized this point in 1995 when he announced that “Relations with China are extremely important to us from the global politics perspective...We can rest on the Chinese shoulder in our relations with the West. In that case the West will treat Russia more respectfully” (qtd. in Kuchins 322). Rucett and Stam warned that NATO should be careful of the emergence of such an alliance. Russia, they argue, will opt for this choice if NATO will not incorporate it into the alliance. Russia will “look eastward for a partner with whom to balance against the perceived growing threat from the West. Expanding NATO without Russia will likely lead to a Russo-Sino rapprochement and even to a formal military alliance” (363-364).
On April 23, 1997 the two presidents signed a joint Sino-Russian Declaration on a Multipolar World in which they announced their opposition to “bloc politics” that China and Russia perceived to be reminiscent of the Cold War. “Attempts to enlarge and strengthen military blocs”, the declaration noted, could “pose a threat to the security of individual countries and aggravate tension on a regional and global scale” (“Russian-Chinese Joint…”). Russia and China stressed the UN’s authoritative and universal role in the preservation of international order and pointed out that the latter’s role should not be replaced by any other international organization, obviously hinting to NATO.

On April 24, 1997 Boris Yeltsin and the Chinese president Jian Zemin ended their meeting in Moscow in a joint statement in which they announced “No country should seek hegemony, practice power politics or monopolize international affairs” (“China, Russia Sign…”). Yeltsin reaffirmed in the meeting that both Russia and China oppose unipolarity in international affairs. “Someone is longing for a single-polar world. He wants to decide things himself…But we want the world to be multipolar. Those poles will form the basis of the new world order” (qtd. in Bennet). Multipolarity became Russia and China’s watchword.

Michael Gordon, from the New York Times commented that the two presidents “pledged today to work together to limit American power and influence in the world” (“Russia - China Theme…”). But limiting American hegemony was not the only drive of their new cooperation.

The two countries rapprochement was clearly of mutual benefit. For Russia, rapprochement with China brought its sympathy for Russia’s opposition to NATO enlargement and to the alliance’s plan of establishing a Missile Defense in Poland and the Czech Republic. Russia, on the other hand, officially reiterated that Taiwan and Tibet remained parts of the Republic of China and declared that it would not establish official relations with Taiwan.
In 2001, Putin and Jiang Zemin formalized the Russian-Chinese relationship by signing the Sino-Russian Treaty on Good Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation. Among the provisions of this twenty year treaty were pledges to solve their differences through peaceful means; not to use nuclear weapons against each other nor target strategic nuclear missiles against each other. They also promised to cooperate in many other important fields such as military technology, aeronautics and space and nuclear energy (“Treaty on Good Neighborliness…”). The arms trade, however, proved to be the most important aspect of their cooperation.

Between 1995 and 2005, Russia’s arms sales to China accounted for approximately 37 percent of its total arms exports. And since 1991, more than 1,000 Russian military experts were involved in technical exchanges with China (Mitchell 143). The Russian-Chinese military cooperation was of mutual advantage. China’s arms trade with Russia enabled it to acquire capabilities “to counter U.S. naval and air power in the Far East and intimidate neighbors like Taiwan”. And Russia was seeking to become “a regional rival to the United States” using money from arms sales to “modernize its own armed forces” (A. Cohen, “Russia-China Friendship…”). Political rapprochement and thriving arms sales brought Russia and China closer.

Russia has continued its arms sales to regimes the United States perceive to be hostile like Syria, Iran and Venezuela. Iran is one of the countries that the United States has classified as a rogue state. Both China and Russia opposed sanctions and military action against Iran over its nuclear program (Vakil 57). Russia, being the world’s primary arms dealer, “allows it a leading role in building up multilateral powers that can collectively rival the United States” (Turner 171-172). The Russian-Iranian cooperation in the nuclear field remains the most troubling part for the United States. It is part of the 1992 long-term trade and cooperation agreement and the 1995 Bushehr nuclear power plant deal. The Bushehr reactor has been
completed in October 2004 (Vakil 57). Russia has clearly maintained its cooperation with Iran in the nuclear field despite the American reservations about the issue.

These political orientations have been taken to signal the United States that Russia wants to pursue its foreign policy in an independent manner. The growing disaffection of Russia over the United States’ grand ambition to “integrate Russia into the West on American terms” made building cooperative bilateral relationship between them more difficult. Russia wants “to be accepted and respected as a major power by the United States, and the West more generally” (Graham, “A Resurgent Russia and American Purposes” 12-13). It wants to become an equal partner not merely a follower and a marginalized player; it wants to have an independent foreign policy free from any American leverage.

On June 15, 2001 Russia and China have enhanced their cooperation after they created the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. The SCO is an inter-governmental body that includes as members China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The organization’s predecessor was the Shanghai Five established in 1996 by the mentioned states excluding Uzbekistan which was not a member at that time. The aim of the Shanghai Five was mainly confidence building and more importantly the disarmament of the member states in the border regions (“Shanghai Cooperation Organization”).

The SCO’s charter discerns a broad field of cooperation among the members. Principally, it seeks to strengthen mutual trust, good-neighborliness and friendship among member states. Developing effective cooperation in political affairs, the economy and trade, science and technology, culture, education, energy, transportation, environmental protection are also among the organization’s interests. The members have also agreed to work together to maintain regional peace, security and stability (“Shanghai Cooperation Organization”).

The SCO has expanded its missions to cooperation to fight terrorism, separatism, religious extremism and drug trafficking. Putin has explained the SCO’s raison d’être by
stating that “after the collapse of the bipolar world, there was a real need for the emergence of centers of influence and power. This is simply an objective reality” (“Valdai Discussion Club”). Lieutenant General William E. Odom, senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, argues that the SCO has been created by Russia and China to serve as a vehicle to assert their influence in Central Asia and curb U.S. access to the region’s vast energy supplies (qtd in L. Beehner, “The Rise of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization”). Many in the West have started to portray the organization as an “anti American union” because the SCO openly pursues the goal of resolving the security challenges in Central Asia without any cooperation from of the United States (Safranchuk). The SCO has a very broad range of interests in the security, trade and energy fields that does not leave so much space for the United States to insert its influence in the region.

The SCO’s observers have been subject to extensive commentary by Western politicians and analysts. Mongolia received observer status to SCO membership in 2004 and Iran, Pakistan, and India in 2005. The United States resented Iran’s probable membership into the SCO. Donald Rumsfeld wondered how one “would want to bring into an organization that says it is against terrorism one of the leading terrorist nations in the world” (qtd. in Gordon, “Rumsfeld Describes Iran…”). SCO Secretary General Zhang Deguang angrily replied that the organization cannot tolerate other countries “calling our observer nations sponsors of terror. We would not have invited them if we believed they sponsored terror” (qtd. in Kimmage). But the American criticism of the organization and its observers would be overshadowed by the benefits such an inclusion would give to the SCO.

The potential inclusion of Iran will add more importance to the organization. Russia needs Iran’s energy, Iran will be Russia’s foothold into the Middle East and Iran needs SCO membership to counter international isolation and Russia’s and China’s votes in the UN Security Council (Lin 1-2). The benefits are mutual and cohesive. The United States,
obviously, is not pleased by the emergence of such a grouping because it will bring new challenges to America’s future power and influence.

The organization was also disapproved as a “league of dictators” by Robert Kagan, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, who maintained that such a league should not be a surprise. The United States and its allies should, instead, decide how to react. “No one should be surprised if, in response, an informal league of dictators has emerged, sustained and protected by Moscow and Beijing…The question will be what the United States and Europe decide to do in response.” America’s insistence on maintaining its Cold War NATO alliance was promoted as a vital means for preserving world peace and spreading democracy, although the recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq had shown a different reality. When Russia and China created a regional organization which was still at its infancy, the United States criticized it to be a league of dictators.

In October 2005, China and Russia conducted Peace Mission 2005; their first joint military exercise. It involved a total of about 10,000 participants on both sides and was framed as an exercise to combat “terrorism, extremism, and separatism.” The mission was partly meant to send a signal to the West that both countries were enhancing and strengthening their military relationship. It was also a message to “the international community, and particularly the United States, about the development of China-Russia strategic relations” (Mitchell 144). The two major SCO members were enhancing their military cooperation, an aspect that would add to the organization’s importance.

The significance of this organization is indisputable. Its member states encompassed a territory of more than 30 million square kilometers, almost three-fifths of the Eurasian continent, with a population of 1.5 billion, about one-quarter of the planet’s total (“SCO Celebrates Ninth…”). The Central Asian countries are very rich in energy resources. Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan together with Russia hold 21.4
percent of the world’s oil reserves and 45 percent of the world’s natural gas reserves (Scheineson). A huge landmass, richness in hydrocarbons and members having nuclear arsenals (mainly Russia and China) are important elements that render the status of the organization noteworthy. Some experts predict its potential future as a hydrocarbon cartel and its consequent influence on oil and gas markets. David Wall, a regional expert at the University of Cambridge’s East Asia Institute, asserts that “an expanded SCO would control a large part of the world’s oil and gas reserves and nuclear arsenal. It would essentially be an OPEC with bombs” (“Central Asian Bloc…”). The organization’s importance cannot be overestimated and that is why the United States has a great interest in the organization’s objectives and policies as far as the United States is concerned.

Evan Feigenbaum, Deputy Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs at the Nixon Center explains America’s concerns over the SCO and whether it will represent a threat to America’s interests in the region. Feigenbaum maintains that a recurring pattern of history is the states’ act of balancing the power of a hegemon, which is the case of the United States. He asserts that there is a tendency of other players “to band together to try to achieve some sort of balance” against the United States. This has resulted in a growing concern on the part of the United States. He notes:

It is often said we need to reassure others about our intentions in this region. But we need some reassurance too…We certainly would welcome transparency with regard to SCO activities. We will watch with interest what the Shanghai Cooperation Organization says, but we will especially watch what it does, and what it becomes. (“The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Future…”)

Russia and China want to use the SCO to curb U.S. access to the region’s vast energy supplies and are also concerned about America’s military presence in the area. The
organization besides the goal of fighting terrorism, separatism and extremism is also
established to strengthen the economic cooperation and trade ties between member states. It
seems that an Eastern bloc is emerging in a long-term attempt to counterweight U.S.
hegemony and economic interests in Central Asia. In a joint declaration on July 5, 2005 the
SCO members called the United States to set a timeline for withdrawing its military troops
from some Central Asian countries, mainly Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan (SCO member states).
Indeed by the end of 2005 American forces were ejected from Uzbekistan (L. Beehner, “The
Rise of the Shanghai Cooperation…”). Restraining the United States military presence in
Central Asia proved to be another important, if not the primary objective of the SCO.

Russia and China, however, have asserted that the SCO is not meant to be a new “bloc”.
Russian defense minister Sergei Ivanov has declared that “We are not going to form any ‘anti-
NATO’ bloc in the East. The time of military blocs and camps has gone” (qtd. in Mitchell
142). Nevertheless their alignment has been of growing concern for both NATO and the
Pentagon. Putin has echoed the West’s intelligence services concerns that the “Russians and
the Chinese are up to something here, that they’ve got some kind of secret mechanism and are
planning something. We have no plans to turn it into some kind of military-political bloc. The
organization’s activities are not directed against anyone” (“Valdai Discussion Club”).

But the Russian-Chinese rapprochement and cooperation in the military field will
constitute a “great force multiplier” and will “set off alarms in the planning rooms of NATO
and the Pentagon” in the event of a major military confrontation (A. Cohen, “What to Do…”).
The United States does not exclude the organization’s development into an eastern alliance
with the goal of rivaling its power. Some analysts observe that the two countries have been
reviving an alliance similar to the one established during the Cold War. For Dianne Smith, a
new geopolitical landscape is taking shape “one in which Russia and China are becoming the
other’s strategic rear and renewing their alliance of the 1950s” (47).
Russia pursued rapprochement towards India. In October 2000 the two countries signed a declaration of strategic partnership and announced their opposition “to the unilateral use or threat of use of force in violation of the UN charter, and to intervention in the internal affairs of other states, including under the guise of humanitarian intervention” (Paul 63). Russia, realizing its inability to counterbalance the United States on its own sought to bring China and India as key players in fulfilling the task. This was an attempt to forge a ‘strategic triangle’ linking Russia, China and India.

Rajiv Sikri, former member of the Indian Foreign Service, explained that from a strategic perspective, Russia alone could not challenge the West and more specifically the United States. “China and India are the only countries that are large enough players and sufficiently independent-minded to be potential partners in this strategic balancing act”. A United States National Intelligence Council report entitled “Global Trends 2015” forecasted that a Russian-Chinese-Indian strategic triangle may emerge to counterbalance the United States and Western influence in 15 years (2000-2015) (“A Dialogue about the Future….”).

Julie Rahm, believed that the strategic partnership between Russia, China and India would represent a “blueprint for the next Cold War” and pose a significant threat (“New Strategic Triangles in Eurasia…”).

At the official level, Russia, China and India declared that their trilateral relationship is not directed against the interests of any country in a hint to the United States. The three countries could make a uniform bloc with outstanding capabilities. Their geographical proximity, nuclear capabilities and huge population (40 percent of global population) would make it the “largest alliance” (Kazmi 225). But Russia’s partnerships with its Eastern neighbors, some analysts argued, would not be so much effective in restraining the United States’ hegemony. Each of the three countries would undergo political and economic costs
should they consider a genuine counterbalance to the United States. This would render their strategic triangle to offset America’s hegemony a difficult task if not a fantasy.

Professor Harsh Pant, from the University of Notre Dames (USA) stresses that the United States can exert considerable influence on the three powers in a way that will minimize their impact. “The centrality of the United States in the foreign policies of Russia, China, and India makes it all but impossible for the three countries to come together and forge a united front against the USA in the near term”. The United States will attempt to thwart this close rapprochement and diminish if not weaken their influence (41). Moreover, mistrust is still a characteristic of the trilateral relationship. Russia, China, and India “have found it difficult to overcome their distrust of each other. And, as one of the three becomes more powerful, the other two may be more willing to counterbalance it—maybe even in coordination with the USA” (Pant 42). Given the centrality of the United States to the present global political and economic order, the current strategic triangle between Moscow, Beijing and New Delhi would not challenge America’s preponderance at least in the near term.

Pundits observed that Russia may opt for another strategic triangle with India and Iran. Russia enjoyed a good political relationship with both countries. If Russia will consider such strategic triangle it will be a formidable strategic combination. Dr. Subhash Kapila notes that “such a combination could substantially alter the global balance of power and the Asian security landscape” (“Russia – India – Iran Triangle…”). Russia obviously still enjoys strategic alignments that will pose a concrete challenge for the United States predominance in global affairs.

Russia wants to restore itself as a great power that the United States should not overlook and take its interests into consideration at least regionally. Russia has developed a pervasive feeling that it has lost its once powerful position (or more accurately that of its Soviet predecessor) on the world stage to a position of little influence and respect. Russia, currently,
wants to restore such a position and role. The CIS, CSTO and the SCO are among the initial steps. If these geopolitical shifts are considered to be benign and with no strong effect on America’s preponderance, the Russian-Georgian War of August 2008 will bring Russia back to the headlines and the war will be portrayed as a new Cold War.

2. The Russian-Georgian War:

One of the repercussions of NATO’s expansionist policies to the Former Soviet Space was the Russian-Georgian War. On the one hand, this war reasserted Russia’s position in the near-abroad. On the other hand, it sent a message to NATO and more specifically to the United States that Russia should have the upper hand in this region. For Russia’s neighbors, this war was a “lesson” that they should not pursue any policies that harm or represent a threat to Russia’s interests at the economic and the security levels.

The eruption of the war represented the climax of a long deteriorating relationship between Georgia and Russia. In the aftermath of the Cold War, Georgia showed a pro-Western if not a pro-American orientation in its foreign policy, further distancing itself from Russia. America’s growing influence in the post-Soviet space had developed into changing authoritarian regimes and replacing them with pro-Western ones as was the case with Georgia. Since 2002, the United States started to support Georgia in developing its military in order to qualify it for becoming a NATO member. Through Georgia’s “Train and Equip” program, American money, know-how, planning, and equipment were used to establish some important military bases (like Gori and Poti) and to bring NATO membership to Georgia (Traynor). Georgia proved to be an area where America’s and Russia’s geopolitical and geo-economic interests clashed.

Dimitri Trenin believes that U.S. policies in Georgia aspire to promote democracy and Western orientation in the South Caucasus/Black Sea region, but also to assure a secure
corridor for transporting Caspian oil and gas to Europe. But a more important aim is to “prevent Russia’s resurgence as the hegemonic power in the region”. He argues that the American-Georgian de facto alliance and the pursuit of its integration to NATO will lead to a rising competition between Russia and the United States and the logical outcome will be the re-embracing of the containment policy towards Russia.

The Putin Administration became specifically frustrated by the regime change that took place in some of Russia’s neighboring states. The Color Revolutions represented a new means through which authoritarian regimes were ousted and replaced by pro-American ones. The Rose Revolution in Georgia (2003), the Orange Revolution in Ukraine (2004) and the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan (2005) were perceived as an American design to undermine Russia’s influence in the Post Soviet space and to insert pro-Western regimes with a long term objective of isolating and weakening Russia. Gail Lapidus, Senior Fellow Emerita at the Institute for International Studies at Stanford University, noted that Russia was concerned over the long-term repercussions on the stability of the region and more specifically over the diminishing of its power in the Caucasus. For Russian elite circles, Georgia’s Rose Revolution was considered as a “heretical model” posing the danger of further “contagion in the region and a threat to Russian political and military preeminence” (152).

These revolutions had similar objectives like earlier attempts by the United States to oust unfriendly regimes that did not serve America’s interests but this time in the former Soviet republics, a previously exclusive area that the United States started to intrude after the demise of the Soviet Union. Thierry Meyssan, French political analyst and founder and chairman of the Voltaire Network, emphasized that Color Revolutions were “regime changes which appear to be revolutions because they mobilize huge segments of the population but are more akin to takeovers, because they do not aim at changing social structures. Instead they aspire to replace elite with another, in order to carry out pro-American economic and foreign
policies”. Slogans of “spreading democracy” and toppling “authoritarian regimes” are only pretexts behind which rested the real aim of opening up new areas for American interests. Meyssan added that behind the soothing rhetoric of the promotion of democracy, “Washington’s actions aim to impose regimes that are opening their markets to the U.S. without conditions and which are aligning themselves to their foreign policy”. He emphasized the fact that these hidden agendas were known only by the leaders of the revolution. The mobilized masses, however, were convinced if not deceived that they were fighting for “democracy”, “freedom” and all the shiny ideal concepts.

Both Russia and China resented these revolutions as a new-packaged American imperialist agenda. The revolutions used new tactics that avoided the old military force to overthrow regimes and instead employed new means of soft power. Jeanne Wilson, from the Wheaton College, Massachusetts clarified that Russia and China perceived Color Revolutions as a modernized method of “conquest and subordination”. The Revolutions’ non-violent approach and reliance on the instruments of soft power made them “imperialism in an updated format”.

Color Revolutions have proved to be a double-edged sword. They have partly resulted in greater rapprochement between Russia and the Central Asian republics that have started to share similar concerns about that type of regime change. The shift in the political and military orientation of the Central Asian countries towards Russia had partly resulted from the growing deterioration in their bilateral relationship with the United States. Unlike the United States that insisted on democracy promotion as the ideological basis of the war on terrorism, Russia supported the authoritarian regimes in Central Asia. Russia’s pragmatism favored the promotion of its strategic cooperation and economic development with the Central Asian States without intervening in their domestic affairs. Indeed, Russia’s strategies to augment its influence and contain the growing Western influence in Central Asia became fruitful.
In 2003 Russia opened a military base in Kant, Kyrgyzstan. In 2004, it opened the first permanent base in Tajikistan, the largest one outside the Federation’s borders incorporating 5000 men and including an air base and a spatial surveillance center. By 2005, Uzbekistan’s geopolitical turnaround to Russia became apparent. In that year both countries signed an accord on strategic cooperation in which Moscow pledged to provide support to the Uzbek regime in case of political unrest. In exchange, Uzbekistan agreed to grant Russian troops access to ten airports and permit them to open a military base in their national territory (Laruelle 12-16).

America’s means of supporting the Color Revolutions included the use of foreign aid to support democratizing parties, youth protests against authoritarian regimes, and more importantly the use of the NGOs. These organizations were funded to strengthen the position of the political opposition forces in an attempt to ‘spread democracy’ in countries that America identified as authoritarian and not fully democratic. The NGOs main emphasis was overseeing the electoral process to insure that the elections were transparent and that the results were not rigged. In short these organizations, the West claimed, were present in such countries to make sure that democracy was advancing and authoritarian regimes would fall through vote and not war.

Russia does not see these revolutions as spreading democracy but rather as enlarging America’s sphere of influence. This may result in Russia’s gradual loss of power and influence in its immediate neighborhood. Through promoting pro-Western opposition factions in CIS countries, Washington also tries to “exert political pressure on Russia through Color Revolutions (Wilson). For Russia, Western funded NGOs are a Western “Trojan horse” that penetrates into the target countries under good intentions and idealistic causes of spreading democracy and human rights but with a long term objective of bringing puppet regimes into power that would serve American interests. America is taking the path of
spreading its political and economic ideologies of democracy and capitalism into the FSU region. But strangely this initiative is overlooked in some of its allies in the Gulf region.

America’s interest in regime change through the color revolutions can be compared to the Soviet Union’s aim of pursuing regime change tactics during the Cold War to spread Communism. The means differed as the United States preferred the use of soft power while the Soviet Union depended on military power to achieve its goals. The roles have been reversed (the United States has made spreading democracy all over the world one of its foreign policy priorities), the tactics have been updated but the aims remain the same: spreading one’s power and enlarging one’s sphere of influence.

Under Gorbachev’s terms’ NGOs were given legal status in the 1990s. According to the Russian Foreign Registration Service, there were 216,000 NGOs registered in 2007, of which 226 were foreign run (Wilson 3). Fearing that they might start a color revolution in Russia, Putin put these organizations under scrutiny and laws were passed to regulate their function. Putin emphasized the essential similarity in aims between the old and new Western imperialist thinking although the pretexts differed only in names. He noted in his 2007 annual address to the Federal Assembly that:

There has been an increasing influx of money from abroad being used to intervene directly in our internal affairs. Looking back at the more distant past, we recall the talk about the civilizing role of colonial powers during the colonial era. Today ‘civilization’ has been replaced by democratization, but the aim is the same—to ensure unilateral gains and one’s own advantage and to pursue one’s own interests. (“President Putin’s Annual…”)

The Putin administration proceeded to pass laws that regulated the functioning of the foreign funded NGOs. In 2006, a law was passed and required the NGOs to register with the FRS, state their aims, present annual accounts of their activities, report sources of funding and
provide records of their spending. They were also required to report their source of financing and methods of distribution. The bill prohibited foreign funding of Russian organizations that engaged in political activities (Wilson 4). The Russian NGO law greatly alarmed American politicians who considered it as a non-democratic measure.

Congress passed a resolution condemning it. Tom Lantos, a Democrat member of the House of Representatives, harshly criticized the Russian NGO law as a proof that Russia had moved backward in its path toward democracy and claimed that it did not deserve participation in “democratic and industrial organizations” such as the G7 (qtd. in Sidorov). In addition to the restrictions imposed on foreign NGOs, Putin started a campaign to curb and control local media. By the time of the outbreak of the Rose Revolution in Georgia, Putin had successfully concluded his battle to assert state supremacy over the media through possessing the three main television channels (Wilson 7).

The Putin administration was criticized, by the West, as retreating from the path of democracy and heading to authoritarianism. Putin pursued a Russian version of democracy, that Putin called “sovereign democracy”\(^{44}\) and the West referred to as “managed democracy”. Since he took office, power was consolidated into the presidency, the state took control of the media, and corruption spread to every aspect of the Russian government. Corruption-monitoring group Transparency International ranked Putin’s Russia as the third most corrupt nation in the world (Tarlton 11-15). The concept of sovereign democracy was developed by Kremlin ideologist Vladislav Surkov. It implied that Russia would determine its own path to democracy free from foreign interference or normative pressures (Welch and Shevchenko 92). Russia, thus, created its own concept and understanding of democracy in a way best suited to its history and culture and which would not be tailored to Western norms. For the West, Putin’s democracy was synonymous with authoritarianism.
Russia’s sensitivity towards America’s growing presence and influence in the post-Soviet space grew since both Georgia and Ukraine clearly showed pro-Western tendencies in their foreign policies and bluntly announced their ambitions to fully integrate into European and transatlantic institutions. They even announced their aims to become NATO members, an alliance that Russia still perceived as the greatest threat to its security. These two states became of great interest for the United States especially Ukraine because a pro-Western Ukraine would mean further weakness and loss of power and influence from Russia to the West and the United States.

Georgia and Ukraine were of great strategic importance for the United States because they would be part of the project of breaking Russia’s monopoly in transporting energy to Europe. After the Rose Revolution, Georgia’s president Eduard Shevardnadze was replaced by Mikhail Saakashvili. Among the reasons of ousting Shevardnadze was his rapprochement to Russia especially in the field of establishing energy pipelines. Stephen Lendman, a Research Associate of the Centre for Research on Globalization affirmed that “Shevardnadze became a liability when he began dealing with Russia on energy pipelines and privatizations”. America, being extremely interested in the Caspian riches, wanted a new president that would serve its interests. After the Rose Revolution, a pro-Western and anti-Russian became the new Georgian president.

The Georgian war took place under the presidency of Putin’s successor Dmitri Medvedev. During the night of August 7, 2008 Georgia launched a large-scale military attack against the breakaway region of South Ossetia in an attempt to regain the territory. The following day Russia reacted by deploying troops in South Ossetia and launching bombing raids deep into Georgia (De Haas 4). Although the causes of the conflict remained ambiguous and each side was claiming that the other provoked the conflict both Russia and Georgia had long term objectives from the war.
The military campaign initiated by the Georgian President Mikhaïl Saakassvili partly aimed at restoring Georgia’s control over South Ossétia. For Russia the war was legitimized by the claim that Russia was protecting the lives of its compatriots (Russian peacekeepers serving in South Ossétia). The war came to an end after the mediation of the European Union under the leadership of the French President Nikolas Sarkozy. A preliminary ceasefire was reached on 12 August and was signed by both countries. In the aftermath of the war, Russia recognized the independence of South Ossétia and Abkhazia from the Georgian control (De Haas 4).

The United States, as it was expected, fiercely criticized the Russian war on Georgia and even considered taking military steps to stop the Russian aggression. However the option was later avoided as the Bush administration team predicted that any American intervention would bring a direct conflict with Moscow (Asmus). Terrence Hunt, Fox News White House correspondent cited President George Bush’s statement that Russia should respect Georgia’s “sovereignty and territorial integrity”. Ironically, Bush denounced Russia’s use of power in conducting foreign policy while the United States, five years earlier, invaded and occupied Iraq under allegations that the latter had WMD and without the UN approval. The use of force seemed to be an “American privilege”. Bush criticized Russia’s “bullying and intimidation” as unacceptable ways to conduct foreign policy in the 21st century.

Only Russia can decide whether it will now put itself back on the path of responsible nations or continue to pursue a policy that promises only confrontation and isolation…To begin repairing relations with the United States, Europe and other nations and to begin restoring its place in the world, Russia must respect the freedom of its neighbors. (“President Bush: Russia Has Damaged…”)
The Bush administration denounced Russia’s policy toward Georgia as reminiscent of the Cold War when the Soviet Union was obsessed by the idea of maintaining the states bordering it as a zone of influence and under its leverage. “The days of satellite states and spheres of influence are behind us,” Bush added (“Rice Says Russian…”). The administration made it clear that it opposed Russia’s attempts to restore its power and influence on its neighbors through intimidation and use of force.

The Western reaction to the Russian-Georgian War was divided between those calling for punishment and those preferring further engagement and cooperation and not isolation. Derek Fraser, former Canadian Ambassador to Ukraine (1998-2001) and Senior Research Associate in the Centre for Global Studies at the University of Victoria, urged the West to take economic measures to punish Russia’s aggression. “The Western response should make it clear to Russia that there is an economic price to pay for such aggressive behavior”. Such a view was officially announced by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice who warned that Russia’s integration into international institutions such as the Group of Eight of big economies and the WTO was at risk (Taylor).

The United States did not risk intervening in this conflict and only intensified its rhetoric towards Russia. The scenario would have been very different and dangerous had Georgia entered the NATO alliance. Patrick J. Buchanan, a former Republican presidential nominee, argued that if Georgia had become a NATO member as Bush wished, America “would be eyeball to eyeball with Russia”. He blamed the course of American policy and renounced it as dragging America into a direct conflict with Russia. “Had George W. Bush prevailed and were Georgia in NATO, U.S. Marines could be fighting Russian troops over whose flag should fly over a province of 70,000 South Ossetians who prefer Russians to Georgians” (“Who Started Cold War II ?”). Buchanan charged the United States of entangling
itself in an area where no American vital interests merited the risk of initiating an armed conflict with Russia.

The United States and Russia’s foreign policy aims in the FSU seem to be contradictory. Continuous rivalry and the likelihood of future confrontation are expected whenever each of them deems the other’s policies as harmful to its interests. Containing the emergence of Russia’s imperial tendencies in the near-abroad, supporting revolutions that brought pro-Western regimes into power, promoting NATO’s open door policy to former Soviet Republics, and securing its interests through breaking Russia’s monopoly in energy pipelines were among America’s aims in the post-Soviet space. Russia on the other hand wants to revive its power and influence in the FSU and to establish friendly if not pro-Russian regimes on its periphery; it opposes the expansion of the NATO alliance, and wants to preserve its monopoly in energy transportation.

The Russian-Georgian war has announced Russia’s return to the world stage. Seeking recognition by its western counterparts, mainly the United States, and reestablishing itself as a great power and an equal player are its obvious aims. America’s provocative if not humiliating policy of expanding NATO to its borders has been bitterly accepted in the aftermath of the Cold War. This has become intolerable since the alliance’s appetite for expansion seems unlimited especially when Ukraine and Georgia, former parts of the Soviet Union, have been welcomed to become new members. Russia is slowly but steadily reviving its traditional role and regaining its sphere of influence in the near-abroad though with great resentment from the United States. Georgia and Ukraine and the other former Soviet republics are the new red-line NATO should not cross. A new division line is appearing in Europe. It was a line that Russia wished NATO would not overstep after the demise of the Soviet Union but was not able to maintain because of its great weakness.
The Five Day War has brought a new reality to global affairs. Russia has not been fully integrated as an equal partner into the Euro-Atlantic security architecture since the end of the Cold War. Once its economy has recovered, Russia aspires to become a major actor in Europe’s security and does not want to remain a marginalized partner. George Friedman, argues that the war should not be considered as a surprise; “it has been building for months…Russia has been an empire for centuries. The last 15 years or so were not the new reality, but simply an aberration that would be rectified. And now it is being rectified” (“The Russo-Georgian War…”). Europe’s dividing lines have never been actually erased. In the aftermath of the Cold War, they have been pushed as further east as NATO can reach and Russia cannot aggressively react. After the Russia-Georgia War the line has been redrawn over the borders of the Former Soviet Union.

Buchanan affirms that if there is a New Cold War it is America that has initiated it. “If Cold War II is coming, who started it, if not us?” The United States, Buchanan argues, has been overstretching its power pursuing a policy that will only antagonize relations with Russia. It is up to Washington to choose between partnership and the initiation of a new Cold War with Russia. The path to a new confrontation with Russia is the consequence of NATO expansion and rivalry over the Caspian Sea oil, two extremely provocative issues for Russia. “If we want another Cold War we are, by cutting Russia out of the oil of the Caspian and pushing NATO into her face, going about it exactly the right way”. Russia’s resurgence, Buchanan asserts, pose no threat to the United States’ interests but the latter insists on pursuing a “God- given right to plant U.S. military power in the backyard or on the front porch of Mother Russia”. Russia does not tolerate America’s intrusion in its backyard and disrespect of its interests.

Some analysts perceive Russia’s campaign on Georgia as affecting America’s prestige. Bush has once told Saakashvili that Georgia has a solid friend, that is, the United States. John
Chiky from Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, a Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center insists that Russia through this war has sent “a message” to the United States that it “can act at will against Georgia or any other U.S. interests in Eurasia” with some confidence that there will be little action in return. The United States, Chiky asserts, must “show resolve in the face of this new Russian assertiveness” (4). But hostile and aggressive reaction from the United States will only make things worse and further deteriorate the situation. The Russian-Georgian war is the culmination of a critical relationship that has developed since the initiation of NATO enlargement in the mid 1990s. Future confrontation is not ruled out if the West will insist on further enlargement. The issue should be carefully studied and its negative repercussions should be taken into consideration. Will Europe be more stable with Georgia and Ukraine or without them in NATO? This should be the decisive element in any future decision on enlargement.

3. The Russian Monroe Doctrine:

In the aftermath of the war in the Caucasus Russia has officially declared its assertiveness, power and privileged interests in the near-abroad. These concepts were included in its new foreign policy doctrine called the “Medvedev Doctrine” which some commentators call a “Russian Monroe Doctrine”. Again, an analogy is made with America’s Monroe Doctrine toward its neighbors in Latin America. The doctrine contains five main elements that will be the guiding principles for Russia’s foreign policy. It also sends messages to the United States and Russia’s neighbors.

The first principle of the doctrine reiterates Russia’s commitment to an international order which operates within the framework of international law and conventions. The role of the UN should be revived to fulfill its duty as the world’s organization where conflicts and disputes are solved. The second principle favors a multipolar world order to replace the
current system which is ominously dominated by the United States. “A single pole is unacceptable. Domination is something we cannot allow. We cannot accept a world order in which one country makes all the decisions, even as serious and influential country as the United States of America” (Kapila, “Russia’s Monroe Doctrine…”). For Russia, the global power system ought to be reconfigured and multipolarism should replace America’s unipolarity and dominance.

The third principle asserts that Russia has no intention of isolating itself from international affairs and “does not want confrontation with any country”. The fourth and fifth elements of the doctrine are the most important. The fourth principle clearly notes Russia’s willingness to intervene, even militarily, to protect Russian citizens and interests wherever and whenever they are under threat. This may happen in the near-abroad where sizable Russian minorities reside. “Protecting the lives and dignity of our citizens, wherever they may be is an unquestionable priority for our country” and Russia will “protect the interests of our business community abroad. It should be clear to all that we will respond to any aggressive acts committed against us” (Kapila, “Russia’s Monroe Doctrine…”). Russia, hence, will intervene to protect its compatriots and economic interests; this is the main reason given by Russia for its War with Georgia. Russians have been killed because of Georgia’s aggression and Russia has reacted.

The fifth and last principle asserts Russia’s aim of making the post Soviet space a zone of privileged interest. “There are regions in which Russia has “privileged interests”. These regions home to countries with which we share special historical relations and are bound together as friends and good neighbors. We will pay particular attention to our work in these regions and build friendly ties with these countries, our close neighbors” (Kapila, “Russia’s Monroe Doctrine…”). The doctrine, consequently, will forestall any further attempts (by other countries) aiming to the strategic neutralization of Russia’s power and limiting its
sphere of influence especially in the near-abroad. The hint is clearly to the United States and NATO because they have expressed their resolution that Georgia and Ukraine, former Soviet republics and Russia’s closest neighbors, will be welcomed to join NATO.

Russia, through the Medvedev Doctrine, has brought back the sphere of influence principle as a milestone of its foreign policy. It is clearly sending a message to the United States that its intrusion and influence in Russia’s neighborhood should stop. Thomas Friedman from STRATFOR argues that Russia is not seeking the resurrection of the Soviet Empire but nonetheless it is seeking “a new structure of relations in the geography of its predecessors, with a new institutional structure with Moscow at its center. Globally, the Russians want to use this new regional power and substantial Russian nuclear assets to be part of a global system in which the United States loses its primacy” (“The Medvedev Doctrine and American…”).

U.S.-Russian relations are deteriorating into a situation that renders them similar to their Cold War relationship. Mistrust is still a characteristic of the relationship and competition is increasing even to the level of confrontation over asserting one’s influence and power in the contested regions especially the post Soviet Space. The United States wants to diminish if not neutralize Russia’s power through NATO expansion and sponsoring color revolutions. Russia, after years of weakness, isolation and no influential role in regional and global affairs seeks the reestablishment of its status as a great power.

Kapila expects that Russia and the United States will resort to their old “proxy war” option to further their respective interests. They “would not enter into a direct armed conflict. Their strategic rivalries and tussles would be executed through proxies in strategic regions of the world”. For Kapila, a new Cold War is inevitable. The Middle East, Central Asia and Eastern Europe would be “the first to feel the pressures of the revived strategic jostling between the United States and Russia” (“Russia’s Monroe Doctrine”). George Friedman
shares this anticipation and argues that if the United States will not respond to Russia’s resurgence and aggressive foreign policy, “The world will look very much like it did from 1945 to 1992. There will be another Cold War at the very least, with a peer power much poorer than the United States but prepared to devote huge amounts of money to national defense” (“The Medvedev Doctrine and American…”). The current struggle between the two countries, however, is not a new one.

The current confrontation between Russia and the United States and its NATO alliance is a new version of their Cold War struggle and rivalry that in fact has never come to an end. The new Cold War that the analysts are anticipating represents the revival of a confrontation between Russia and the United States that goes back to the old struggle of the Cold War. The latter, in fact, did not end with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The United States through expanding NATO has been partly attempting to contain a future expansionist threat by Russia towards its neighbors. In the aftermath of the Cold War, Russia was not in a situation that would enable it to pose any danger to its neighbors. But Russia has not given up the concept of having a sphere of influence on its western borders. This remained an aim and later became an urgency that was heightened by the constant expansion of NATO. The economic growth that Russia has witnessed under the Putin administration brought a great sense of confidence and revived Russia’s aspiration to restore itself as a great power again.

Russia seems to have accurately timed its offensive against Georgia and to announce its new foreign policy doctrine. The United States’ unrestrained use of military force and unilateralism in the conduct of its foreign policy have undermined its credibility especially after the wars on Afghanistan and Iraq. America, Kapila argues, is witnessing an “imperial overstretch” because of its numerous military entanglements in different spots of the world. This has restricted the way America can deal with Russia’s resurgence. Moreover, any hostile
actions toward Russia may push the latter to take anti-American policies in the spots that the latter is now committed to (especially in the Middle East and Iran) by making its tasks harder and longer. Russia could also exert an important leverage over America’s allies in Europe to make them oppose some policies that it perceives as harmful. Its oil exports for energy hungry Europe represents a powerful leverage since Europe is greatly dependent on Russian energy sources.

Russia has put the world and the United States, specifically, “on notice”. History is really repeating itself concerning the current American-Russian relationship. Mistrust and rivalry still linger. The Russian-Georgian War has brought to the fore the old rules of the Cold War such as the balance of power, the sphere of influence, regime change and the containment policy. Each of them is seeking to contain the other’s expansionist tendencies. The issue of enlarging NATO remains a sore point in their bilateral relationship. It will remain a complicated problem as both countries are highly committed to their position on the issue. America maintains that the alliance will carry its open door policy and new members will be welcomed into the alliance even Georgia and Ukraine. Russia has concretely showed its great opposition by waging a war through which a message has been sent to NATO aspirants (especially Georgia and Ukraine) to think twice.

If in the beginning weakness has given Russia no choice but to complain and denounce NATO expansion, the late Russian-Georgian war has shown that Russia is ready to use military force to protect its vital interests. As far as Georgia and Ukraine are concerned the alliance has decided in April 2008 not to grant them MAP status despite America’s insistence and bidding for the issue. However, the allies have also declared in their communiqué that Georgia and Ukraine will become members of NATO. Paul Gallis, Specialist in European Affairs, Foreign Affairs and Defense comments that NATO statement is an “obvious message to Moscow that it may not determine which governments enter NATO”. Rice has reiterated
that “Georgia and Ukraine will be members of NATO. We believe strongly in NATO’s open-door policy, that states that are prepared for NATO membership and can assume the responsibilities therein should be welcomed into the organization” (“Remarks by Secretary Rice…”). The United States, clearly, does not consider changing its policy towards further enlargement only because Russia opposes the step. The message is that the late August War will not halt NATO from welcoming future members.

Russia’s assertiveness in its foreign policy has become a fact. No more willing to play a minor role on the stage of international affairs Russia is seeking a vital and genuine part in regional as well as global affairs and to reestablish its grandeur. Russia has eventually shown that it has the leverage and power to make the West take its reservations and interests into account. Polish Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski has announced that “the rules have changed in the sense that Europe, in which we could dispense security guarantees to countries without anticipating having to bear any cost for them, has just ended. The Russians have forced us to think in a more disciplined way about the future of NATO, the value of the guarantees, the practicalities that go with them” (qtd. in Cassata). Russia has made it clear that, from now on, its voice should be heard and its reservations should be taken into account.

It is noteworthy that outstanding statesmen who shaped America’s policy during the Cold War have warned of similar outcomes that may result from inconvenient policies towards Russia. George Kennan, the creator of the containment policy that guided America’s policy during the Cold War has warned that NATO expansion will represent:

The most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-Cold War era.

Such a decision may be expected to inflame the nationalistic, anti-Western and militaristic tendencies in Russian opinion; to have an adverse effect on the development of Russian democracy; to restore the atmosphere of the Cold War
to East-West relations, and to impel Russian foreign policy in directions
decidedly not to our liking. (qtd. in Lourie)

The specter of the Cold War is already overshadowing the American-Russian relationship and many analysts assert that the two countries are in a state of new Cold War. The Russian-Georgian War can be classified as one of the errors resulting from expanding the alliance. Further errors that will endanger Europe’s security in the first place are expected if a thorough solution to this critical issue is not found. The consideration of isolating Russia as a punishment for the Russian-Georgian War is not welcomed by political experts. Henry Kissinger and George Schultz (both former secretaries of state) stress that such policy is neither “feasible nor desirable”. Russia adjoins “Europe, Asia, the Middle East” and possesses a stockpile of nuclear weapons “comparable to that of the United States”. The ball is in America’s side. It should envisage a clear and coherent policy towards Russia of either cooperation or confrontation.

The degeneration in Russian-American relations over the issue of NATO eastward enlargement has brought Cold War rhetoric back to the official circles. Russia feels that the United States still aims to contain Russia through enlarging NATO and encircling it with new NATO members. Its neighbors feel threatened by the renewed assertiveness in its foreign policy especially in the aftermath of the Russian-Georgian War. The idea of ignoring Russia has proved to be impractical since security in Europe will not be obtained without a vital role for Russia. Russia seems to be no longer tolerating the West’s reliance upon her eventually giving up. Giving up due to a lack of power has become history; Russia will fight for its interests to the utmost. “The days in which Russia could be treated as a quantité négligeable are over…There will be no security and peace in Europe without Russia, and none at all in opposition to Russia” (Dembinski et al. 1). Russia has developed autonomy in its foreign
policy and a sense of confidence if not assertiveness in its relations with the United States, Europe and the near-abroad.

A vibrant Russia has returned and it wants a real say and role in European security affairs. Its role in the NATO - Russia Council (a voice but not a veto) has proved to be incoherent. Russia has not become a full-fledged member. The idea that the alliance may integrate Russia in NATO is very improbable and Russia will unlikely accept to give up its strategic independence to NATO’s command. Russia wants an equal authority to discuss and decide European resolutions especially in the security field.

America’s project of establishing a National Missile Defense (also known as the Missile Shield) is another great problem between the two countries. America claims that the aim behind the project is to protect itself and its allies from rogue states’ nuclear attacks. Russia refutes the project and declares that it is unacceptable because it will be a direct threat to its security and deterrence capability. This will be the issue on which the next chapter will focus.
Endnotes


36 Christopher Layne, Associate Professor at Texas A & M University defines balancing as “a countervailing strategy”. States balance when power is over concentrated and weaker states are “at risk of being dominated by the strongest one”. There are two types of balancing: internal or external. Internal balancing is achieved through military buildups; external balancing through participation in counter hegemonic coalitions or in some instances, by doing both.” Christopher Layne, ‘The Unipolar Illusion Revisited: The Coming End of the United States’ Unipolar Moment,” International Security 31. 2 (2006): 28. Web. <belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/is3102_pp007-041_layne.pdf>.

37 The Collective Security Treaty was signed on May 15, 1992 in Tashkent, Uzbekistan. At present, the CSTO members are Armenia, Belarus, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. According to Article IV, the Participating States, collectively confront and eliminate a military threat against their sovereignty and territorial integrity. In case of an act of aggression against a Member State, all other members would provide all necessary assistance, including that of military. “Collective Treaty Organization Treaty,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia, 12 Nov. 2009 <http://www.mfa.am/en/international-organisations/CSTO/>.

38 The term “Great Game” refers to the competition between Tsarist Russia and the British Empire for increasing influence in a common area of interest, where India was the British “Crown Jewel”. The term’s first use is attributed to a British officer, Arthur Connolly, in 1829. Maria Raquel Freire, “Russian Policy in Central Asia/ Supporting, Balancing, Coercing, or Imposing?” Asian Perspective 33. 2 (2009): 147. Web. 12 Apr. 2009 <www.asianperspective.org/articles/v33n2-e.pdf>.


41 Rogue State is a label used by the Clinton administration to characterize states ‘beyond the international pale’ that are hostile to the United States. They are portrayed as being contemptuous of international norms, bent on acquiring WMD, and being sponsors of terrorism. The label is most consistently applied to Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Cuba, and Libya. “Rogue State,” Oxford Dictionary of Politics, 12 Apr. 2009 <http://www.answers.com/topic/rogue-state>.


43 Non Governmental Organization refers to any non-profit, voluntary citizens’ group which is organized on a local, national or international level. Task-oriented and driven by people with a common interest., NGOs perform a variety of service and humanitarian functions, bring citizen
concerns to Governments, advocate and monitor policies and encourage political participation through provision of information. Some are organized around specific issues, such as human rights, environment or health. “What is an NGO?” West Godavari District, 12 Apr. 2009 <http://www.westgodavari.org/NGO/WHATISNGO.asp>.

44 Managed Democracy is a term used to refer to the Russian political system under president Putin. Its basic elements are 1) a strong presidential system of state management together with the weakening of other institutions, including parliament, the Judiciary, and regional elites; 2) state control over media, which is used to shape (even control) public opinion; 3) control over elections, changing them into a means of legitimizing decisions made by elites. Nikolai Petrov, “From Managed Democracy to Sovereign Democracy: Putin’s Regime Evolution in 2005,” PONARS Policy Memo No. 396. Center for Political-Geographic Research (Dec. 2005): 182. Web. 12 Apr. 2009 <www.gwu.edu/~ieresgwu/assets/docs/ponars/pm_0396.pdf>.

45 The Monroe Doctrine was articulated in President James Monroe’s seventh annual message to Congress on December 2, 1823. The European powers, according to Monroe, were obligated to respect the Western Hemisphere as the United States’ sphere of interest. “Monroe Doctrine 1823,” Our Documents, 12 Apr. 2009 <http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=old&doc=23>.
Chapter Four
The United States Missile Defense Plans and their Military and Political Repercussions on U.S.-Russian Relations

America’s commitment to build a Missile Defense (MD) program represents another bitter issue that is negatively affecting its relations with Russia. Through this project, the United States claims that it intends to intercept any missile attacks from “rogue states” (Postol, “The Target is Russia”). This project is greatly resented by Russia that perceives the program as threatening to its security and deterrent capability. What this program is about, how and where America intends to establish it, why Russia is fervently opposing it, and what are its political and military implications will be the focus of this chapter.

1. National Missile Defense under the Clinton Administration

The term Missile Defense refers to a program that seeks to protect the United States from ballistic missiles of all ranges including accidental or unauthorized launches (“National Missile Defense”). America’s commitment to such a program, under the Clinton and Bush administrations, stems from their concern over the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and ballistic missiles technologies to states that are classified as hostile to the United States.

The aim of creating a defense system that renders America immune against any missile attacks is not a new one. It goes back to the days of the Cold War. Ronald Reagan boldly pursued this project under the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program, known as “Star Wars”. The NMD is nicknamed ‘son of Star Wars’ because it is the second generation of an attempt by the United States to build an anti-ballistic missile shield (D. Robertson 454). It is a
scaled-down version of Ronald Reagan’s plan to use land, sea and satellite-based lasers to shoot down intercontinental ballistic missiles before they could hit the United States.

Reagan’s project seemed to be a fantasy and critics argued that besides being too costly, the system’s technical reliability was greatly doubted. Reagan argued that America should leave the paradigm of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) long shared with the Soviet Union. This concept entailed that “one’s population could best be protected by leaving it vulnerable, so long as the other side faced comparable vulnerabilities” (Gaddis 218). In short, the fear of retaliation deterred both sides from initiating a nuclear attack. Whoever shoots first dies second (“Mutual Assured Destruction”). Reagan contended that the United States should pursue a security system that would protect it from nuclear attacks.

In his SDI speech he announced his new vision for a hopeful future for America through embarking on a program “to counter the awesome Soviet missile threat with measures that are defensive” (“President Reagan Announces…”). He emphasized that such a system would render the Americans more secure knowing that “their security did not rest upon the threat of instant U.S. retaliation to deter a Soviet attack” but rather on a defense system that could “intercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reached our own soil or that of our allies” (“President Reagan Announces…”). For Reagan, the United States should become invulnerable to missile attacks.

Reagan raised the issue of the project’s probability of success and failure. He emphasized the important role of the scientists in making their best to render the project a reality. Though the task was “formidable” and might take years if not decades to materialize, Reagan was in parallel optimistic about the continuous technological advances that would render this fantasy a reality. “I call upon the scientific community in our country, those who gave us nuclear weapons…to give us the means of rendering these nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete” (“President Reagan Announces…”). Reagan officially proclaimed that the
United States would initiate the development of a program that would eventually achieve the goal of eliminating the threat posed by strategic missiles from the Soviet enemy. Although the Soviet enemy crashed, and the Cold War was assumed as ended America’s interest in establishing such a system was maintained. In 1991, SDI’s name was changed to the Missile Defense Agency (“MD History”). The talk about deploying a missile defense program resurfaced in public discourse under the presidency of Clinton.

It was the first Gulf War which brought missile defense onto the American security agenda. The war made a great shift in American foreign policy and security thinking especially by those who alleged that America was unprotected in the face of a large-scale missile attack. Iraq, specifically, was portrayed as having a considerable ballistic missile arsenal that was effectively used against American forces. Saddam Hussein was claimed to possess a “frightening” missile arsenal and had developed several systems with the range from 70 to 900 km. America’s concern about ballistic missile threat from hostile states was heightened by 1989 when Iraq had also developed two types of missiles: the Al-Hussein (600 km range) and the Al-Abbas (900 km range) (S. McMahon 56-57). Such missile capabilities by rogues made the United States steadfast to establishing missile defense plans to face such threats.

America’s commitment to NMD was heightened after the delivery of the “Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States” known as the “Rumsfeld Commission Report” in July 1998. The Commission had been ordered to assess the “nature and magnitude” of the existing and emerging ballistic missile threat to the United States. Among the key findings of the report was that there were efforts by a number of “overtly or potentially hostile” nations to acquire ballistic missiles. These nations according to the report were posing a “growing threat” to the United States, its deployed forces as well as its allies. Among the nations listed as a high concern were North Korea, Iran and Iraq. The
report, however, included Russia and China in the list of states posing a threat to the United States. The report found that:

These newer, developing threats in North Korea, Iran and Iraq are in addition to those still posed by the existing ballistic missile arsenals of Russia and China, nations with which we are not now in conflict but which remain in uncertain transitions…would be able to inflict major destruction on the U.S. within about five years of a decision to acquire such a capability (10 years in the case of Iraq). During several of those years, the U.S. might not be aware that such a decision had been made. ("Commission to Assess the Ballistic…")

The commissioners were greatly concerned about the ability of these hostile states to develop their missile capabilities and eventually load them with biological or chemical weapons with the ultimate aim of targeting the United States or its friends and allies. Such a dangerous action could be taken since these states greatly resented America’s interventionist policies in regional and internal affairs.

A whole doctrine was devised to face the rogue states’ threat and the support for establishing a missile defense program as soon as possible was stressed by the conservatives in Congress. Representative Robert Dornan (Republican - California) stressed “It won’t be all that many years before a pirate in a place like Baghdad or Pyongyang gets hold of a nuclear bomb and the means with which to deliver it. When that capability exists, it will of course be too late to start slapping together a national missile defense” ("Ballistic Missile Defense through..."). Establishing an NMD became one of the security priorities.

The need to establish an NMD was meant to deprive such states from intimidating the United States and to preserve the latter’s ability to stand to its commitments. According to Walter B. Slocombe, NMD would help the United States to retain “our freedom to respond to a regional crisis because they would negate the potential of regional aggressors with small,
long-range missile forces to attack the American homeland as a penalty for standing by our commitments” (“U.S. National Missile Defense…”). Intimidating the United States through developing long-range ballistic missiles, consequently, should be neutralized by establishing an NMD.

The rogue states were portrayed as irrational. Behind their aim to acquire nuclear weapons and missile technologies was the intention of using them against the United States and its allies. The United States claimed that these states, if able to acquire WMD, would very likely use them against it. Ivan Eland and Daniel Lee from the CATO Institute explain the rogue state doctrine as:

Predicated on the claim that those states act irrationally, and therefore cannot be deterred with America’s offensive nuclear arsenal - as was the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Armed with ballistic missiles, such unpredictable states may strike the United States at any time. Therefore…the United States must deploy an NMD system at the earliest possible date for protection against such contingencies. (“The Rogue State Doctrine…” 3)

According to the Rumsfeld Report, these Third World countries opted for developing such delivery systems because they considered the acquisition of WMD and missiles as a “highly effective deterrent weapons” and an “effective means of coercing or intimidating adversaries, including the United States” (“Commission to Assess the Ballistic…”). But intimidation and the real use of these weapons are different strategies. These states know very well that if they may use these weapons, which is very unlikely to happen, they will be erased from the world map.

The concept of irrationality was controversial and even undermined by other analysts who stress that the rogue states are in fact rational. Almost all the rogues acted rationally and with prudence because they wanted to maintain their grip on power in their countries. North
Korea, taken as an example, showed certain rationality. The leadership “has shown intent to stay in power and refrains from taking steps it perceives would weaken its hold on the country or lead to outright hostilities with the United States” (Kimball and Young 16). The concept of irrationality appeared to be incoherent to depict rogue states’ behavior.

By May 2000, Robert Walpole, CIA National Intelligence Officer for Strategic and Nuclear Programs gave a clearer assessment. According to Walpole, these countries were pursuing missile programs because they “view these weapons more as strategic tools of deterrence, coercive diplomacy, not as operational weapons of war” (qtd. in Daniel Smith, “National Missile Defense: What...” 7). This conclusion was clearly mentioned in his CIA report on ballistic missile threat to the United States. These weapons, consequently, would serve as a bargaining chip, as a means of coercion to deter the United States from taking harmful policies towards them.

The rogue state doctrine served another aim for the United States. The concept was a pretended urgency to establish the NMD. These states were used by the United States to create a new threat through which it would continue its worldwide military presence and military expenditures. The rogue states’ threat appeared to be premeditated and their insignificant ballistic missile programs were highly exaggerated to prepare the climate to continue America’s military agenda. Dr. Frank P. Harvey, Director of the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies at Dalhousie University in Halifax, Canada, asserted that the Pentagon and the Military Industrial Complex of defense-related industries “need rogue threats to justify expenditures on the latest military technologies”. American officials, they add, “are compelled to view the world through ‘rogue’ colored glasses and exaggerate (even fabricate) nonexistent threats for economic reasons” (70). Such a threat from Iraq, Iran and North Korea would justify massive military expenditure to build an NMD and protect the mainland.
Ivan Eland and Daniel Lee stressed that “The vacuum in U.S. foreign policy left by the collapse of the Soviet Union resulted in the pressing need to create an alternative justification for the widespread presence of American forces throughout the world” (“The Rogue State Doctrine…” 2). The doctrine became a cornerstone of America’s post-Cold War foreign policy. The threat from these states lied in the unpredictability of their behavior in using their WMD against the United States. Iraq was used as an example to show that Saddam Hussein used chemical weapons on his own people and his neighbors (Iran) in the eighties (Chomsky).

So what does a “rogue” state mean? First of all, the term is interchangeably used with other synonyms like “pariah states” or “states of concern”. There is still no consensus definition on what rogue states are, but among the main criteria used to categorize states into rogues are challenge if not disregard to international norms, pursuit of acquiring WMD, potential threats against neighboring states and support for terrorism or insurgency.

But who defines the international norms that the rogues are said to be violating? International norms come from “the influence of ideas, or from the effect of power and power distributions” (Ayres and Mathew 6). The second category seems problematic. If international norms are written by or under the influence of the powerful states this entails that rogue states are those out of favor with the powerful states of the system. William Ayres and Sunayna Mathew from the Department of History and Political Science from the University of Indianapolis explain “In the context of a unipolar system - which is the consensus view of the post - Cold War world - this means simply that rogue states are those which the central, hegemonic power does not like” (6). Labelling states as rogues serves a “political purpose since leaders (especially American leaders) can mobilize constituencies to support aggressive policies against the demonized states” (Litwak 241). The classification of states into rogues, hence, depends on the United States’ perception and attitude towards them.
But the concept of irrationality was also considered by the United States itself to be used in its foreign policy. The American defense planners and strategists formulated the strategy of irrationality in using American nuclear forces in the future. A secret 1995 study of the Strategic Command (responsible for the strategic nuclear arsenal) entitled “Essentials of Post-Cold War Deterrence”, called the U.S. to exploit its nuclear arsenal and portray itself as “irrational and vindictive” if its “vital interests are attacked”. Portraying the United States as fully rational and cool-headed and committed to international law and treaty obligations might become harmful. America’s irrationality and being “out of control” could be “beneficial to creating and reinforcing fears and doubts within the minds of an adversary’s decision making (“Essentials of Post-Cold...”).

The rogue states represented unfriendly if not hostile countries which were claimed to be developing missiles capable of reaching the American territory or that of its allies and friends. The obstacle towards the initiation of the missile defense system was the paramount treaty signed between the United States and the former Soviet Union in 1972: the ABM Treaty. The Clinton administration knew that the system could not be started because it was illegal under the ABM provisions. The treaty banned all forms of national missile defense that could provide defense for the territories of the United States or the Soviet Union against long-range missile attacks.

According to the treaty, each side should have only one missile site either on the nation’s capital or around an ICBM site. The site could contain no more than 100 Anti-Ballistic Missile launchers and 100 ABM interceptor missiles. Russia placed its system around Moscow and the United States chose to place it in North Dakota to protect the intercontinental ballistic missile sites (Byers). The essence of the treaty was to preserve the vulnerability of the two sides to the other’s attack. It prevented both countries from resorting to use their nuclear arsenal because they knew that the other side would retaliate and the
ultimate consequence would be mutual annihilation. Lindsay and O’Hanlon clarify the aim of the treaty as banning:

All national missile Defenses - that is, any system, however limited in scale, that could defend all of a country’s territory against long-range missile attack…Washington and Moscow formally embraced the idea that, at least in the case of their superpower rivalry, mutual vulnerability helped prevent nuclear war and dampen a wasteful arms race. (“Defending America: The Case…” 5)

Both states, accordingly, should preserve a certain degree of vulnerability towards the other side to prevent an endless arms race.

The ABM treaty became a controversial issue between Russia and the United States. The Russians were fervently sticking to its preservation with no further amendments because they considered it to be the basis of the strategic stability between Russia and the United States. The Americans sought to modify it to be able to establish their missile defense system. It is noteworthy that early negotiations between the Americans and the Russians resulted in an agreement at the Helsinki Summit that convened in March 1997 (Parrish). At the summit, Yeltsin and Clinton issued a joint statement on the ABM Treaty viewing it as the “cornerstone of strategic stability” and pledged to preserve it. Russia and the United State agreed to develop only TMD systems that would not “pose a realistic threat to the strategic nuclear forces of the other side” and added that neither country would develop or test space-based TMD systems (Parrish).

In the aftermath of the summit, Clinton enthusiastically declared “Today, after three years of negotiations, we agreed to preserve the ABM treaty while giving each of us the ability to develop defenses against theater missiles” (“Press Conference of President…”). The
essence of the agreement was to distinguish between ballistic missile systems restricted by the ABM treaty and theater missile defenses that were not prohibited.

Ballistic Missile Defense programs are divided into two broad categories. NMD is intended to protect U.S. territory from attacks by long-range, “strategic” missiles. TMD systems are designed to protect U.S. military forces deployed abroad, allied military forces and allied nations from attacks by short to intermediate-range missiles (Daggett and Shuey). The two sides agreed to deploy TMDs which are intended to defend smaller areas. They are designed to be mobile so that they can be deployed with troops or moved as needed to defend U.S. allies (“Theatre Missile Defense”).

The United States, however, was not satisfied by this ability to establish only theater missile defenses. Securing the whole national territory lingered and the NMD issue was reopened. In May 1999, Congress passed the National Missile Defense Act which stated “It is the policy of the United States to deploy as soon as is technologically possible an effective National Missile Defense system capable of defending the territory of the United States against limited ballistic missile attack” (“The National Missile Defense Act…”). The act was easily passed because the Republicans were a majority in both houses of Congress after the 1994 Congressional elections. It was the Republicans, for the most part, who were greatly committed to the plan.

A second reason was the findings of the Rumsfeld Report. North Korea which was among the countries listed as representing a missile threat to the United States surprised the world with its August 31, 1998 attempt to place a satellite in space using a three-stage Taepo Dong - 1 rocket (Thielmann, “The National Missile Defense…”). Although the test failed the political impact of the event was great. Proponents of strategic missile defense used the North Korean launch as evidence of the Rumsfeld Commission’s warnings.
The Clinton administration allocated approximately $7 billion over six years for the deployment of the system. It proclaimed it was examining the “nature and scope” of alterations to the ABM Treaty that might be needed to legitimize deployment of such a system (W. Bowen, “Missile Defense and Transatlantic…” 487). The program was intended to initiate a new missile site which would station 100 interceptor missiles in Alaska and one X-Band radar based at Shemya Island of the Aleutian Islands (Alaska). The radar would be able to detect the launch of enemy ballistic missile; it could track its path through ground based radars. At the final stage the system would destroy the hostile ballistic missile warhead above the earth’s atmosphere by force of impact (“National Missile Defense”).

Clinton’s vision of the missile defense was about securing the American mainland, that is, the fifty states from any potential missile attacks that could be loaded with nuclear, biological or chemical warheads. He knew that the ABM treaty should be amended so as to allow the construction of a “continent-wide system”, the first phase of which would be based in Alaska (Byers). Under the ABM provisions the United States and the former Soviet Union should have only one missile site on their territories. The administration wanted to establish a new missile site. This would directly violate the treaty. Knowing that the Russians would resent any further alterations to the treaty, Clinton took the path of negotiations. He started by sending a letter to his counterpart in late January 1999. As was expected, Yeltsin showed vehement opposition to the issue and responded by urging Clinton to strictly adhere to the ABM Treaty.

Statements by Russian officials showed how Russia was offended by the decision of Congress. They unanimously opposed any amendments. The greatest objection to the NMD came from the Russian military as it was clearly echoed by Colonel General Valery Manilov, the First Deputy Chief of the Russian General Staff. He avowed that there could be “no compromises” on this issue. He warned that:
U.S. attempts to withdraw from the ABM Treaty are objectively destroying the system of agreements covering the limitation and reduction of weapons of mass destruction ... The basic and fundamental character of the ABM Treaty excludes the possibility of adjusting it to the momentary interests of the American Administration. (“U.S. NMD Plans and the Future…”)

The Clinton administration, in an attempt to ease Russia’s opposition to the NMD, claimed that the system could not neutralize Russia’s capabilities of striking the United States. Albright maintained “The missile system we are planning is not designed to defend against Russia and could not do so”. She emphasized the limited scope of the changes the United States was contemplating and that they “would not permit us to undermine Russia’s deterrent” (“Albright before Chicago Council…”). Such appeasing statements did not alleviate Russia’s concern over the planned NMD. The latter was decisively committed to preserve the treaty to its letters.

When the administration saw that the Russians were insisting on their stance it started to send signals that the treaty contained the provision of withdrawal before six months notice. The Americans shifted the blame for the probable abrogation of the treaty on Russia’s insistence on not accepting modifications. John Holum, Senior Advisor for Arms Control and International Security Affairs at the U.S. Department of State affirmed “The ABM Treaty does contain a supreme national interests clause that allows either country to withdraw from the treaty upon six months’ notice”. Walter Slocombe, Under Secretary of Defense, in a more assertive tone declared that his country’s desire and expectation was that the “limited national missile defense program can proceed to deployment without destroying the ABM Treaty”. Nevertheless, “we will not permit any other country to have a veto on actions that may be needed for the defense of our nation” (“Slocombe on National Missile…”). Russia had been
put on notice either to submit to the proposal of making amendments to the treaty or the United States, under the provisions of the treaty, would withdraw from it.

Jesse Helms, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee aggressively opposed Clinton’s commitment to preserve the ABM treaty which presented an impediment to the United States to establish an NMD. He denied such a vision and disagreed to compromise the safety of the United States because Russia did not permit the amendment of the ABM. For Helms, “The ABM Treaty is dead. It died when our treaty partner, the Soviet Union, ceased to exist” (“Amend the ABM Treaty...”). But the feasibility of the treaty was kept by signing the Memorandum of Understanding.

This memorandum was signed in New York on September 26, 1997. According to Article I “The United States of America, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine, upon entry into force of this Memorandum, shall constitute the Parties to the Treaty”. Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine, hence, became the successors to the Soviet Union as the second signatory to the ABM. Article II stipulated that “the USSR Successor States shall assume the rights and obligations of the former USSR under the Treaty and its associated documents” (“Memorandum of Understanding”). Russia and the United States remained bound by the ABM treaty’s provisions.

Russia remained a threat to the United States national security because of its loose nukes. The Rumsfeld Report acknowledged that “Russia continues to pose a ballistic missile threat to the United States, although of a different character than in the past” (“Commission to Assess Ballistic…”). The threat would not be from a deliberate attack but rather from an unauthorized missile launch. The nuclear threat from Russia stemmed from its aging ballistic missile early warning system resulting from delays in planned modernization that were caused by economic constraints.
Russia posed another problem for the United States. It was one of the countries that exported advanced technologies such as ballistic missiles to countries that were hostile to the United States such as Iran. The Rumsfeld report noted that Russian assistance would greatly accelerate Iran’s ballistic missile program; a finding that was emphasized by a 1999 CIA report about Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States. “Iran could test an ICBM that could deliver several hundred kilograms payload to many parts of the United States in the last half of the next decade using Russian technology and assistance” (Walpole 7).

The CIA report, however, was clearer in specifying the degree of threat and its likeliness from the states with missile capabilities or those aspiring to develop them. “We project that during the next 15 years the United States most likely will face ICBM threats from Russia, China, and North Korea, probably from Iran, and possibly from Iraq”. As far as Russia was concerned the report emphasized that “The Russian threat, although significantly reduced, will continue to be the most robust and lethal, considerably more so than that posed by China, and orders of magnitude more than that potentially posed by other nations, whose missiles are likely to be fewer in number” (Walpole 2). Thus the real and absolute missile threat would come from Russia.

Because some interception tests of the new NMD failed, Clinton became more skeptic about the program. As a result, in September 2000 he delivered a speech in which he proclaimed that he would not order the deployment of NMD. There was reasonable chance that the challenges facing the NMD technology and its operational effectiveness could be met in time, but with “the information I have today”, Clinton reasoned, “I have decided not to authorize deployment of a national missile defense at this time” (“Clinton Delivers Speech…”). Clinton’s decision was taken after considering a number of criteria to initiate the deployment of the system. Deployment should take into consideration four main points which
were the ballistic missile threat to the United States, the technological feasibility of the system, the cost of NMD, and more importantly the impact of deployment on arms control.

Clinton, however, asserted America’s unchallenged primacy as the world’s supreme military power and confirmed America’s military technology was “well ahead of the rest of the world”. “Today, the United States enjoys overwhelming military superiority over any potential adversary. For example, in 1985, we spent about as much on defense as Russia, China and North Korea combined. Today we spend nearly three times as much, nearly $300 billion a year”. This abundant confidence in the United States’ military capabilities would render the trials of countries such as North Korea and Iran to acquire ICBM missiles as futile when compared with the stature of the United States military.

This high confidence in America’s military capabilities seems to be at odds with the obsession with missile attacks from novice nuclear countries such as North Korea and Iran who have just joined the nuclear club with a very modest arsenal. The CIA report contended that “The new missile threats involve states with considerably fewer missiles with less accuracy, yield, survivability, reliability, and range-payload capability than the hostile strategic forces we have faced for 30 years” (in reference to the Soviet Union and China) (Walpole 4). The capabilities of North Korea, Iraq and Iran were, consequently, very limited in size and capacity.

Clinton’s decision not to deploy an NMD was positively received by Russia and China. But both knew that the system was only put on a halt and was not totally abandoned. Both Presidential candidates Al Gore (Democrat) and George W. Bush (Republican) were interested in establishing an NMD though in different tones. Gore supported Clinton’s decision yet he would not block the NMD deployment simply because Russia and China were against it. If the system was “affordable and needed” he would proceed in deploying it. He suggested that in case he became president, he would use such a time to negotiate with the
Chinese and the Russians to persuade them to accept amending the ABM treaty since he wanted to avoid the idea of opening “the gates for a renewed arms race with Russia and a new arms race with China”. Bush declared that his first priority would be the development and deployment of an “effective” missile defense at the “earliest possible date” (Boese). Once becoming president, Bush would eagerly pursue the project.

2. Missile Defense under the Bush Administration:

Just after winning the presidency Bush delivered another speech in which he outlined his administration’s approach to NMD. On May 1, 2001 he announced his commitment to establish a robust multi-layered Missile Defense that would have land, sea, air and even space based components. For Bush, the ABM treaty had become irrelevant for the 21st century security challenges. As the ABM treaty was representing an obstacle in front of the plan, a “new framework” that would allow to build “missile defenses to counter the different threats of today’s world” was needed. He openly declared that “We must move beyond the constraints of the 30-year old ABM treaty…No treaty that prevents us from addressing today’s threats, that prohibits us from pursuing promising technology to defend ourselves, our friends and our allies is in our interest or in the interest of world peace” (“President Bush’s Speech…”). Senator John McCain (Republican) added that leaving the United States “vulnerable to missiles armed with nuclear warheads, is simply no longer tenable”. The 1972 ABM Treaty “cannot continue to provide the basis of our approach to one of the most serious threats to the territory of the United States” (“Remarks of Senator John…”). The Bush administration’s attitude of the ABM treaty showed that its days were counted.

As his predecessor, Bush maintained that the program’s aim was to deprive the irrational rogue states from using such a technology as a blackmail to deter America from playing its role and protecting its interests and those of its allies. Such states seek WMD “to
intimidate their neighbors and to keep the United States and other responsible nations from helping allies and friends in strategic parts of the world” (“Remarks by the President to Students...”). Secretary of State Colin Powell sent an easing message to Russia and China, during a July 2001 trip to Beijing that the United States was seeking to build a limited missile defense that “would not threaten, (was) not intended to threaten” the strategic deterrents of either Russia or China (qtd. in Lindsay and O’Hanlon 164). The intention of establishing the missile was not Russia, and Russia should consider itself to be the target of the system. These were the main assurances the United States kept giving to Russia to alleviate its concerns.

The Bush administration faced the resistance both of anti-nuclear activists and those who were worried that the NMD would threaten the traditional concept of deterrence. The administration noted its full commitment towards the program and that it was going “to consult with our allies to hear their concerns, but we are not going to get knocked off the track of moving in this direction as long as the technology points us in that direction” (“Bush Administration Pushes...”). There would be consultations with allies but the decision to deploy was already taken. The only impediment would be technical considerations.

Bush emphasized the urgency to deploy the system and to not wait till the threats became realities. “If we wait for threats to fully materialize, we will have waited too long,” he told West Point cadets in June 2002. “We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans and confront the worst threats before they emerge. In the world we have entered, the only path to safety is the path of action. And this nation will act” (“Bush Calls West...”). Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld reiterated the administration’s opposition to keep the United States territory and people vulnerable to attacks simply because some countries were against it. “No U.S. President can responsibly say that his defense policy is calculated and designed to leave the American people undefended against threats that are known to exist (“Bush Administration Pushes...”). Other voices within the administration used a more compromising
tone. Senator Joseph Lieberman confirmed that “The chance that a hostile nation may acquire weapons of mass destruction and missiles to deliver them is a threat to our homeland in America, but it is also a threat to Russia’s homeland and to Europe’s... [W]e and you, our allies in Europe, and our friends in Russia, should work together to build defences” (“Bush Administration Pushes NMD, Orders Nuclear Review”). Russia and the European allies that opposed the NMD would probably face the same threat, thus, they should cooperate to face the rogue state danger.

Through time it became clear that the United States was taking the path of abrogating the ABM treaty to free itself from its provisions. Such a choice would not be without costs. Analysts foresaw the negative outcomes of such a decision and advocated that the treaty should not be deserted at least until the technology became reliable. Ivan Eland, director of defense policy studies and Charles Pena, senior defense policy analyst at the CATO Institute maintained that there was “no immediately compelling reason” to withdraw from the treaty and that leaving it might:

Potentially undermine the great progress made in the changing U.S.-Russian relationship, especially the agreement by both presidents to dramatically reduce strategic nuclear arsenals and the two nations’ continued cooperation on the war on terrorism and safeguarding Russia’s dangerous stockpile of weapons of mass destruction. (“Do not Leave the ABM...”)

Samuel Berger (former National Security Advisor under President Clinton) considered building and NMD to be a “mistake”. He suggested that before taking any decision, the administration should consider whether the Americans would be more secure with an NMD or without it. Berger stressed “we must understand that the basic logic of the ABM has not been repealed - that if either side has a defensive system the other believes can neutralize its offensive capabilities, mutual deterrence is undermined and the world is a less safe place”
The ABM was a key Cold War treaty that prevented the Cold War arms race from lasting forever. With its probable abrogation security uncertainties would resurface. In July 2000 Russia and China united to oppose the United States’ NMD system. They issued a joint statement in which they strongly opposed the program as having damaging effects on their security and that of other countries and condemned it as disruptive to the international strategic balance (‘U.S. National Missile Defense (NMD) Program’ 59). But rhetorical resistance to the proposed NMD would be supported by concrete procedures to lessen security concerns.

The abrogation of the ABM would very likely initiate an arms race. To deal with the NMD system, Russia would react by deploying “multiple warheads on its new land-based Topol M strategic missiles and might consider extreme responses including the fielding of space mines designed to disable the NMD’s space-based sensor system in the event of U.S.-Russian hostilities” (Blair, “National Missile Defense: What...” 22). Similarly, China would not only opt for modernizing its existing ICBM fleet but would also put MIRVs on its land-based ICBMs. India, which considered China as its main threat, might try to field an intermediate and long-range missile capability. In turn, as a reaction to India’s efforts, Pakistan would undoubtedly build-up its capability (Daniel Smith, “National Missile Defense: What...” 8). The NMD would lead to rising uncertainty and sense of threat; which would result in its turn to a new arms race that would heighten instability in global affairs.

Among the expected repercussions of establishing the NMD was the growing recklessness in the United States foreign policy. For Eland and Pena, such a missile defense could actually “encourage U.S. policymakers to engage in reckless overseas military adventures against nations with weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles, which
would undermine - not enhance - U.S. national security” (“Do not Leave the ABM…”). If such a system would ever materialize it would make the United States keener in intervening worldwide, hence, increasing the threat to its security and not diminishing it. The Iraq War represented a concrete example of America’s recklessness as the war was waged, in the first place, to deprive Iraq from its WMD (though no weapons were actually found) and to neutralize its threat to the United States.

The September 2001 attacks gave the Bush administration a new leverage and a strong cause to take more assertive decisions on the missile defense. The attacks showed that the United States was vulnerable and led to the emergence of a consensus between the Republicans and the Democrats. Shortly after the attacks, Bush proclaimed that his country would unilaterally withdraw from the ABM treaty something it did in December 2001 (Gressel and Kogan 11). Bush announced “I have concluded the ABM treaty hinders our government’s ability to develop ways to protect our people from future terrorist or rogue-state missile attacks...Defending the American people is my highest priority as commander in chief and I cannot and will not allow the United States to remain in a treaty that prevents us from developing effective defenses” (“America Withdraws from ABM...”). For Bush, to withdraw from the ABM treaty was unavoidable.

Russia did not welcome Bush’s decision and Putin considered the step to be a mistake (“America Withdraws from ABM Treaty”). For Putin, abrogating the treaty and deploying an NMD would do “irreparable damage to the architecture of international relations”. He warned that Russia would scrap all existing arms control agreements if Washington reneged on the ABM treaty (“Bush Confirms ‘Star ...’”). Once freed from the constraints of the ABM Treaty, Bush issued a Presidential Directive in December 2002. The directive announced America’s decision to deploy by 2004 a system that would consist of interceptors based on land and on
sea, as well as radars on land and in outer space (Ramos 4). It was supposed to be a continuation of the Missile Defense Act signed in 1999 by President Clinton.

By 2004, the administration started to deploy sixteen Ground-Based Interceptors in Alaska and three in California on Vanderberg Air Force Base. It also announced that it might cooperate with the United Kingdom and Denmark to establish some elements of the system (Ramos 4-5). The whole NMD system intended to protect the United States required a third site of deployment in Europe; as placing the radars closer to the expected enemy launch sites would allow for more accurate reading of the missile trajectories. It was over the European site of the NMD that the Russian-American relationship would become more strained.

In July 2000 during a Senate hearing about NMD, Secretary of Defense William Cohen was asked whether it was possible to build an efficient NMD without any deployments in Europe. Cohen responded “If you do not have forward-deployed X-band radars, then you cannot see the missiles coming” (qtd. in Valasek 34). In Europe the United States intended to use two upgraded early warning radars in Fylingdales, UK and Thule, Greenland (Gressel and Kogan 11). These two radars were built during the Cold War to warn the command center in Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado of intercontinental ballistic missile launches in the Soviet Union (Valasek 34). Other parts of the NMD were planned in South Korea and Japan where Patriot PAC-3 missiles were to be deployed and two radars were scheduled to be deployed in Japan and Israel (Gressel and Kogan 11). The geographical scope of the NMD was constantly widening.

More importantly, the United States started bilateral discussions with Poland and the Czech Republic, former Soviet satellites and new NATO allies, about deploying radars and interceptors on their territory (Kelleher, “National Missile Defense: What…” 10). The United States announced that the system would be limited in scope. It would entail the placement of about 10 interceptor missiles in Poland and a radar tracking station in the Czech Republic.
A third European site was needed for the NMD to be more effective. The missile interceptors in the United States were placed to defend against potential attacks from North Korea but they were not “ideally positioned” to intercept attacks from Iran (Möckli 2). Central Europe, Therefore, became very important for such an objective. Washington claimed that the system was expected to offer protection to the U.S. homeland as well as Europe.

The governments of Poland and the Czech Republic had shown their approval and willingness to accept the facilities on their soil. In July 2008, Czech Prime Minister Mirek Tapolanek signed a deal with Washington over the radar. One month later, Poland signed its part of the deal with the United States (Gerecht 1). The agreements should, however, be ratified by the parliaments of both countries before any deployments could take place.

But the majority of the local population did not share their government’ view about the system. Public opinion polls indicated that most Poles and Czechs were unwilling to host the MD system. In June 2008, a poll showed that 68 percent of Czechs opposed the radar installations and only 24 percent were in favour (Gerecht 1). This reaction mainly stemmed from a belief that the presence of an American missile defense system on their territory would lessen their national security and would seriously damage their relations with Russia.

Without a doubt Russia was greatly irritated by this new system that set alarms in the Russian military. The proposed missile defense in Central Europe was negatively perceived by the Russians, a stance that they clearly echoed in their official rhetoric. Col. Gen. Vladimir Popovkin, chief of Russia’s Space Forces, told reporters that the step presented a “clear threat” to Russia. Foreign Ministry spokesman Mikhail Kamynin underlined his government’s opposition in an interview with the ITAR-Tass news agency where he criticized the creation of a U.S. European anti-missile base as “a substantial reconfiguration of the American military presence in Europe”. He called the move “a mistaken step with negative
consequences for international security” (qtd. in Konviser). But Europe’s security was the first to be affected by the system’s deployment.

First, the missile defense in Europe represented a violation of the NATO-Russia Founding Act signed in 1997. According to the act, NATO promised to refrain from stationing substantial combat forces in new member states (Stephanova 28). Yeltsin, at that time, managed to extract an assertion by NATO not to deploy troops and nukes in the new member states. “The member States of NATO reiterate that they have no intention, no plan and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members, nor any need to change any aspect of NATO’s nuclear posture or nuclear policy - and do not foresee any future need to do so” (“Founding Act on Mutual…”). This agreement was reiterated by President Clinton in his press conference with President Yeltsin the same year. “The NATO military commanders reached an independent judgment that, based on the facts that exist in the world today, they have no reason, therefore, no intention and no plan to station any nuclear weapons on member’s soil” (“Press Conference of President Clinton…”). This pledge was clearly overlooked by the United States and NATO.

Russian analysts were not convinced by the U.S. plea that the proposed deployments in Central Europe would be modest and unthreatening to Russia’s deterrent capabilities. This point of view was expressed by Viktor Litovkin, a prominent Russian commentator and editor of the Russian publication Independent Military Review. Litovkin asserted that it would be “naïve” to think that Washington “will limit its appetites to Poland and the Czech Republic or to the modest potential that it is now talking about”. There were no guarantees that there “will not be 20, then 100 or even more of them or that they will not be replaced with their upgraded versions that are being developed in the U.S.” (“ABM: Washington Trying to Use…”). The Russian fear, thus, was not over the modest number of interceptors and the radar that would
be built in Central Europe but rather from future additions to develop the system’s capabilities.

This idea was clearly expressed by Donald Rumsfeld in May 2003 who clearly mentioned that America’s aim for the time being was to establish a rudimentary system that could be later enhanced. “Instead of taking a decade or more to develop someone’s vision of a ‘perfect’ shield, we have instead decided to develop and put in place a rudimentary system by 2004 - one which should make us somewhat safer than we are now - and then build on that foundation with increasingly effective capabilities as the technologies mature” (qtd. in Samson). President Bush had already signed a National Security Presidential Directive 23 (NSPD - 23) on December 6, 2002. According to the directive the United States would begin to deploy missile defenses in 2004 “as a starting point for fielding improved and expanded defenses later” (Lewis and Postol). In other words, missile defense systems could be upgraded to something far more advanced as U.S. missile defense activities develop.

Russia rejected all the American official statements that it was not the system’s target. General Yury Baluyevsky, the chief of the Russian General Staff said that “The real goal [of the U.S. deployment] is to protect [the U.S.] from Russian and Chinese nuclear-missile potential and create exclusive conditions for the invulnerability of the United States”. Baluyevsky warned that Russia would not stay cross-handed. “If we see that these installations pose a threat to Russia’s national security, they will be targeted by our forces, what measures we are going to use - strategic, nuclear or other - is a technical issue” (“Russia Rejects U.S. Missile…”). America’s discourse that the most important aim of the NMD program was the neutralization of rogue states’ attacks was totally rejected and Russia was threatening to react.

The system presented a potential threat for Russia’s security and its nuclear arsenal. Although direct military confrontation between Russia and the United States remained
unlikely, both countries maintained their Cold War era military thinking. Assuming that the
Cold War was over and no longer considering themselves as adversaries such tensions should
have been decreased over the years. As John Steinbruner, Director of the Center for
International and Security Studies, University of Maryland pointed out that “the continuous
daily deterrent confrontation between the two forces”, that is the American and Russian
forces, “has all along been there. It has not gone away. In that sense, we have never gotten rid
of the Cold War” (Avoiding Renewed U.S.-Russian...”). The issue of deterrence was at the
heart of the problem. Russia was concerned that the NMD would deprive it from such a
capability leaving it an easy and vulnerable prey. The only assurance it was given was official
declarations and provisions in official documents that it would not be threatened by the
system.

The MD issue had negatively affected the bilateral relationship. It had added a bitter
dose and further soured the relationship. The United States, though supposedly fighting the
rogue state threat, could not deny its obsession by Russia’s nuclear wherewithal. Bruce G.
Blair, President of the Center for Defense Information and a former Minuteman launch
officer, confirms:

The real obsession of the U.S. nuclear enterprise at all levels…is keeping U.S.
nuclear forces prepared to fight a large-scale nuclear war at a moment’s notice
with …Russia…Scratch Russia from the list of enemies, as it should be, and all
justification for maintaining a large U.S. nuclear arsenal evaporates. (“Rogue
States: Nuclear…”)

Both countries maintained their Cold War fighting plans. Nuclear deterrence weapons and the
inherent risks of global nuclear annihilation “have not significantly changed since the end of
the Cold War” (Kimball and Young 16). The nuclear threat was controlled by the ABM treaty
and due to the successive arms control treaties between the United States and Russia; a situation that proved to be stable and unthreatening until the MD issue re-emerged.

For Russia, the nuclear arsenal is still considered to be one of its most important leverages and a last superpower characteristic that is second to none but to that of the United States. America’s constant easing official statements that the MD in Europe is not intended for Russia nor could it threaten its nuclear capabilities are not unequivocally accepted. Military planners and political leaders usually respond to capabilities, not just intentions. The Kremlin sees the planned antimissile shield as a serious national security threat even though the White House insists that it is a limited and targeted at ballistic missiles launched from Iran. Moscow’s unease and security concerns were greatly heightened since the United States was vigorously pursuing the enlargement of NATO and building its multi-layered missile defense system simultaneously. For Russia, since the end of the Cold War, its weakness was taken as an advantage “to advance U.S. security interests” (Mendelsohn). At the military level, Russia is gradually losing its parity with the United States.

Russia’s nuclear arsenal is in constant decrease. Because of the economic strains and budget shortages since the 1990s, the country’s military capabilities and performance have immensely deteriorated. The Russian nuclear establishment is no exception. Russia’s early warning system has been decaying, the nuclear forces have been rusting and not getting repaired (Blair, “National Missile Defense: What...” 20). The reductions in Russia’s nuclear stockpiles are the result of the bilateral treaties signed with the United States.

This worked as a disadvantage for Russia. Raphael Ramos, Research Associate at the European Strategic Intelligence and Security Center emphasized that the decline in Russia’s nuclear arsenal both in terms of quantity and in terms of technology and the deployment of an American missile defense “would give Washington and immediate strategic advantage. It would render any Russian response virtually impossible” (3). At the theoretical level, a future
A crisis between Russia and the United States might lead to U.S. strikes on Russian ICBMs followed by the use of a mature missile defense to reduce or eliminate the consequences of Russian efforts to retaliate. In the long term Russia’s deterrence capability would vanish; an outcome that Russia would do its utmost to prevent from happening.

As his predecessor, Bush’s MD system proved to be controversial inside and outside the United States. The system faced criticism of being far from perfect and vulnerable to countermeasures in the United States. Scientists from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the Union of Concerned Scientists noted that the MD system under development was not designed to discriminate against warheads accompanied by realistic countermeasures that would be available to any state developing long-range missiles (“Countermeasures: A Technical Evaluation...”). It could not provide any security from less sophisticated means of delivery like a ship, truck or an aeroplane. Should a hostile country decide to attack the United States, it would choose more reliable, less expensive and more covertly effective delivery methods than the long-range ballistic missiles.

Missile Defense proved to be a divisive factor in America’s foreign policy with its allies in NATO. The general impression in Europe was that MD was unnecessary and unworkable (“Missile Defence, Deterrence...”). The division was apparently between “Old” and “New” Europe; “New” referring to the Central and Eastern European countries that joined the alliance in the post-Cold War period. The Eastern European countries were more aligned with U.S. foreign policy objectives (Shirinov 98). They maintained their fear of Russia’s assertive foreign policy especially after the Russia-Georgia War of 2008.

The Polish government signed the Missile Defense deal in the immediate aftermath of the War. The link between the two events became obvious; Poland wanted to tie itself with the United States through the MD system in return for America’s Patriot missiles to shield Poland against short- and medium-range missiles (Hildreth and Ek 6). These missiles would
be an additional security guarantee, the Polish argued, because there would be a risk of being targeted by rogue state missiles as a punishment for hosting the system. Concern over a rogue state attack, however, was not the only motive for such a request. The Poles were also concerned about Russia’s response.

The concerns of the “New” Europe were echoed by Defense Secretary Gates who commented on August 15, 2008 that Russia’s neighbors had “a higher incentive to stand with us now than they did before, now that they have seen what the Russians have done in Georgia” (qtd. in Hildreth and Ek 8). Reuel Gerecht, from the American Enterprise Institute, argued that Polish fears of a resurgent and aggressive Russia “unquestionably have made any defense agreement that bases some U.S. troops in Polish territory more appealing”. For the Polish government, America’s military presence on its soil would deter Russia from becoming aggressive with Poland.

The establishment of the MD in Europe was not welcomed by the “Old” Europe. In the spring of 2008 a poll was conducted by the International Herald Tribune and the news channel France 24. The general conclusion was that the majority of the public in key European countries were against the MD in Europe. In Germany 71 percent were against while 19 percent supported it, in Spain the numbers were 61 percent against and 19 percent in favor, and in France 58 percent were opposed and 22 percent in favor (Gerecht 1). The reasons for their negative response resulted from their disagreement with the threat assessment that led to the conception of the NMD in the first place, the latter’s impact on the arms control treaties and the negative consequences of the system on Russia’s relations with its European neighbors.

The European governments were hesitating about committing billions of dollars to fight the unlikely rogue state threat. A study prepared by the Atlantic Council of the United States in 2000 showed that most Europeans would argue that North Korea’s missiles “is more
related to acquiring bargaining leverage linked to its economic development than to any serious intention to present a military threat to the United States or Europe” (Valasek 35). These European countries did not feel the same degree of threat by missiles of North Korea, Iraq and Iran as their American counterpart. In addition, the Europeans developed a tendency to give diplomacy and negotiations with hostile countries the priority over military responses.

The European allies, unsympathetic to the MD, had voiced strong concerns about the program’s impact on arms control treaties with Russia and the possible destabilization in Europe that would result from renewed U.S.-Russian tensions. President Jacques Chirac of France argued that “Nuclear disarmament will be more difficult when powerful countries are developing new technologies [NMD] to enhance their nuclear capabilities” (qtd. in Caroll, “National Missile Defense...”). He added “In our opinion, NMD cannot fail to re-launch the arms race in the world” (“Chirac Warns of Global…”). The system would restore suspicion and sense of insecurity back to Europe. German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier was quoted in a newspaper article as saying that, in protecting against a possible Iranian threat, “the price of security must not be new suspicion or, worse still, fresh insecurity”. Steinmeier asserted “We cannot allow a missile defense system to be either a reason or a pretext for a new arms race” (qtd. in Webb). This was a clear hint that the American system’s first negative outcome was the initiation of an arms race with Russia.

Both the United States and Russia proposed cooperation in the field of missile defense though fruitlessly. In 1999, Russia proposed the establishment of a Global Missile and Missile Technology Non-proliferation Control System (GCS) at the G8 summit in Germany (Woolf 13). It would, in part, complement the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) by regulating the behavior of nations that might seek to acquire ballistic missile technologies and would operate under U.N. auspices. For the Russian officials, the GCS would present an
alternative to NMD that would maximize peaceful diplomatic and political efforts to address concerns about missile proliferation.

In June 2000, Putin proposed that Russia cooperate with nations in Europe in developing defenses against theater ballistic missiles. He referred to this concept as “a regionally-based missile defense system that would not require any changes in the ABM Treaty” (“Europe Urged by Putin...”). The Russian defense minister presented Putin’s plan in details at a Russia-NATO meeting in Brussels where he offered a list of possible fields of cooperation. It included joint evaluation of the character and scale of missile proliferation and missile threat, joint development of non-strategic BMD systems, establishment of a joint missile warning center and joint research and experiments (Savelyev 100). This offer, however, would not be satisfying for the United States.

When Russia first offered its proposal for a European Missile Defense system, the Clinton Administration said the idea could not serve as a substitute for a U.S. NMD. Secretary of Defense William Cohen maintained that it would leave the United States and Europe vulnerable to attacks from long-range rockets being developed by countries such as Iran and North Korea (Drozdiak). The Russian suggestion for a cooperative system with Europe could “supplement, but not substitute for the system that the U.S. is developing,” said Cohen (qtd. in Woolf 16). Russia’s proposal of cooperation and aspiration that the United States may reconsider its plan were not fruitful.

In late May 2007, during the G8 conference in Europe, Putin proposed to Bush that Russia would be willing to make the data from early-warning radar in Azerbaijan available to the United States. This radar was an interesting offer. Professor David Webb clarified that the radar “would give a good coverage of missiles from Iran but not of Russian launches because of an intervening range of mountains” (“Does Europe Need...”). One month later, in a meeting in Maine, Putin widened the scope of his proposal by offering to make available data from a
second, much more modern Russian early-warning radar at Armavir, Russia (Lewis and Postol). Putin’s scheme would eliminate all the Russian military’s concerns about its deterrent capabilities that would be caused by the American MD plan in Europe. Lewis and Postol explain:

Placing missile defense radars and interceptors south and west of Russian ICBMs would eliminate any potential future missile defense threat to Russian ICBMs from U.S. interceptors based in Europe. Missile defense radars would not be able to observe and track Russian ICBMs early after launch, and interceptors would be too far from Russian ICBMs to catch them after a launch. (“European Missile Defense...”)

Putin offered to jointly man early-warning centers in Moscow and in Brussels and showed an inclination to further discuss possible ways to address the impasse with the United States over the location of the X-band radar and interceptors. Though the change in tone from total opposition to cooperation in the MD issue was welcomed by the United States, the propositions were not considered to completely replace the original plan.

Cooperation with Moscow in the field of MD was not taken seriously by the Bush administration. The latter wanted a free hand in its projects and “did not want any constraints to remain on U.S. missile defense plans” (Woolf 18). Preliminary plans for cooperation and joint creation of missile defense system were clearly linked to the United States desire to control the system alone. Pavel Zolotarev, Deputy Director of the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies at the Russian Academy of Sciences explains “the United States is ready to admit Russia, on certain terms, to the creation of a missile defense system and to exchanges of advanced technologies and technical solutions—but not to the control of this system” (“Missile Defense Challenges”). Joint control between Russia and the United State over the facilities would have allayed Russian apprehensions caused by the MD deployment.
Freedom from any constraints also entails no control over the bases by the countries that would host the system. As in the UK, the Czech and Polish governments will very unlikely have control over the launching procedures and decisions. The 500 American staff to be employed will not be subject to Polish or Czech law (Webb). The hosting countries, consequently, will have no jurisdiction over the American facilities.

The Bush administration suggested some kind of cooperation meant to ease the Russian fears. They included giving Russia the right of inspections of the future sites, exchange of intelligence regarding common threats, as well as the possibility of a fundamental integration of Russian and American missile defense systems (Ramos 6-7). None of these offers of cooperation developed into tangible policies. Mistrust still lingers on the U.S.-Russian relationship especially in security issues. Some analysts have already predicted that a U.S.-Russian cooperation will be unlikely. Bleddyn Bowen stressed “A lot of effort would be required through costly signalling to build trust between Russia and the U.S. in this case, to prove one another’s trustworthiness and genuine benign intent” (“Ballistic Missile Defense...”). Mutual proposals of cooperation did not surpass rhetoric. Both countries’ unwillingness and dissatisfaction with the other’s proposal led to the dropping of friendly cooperative rhetoric and a shift to a more aggressive and retaliatory language especially from the side that considered the plan to be dangerous to its security, that is, Russia.

Kremlin officials started to question the accuracy and exactness of America’s threat assessment of the rogue states. Denial of the presence of an imminent missile threat to the United States was the first reaction. Putin once agreed that there was an emerging missile threat even at the “theoretical” level but maintained that “we do not believe that there are such threats now nor that they are coming from any specific states” (qtd. in Woolf 6). Colonel General Leonid Ivashov, head of the Russian Defence Ministry’s International Affairs Department, refuted the whole rogue threat issue and considered it an American tale. “Talk of
the need to deploy a national missile defense system to counter intercontinental ballistic missile strikes from North Korea, Iran and Iraq is pure invention, and nobody in the world believes these tales” (“Bush Administration Pushes...”). The rogue state threat for Russia became an exaggerated danger used by the United States to cover its undeclared intentions about Russia’s nuclear capabilities.

Rogue states are for the most part Third World countries with economic problems that will inhibit the establishment of remarkable nuclear capabilities that will threaten a superpower like the United States. Russia’s former Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev has affirmed that even if such missiles will become “part of the armory” of such states at the theoretical level, the “nuclear deterrence factor that demonstrated its effectiveness back in the Cold War years will still apply to those countries” (qtd. in Woolf 7). Sergeyev concludes that because Russia does not perceive missile threats to be as imminent as the United States is claiming the only evident aim behind the MD project is America’s pursuit of global domination and more specifically undermining Russia’s deterrent ability.

Some pundits, mainly William Engdahl, maintained that the ultimate aim of the NMD was to achieve “full spectrum dominance”, one part of the American scheme to eliminate Russia “once and for all, as a potential rival for power” (qtd. in Lendman, “Full Spectrum Dominance...”). Russian experts asserted that neither Iran nor North Korea could possibly have the scientific or technical capability within the next 20-30 years to develop ICBMs capable of reaching the United States.

First Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov wondered “Since there are not, and will not be, any ICBMs [with North Korea and Iran], then against whom, is this system directed? Only against us” (qtd. in Bhadrakumar, “In the Trenches of the New...”). This was confirmed by the Russian military and technical analyses of missile threats of ICBMs launched by rogue states. Sergeyev announced that there was no real motive for the MD deployment other than the
determination of the United States “to acquire strategic domination in the world. We are deeply convinced that such a deployment would be primarily directed against Russia” (qtd. in Woolf 7). It could be reasonably deduced that the real aim of the deployment was to face the Russian ballistic threat and Russia’s concerns were legitimate.

Russia boldly outlined the main retaliatory steps that would be taken if the MD would be established in Central Europe. They included threats of withdrawing from arms control agreements, modernizing its nuclear forces, and making additional deployments if the United States pushed ahead with its MD plans despite Russian opposition (Sokov). Rhetoric did not make the United States change its mind about the missile defense, hence, concrete steps should be taken to show Russia’s determination.

Moscow threatened in June 2000 to withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty if the United States would deploy the MD system in Europe. The INF treaty banned missiles with ranges from 500 km to 5,500 km, and removed Moscow’s ability to threaten Western Europe with nuclear-armed missiles. In April 2007 Putin declared a moratorium on his country’s participation in the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) which limited the deployment of conventional arms in Europe (“Russia Suspends the Treaty...”). Putin argued:

We have signed and ratified the CFE and are fully implementing it. We have pulled out all our heavy weapons from the European part of Russia to locations behind the Ural Mountains and cut our military by 300,000 men. And what about our partners? They are filling Eastern Europe with new weapons, a new base in Bulgaria, another one in Romania, a site in Poland, and a radar in the Czech Republic. What are we supposed to do? We cannot sit back and look at it. (“Avoiding Renewed U.S.-Russian...”)
This represented the first suspension of a key arms control treaty considered as the cornerstone of European security, this time, from the part of Russia. The negative consequences of Russia’s suspension “could result in a number of adverse developments and a re-emergence of risks and rivalries reminiscent of the Cold War” (Lachowski 6). The treaty is very important for Europe’s security. It set limits on the amount of tanks, artillery, and other conventional weaponry that thirty states-parties deploy in Europe. Its regime provides for verification; a procedure that will stop in Russia after its withdrawal.

Russia’s suspension of the CFE represented an effort to force NATO allies into renegotiating the balance of forces in Europe that Russia perceived to be detrimental to its security. Due to successful U.S. diplomacy, however, the United States and NATO reached a consensus on the missile defense issue. After a special meeting in Brussels on April 19, 2007 it was announced that NATO had a united missile defense approach, that the threat of missile attacks was real; and that the U.S. deployments in Central Europe “would not affect the strategic balance with Russia” (Bhadarakumar, “In the Trenches of the New...”). The Missile Defense in Europe would be established despite Russia’s reservations.

The American missile defense plan remains a controversial issue inside and outside the United States. The issue proved to be greatly alarming especially for Russia. Threats of abandoning major arms control treaties, retargeting missiles towards European capitals that may host the system, and divisions among the United States and its European allies are among the main negative repercussions of the system. America’s insistence on establishing a multi-layered defense system remains one of the key security aims that the latter insists on establishing sooner or later.

The question of missile defense system has proved to be the subject of a hot debate between Washington and Moscow; still the world’s most imminent nuclear powers. When these two countries are antagonized by such military issues with open threats of retaliation
(mainly from Russia), the international community in general and Europe specifically will have legitimate concerns about the negative outcomes of such an issue. The aggressive rhetoric used by Russia has “resuscitated the spectre of the Cold War” (Ramos 8). Only regrettable consequences are expected and till now this issue has resulted in nothing but tension.

Russia’s position towards the MD did not change. The two head of states in a joint declaration in 2008, agreed that “both sides expressed their interest in creating a system for responding to potential missile threats in which Russia and the United States and Europe will participate as equal partners”. Putin said in a press conference after his meeting with Bush that Russia’s “fundamental attitudes to the American plan have not changed” (“Bush, Putin Still at Odds over U.S. ...”). The current deadlock would be solved only if a compromise is reached. Analysts anticipate that there might be a gradual movement toward the Russian proposals because they were not “aimed at gaining unilateral advantages and which are highly rational” (Zolotarev). It is the United States that would acquire more strategic advantages over Russia if the missile defense would be deployed.

Voices calling for halting the system started to rise because the system is far away from being perfect and its viability is doubted. The United States is called to drop the idea or at least delays it to some future date when Russia’s concerns will be eradicated. Eugene Caroll, Director of the Center for Defense Information warned about deploying an NMD because “by such an action we will signal to the world that we are willing to pursue illusory defenses against non-existent threats”. Caroll wondered “What good does a defense system do if it weakens nuclear stability which rests on a hard - won arms control structure built over the last 30 years?”

No good has obviously resulted from America’s quest for an NMD but tension, mistrust, an increasing sense of insecurity and suspension of key arms control treaties. Some
observers have warned that unless a coherent solution for the current deadlock is found, the
two countries will head for a new Cold war. Alexander Saveleyev, Head of the Department of
Strategic Studies at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (Moscow)
maintains “without rethinking the basic approaches and principles of the U.S.-Russian
strategic and arms control relations, the two states (and the East and West in general) can
enter a period of “Cold War II” and waste their time and energy on confrontation and
“countermeasures”, instead of working together to make the world more stable and safe”
(107). Europe and the world have been more stable than they are now after the abrogation of
the ABM treaty, the cornerstone of strategic stability.

The United States’ plan of establishing a National Missile Defense system has proved
to be a highly critical issue that has resulted in negative political repercussions especially on
the United States’ relations with Russia. Russia’s reservations about the system have stemmed
from the security threats that the system may pose for its deterrent capabilities in the future.
The system has been initiated after the abrogation of the ABM treaty by the United States in
2002. Since then, a conflictual relationship has ensued. For Russia, the European part of the
NMD to be placed in Poland and the Czech Republic represent a threat to its security; a threat
that Russia is determined to face even by targeting the host countries with its missiles.
Europe’s security will depend on a coherent solution of this deadlock.
Endnotes

46 Ballistic missiles have different ranges. Short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) have a range that is less than 1,000 km, Medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) range from 1,000 to 3,000 km, Intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) range from 3,000 to 5,500 km and Intercontinental ballistic missile have a range that exceeds 5,500 km. Greg Thielmann, “Rumsfeld Reprise? The Missile Report that Foretold the Iraq Intelligence Controversy,” Arms Control Association. 2003. Web. 12 Dec. 2009 <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_07-08/thielmann_julaug03>.


48 The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) was established in 1987 by G-7 governments as an international export control policy with arrangement to limit the proliferation of nuclear capable missiles. The regime limits the transfer of missiles able to carry 500 kg to the distance of 300 km or more. The regime is a voluntary agreement and not a formal treaty. Rashad Shirinov, “U.S. Missile Defense Shield and Russia: Second Cold War as a Farce,” Caucasian Review of International Affairs 2. 2 (2008) 96. Web. 15 Feb. 2010. <http://www.cria-online.org/3_4.html>.
Conclusion

The focus of this dissertation was on U.S.-Russian relations in the post-Cold War era. There was so much optimistic rhetoric about an opportunity to make Russia shift from communism to Western economic and political systems and that eventually Russia would be integrated to the West. The development of the bilateral relationship in the aftermath of the Cold War, however, represented a continuity of a Cold War mindset between the two countries especially over the eastward expansion of NATO and America’s insistence on establishing a Missile Defense system.

In the 1990s the Cold War triumphant United States started a policy of incorporating a number of the newly independent states that freed themselves from the Soviet grip into the transatlantic Cold War alliance of NATO. Preached as being of a stabilizing effect to Europe’s security, two rounds and consequently ten East European states were welcomed into the alliance (from 1992 to 2008). Future enlargement rounds were announced since the alliance declared that it was pursuing an open door policy and that any European country that would fulfill the prerequisites of membership would eventually become a member of the alliance.

NATO enlargement was faced from the start with Russian opposition. The eastward expansion of the Cold War alliance was skeptically and resentfully resisted. NATO, however, enlarged despite Russia’s opposition because the latter, at a certain time (under the Yeltsin administration in the 1990s), did not have any other option but acquiescence. Its economic weakness and political instability together with its loss of superpower status and the rising hegemony of the United States dwarfed its capacity to exercise an influential role in European security affairs and mainly in opposing the enlargement of the alliance.
The optimist view that both countries could develop a strategic partnership in the aftermath of the Cold War proved to be a distant aim if not a fantasy. Even when the long Cold War struggle was declared as finished, the Cold War alliance (NATO) persisted and then announced that it would enlarge. Decorative announcements by both the alliance and Russia that the latter would one day join NATO remained only rhetoric since Russia has not, till now, become a member and the relationship is steadily deteriorating. It is unlikely that there will be a western invitation for Russia to join the alliance and Russia will not ask for membership either.

One of the aims of enlargement was a fear from a theoretical Russian threat that might take place in the future. Weakened and defeated Russia was still considered to be among the threats to Europe’s security since it might regain its strength and its imperialist tendencies might once again revive. It was a priority to spread and protect the concepts of freedom, democracy and also give security guarantees to those states that were once under the Soviet rule and sphere of influence. Consequently, a number of former Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe joined the alliance in an attempt to tie themselves permanently to the West and more specifically to the United States under the umbrella of NATO.

The organs that the alliance devised to conduct its relations with Russia like the PJC remained a forum for discussing European security issues. Russia remained an outsider since it was given a voice but not a veto. In fact, a future Russian threat was behind the membership of some European countries. It seems incoherent to include Russia when it is still considered as a potential danger for the security of some European countries.

Russia, from the start, perceived the expansion as a continuation of the West’s containment policy through encircling it with NATO member states. The constant advance of the alliance towards its borders represented a growing security threat that it could not tolerate. It also resulted in the gradual fading of its power and influence in the territories that used to
be under its sphere of influence. Though it tried to red-line the alliance’s expansion the United States pursued its project with great fervor and without taking Russia’s stance seriously.

The Russian-Georgian War (2008), however, represented a culminating if not a turning point in Russia’s foreign policy towards its near-abroad. Besides using its hydro-carbons as leverage against them, Russia also announced a Monroe Doctrine claiming the former Soviet space as an area of ‘privileged interest’. Many analysts commented that this conflict signaled the beginning of a New Cold War through which Russia was reasserting its power over its neighbors by using military force. But Russia did not give up its perception that the Former Soviet Union space was its sphere of influence ever since the end of the Cold War. Its weakness in the 1990s did not leave time and capacity to such a role. Putin’s presidency marked a revival, if not a resurgence, in Russia’s foreign policy. It aimed at reestablishing Russia as a great power after years of weakness and absence from playing a key role in its neighborhood especially after the expansion of America’s military presence in Central Asian states in the aftermath of 9/11.

Russia constantly reiterated that it would take the necessary decisions to prevent former Soviet republics especially Georgia and Ukraine from joining the alliance. The latter under the leadership of the United States, asserted it would welcome both countries as new members. NATO members also criticized Russia’s intimidation and use of force in its policy towards its neighbors and refused to recognize any Russian sphere of influence.

It is noteworthy that there is a great similarity between Russia’s current foreign policy of making the former Soviet Union space as a Russian sphere of influence and that of the Soviet Union towards Eastern Europe during the days of the ‘Old Cold War’. The United States, as in the years of the Cold War reiterated its rejection of spheres of influence and supported the democratic revolutions that took place in some of the former Soviet Republics like Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan. Both countries are in fact supporting pro-Russian or
pro-American candidates and these states became a scene for the old Cold War concept of regime change.

The deterioration in the relationship led some NATO members, mainly France and Germany, to refuse giving MAP to Georgia and Ukraine since they knew it would antagonize Russia. Indeed, MAP was not granted to both countries and after the Russian-Georgian war, it is unlikely that the alliance will do it in the near future. Russia managed to draw a red line for the alliance. Whether or not this red line will be surpassed remains a critical decision for the alliance to make and it is highly possible that it may result in undesirable if not dangerous response from the part of Russia against the future candidates.

The rising American hegemony in the aftermath of the Cold War led Russia to pursue relationships with rising powers in the world such as China and India to balance the American power through preaching multilateralism as the best system that would insure the world’s stability instead of America’s unilateralism. At the regional level Russia became a key member in some organizations such as the CIS, CSTO, and the SCO. The CIS tied Russia to some of the former Soviet Republics and the CSTO represented another Russian tactic aiming at limiting if not neutralizing any American attempt to intrude into Central Asia through forming this alliance with some of its neighbors. Through the SCO, Russia and its neighbor China clearly want to diminish America’s growing power and influence in Central Asian security affairs. The SCO is a coalition if not an alliance in the making (though both countries claim the opposite and announce that it is not planned against any other alliance). Russia and China are together again and the United States is highly concerned from the development of this organization into an anti-American, if not anti-NATO military alliance.

America’s plan to establish a Missile Defense system is another critical issue that is badly affecting the bilateral relationship. The United States keeps claiming that the objective of the system is to intercept any missile attacks from ‘rogue states’ like North Korea and Iran
but Russia is greatly skeptical about the program because it will be established on the territories of new NATO members like Poland and the Czech Republic. Russia’s total opposition to the system stems from two points. The system, according to military specialists, could pose a threat to Russia’s nuclear capabilities if the United States develops the latter’s abilities in the future. The second point has to do with Russia’s sensitivity towards establishing the program in two former Soviet satellites. Russia asserts that the alliance has given a promise in the aftermath of the Cold War not to initiate any nuclear infrastructures in the territories of the members that would enter into the alliance. For Russia, the program represents a reconfiguration of America’s military presence in Europe, poses a threat to its offensive missile capabilities, and will drag Russia into a new arms race with the United States. Though the initial parts of the program do not pose a great threat, Russia’s concern is over future developments that can be made on the original program to enhance its capabilities. Russia, as a result, has warned that it will take the needed actions to protect itself from this threat even by targeting the countries that will host the program with its Iskander missiles.

The Missile Defense issue resulted in the abrogation of some key Cold War arms treaties. It started with America’s withdrawal from the ABM treaty, a treaty it came to consider as a relic of the Cold War and an obstacle that prevented it from establishing a security system which is very important for its own protection and its allies in Europe. Russia, on the other hand, reacted by leaving other key European arms treaties such as the CFE and the INF. These were key arms treaties that were the basis of Europe’s security.

What is undeniable is that Russia is back on the European political and military scene. It shows an assertiveness to be present in key European security issues such as NATO enlargement and the Missile Defense program; issues that years ago were tackled without giving Russia a heard voice. Russia’s nostalgia for superpower status and influence in its near-abroad is heightened due to its gradual economic revival resulting from its oil exports.
Eager to regain its lost prestige and influence, Russia made it clear especially after the Georgian War that it is back on the scene and that it wants a key role in regional if not in global affairs.

The United States should recognize that it no longer enjoys unlimited leverage over Russia and Washington seems unable, to a great extent, to force its will on Moscow as it did in the 1990s. One of Russia’s foreign policy objectives seems to be regaining its traditional sphere of influence. Economic weakness, it seems, was the only major constraint that hindered it from exercising its traditional role of balancing America’s power. Russia is expected to growingly challenge the United States especially in areas that it considers of vital interests. It is determined to make its voice heard and whenever necessary will take the appropriate measures. The Russian-Georgian War (2008) made it clear that Russia wants to have the upper hand in its near-abroad, and that its neighbors should not pursue policies that are pro-American and anti-Russian especially if Russia deemed them inimical to its interests.

NATO enlargement and the Missile Defense program remain two hot issues that are antagonizing the bilateral relationship between Russia and the United States and jeopardizing Europe’s security. The relationship worsens whenever these two issues are opened and neither side has shown a tendency to give up its disposition towards them. They reflect the image of Cold War political thinking which still lingers and shapes, to a great extent, their policies. The Cold War continues to influence their political mentalities and a new one is in the making. Its current stage is the FSU and specifically Georgia and Ukraine, which aspire to become NATO members.
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