

**People's Democratic Republic of Algeria
Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research**

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FACULTY OF LETTERS, HUMAN & SOCIAL SCIENCES

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قسم اللغة الانجليزية

مدرسة الدكتوراه



**THE ROLE OF INTEREST GROUPS IN THE MAKING OF THE US FOREIGN
POLICY : THE CASE OF US INTERVENTION IN IRAQ**

**A Dissertation Submitted to the Department of English in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Magister Degree in American Civilization**

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Acknowledgments

First and foremost, I would like to thank the Almighty God who gives me strength and good health while doing this work.

I would like sincerely to thank my supervisor Dr. ELAGGOUNE Abdelhak who has been the ideal supervisor. His stage advice, insightful criticisms and patient encouragement aided the writing of this thesis in innumerable ways. Thank you for your assistance, guidance and patience that made me hungry for knowledge and your steadfast support of this work that was greatly needed and deeply appreciated.

I am thankful to all the examiners who spared me some of their precious and busy time to read, correct and criticize my work which is not immune from mistakes and imperfections.

I would like to thank and express my heartfelt gratefulness for guide and support that I believed I learned from the best, all my teachers without exception. The realization of this work was only possible due to the several people's collaboration, to which desire to express love and respect, to all my best friends Sihem, Roubila and Adala, thank you for your understanding and encouragements in many ups and downs of this work. I would also thank all the colleagues of the Doctoral school and Guelma English Department.

Dedication

This work is lovingly dedicated to my respective parents who have been my constant source of aspiration. They have given me the drive and discipline to tackle any task with enthusiasm and determination. Without their support, this research would not have been possible. As a perfect father, he worked to support me and spare no effort to provide the best possible environment for learning. He had never complained despite of all the challenges of life, I am very proud of such father. Thank you my father 'Nouredine'. My first inspiration, ambition and good principles in life, I cannot ask for more from my mother 'Fatiha'. I have no suitable word to describe her great love, sacrifice and support in the most difficulties of my life; I am deeply grateful and proud of such a mother. I owe an immense gratitude to the person who hurdle all the obstacles in the completion of this research work, to my dear husband 'Saleh', thank you for your practical and emotional support. Importantly, to the person who taught me that the best kind of knowledge that is learned for its own sake, and who taught me that even the largest task can be accomplished if it is done one step at time. Thank you for your unconditional support, my sister 'Lilia'.

A special dedication goes to my best mate and standing beside me, my brother 'Sadik'. To my sister 'Djazira' for her unselfish and unfailing help with her generous husband 'Adel' and daughters 'Ranime and Jinan'. Special dedication goes to my Grandfather, Grandmother, uncles, aunts, cousins and nephews especially Rihem, Louay, Moataz and Rimase. To all those who have given me a loving environment where to develop at ease, thank you very much.

Abstract

This work examines the extent to which interest groups in the United States are able to influence decision making in the realm of foreign policy. Interest groups are largely considered as the key connection between the citizens and the government which in turn affects their activity as well as being affected with their pressure. The latter was extensively noticed on the domestic area while ignored at the foreign one. The extent of this incidence is subjected to various conditions, primarily, the nature and locus of the decision making as well as political and international events. The present dissertation provides a test to the power gained by interest groups and their ability to share foreign policy outcomes in the contemporary period and highlights the decision to invade Iraq in 2003 as a case study in order to answer the question: To what extent did interest groups influence the US decision to invade Iraq? The example of the American invasion of Iraq reinforces and evidences the comprehensive view about the new relationship between interest group activity and foreign policy and assesses the extent of the access provided toward organized groups. To assess such an assumption the work investigates the different circumstances that were behind the absence of these groups from sharing policy making at different stages in relation to the American domestic and foreign policy changes. Within the Iraq context, the work provides a contemporary assessment of the role played by the Jewish lobby in the United States foreign policy toward Iraq. It further tests the extent to which the Bush administration was subjected to external influence of interest groups on the decision of such an invasion and it eventually concludes that the Iraq invasion of 2003 was the outcome of both interest group activation and other incidents.

Résumé

Cette étude examine le rôle joué par les groupes d'intérêt dans la prise de décision politique étrangère américaine. Les groupes d'intérêt sont largement considérés comme la connexion essentielle entre les citoyens et le gouvernement qui à son tour affecte leur activité tout en étant affecté par leur pression. Cette influence a été largement remarquée sur le domaine de la politique intérieure mais longtemps ignorée sur la scène étrangère. L'ampleur de cette prévalence est soumise à diverses conditions, en premier lieu, la nature et le lieu de la prise de décision ainsi que les événements politiques et internationaux. Le présent mémoire propose une étude approfondie de la puissance acquise par les groupes d'intérêt et leur capacité à prendre part aux décisions de la politique étrangère dans la période contemporaine, et prend la décision d'envahir l'Irak en 2003 comme étude de cas qui à son tour porte sur une question importante: Est-ce que les groupes d'intérêt ont réellement influé sur les décisions de la politique extérieure américaine d'envahir l'Irak? L'exemple de l'invasion américaine de l'Irak renforce et atteste de l'aperçu complet de la nouvelle relation entre l'activité des groupes d'intérêt et la politique étrangère et évalue l'étendue de l'accès fourni à l'égard des groupes organisés. Pour évaluer cette hypothèse le travail explore les différentes circonstances qui étaient derrière l'absence de ces groupes de politique de partager des décisions à différents stades en ce qui concerne les changements de politiques intérieures et étrangères. D'autre part, dans le contexte de la guerre Irak, le présent travail de recherche fournit une évaluation contemporaine du rôle joué par le lobby juif dans la politique étrangère des États-Unis envers l'Irak. En outre, il vise à vérifier la mesure dans laquelle l'administration Bush a été soumise à l'influence extérieure des groupes d'intérêt sur la décision d'une telle invasion et conclut finalement que l'invasion de l'Irak en 2003 a été le résultat de l'activité de groupes d'intérêt ainsi que d'autres raisons.

ملخص

تبحث هذه الأطروحة في مدى تأثير جماعات الضغط على القرارات المتعلقة بالسياسة الخارجية الأمريكية. إذ أن هاته الجماعات تمثل حلقة الوصل بين المواطنين و رجال السياسة لأنها تؤثر فيهم و تتأثر بهم. ان مدى تأثير هاته المنظمات على القرارات السياسية الخارجية لم يكن ملحوظا ان لم نقل منعدما، في حين اقتصرت الأبحاث على دورها في السياسة الداخلية فقط و هذا راجع لمجموعة من الأسباب أهمها الظروف المحيطة في اتخاذ القرار من حيث بؤرة صنع القرار إضافة الى نوعه و العوامل السياسية الداخلية و الخارجية للدولة. تقدم الأطروحة الحالية اختبارا حول فرضية تأثير المنظمات الغير حكومية في اتجاه و نوع القرار على الصعيد الخارجى مستندا بذلك على مثال الحرب على العراق لسنة 2003. وتناولت اشكالية هامة تخص دراسة أهم الظروف التي تؤثر في اتخاذ الرئيس للقرار، فما هو مدى تأثير جماعات الضغط في الضغط على قرار الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية لغزو العراق؟ نموذج حرب العراق يعزز و يثبت العلاقة الجديدة التي تجمع صانعي القرار في أمريكا و جماعات الضغط صف الى ذلك مختلف الطرق التي تبيح لهاته المنظمات الوصول الى صانعي القرار و التأثير فيهم. من جهة أخرى و في اطار الحرب على العراق ، العمل يقدم تقييما للدور الذي يقوم به اللوبي اليهودي في السياسة الخارجية الأمريكية تجاه العراق و يبحث بشكل أهم على المدى الذي تعرضت اليه ادارة بوش لضغط مثل هذه المنظمات. أخيرا تختتم الأطروحة بنتيجة أن الغزو الأمريكي للعراق سنة 2003 هو نتيجة ضغط هاته المنظمات و عوامل أخرى.

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

AARP	American Association of Retired People
ABM	Anti-Ballistic Missile
ACLU	The American Civil Liberties Union
AFL-CIO	The American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations
AIPAC	American Israeli Public Affair Committee
CFR	Council on Foreign Relations
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CNN	Cable News Network
CPMJO	Conference of Major Jewish Organizations
FMF	Foreign Military Financing
GATT	Central Agreement on Tariff and Trade
IMF	International Monetary Fund
MFN	Most Favored Nations
NAACP	The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
NAFTA	The North American Free Trade Agreement
NEA	The National Education Association
NOW	The National Organization of Women
NSC	The National Security Council
OSP	The Office of Special Plans
PAC	Political Action Committee
PNAC	The Project for the New American Century
PNTR	Permanent Normal Trade Relations
USTR	United States Trade Representative
WMD	Weapons of Mass Distruction
WTO	The World Trade Organization

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Introduction

The present research work is an attempt to deal with the role and influence of interest groups in the US foreign policy decision making. The relationship between foreign policy decision makers and interest groups in the US has always been the subject of ongoing hot debates. Despite the massive attention given to the different actors of foreign policy making such as Congress and the President, relatively a little scholarly attention was given to the role of interest groups in foreign policy decision making. Until recently, both the academic literature and most observers' broader concerns about interest groups' ability to divert national policy have focused predominantly on issues in the domestic arena.

It has been assumed that interest groups have in recent decades progressively shown their ability to influence decision making in the area of foreign policy. To shed light on the relationship and impact of interest groups on US foreign policy decision making, the country's decision to invade Iraq has been selected as a case study to test the validity of such an assumption. In addressing the role and influence of interest groups' activity on foreign policy decision making, the study primarily aims to answer the following questions: what is the formal role of interest groups in the foreign policy decision making process? How much access do interest groups have to decision makers? What roles do interest groups play in the policy process? Did interest groups influence policy outcomes during the decision to invade Iraq? In providing answers to these questions, the study will provide a comprehensive view about the new relationship between interest groups' activity and foreign policy by examining the US decision to invade Iraq, which is well

grounded in this work, in order to identify the role of interest groups in shaping political decisions.

Part of this study is a theoretical analysis that examines the formal role of interest groups in foreign policy decision making in relation to the different actors of policy making. More precisely, it seeks to explore and analyze the actors, issues, processes, and political conditions involved in the making of American foreign policy. It also provides a coherent explanation to the different causes that led to the absence of interest groups mobilization in foreign policy prior to the Cold War era.

The 9/11 attacks compelled the United States to change the premises of its foreign policy in order to adapt to new circumstances which were ostensibly in a state of flux, where the relative status of America political and economic power was changing and new national priorities were replacing old ones. Throughout this state of affairs, interest groups were able to find many points of access to decision makers and, hence, became an influential part in the decision making process.

Soon after the 9/11, the new foreign policy priorities put forward by Washington to protect the country from other external threats gave birth to the Patriot Act which enabled the President to declare war without prior congressional consent. At the same time, US investigations condemned without any valuable proof Saddam Hussein, his regime and al Qaeda as the only responsible for such attacks, to pave the way for the United States to attack Iraq in order to end terrorism, save the world from mounting global terrorism, and preserve human rights. The decision to invade Iraq was subjected to different external features that essentially aimed to justify that the country was subject to an imminent threat. In addition to Congress and the Bush administration's Cabinet, public opinion and

the media were also convinced with such an assumption and supported George W. Bush his efforts to engage in the war.

As soon as the war took place and no Weapons of Mass Destruction were found, US public opinion and the media, at home and abroad, doubted about the real motives that pushed President George Bush to invade Iraq. The 9/11 investigative committees could not find any relations between the attacks and Iraq. Simultaneously, new facts appeared and showed that external factors were behind the decision of the war. Neoconservatives together with prominent Israeli officials in the Bush administration fabricated the war to materialize an old dream, that of dominating the Middle East region.

The relationship between the United States and Israel gave the Jewish lobby great strength through its different links to decision makers. Indeed, the nature of American foreign policy after the 9/11 attacks offered new policy options in which the decision making process became subjected to interest groups' influence. As the most powerful lobby in Capitol Hill, the Israel Lobby used many tactics to reach decision makers in order to get adequate policy outcomes. In this logic, the case study examines the co-relationship between Israel and the United States foreign policy on one hand, and the Middle East; specifically Iraq on the other hand.

The dissertation also attempts to show how the Israeli lobby pushed toward the Iraq War which was justified with faked reasons to the whole world media and public opinion, particularly Americans. During that critical moment, the majority of the American people were not aware of the hidden motives of the war and the secret plans of the neoconservatives and pro-Israeli officials in the Bush administration's cabinet. However, as war dragged on it became evident that powerful strategic interests drove the US to the Iraq invasion.

The dissertation has been divided into three chapters. The first one concentrates on interest groups' formation in US politics and their influence on US foreign policy decision making. Basically, the chapter analyses the role of interest groups in American domestic policy and the different reasons that were behind their absence from United States foreign policy in relation to the major political changes that occurred on the international arena before the end of the Cold War.

The second chapter discusses the essential conditions that paved the way to interest groups' mobilization in American foreign policy. The new political agenda that made American foreign policy similar to and as important as the domestic one, in addition to the various reformations and issues upon which foreign policy decisions were taken, all met to contribute to interest groups' influence. It also makes reference to several cases to explore the growing importance of interest groups in the United States foreign policy decision making. The findings of this chapter reveal the power yielded by certain interest groups on some important policy outcomes.

The third chapter analyses the pressure exerted by special interest groups on American decision makers in the period preceding the invasion of Iraq, and examines their impact on the US decision to invade Iraq. It assesses President George Bush's decision to invade Iraq and the various circumstances that pushed him to declare the war taking into account the influence of interest groups. It also considers the impact of the 9/11 attacks in persuading the American public opinion and monitoring the US media with the legitimacy of the war, and reveals how Weapons of Mass Destruction and the US efforts to prevent other terrorist attacks were strong justifications of the war.

In short, the study endeavours to show the power of interest groups, especially those which have great a great stake in the war such as the Israeli lobby, to exert heavy pressure

whether on decision makers or on the public opinion. It also investigates the special relationship between the United States and Israel which enabled the latter to have easy access to policy makers.

It is in this respect that the dissertation focuses on the neoconservatives within the Israel lobby and on their ability to gain access to policy makers within the Bush administration. The pre-war justifications used to end terrorism, stop nuclear programmes, and punish tyrant rulers to prevent them from extending their powers; all were part of the hard efforts made by the Jewish Lobby to convince the American public opinion with the legitimacy of the war. Because of its power, the Israeli Lobby was able to convince the American public that the war was fought for the above cited reasons and not for other hidden motives such as the security of the state of Israel.

This work adopts more than one methodology. Historical analysis focuses on studying the changes that occurred on the United States foreign policy decision making system's structure, agenda, and the international environment. Besides offering a situational analysis of the new role and influence in the decision making, the study provides a useful analytical framework to examine the factors that motivated interest groups to play a preponderant role in foreign policy making. Discourse analysis, which is backed with empirical studies of public opinion polls in order to reach accurate conclusions, is also used to interpret some speeches of the Executive and Congressmen.

The content of the dissertation is enhanced by a number of important primary and secondary sources to provide accurate results. Though a substantial scholarly literature on the study of interest groups and foreign policy exists, most of it has relatively given little attention to the question of interest groups influence on foreign policy making. Early works on foreign policy-making dealt with the impact of interest groups on domestic

issues. Nevertheless, the frequent changes that occurred in the United States foreign policy after the end of the Cold War as well as the growth of interest groups in number and scope made the relationship between interest groups and foreign policy the main topic of numerous scholars in recent years.

For instance, in his 2005 *US Foreign Policy after the Cold War. Global Hegemon or Reluctant Sheriff*, Eraser Cameron provides an evident example of the immense rising activity of interest groups in relation to the American political changes within the scope of decision making from the terrorist attacks of 2001. In the same logic, Parmar Inderjeet *New Directions in US Foreign Policy* and Jürgen Rùland, Theodore Hanf and Eva Manske *The Making of US Foreign Toward Third World: A Post-Cold War Assessment* are also similar examples of excellent works that examine the new international agenda which promoted external features to share the locus of decision making process, especially by interest groups.

A considerable literature on the role of interest groups in the US decision to invade Iraq raised many doubts about the real power expanded by pressure groups. In her work: *US Foreign Policy in the Middle East. The Role of Lobbies and Special Interest Groups*, Janice J.Terry assesses the great power of lobbies to shape their favourite policies in the Middle East comparing the relation between US foreign policy makers and the heads of prominent lobbies as an opera scene. In this regard, Robert G. Shutter's *US Policy toward China. An Introduction to the Role of Interest Groups* measures the influence of interest groups on foreign policy in the contemporary period with new principles and techniques from the earliest stages of the negotiations to the final steps of decisions.

Two prominent works about the role and influence of interest groups on the decision to invade Iraq greatly served the present study. Petras James' *The Power of Israel in the*

United States and Mearsheimer J. John and Walt M. Steven's *The Israel Lobby and US Foreign policy* backed the theme of this dissertation and justified the assumption we made about the influence of the Israeli Lobby on the making of US foreign policy toward the Middle East in general, and toward Iraq in particular. Petras attempted with different arguments and justifications to reveal the true motives behind the Iraq War by stressing the historical and warm ties between the United States and Israel. Mearsheimer and Walt assessed the role played by the Jewish Lobby to push for the Iraq invasion.

Regarding the realm of foreign policy changes, the 9/11 attacks, the various actors that shared foreign policy decision making, as well as the need to examine responses and attitudes of the President and the public opinion before the decision to invade Iraq, considerable works are referred to throughout this work. They include Jenifer J. Matystik, "Presidential Decision Making and the Role of Intelligence: Pre-War Planning for Iraq", and Jane K. Cramer and Trevor A. Thrall, *Why the United States Invade Iraq?*

In short, this dissertation has attempted to fill the scholarly vacuum on identifying and explaining the role and influence of interest groups in making American foreign policy in the post-Cold War period. Because government decision-making is a complicated process, the study of interest groups in the contemporary foreign policy-making system must go beyond studying the conventional role of interest groups and examine their efforts in the broader context of the varied domestic and international factors that shape decisions.

Chapter One

Interest Groups in the United States and Foreign Policy Making

As an integrant part of the American society, interest groups represent different parts and individuals who share common interests and similar objectives. Their most important aim is simply to gain access to influence decision-makers on particular domestic or foreign policies. In playing their lobbying role, these organizations commonly use a wide range of direct or indirect techniques in order to get their preferences.

From the earliest days of the founding of the American Republic, politicians and scholars alike have examined and debated the extent to which interest groups are able to have an influence on policy-making and shape the country's policies to their particular benefits. Until recently, however, both the academic literature and most observers' broader concerns about interest groups' ability to divert national policy have focused predominantly on issues in the domestic arena. This focus stemmed from the facts that in the domestic arena a multitude of organized groups emerged to promote and defend their specific interests and the decision making process was organized in a way that encouraged constituent lobbying.

Although the role of these organized groups in American foreign policy has seen no scholarly attention in the past, their influence on the domestic affairs has always been extremely significant. The absence of interest groups' activity in foreign policy-making was attributed to many reasons, in particular the scope and the nature of American foreign policy issues. The latter was carefully selected as the country was still a fresh Republic that had just gained independence without extensive foreign relations because of its policy

of isolationism, in addition to the fact that the scope of US foreign policy was under presidential domination for the sake of the nation's security.

Nevertheless, the fact that organized groups were not an influential part of the foreign policy making that did not mean that they were not an influential actor in the domestic sphere. They, in fact, used to play a greater role. Being able to reach domestic politics provided interest groups with access points to decision makers in order to seek policy preferences using a wide range of techniques.

This state of affairs continued for a long period of time, but the matter reversed immediately after the country entered to the Cold and Vietnam Wars. The change in the locus of the decision making in addition to the Congressional reforms of the 1970s brought a new foreign policy agenda which enabled interest groups to play an important role in foreign issues.

Accordingly, the main intention of this chapter is to tackle the above mentioned issues in details in order to identify and explain the role and influence of interest groups in making American foreign policy in the post-Cold War period. First of all, it is important to deal with the evolution of interest groups, locate their importance and influence in US politics, and illustrate some of the techniques they use in the process of lobbying. It is also essential to show their importance in domestic policies, and state the different reasons that contributed to their absence from sharing political decision-making in foreign affairs. In this respect, several cases in which interest groups played a chief part will be provided in order to reveal their importance within the American political system.

I. US Interest Groups and Foreign policy

During the process of drafting the US constitution, the founding fathers left a space to all American citizens to interfere in the decision-making process. The system of checks and balances that conducted Washington's governmental politics has always provided citizens with the possibility to be part in any political decision. As a consequence, interest groups have attempted to use this prospect in order to serve as a connection between the citizens and the government. This opportunity, however, used to be filled only within domestic politics since organized groups were, for many reasons, not able to reach foreign policy making.

According to the US constitution, the locus of decision-making in the realm of foreign policy belongs to the President, as the first decision maker, as well as to Congress. However, the changes that occurred in American foreign policy mainly after the Second World War caused various problems and threatened the country's national security. These developments compelled interest groups to turn their sight to foreign policy as it became a big matter of concern to all public not only decision-makers. As a result, interest groups intensely entered foreign policy decision-making due to the new international economic and trading issues.

I.1. Interest Groups as an American Characteristic

Being a significant constituent in the US political life, interest groups play a vital linking role between the government and citizens. This role constitutes the relation between individuals and their representatives in office. To achieve particular objectives, individuals engage in and back organizations that seek to obtain their favorite policies. Interest groups or pressure groups are defined as “any organized group whose members

share common objectives and actively attempt to influence government policy makers through direct and indirect methods” (Barbara et al 197). It is clearly understood from this definition that interest groups are mainly formed to attain certain interests from policy makers using different methods.

Interest groups are considered as the basis of persuasion of democracy as they can exist in a pluralist society (Pagan 3). It is meant by a pluralist society one that shares individuals’ decisions through their representatives, and the United States is one of these countries. As Duncan Watts claimed, America is a pluralist society in which group activity can flourish to share decision making (220). In the United States, interest groups do not aim to get control of the states; instead, their aim is to promote democracy and represent all individuals in front of the government. With such a unique characteristic, US interest groups are unlike any other political organizations especially political parties who seek to get government’s control.

Interest groups have long been a characteristic feature of American politics due to their constitutional rights contained in the second amendment. As stated by James Madison in Federalist Papers 10:

The latent causes of factions are thus seen in the nature of man [and] most common and durable source of factions has been the various and unequal distribution of property. Those who hold and those who are without property have ever formed a distinct interest in society. Those who are creditors and those who are debtors ... A landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a moneyed interest, with many lesser interests, grows up of necessity in civilized nations, and divides them into different classes, actuated by different sentiments and views.¹

In this respect, it is imperative to say that interest groups are a natural outgrowth of the United States constitution which extended individuals the right to form groups according to their interests, beliefs, and capacities.

However, political scientist Alexis De Tocqueville, struck by the phenomenon of interest groups that already existed in the United States in the early 19th century, asserted that: “In no country in the world, has the principle of association been more successfully used or applied to a greater multitude of objects than in America”². Thus, one can say that the existence of interest group in the United States political system stemmed its power and zenith from the country's constitution and the Federalist Papers 10. As an inevitable phenomenon within the American political life, the formation of pressure groups came along with the government development.

I.2. US Interest Groups’ Formation: A Historical Background

The historical roots of US interest groups go back to the early years of the American Republic. The idea of interest groups’ foundation took place when the first European immigrants organized themselves into groups and asked for their rights from the British monarch through a process called ‘petitions’. At that time, groups held petitions to the king in order to improve their situation. After that, and precisely in the 1770s, the time of the American Revolution, groups organized themselves to ask for their independence from the British crown.

In the early years of the establishment of the US constitution, the founding fathers took into consideration the participation of groups in the US political system, developed the idea in the federalist papers 10, and ensured the role of organized groups in the political system. In this way, they allowed the idea of pluralism, and at the same time, left

government control not to a specific elite of society, but rather to all individuals where a continuous competition for political power between the majority and the minority permitted the practice of persuasion of democracy. This early political ideology of plurality was regarded as conditional and mandatory for the political development of the United States (Reiher 4).

As mentioned in the first amendment, the constitutional sovereignty in the US considers interest groups as an evolutionary consequence of the nation's political development (4). In addition, it stated the relationship between the government and citizens, and allowed the latter the right to petition the government. Indeed, Congress shall make no law, but will serve as a bridging gap for the right of people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances (5).

Consequently, the growth and development of US interest groups came gradually through waves and within particular eras of US history. Historians suggest that the great numbers of interest groups' formation was during the 1960s; following the changes that occurred in the United States political agenda. "David Truman has argued that the formation of associations tends to occur in waves, and James G. Wilson subsequently noted that three great waves of association formation occurred between 1800 and 1940" (Qtd.in Herbernar17). Thus, in assessing the impact of their policy making one needs to understand how these groups developed throughout US history.

The first major wave was before the Civil War. At that time, there were few numbers of interest groups and this was mainly due to the farming way of life, in addition to the limited agricultural environment (no imports and exports). Only few numbers of people were eager to form associations that could advance their interests within the local

level. However, between the 1830s and the 1860s, and with the expansion of railroads people started to organize themselves as interest groups (“Interest Groups ...” 192).

The second wave of labour and business group organizations took place during the Progressive era, mainly between the 1890s and 1920s (192). This coincided with the spread of mass industrialization in the United States. This period was often considered as the boom extension of US interest groups, especially the large ones, that still exist even today and examples of these include the US Chamber of Commerce, the National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People, the Urban League and several other organizations.

The emergence of the third wave of interest groups took place between the 1960s and 1980s. This period is the most important to organized groups’ formation because of the wide increase of political and economic issues that supported interest groups’ activity and easy access to policymakers both on the domestic and foreign levels. Meanwhile, from the 1960s onward and for the first time US interest groups gained much access and mobilization and started to increase in number by thousands, each of which aimed to influence policymakers’ decisions toward their own interests.

The formation of US interest groups was the result of several conditions that enhanced their growth through waves from the early years of the Republic until today. However, the formation of US interest groups has been attributed to some long-lasting causes that are related to the American political system. This means that the evolution of interest groups went hand in hand with the development of the American social and political systems. In addition to the decentralized political system, which contributed to interest groups’ formation, the US as a pluralist nation is composed of different ethnic groups and many national backgrounds. Such social diversity created different interests of

its regions as well as the complexity of its economy; all these differences have contributed to the making of the United States as a country ripe for the existence and formation of thousands of interest groups.

The US political culture is also another contributor to interest groups' formation. The constitutional rights of interest groups' formation is guaranteed in the second amendment together with the right to free speech and free press, while the political system of government in which interest groups' formation is the core part is mentioned in the first amendment. The failure of political parties to express all individual interests and the failing existence of powerful third parties forced individuals to form interest groups in order to reach their policy goals. As a result, it becomes evident that US interest groups' formation has been the product of different social, economic, and political reasons that made the United States a fertile scene for competing groups that aimed to influence the government decision making to their direction.

I.3. Interest Groups' Techniques

In the process of lobbying, interest groups were able to create a number of techniques in order to reach their favourable policy outcomes. To do so, they usually use particular means to sway decision makers toward their favoured policies. Some of these techniques are direct and others are indirect. Direct techniques are those that are in common with any interest group such as lobbying, campaign assistance and litigation. While indirect techniques are the ones which distinguish one group from another, like public support. However, all of the techniques whether direct or indirect are used for one purpose which is government lobbying.

Nevertheless, not all interest groups can successfully reach their policy goals. The reason is that success mainly depends on how these associations apply different techniques in order to persuade government officials to back their favoured issues. In addition, the relationship between interest groups and government officials is reciprocal; that is each one of them needs the other and both of them have to build a relationship that is based on mutual respect and cooperation. For instance, interest groups provide government officials with the best sources of information and assistance; whereas government officials provide pressure groups with the necessary access to express and reach their interests (Pagan 3).

Lobbing, as a direct technique, has always been used by interest groups. This strategy is used to establish a close personal contact between the groups' representatives and the public officials. The main activity used by lobbyists is to provide public officials with the necessary information. The information provided should be true because lobbyists need to be trusted from government officials so that they would be able to get the necessary access (Remy et al. 555).

Most of the lobbyists are professionals in the legislative process. They have a detailed knowledge about the policy-making process as they worked before in the federal or state government as legislators, legislative assistants, bureaucrats, senators or presidential advisors who can provide their services only if they are given high salaries. This explains why lobbyists became known as "guns for hire" or "the ropes of Washington politics"³. As an illustration one can cite what happened in 1986 when Senators Russell Long and Paul Laxalt retired. Their services were sought by many Washington law firms which represented clients before government agencies. Both

eventually joined Finley Kumble at salaries of \$800,000 a year (Qtd. in Mc Keever and Davies 183).

The second direct technique used by interest groups to gain government access in the policy-making process is through campaign assistance. By campaign assistance, it is meant that interest groups help legislators and public officials to get elected or re-elected. In this strategy, interest groups promise campaign finance funds to those who favor their policies and in turn, once elected interest groups gain the expected access. “Interest groups formed Political Action Committee (PAC) to raise their funds in order to contribute to political campaigns” (Remy et al. 557).

Providing legislators with the necessary funds do not always assure they are elected they will surely respond to the interest groups’ demands. However, this does rarely happen because once candidates take office they will automatically respond to their favourite groups. The 1974 Federal Campaign Act and its 1976 amendments allowed corporations, labour unions and special interest groups to set up PACs to raise money for candidates. For a PAC to be legitimate, the money must be given to at least five candidates in the federal election (558). This campaign reform act was drawn to limit funds and money contributions given from interest groups to candidates in order to create a balance between candidates in terms of financial resources. Despite these regulations and others, interest groups continued to use campaign financing as the primary tool to pressure government officials because it is the most effective technique by which interest groups would assure future access in policy decision-making.

The third direct strategy used by interest groups is through litigation. In this process, interest groups submit “amicus curiae” briefs or friend of the court, in which they assist the courts in reviewing cases and try to influence its final decisions. Among the indirect

strategies used by interest groups over government officials is to generate public pressure or public relations campaign. Well-financed interest groups use this strategy in order to gain public support on a particular case. Interest groups sometimes organize strikes by mounting public opinion because it is another effective technique to push and sway government officials.

The other indirect technique is to form coalitions with other interest groups that advance the same case. This kind of alliance will put strong pressure upon legislators so that their decisions will satisfy interest groups demands. Despite of these techniques, the impact of interest groups in the US foreign policy remained very limited for many decades due to a number of circumstances. However, their role in influencing the domestic policy was considerable as we will see in the next section.

II. Interest Groups and US Foreign policy Decision-Making

By using various techniques, US interest groups gained a lot of power to influence government decision-making, especially at the domestic level. Drawing this right to petition the government from the constitution, the Federalist Papers, in addition to the US decentralized political system of checks and balances, interest groups appear in the American political system with great power and strength at the domestic level. This is so because organized factions gained power from the early years of the Republic due to its political scene which enabled social mobilization to share policy process. In his book, *Defending the National Interest*, Steven Krasner argued that the state in America is weak but society is strong (Qtd. in Bowel 10). In the same perspective, Martin Sklar noticed in 1998 that the supremacy of freely developing society over the state, government and law was evident throughout American history. He the government further posited the society

as characterized by equal liberty for all full citizens and special privilege or monopoly power for none.⁴

II.1. Reasons behind the Absence of Interest Groups from US Foreign Policy Decision-Making

According to a US historical perspective, interest groups did not share any foreign policy decision-making prior to the end of Cold War (Uslaner 126). This was simply because these groups were more active in the domestic area than in the foreign one. However, regardless of the extent of their participation and impact on foreign policy, it was consistently ignored by scholars for almost more than a century, while their impact on the domestic arena was well depicted. Such neglect, however, was attributed to many reasons.

Among these was the fact that the impact of interest groups on foreign policy had essentially been to deal with the nature of foreign policy decision-making. The US constitution had clearly stated that the only decision-makers of the foreign policy matters are the President and Congress. Article II Section 2 (ii) of the US constitution stated that the President is responsible for making foreign treaties on condition that two-thirds majority of the Senate should approve these decisions (Tims 19). In addition, though the constitution makes the President the Commander in Chief of the armed forces he cannot declare war unless Congress decides so.

As a result, the US constitutional framework had clearly stated that the foreign policy decision-making is a power shared between the executive and the legislative processes. Thus, many scholars noticed that this relationship between the President and Congress is a kind of competition and struggle. In this regard, Edward S. Corwin⁵ stated

that the shared power between the President and Congress is “an invitation to struggle for the privilege of directing American foreign policy” (6-7). Besides, the constitutional prerogatives given to the President and Congress over the foreign policy-making process make the role of interest groups in foreign policy very limited and negligible. The reason behind this is that most of the scholars argue that it is a matter of national interest and national security (most of foreign policy issues deal with war and peace treaties).

In addition, the cases of foreign policy are of utmost priority and need a quick and a secret decision. Furthermore, in such cases where the national interest is over all, interest groups should stay far from this realm. Indeed, interest groups' desires trumped under the national interests (D'Anieri 133). Evidently, the reason behind interest groups' existence is to get the access in order to implement their interests. However, such claim would make them out from the realm of the foreign policy decision-making process. Hence, it can be asserted that interest groups do not exist on foreign policy issues mainly because of the scope and matter of foreign policy issues (134).

The second reason is related to the nature of US foreign policy decisions which do not allow any interest group to share it, especially in crisis' issues where the President is obliged to act lonely and quickly even without Congressional consent or the participation of any other US elected branch (Uslaner 125). Besides, crisis' issues offer the President the prerogative to act alone without negotiations with Congress, since it is a matter of national security and the state power should remain in one hand. This case of crisis' issues, however, occurred many times throughout US history and in which the President was the only decision-maker on foreign policy. A best example occurred in 1962 during the Cuban missile crisis when President John F. Kennedy had to set a national policy just

a few weeks as the threat of a nuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union loomed on the world (Uslaner126).

Consequently, foreign policy issues need quick decisions while domestic ones may last for a long time and thus time and power are in the hands of interest groups to gain the necessary access with the appropriate techniques to influence decision-makers. An example of a long domestic issue opened to interest groups' influence for more than a decade is the American issue of medical care to the elderly which had almost more than fifty years on the policy agenda of the legislative process. This allows interest groups to interfere and impact using many ways. In addition, at this level interest groups have plenty of time to try what they see as a favourite way to reach their interests.

To illustrate interest groups' influence on domestic issues, scholars argued that foreign policy issues are centralized within the executive branch, and generally need one single voice that speaks in favour of the national interest. Besides, all American citizens should unite behind the nation's benefit. This would not place the national security and interest under competitive groups, where each wants to transform it according to its benefits and regardless of the collective voice. The fact that the nation should remain as one hand in the international scene is too important because it enables the nation's power and honour to remain united (127).

The third reason is that foreign policy decisions usually require the President to take irreversible decisions. Once he had decided on a case, nothing will change it whatever happens. While in domestic policy, decision-makers are free, take their time and change their decisions according to the different interests. However, foreign policy issues are not flexible and the President cannot declare a certain international policy and then suddenly

decides to take it over. It is also part of weakness and shame if such phenomenon happens (128).

The fourth and important reason is that most American citizens do not care too much about foreign affairs; but rather care about domestic politics. Nevertheless, they consider foreign policy issues as part of their elective executive and his/her key advisors since it is responsibility to decide upon foreign relations and provide protection to all citizens. By contrast, Americans always move their interest to the domestic issues simply because its politics affect them directly and they are more interested to form coalitions of interest groups in order to get the necessary access to key decision-makers especially in certain fields as health care insurance, labour and business groups (128).

Furthermore, Congress with its special committees is seen as the best target to many interest groups to gain access and to influence policy decisions. In this case, interest groups use financing campaign techniques to influence Congressional legislators during campaign cycles and they are likely to elect those who care about domestic not foreign policy. In addition, interest groups finance is vital because they remain a great pillar that support and oppose any election cycle. Thus, it is noticeable that interest groups' finance is necessary to any candidate in elections. Concerning domestic issues, interest groups would support candidates that advance domestic policies rather than foreign ones. As one member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee states:

In my re-election campaign last fall, the main thing they used against me was that because of my interest in foreign relations, I was more interested in what happened to the people of Abyssinia and Afghanistan than in what happened to the good people of my state (Qtd.in Uslander 127).

Furthermore, the US citizens do not care about foreign policy issues since it is delegated to the President as the only executive leader. Political scientist Eugene Wittkoft provided reasonable evidence when he claimed that the mass of US public citizens do not share any ideas about the US foreign policy and that “the mass public holds stable foreign attitudes capable of relating discreet foreign policy issues to another in a systematic and coherent fashion” (Qtd.in Hirshberg 23).

In this logic, US public opinion usually tends to have the same attitudes and behaviour toward foreign policy issues. They, rather, do not care about it and do not share any knowledge or political sophistication. Wittkoft further argued that US citizens’ are ignorant of foreign policy matters and stated that the mass of the American people are relatively speaking, uninterested in, and ill-informed about foreign policy issues. He added that interest and knowledge are largely irrelevant to whether the American people are able, in the aggregate, to hold politically relevant foreign policy beliefs (Qtd.in. Hirshberg 23).

One can deduce that, from the early beginnings of the American government to the end of the Cold War, foreign policy issues did not matter a lot. It has always been so because American citizens delegated powers to the President and Congress. As a result, foreign policy issues did not take a great deal of concern as much as domestic policy. Interest groups lobbying on security matters would not be fruitful at that time because this competition and lobbying efforts to influence the President’s decisions over security matters would have no sense and they would be accused of preferring their private interests rather than the national interest.

II.2. Interest Groups' Mobilization: A Historical Perspective

For a better understanding of the participation and impact of interest groups in the foreign policy decision-making and, it is important to address their role during two distinct periods. This division takes into consideration the nature of the US foreign policy in addition to the core makers of foreign decisions. The first period started from the early years of the Republic up to the end Cold War, and the second period started from the post-Cold War era up until the contemporary period.

In addition to the nature of the nation's foreign policy and key decision-makers, the other attribution is that the scholarly attention to the role of these organized groups was neglected. Moreover, the role of interest groups over foreign policy did not gain scholarly attention up until the 1970s. Scholars' chief concern was limited to the domestic policy for reasons we have mentioned before. In addition to that, foreign policy decisions were made in a hierarchical order, where the President is always the core decision maker of foreign affairs (Uslaner 127).

Given this privilege, other members of the two elective branches were alienated from the realm of foreign policy decision-making process. The nature of US foreign policy and the hierarchical order of foreign policy making curbed interest groups from gaining any governmental access to influence policy makers. From a historical perspective, the US as an infant state preferred to stay far from outside competitions and wars whether with Europe or any other nations. The policy of isolationism was issued by President George Washington in his farewell address in 1796 when he stated that the US should stay alone and isolated without foreign relations with any country especially Europe as it was the first US rival at that time. Washington said:

The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is, in extending our commercial interests, to have with them as little political connection as possible... Europe has a set of primary interests, which to us have none... Hence, she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves by artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities. (Qtd. in Mc Keever and Davies 320).

Again, in first inaugural address in 1801, Thomas Jefferson warned that the involvement of the new Republic in foreign relations would bring conflict to her that may threat its independence that she had recently gained. As a result, the new Republic followed a state of isolationism in order to insure stability and take care of the domestic development.

During the 19th century, however, the US dropped its policy of isolationism following the introduction of the Monroe Doctrine of 1823. The latter ruled the US foreign policy from that time onward, and was considered as the basis of the country's future foreign relations. It stated that the European nations should not interfere in Latin American affairs. In this respect, President Monroe declared: "We should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety" (O'Callaghan 85).

Thus, from the Monroe Doctrine onward, the US acquired new territories from its neighbours in Latin America and the Caribbean. In 1898, the US engaged in the Spanish War and acquired new lands by which it extended its possessions where President William McKinley declared, "isolationism has become no longer possible or desirable" (Skelley and Howard 32).

As a result, the US started gradually to go out from its isolationist policy to international engagement. In 1904, President Theodore Roosevelt added a new dimension to the Monroe Doctrine in what became known as the Roosevelt Corollary. In his corollary, President Roosevelt argued that the US should play the role of the world's police for the sake of promoting democracy and human rights. Thus, the US began to interfere in international conflicts and, in 1917 President Woodrow Wilson declared his country's involvement in World War I. After the war's end, the country returned to its isolationist policy and it refused to become a member in the League of Nations (33).

Isolationism was again reinforced within this period because the US returned to take care of the domestic policy following the Great Depression. With the coming of the Second World War, the US tried to remain neutral. Congress passed a number of neutrality acts in which it prevented the US from getting involved in this European conflict. However, as it did the US was compelled to enter the war with the allies. From that time on, the US no longer appeared as an isolationist nation and entered the international scene as one of the superpowers in the world (33).

Because of US isolationism and the absence of an active foreign policy, interest groups did not find the appropriate opportunity to gain any government access to interfere in foreign policy decisions, since the nation was in isolation and if there were any foreign relations, they were war and peace decisions in which policy-makers placed the national security of the American people beyond any direct or indirect influence from organized interests.

Another factor which has limited the role of interest groups in foreign policy decision-making is the hierarchical manner within which foreign policy decisions were taken. In other words, most of foreign policy decisions were taken in the legislative

process by the President. The US President remained the core decision-maker in foreign affairs even without Congressional consent in times of crises and wars. This prerogative, however, was appropriated by US Presidents to themselves as a hereditary role in special cases while most of them turned it as a constitutional role. As the US kept on a dual isolationism in foreign affairs from its earliest beginnings, foreign relations were rare and if there were any, the President and Congress were the key actors.

According to the United States Constitution, some foreign policy powers are shared between the President and Congress. For example, as he is the commander in chief of the armed forces, the President cannot engage in a war or send the American troops somewhere only if Congress gives him the authority to do so. This relationship between Congress and the President over foreign policy is called the “twilight zone”, a word coined by Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson who said, “a zone of twilight in which [the President] and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain” (Mc Cormick 255).

Accordingly, the US foreign policy decision-making is a power shared between the executive and legislative processes, but what appears in reality is that the President is the only controller of foreign affairs. In this process, the President remains the dominant power, and Congress does not have the right to negotiate. However, Article II vested general executive powers in the presidency. Moreover, as Federalist papers 64 and 75 emphasized, the structural advantages of the presidency-unity, decision secrecy, dispatch, stability of purpose, special sources of information made the executive the prime agent in dealing with foreign states (Schlesinger⁷). Nevertheless, US Presidents almost did not respect the constitutional prerogatives of Congress over foreign policy decision-making.

They rather tended to seek a kind of foreign policy decisions without Congressional consent.

Throughout the history of the American Republic up to the Second World War, US Presidents had dominated foreign policy decisions especially on war times without Congressional approval. Indeed, as Olson claimed, in just few exceptions throughout the first 200 years of US history, the balance of power in the foreign policy domain tipped decisively in favour of the executive (Olson 547). As a result, presidential dominance over foreign policy was prevalent from the early years of the Republic. Two prominent cases occurred in 1861 and 1941. The former took place when President Lincoln assembled the militia after the attack of Fort Sumter without Congressional authorization and the latter happened when President Franklin Delano Roosevelt involved the US army to protect the lifeline of supplies to Britain which were attacked by the German submarines (547).

In addition, wartime always creates emergency powers to the President. It was not a matter of prerogatives, but rather a constitutional power and once the war ends presidential power will shrink automatically. This can be justified by the words of President Lincoln who once said: “the executive power itself would be greatly diminished by the cessation of actual war” (Schlesinger 42). He further added, “when the war is won, the powers under which I act automatically revert to the people –to whom they belong” (43). The consequence of all this is that from the early years of the Republic up to the Second World War, foreign policy decision making was far from the grasp of interest groups’ impact. Since the President took the lead, no one could influence his decisions especially if the case had to deal with matters of national security.

Yet, it can be said that the role of interest groups in foreign policy decision making was not properly considered and their participation in the decision making was ignored

mainly due the nature of the country's foreign policy. Thus, interest groups were not able to find gaps to interfere and act simply because the United States did not engage in foreign affairs. It was rather interested in domestic ones and its isolationist policy made it far from global politics. However, when there were matters of national security and foreign engagements against its interests and its frontiers, the executive leader remained in the political scene and took the necessary decisions. In such cases the President acted without Congressional approval, and his actions were justified under the inherited and emergency powers. This explains why neither Congress nor the public were in opposition in such cases. As a result, US interest groups were ignored in the international scene because of two reasons: the nature of foreign policy (isolationism) and the nature of decision-making process (presidential dominated).

II.3. The Impact of Interest Groups on US Domestic Policy

Interest groups use different techniques to shape policy decisions and their impact can be clearly noticed in the domestic policy. The latter is viewed as the most opened area to interest groups influence throughout its three elective branches. Assessing the impact of interest groups in domestic policy comparatively remains an easy task to do since these groups used to gain access to policy decision-makers in cases that dealt with internal affairs from the early establishment of the US. This active mobilization in domestic policy attracted many scholars to speak about these groups, and their tactics and strategies to obtain access and lobby legislators.

Interest groups use different ways in order to influence a particular branch of government. Due to many reasons Congress, however, is considered as the most opened elective branch to interest groups' impact (Victor 4). Firstly, it has to deal with the rewards

offered by interest groups as a strategy to persuade legislative officials to gain access to policy making. This almost includes electoral campaigns where interest groups always promise candidates or Congressional officials to fund and run their political campaign to succeed in the elections as new candidate or to be re-elected. This is often attributed by Political Action Committees (PACs), in return, the Congressional representatives, once in power, will respond to the group's demands or at least give them the necessary access. This is why it had been argued that campaign contributions can buy access, but not necessarily votes (Victor 4). This, however, does not mean that they will have the impact they expect.

Secondly, the nature of legislation enactment provides interest groups with more access. This is so because of the long period that characterises the drafting of legislation and the enacting of bills. When hearings of legislation start in committees and subcommittees, interest groups gain formal opportunities to testify on legislative business before committee. Groups may also use other private ways to lobby legislators (individual benefits). Lobbyists usually stand in waiting rooms in front of hearing rooms of committees waiting for legislators to speak to them and try to affect their decisions.

As Woodrow Wilson once observed, "Congress at work is Congress in committee, and Congress in committee is where Congress and interest groups meet, thereby epitomizing the penetration of the state by society" (Bowles 213). Consequently, committee hearings are important processes that enable interest groups to influence policy decisions. Nevertheless, limiting the time of Congressional hearings may also limit interest groups' access and sometime committees take into consideration only the view of powerful and organized groups.

Thirdly, in order to gain the appropriate access, interest groups must manipulate adequate strategies to maintain their interests. Techniques and strategies differ from one interest group to another, but coalition between interest groups, considered as the best way, in lobbying Congress together in one side provide interest groups with successful access to policy making because together they can pressure more (“Interest Groups ... ” 203). In addition, in order to lobby Congress interest groups had to follow the following five principles:

The Five Commands of Lobbying Congress

- | | |
|----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1- | Tell the truth |
| 2- | Never promise than you can deliver |
| 3- | Know how to listen so that you accurately understand what you are hearing |
| 4- | Staffs are there to be worked with, not circumvented |
| 5- | Spring no surprises. |
-

Source: Bruce Wolpe and Bertran Levine, *Lobbying Congress* (Washington, DC.:CQ Press, 1996.

Examples of interest groups' impact on Congress include their efforts in 1789 to pass the Tariff Act. They had also effectively lobbied Congress to stop the Tennessee Valley Authority in 1973 from building dams in living areas that would endanger the living species of fish (Remy et al. 558). This was in fact the result of pressure from environmental interest groups. Another example occurred in 1986 when several business groups allied into one coalition to stop Congress from passing the Tax Reform Act.

This occurred because business groups wanted Congress to reduce tax concessions and shelters. However, despite all those efforts from interest groups, public opinion was against the act, and then Congress passed the bill and defeated all those powerful groups.

This, indeed, illustrates that interest groups' lobbying is not always effective especially if it is against the public opinion. Thus, interest groups used Congress as a fertile floor to promote their interests in the area of domestic policy (Remy et al. 558).

With the judicial branch, interest groups use their techniques to seek pressure under litigation as the most used strategy among interest groups to affect policy making. In this strategy interest groups' representatives submit "amicus curiae" or "friend of the court" sessions and hearings so that to find key points to interfere in the final decision of the court. It is like someone who is not a party to the litigation but who believes that the courts decisions may affect its interest (Qtd.in Ashebee 256).

However, friends of the court are mostly considered third parties but they always side as a contribution to one political party "far from its literal translation, however, those 'friends of the court' are hardly neutral third parties" (Collins and Saolowiej17). In this sense political scientist Hass has illustrated that friends of the court should offer a credible source, one who is perceived to be willing to communicate that information without bias (Qtd. in Collins 4). Because the ability to obtain desired outcomes often depends on possessing accurate information, persons are likely to be quite open to messages that update or improve their view of reality (4).

A best example of interest groups' successful litigation in the Supreme Court occurred during the civil rights movement of the 1960s. The National Association for the advancement of Coloured People (NAACP), which was an interest group that had advanced the case of African-Americans in the United States since 1909, had supported the denied constitutional rights of blacks because of the 14th amendment. It successfully lobbied the US Supreme Court in Brown vs. Board of Education and backed the demand for ending segregation and discrimination in the United States (Remy et al. 558). Two other interest groups had also

successfully lobbied the court in recent years. They were the National Right to Life Committee (NRLC), and the National Abortion Right Action League (NARAL) which both advanced abortion rights (558). In short, interest groups access to the judicial branch is usually successful through effective litigation.

Concerning organized groups and the Presidency, it is important to notice that the President is not immune from the influence of such interest groups' pressure. Being the first executive power in the government, the US President is subjected to interest groups' lobbying whether as a presidential candidate during elections or in other policy objectives. The President in turn attempts to present his own interest due to the power he has. Since he is the first politician in the country, he can admit the policies that serve both his interest and the public interest in general (559).

Nevertheless, Presidents still have a distinctive position in policy-making that is why they are the target of interest groups' mobilization and competition. One estimate justified that interest groups' attribution to the President depends on the latter's political party. For example, most of the labour unions interest groups usually advance the Democratic party Presidents (Salamon and Lund 303). Like Congressional representatives, interest groups promise and help Presidents in campaign finance through the PACs to get elected or re-elected, and of course, once the President is in power he should allow them policy access or at least show sympathy toward their policies.

The best example that illustrates the previous point happened during the administration of President Reagan, when he gained coalitions from interest groups to support his policies in front of Congress. Reagan had successfully passed the Omnibus Reconciliation Act and the Economic Recovery Tax Act in 1981 with the help of powerful business and taxpayers' groups in suppressing Congress to obtain such acts. Furthermore, interest groups coalitions'

support to President Reagan throughout his presidency greatly helped him to pass a number of other legislations at the expense of Congress (303).

Despite their support, which promotes the President's policies, interest groups' opposition can also cause problems and failure to the President's policies. This happened with President Johnson when he attempted to enact bills that would ensure federal aid to public schools. The National Education Association (NEA) changed its beliefs and agreed to pass such legislation (303). Another example related to the opposition of interests groups occurred during the Reagan presidency when interest groups, including the National Organization of Women People (NOW) and the NAACP and the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), opposed his appointment of the Supreme Court Judge Bork (303).

Thus, the presence of interest groups' activity within the American political life is necessary, especially in the domestic policy. Interest groups are also an important element for the three elective branches, especially for the campaign finance of the legislative and executive branches, and the information provided, to gain, in return, the necessary access (Ashebee 320). Regardless of their remarkable role in the formulation of domestic policy, and obvious absence from foreign affairs, one has to say situation has progressively changed following the end of the Cold war, and interest groups started to have a heavy impact within the foreign policy decision-making process.

III. The Shift in US Foreign Policy Making and the Increasing Influence of Interest Groups after the Cold War

As mentioned earlier, the impact of interest groups on domestic policy is mirrored through their successful access to decision-makers of the three elective branches of government. Congress remained the most opened branch due to its greater participation in

policy decision-making, in addition to the process followed in the adaptation of any bill that paved the way and offered access to competitive interest groups. Yet, this active mobilization and greater access was only available in the domestic arena, while the foreign policy field continued to be executive dominated especially in the years following the Second World War.

III.1. US Foreign Policy from the Vietnam to the Cold War End and the Changes in the Locus of Foreign Policy Decision-Making

The post-World War Two gave US foreign policy a new direction because Washington entered a new area of international politics after its long period of isolationism. This global change led US foreign policy decision-making to become presidential dominated: an instance where the President played the essential role. This was mainly illustrated during President Franklin Delano Roosevelt administration, particularly when he exercised presidential prerogatives over foreign policy during the Second World War period.

In 1941 when German submarine warfare threatened to sever the life line of supplies to Britain, Roosevelt, without Congressional authorization, dispatched troops to Ireland, issued a “shoot on sight” order to the navy, and launched an undeclared war in the North Atlantic”.⁷ Thus, the increasing power of the President over foreign policy-making was considerable from the early 1940s. In addition, in the 1950s Truman also established presidential power without Congressional consent in Korea. Then, President Eisenhower also gained support from both parties regarding his foreign policy initiatives.

More than this, Kennedy handled the Cuban Missile Crisis without Congressional approval, too. Scholars like Cecil V. Crabb Jr., and Pat M. Holt viewed this kind of policy decisions as a special one mainly after the Second World War and noticed that over the

course of US history, the US has been involved in more than 125 ‘undeclared wars’ and other instances of violent conflicts abroad conducted under presidential authority (12).⁸

Besides , the post-World War II gave the US foreign policy decision-making process another direction that had limited or ignored interest group mobilization in foreign policy and because the US entered another era of global politics that demanded more executive dominance. The Vietnam War in the 1960s and the Cold War in the 1970s had completely changed the process of foreign policy making. As a result, interest groups could not gain access to interfere because these issues had exaggerated the role of US Presidents throughout these periods. However, US international politics and security were under the threat of Communism and a looming Third World War, in which the President and his advisors faced crisis’ issues; where they had to act quickly and secretly. In times of crises, the President faces two types of issues: strategic and structural which do not permit any interest group activity or access. This is simply because the national interest is above every private or elite interest.

III.2. US Foreign Policy from the Vietnam to the End of the Cold War

From the post-World War II, the US started to engage in global politics and international conflicts. In the 1950s and particularly during the Korean war, America packed South Korea with a security treaty against North Korea under the leadership of President Harry Truman who followed the same policy as his predecessors. President Truman stated that his government would protect its interests and its borders and defend itself from any threat or aggression that would endanger its security. As he was the executive leader during the fifties, Truman made himself the only responsible for foreign policy decision making. He clearly stated: “I make American foreign policy” (Wittkoft and Mc Cormick 277).

In the eighteenth century John Marshall, while still a member of the House of Representatives, declared that the President was the “sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations” (Qtd. in Slonim 30). In the 1960s, under the administration of President Kennedy, Washington entered into another big historical conflict against Vietnam under the argument of protecting human rights and democracy as it was announced thirty years earlier in President Theodore Roosevelt's corollary. President Kennedy announced to the world that the US was unwilling to witness or permit the slow undoing of human rights to which this nation has always been committed (Melinda 158). Towards this aim, President Kennedy ordered thousands of military operations and sent troops to North Vietnam.

The involvement in such a conflict not only endangered the American national security but also raised many doubts about the future of this war. After the assassination of President Kennedy, acting Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson became automatically the US President. Four years later in 1964, the Vietnam war had increased many suspicions again and increased the President's power over the foreign policy decision-making process. Thus, Congress passed the Tonkin Gulf Resolution in 1964. The measure was passed by the house of Representatives in less than one hour of debate and 98 senators out of 100 also voted in favour of this joint resolution (159). This resolution, however, ensured more the role and prerogatives of the President in foreign policy, and since the President has the role of commander in chief of the armed forces, he had the right to take all the necessary measures to protect the US from any imminent threat in the future.

Unfortunately, the prerogatives given to the President were not used in the right direction. He rather used these rights and took wrong decisions that threatened the nation's security. President Johnson doubled the number of US soldiers in Vietnam. As a result, the

earliest seeds of anti-communism started to grow-up from the 1940s and the conflict between the US and the Soviet Union reached the peak of a nuclear war, especially after the coming of President Nixon who had sent in the 1970s US and South Vietnamese troops into Cambodia to destroy communist camps (“Interpreting White ...”).

However, the President’s actions started to get popular resistance from interest groups’ activity about the future of the Vietnam conflict that became a serious danger because of the number of deaths in the American troops. *USA and the World* newspaper described numerous major protests against the President’s actions, triggered by students in 450 colleges. In Ohio, National Guard troops fired on anti-war protesters at Kent state killing four students. The leaders of Wall Street flew to New York to warn Nixon that a wider war threatens the stability of the stock market (“Global...”). As a result to these public pressures, various voices called on Congress to curb the power of the President over foreign policy decision making.

These demands culminated with the enactment of the War Powers Act in 1973. The latter was passed by Congress with greater assertiveness that helped to end the war and establish a new framework for executive and legislative war-making authority. The act was passed over President Richard Nixon’s veto “by 284-135 in the house and 75-18 in the Senate” (Hamilton and Tama 12). It emphasised that the President should consult with Congress before introducing or involving or giving orders to US military forces to be engaged in any hostile act against any nation. Then, the President “must report to Congress when such forces are introduced and must terminate the use of forces within sixty to ninety days unless Congress authorizes their use or extends this period (13). The most important notion of this legislation is that it is based on the principle that the President cannot declare war unless he receives Congressional consent.

However, the increasing power of the President became a hot topic among political scientists. For example, in 1973 Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. conducted a research upon presidential power and called this overwhelming phenomenon ‘the imperial presidency’. By ‘imperial’ he meant the absolute power of modern Presidents but also their relative power, as altered by the office’s predilection for expansion across the constitutional map” (Rudalevige 57). Thus, the imperial presidency became the leading executive of the US foreign policy decision making. Indeed, “Wildarsky shows that from the late 1940s and through the mid-1960s, Presidents obtained about 70% of their foreign and defence policy initiatives from Congress but only about 40% of their domestic initiatives” (Qtd. in Mc Cormick 60).

III.3. The Change in the Locus of Decision-Making after the Vietnam War

From the Vietnam war and up to the end of the Cold War, US presidential foreign policy decision-making started to wane and the imperial presidency that governed the US foreign policy for decades restricted. From the 1970s onward, Congress started to renew its power over foreign affairs. As Linda Jamison⁹ justified:

Congress became the primary venue for defending and sustaining the containment strategy and with the breakdown of executive-legislative trust during the 1960's and 1970's, as a result of the Vietnam war and Watergate scandal Congressional activism had a different purpose, a desire to challenge presidential initiatives, primarily those involving the commitment of U.S troops and other military resources. (94)

Due to the strong opposition to the Vietnam War, particularly toward the increasing power of the executive, Congress passed some internal reforms in the early 1970s which allowed wider legislative participation in both domestic and foreign policy decision-making.

Congress also passed the Legislative Reorganization Act to provide a legislative body to each Congressional committee. This means that each committee contains a legislative body where it reviews and drafts bills before they become effective. Consequently, more points of access became available to outside influences from both Congress and other organized groups that try to influence the decision-making policy since the years of the Vietnam war because Congressional committees share more jurisdiction concerning foreign policy matters (94).

According to one estimate, some sixteen committees in both the House and the Senate have at least some responsibilities over foreign and defence policy issues. Reforms in the two Houses in the early 1970s enabled Congress to continue to challenge the military aid programme. These reforms weakened the seniority system, expanded committee staffs and reposed major authority in new subcommittees (James 173).

The expanded committees were thus created in order to ensure that Congress would further participate in decision-making. Hence, whenever the decision took time in the committee floors it would open the door for different groups to state their opinions and seek the necessary impact. Other Congressional reforms included the changing membership of foreign policy committee of Congress: for example, the House of Foreign Affairs became now the International Relations Committee. Besides, Congressional reforms swept to the political parties' membership policy ideologies, in that the Republicans became more conservative and Democrats became more liberals (173).

The changes within the political parties were followed in the mid-1980s, and they took hold of Congress, to some degree, because party leaders replaced committee chairs and became the centre of decision-making within the House and the Senate (Zelizer 33). Therefore, party caucuses became influential as the two parties converged and shared the political system. First, each party became more homogenous ideologically, thereby creating a

greater consensus within each body. As the number of Southern Conservative Democrats diminished Democrats moved to the left and Republicans to the right (33).

Consequently, the changing political ideology of each political party, due to the 1970s' changes within Congress, enabled party leaders now to have the ability and the opportunity to debate and seek agreements on certain issues. In time, this would help them expand their role, reinforce and strengthen their political parties. In turn, due to all these changes and reforms in foreign policy-making between the executive and legislative branches, debate over foreign policy making between the executive and legislative branches expanded and both of them started to give opportunity and access to outside influences over decisions from different coalition of interest groups. Furthermore, these changes created many problems in Congress and made it open for debate and influence from interest groups.

Most importantly, such changes prevented the President of the major party from persuading party leaders as President Truman had done in the Vandenberg issue to insure the success of his legislative programmes. As the Speaker of the House, Thomas P. O'Neill illustrated: "if a member didn't like a particular proposal, he would swallow hard and support the President. Today, we no longer have a bipartisan foreign policy. Everyone is for himself" (Andy 101).

In this particular context, one may say that the Congressional reforms of the 1970s brought many benefits to the policy decision-making, especially in foreign policy. It weakened the role of the President over foreign policy; and Congressional consent became something needed and necessary before any decisions. Moreover, these changes also limited presidential power, such as the prevention of any US engagement of any future war without Congressional consent. Accordingly, these reforms came temporarily after the US loss of the Vietnam War and the Watergate Scandal in 1974. These two events were almost considered

as the important causes that led Congress to reassert its power over foreign affairs. The Watergate Scandal had also brought a new relationship between the legislative and executive branches. In that period “Congress was not in a ‘resurgent’ phase only; it was also going through a period of renewal” (102).

These events struck Congress and the public opinion and so threatened the national security of US citizens that an immediate response was needed to limit the growth of the imperial presidency and its transformation to the imperilled presidency; where Congress would have the ultimate power upon foreign policy decision-making. However, these changes had a positive connotation upon interest groups’ activity in focus of foreign policy making. As the scene of the decision-making moved from the President’s Cabinet and his advisors to the floor of Congress this helped interest groups to lobby, express their opinion, and then pressure the policy process of Congressional representatives to enact it according to their interests.

The important incident that helped interest groups to enter the realm of foreign policy decision-making was the increasing concern of public opinion. The latter was affected with the horrors of the Vietnam War and became directly involved in foreign policy which was beyond its main concern for many years:

Public opinion... has supported hard line anti-Soviet and anti- Chinese policies when they were official policy [as they were from Truman’s day right through to Johnson] and it has supported moves toward a relaxation of tensions and negotiating conflicts of interests.¹⁰

Both kinds of moves received wide spread popular acclaim. The public looked to the President for his cues.

In this essence, public opinion started to doubt about the future of the foreign policy-

making that became shaped with the so-called “imperial presidency”. Explicitly, political scientists and observers started to doubt this unusual power offered to the President over the foreign policy process which in turn changed as soon as the US national security was threatened by a nuclear war. Besides, the loss of thousands of US troops in Vietnam drove public opinion to be aware that their opposition to the Vietnam War started as early as the mid of the 1960s. This change of public opinion was due in part to the role of media access to and coverage of those events. Public support against Communism was huge, but as soon as the US engaged in the Vietnam War imminent threats became evident, and public support started to wane year after year:

When US troops first went ashore in Vietnam in 1963-4 to protect the south from ‘northern aggression’, a clear majority of Americans approved of the intervention. A plurality continued to support the war, albeit in decreasing numbers, until October 1967 when for the first time more Americans opposed the distant war (46 percent) than approve it (44 percent). (Hisberg 9-10)

Furthermore, evidence about the public percentage opposition to the Vietnam war during the Johnson’s administration suggested that between July 1966 and October 1967 the public escalation of the war was remarkable. “In July 1966, 60 percent supported the war, then in September 1966 only 44 percent. In November 1966, only 11 percent, then in August 1967 only 24 percent and in October 1967 only 42 percent” (11).

Thus, public polls were not fixed and public opinion opposition to the war varied and changed dramatically from one year to another. The change in public support over the opposition to the Vietnam War had made foreign policy decision makers more worried about the public polls, and public demonstrations in opposition to the Vietnam war were also fruitful. The result brought Congress to act and curb presidential power over foreign policy

decision-making by passing the War Powers Resolution Act in 1973.

In sum, the domestic and global changes in the US political arena as a result of the Vietnam and Cold Wars, in addition to the threatened national security led Congress to renew and reassert its power over the process of foreign policy-making. This Congressional move started to allow access to interest groups' activity more than ever before. It was the result of the Vietnam and Cold War years, which had previously prevented any interest group activity in foreign policy. Then, the policy arena was exclusive to the President and the Cabinet, in addition to the time and nature of issues which did not allow interest groups to find any points of access. However, after the loss of the Vietnam War, the US Congress expanded its powers over foreign policy issues. In addition to political parties, interest groups' activity also took a new direction on the foreign policy process after the end of the Cold War.

IV. US Foreign Policy After the Cold War and the Increasing Influence of Interest Groups

The end of the Cold War marked an evident shift in US foreign policy as well as in domestic policy. The collapse of the Soviet Union, as an important global rival to the United States led to the emergence of the US as the solely international power. A new international agenda redefined US foreign policy, and consequently, new issues and new actors started to appear in the US policy making process.

IV.1. US Foreign Policy after The Cold War

The disintegration of the Soviet Union came together with other global changes, particularly in Eastern Europe with the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the unification of East

and West Germany. The foundation of American foreign policy-making will no longer be threatened by any Communist aggression. Thus, the US policy makers concentrated on new economic, environmental, social, cultural and security issues. These new issues transformed the US policy making into an 'interdomestic' one (Qtd. in Uslaner 127). Thus, from the end of the Cold War, the foundations of the US foreign and domestic policy-making became identical. This was because of the nature of the issues promoted and the key actors that sponsored them in taking such decisions.

This new global arena, however, caused many changes over the policy-making process, especially in the locus of the decision-making where Congressional assertiveness over foreign policy-making gave an increasing access to interest groups mobilization over the foreign policy-making. Accordingly, the end of the Cold War led to an immense change in the US policy making in which the communist threat no longer shaped the US national security policy. And, in fact, the United States rather turned its sight to other new issues and to developing a new policy arena under its leadership as the only remaining global power (Uslaner127).

IV.2. The Increasing Influence of Interest Groups in the Foreign Policy Decision-Making

Due to this overall shift in the making of US policy, as well as to the new international agenda, US interest groups started to get their way into foreign policy. Many circumstances helped that policy influence; primarily the reformation in Congressional committees and Congress's assertiveness to take a leading role in foreign policy, in addition to the new economic, trade and environmental issues that came together with the end of the Cold War.

The end of the Cold War had enhanced interest groups' activity over the foreign policy

decision-making because of the shift in the US policymaking system in the foreign policy process following the Vietnam War and the Watergate scandal. The War Powers' Resolution of 1973 came as a consequence of the Watergate scandal and the increasing power of the President in foreign affairs. This act was passed to put an end to the imperial presidency in cases of declaring wars and threats to the national security.

In addition, the threat of another war and the costly Vietnam War led the stronger consensus between Congress and the Executive to weaken, contrary to what prevailed in the early period of the Cold War. Hence, the growing Congressional distrust between the President and Congress led the latter to draw a new direction in the US foreign policy-making. In consequence, an easy way was empty for interest groups' activity and new issues invited their pressure upon Congress in foreign policy. In this particular instance, Olson viewed that:

As the Cold War consensus began to weaken during the Vietnam area, Congress also came to reflect the divisions among an increasingly vocal American people on questions of the U.S world role. Interest groups formed and began to lobby Congress and exert influence over U.S conduct abroad. The combination of these and other developments has fundamentally altered the Congressional role in policy formulation. (Olson⁵⁴⁸)

Thus, unlike the Cold War period where interest groups' access was limited, the change in the locus of the decision-making policy gave an increasing access to interest groups in foreign policy. The potential for a nuclear war with the Soviet Union as well as Congressional compliance in the conduct of foreign affairs justified presidential dominance over security issues that demanded a quick and an immediate response from the President (Jamison 95). So, Congressional compliance was not permitted and interest groups' access

was limited. Nevertheless, with the end of the Cold War, the nature of policies had changed and strategic and structural issues became different from those of the Cold War period.

Strategic issues are those that specify the goals and tactics of defence and foreign policy.

The President has the advantage to manage and take actions, but Congress has also the power to review and access presidential actions on foreign policy, particularly when issues do not demand quick response. As a result, this shift in the decision-making from President to Congress after the Cold War gave interest groups opportunities to lobby in order to produce the adequate policy outcome. Henceforth, interest groups' access will further expand and increase whenever strategic issues involve review of policies that is more Congressional centred. While structural issues are even "more ripe for interest group activity", because their actions are taken in Congress's floor and have a long period of time, thus, interest groups' access would widen (Qtd. in Mc Cormick and Scott 187).

Structural actions deal with foreign and defence policy in details, as Lindsay and Ripley note: "These policies focus on procuring, developing and organizing military, personnel and material...[and] which countries will receive aid, what rules will govern immigration" (188). According to the Constitution, this kind of actions are under the responsibility of Congress and then, interest groups are invited with greater access to policy making due to the long procedure of enactment and selection of the appropriate decisions.

Furthermore, the shifts that had occurred in the foreign policy making from the executive to the legislative process, together with the changes in the types of issues gave more access to interest groups. In other words, the delay in the legislative review in committees provides time and access to interest groups in foreign policy. Then, interest groups will be able to have the necessary access and effective techniques to lobby Congressional staffs and to shape foreign decision making according to their will.

Moreover, Congressional reforms over the executive decisions in foreign policy brought many new structural issues in the Congressional committees' floor for their review like the war making area, the trade and aid area and the general oversight of foreign policy. All of these cases became under the responsibility of the Congressional review and, automatically, committees will take time to decide what to do with them. This would give interest groups enough space to gain access to affect the direction of such decisions. With regard to the context of the nature of issues that enhanced interest group access within foreign decisions especially with Congress after the end of the Cold War, scholars like John Tierney noted in his essay "Interest Group Involvement in Congressional Foreign and Defence policy" that:

There are parallels between Congress's role in foreign policy and that of organized interest groups. Congress's role in foreign policy increases as one moves along a spectrum from crisis policies to structural policies. He traces the same patterns for organized interests... Generally speaking, this means that organized interests have less to say in decision-making process surrounding crises. Yet, as presidential dominance and 'national interest' considerations decline in intensity, the potential for interest group influence increase. (Qtd. in Shutter 18)

According to Robert G. Shutter, however, the nature of the issues represented makes difference in determining the influence of organized interests. He claimed that interest groups' influence vary according to its widespread and popularity through the media, public influence, and among legislators and decision makers. He further noticed that organized interests are less widespread, contrary to competing ideological, partisan, or constituency pressure. On the contrary, he argued that organized interests appear more likely to affect

outcomes on issues that neither undergoes active public or media scrutiny or conflict with legislators or other policy makers' convictions, partisan learning, or constituency needs. He added that just as Congress is more effective in foreign affairs in changing or blocking executive actions than in taking major legislative initiatives on its own, so too are organized interests more effective in working to resist or alter changes rather than in actively changing the status quo (18).

Thus, the post-Cold War area had notably given rise to interest groups' access due to the issues represented. The nature of these issues had also enhanced their role in addition to the changing in the locus of decision-making. Consequently, the US foreign policy decision-making after the Cold War turned to a more pluralistic one in which various interest groups gained access to foreign policy-making. This was unlike the Cold War era where the policy-making was an elitist one centred on the President and his key advisors due to the nature of issues at that time. Then, crisis issues needed quick response without external influences from organized interests, while the post-Cold War consensus gave the opportunity to organized interests due to the issues represented in the political agenda.

Indeed, interest groups no longer care about the Soviet aggression and Communism; they rather have other new economic and environmental issues. In addition, the locus of the decision-making in the legislative process and the long delay of each decision will have a positive impact upon interest groups' participation in the foreign policy-making (McCormick and Scott 87).

In addition to the change in security issues after the Cold War, new economic trading issues also emerged in the political scene of the international agenda in the US. These new economic policies had also contributed to the increasing access of interest groups' activity within the foreign policy-making. Furthermore, trading issues led to the division among the

American public. The latter divided into coalitions, joining different economic interest groups in order to lobby, and influence Congress's decisions in such cases. Among these new international trading policies, one can mention the two most important ones namely, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and the World Trade Organization (WTO) (88).

The Congressional approval of the NAFTA and WTO led to its division during the post-Cold War era. This fact opened the way to interest groups for lobbying. However, the debates among NAFTA were considered as the most influential issue in international trading policy because many interest groups gained their way to influence Congress's decision upon this trading institution. As Jacqui S. Porth argued, Washington lobbyists, special interest groups, and grass roots lobbying organizations were spotlighted during the debate over the (NAFTA) which was a major preoccupation of Congress for several years in the early 1990s. The *Nation* magazine described NAFTA as the "perfect issue" for lobbyists because it was "highly technical" and replete with "arcane" details (US House of Foreign Affairs 28).

Political scientist James Q. Wilson was also among scholars who considered the NAFTA debates as the best example of interest groups' activity and access in foreign policy in the post-Cold War world because it aimed at advancing free trade between Canada, Mexico, and the United States. This opposition was also justified by Wilson when he noted:

Many labour unions and environmental organizations oppose free trade because the unions fear jobs in the US might be shifted to countries that pay lower wages and environmental groups worry that products made abroad may be created without the environmental rules that govern American industry (346).

These trading issues also caused fierce division among President Clinton's administration and

his own members of the democratic party and his key collaborators, particularly those of the working class. This case also enhanced interest groups' access in foreign trade.

The US trading policy toward China (Most Favored Nations (MFN)) also led to unusual coalitions among the US government between opponents and proponents (Shutter 18). The case of MFN was to find an end to the US trading policy toward China that is establishing permanent and normal relations between China and the United States. These divided coalitions led to the emergence of hundreds of interest groups, and each one wanted to influence the government decisions toward China.

Proponents of granting MFN a permanent trading policy were mainly from Liberal and Conservative free traders and foreign policy realists from both Democrats and Republicans, while opponents emerged from human rights' activists and religious conservative groups (21). Because of such cases, interest groups emerged in unusual numbers; each was attributed an economic case, and joined certain coalitions of organized interests to maintain their aims. Thus, these new post-Cold War issues had enhanced interest groups' activity and access in foreign policy making at different levels.

As new security and economic issues supported interest groups' access in the foreign policy making after the Cold War, environmental and sociocultural issues had caused the same effect. However, different coalitions of interest groups emerged to advance environmental and human rights issues, too. Environmental interest groups emerged because of the effects of the global warming. This issue also gained both supporters and opponents. Those who claim protecting the environment from the effects of factories' pollution were its supporters, while coalitions of business and trading leaders were the strong opponents of this issue. The sociocultural issues that emerged after the Cold War also denoted that the US citizens started to be aware about foreign policy issues. So, they were organized to defend

human rights and environmental issues, in addition to the promotion of democracy abroad.

Finally, one can say that the post-Cold War era remained an important direction in the US interest groups' history. The new security, economic, sociocultural, and environmental issues gave the opportunity to interest groups' mobilization and access to the foreign policy making process. The change in the locus of decision-making in foreign policy led to a more Congressional dominance that has attributed to interest groups' increasing access because Congress became the most opened branch to interest groups' activity.

Furthermore, these issues led to divisions among legislators, political party leaders, and many key actors in the legislative process. The end result was that all of them joined in certain coalition of interest groups in order to pressure their needs to decision-makers. Therefore, interest groups were invited to a larger political scene to exert their influence. The new sociocultural issues and environmental issues also helped the sheer growth of interest groups' activity. In other terms, the end of the Cold War, and the increasing awareness of the US citizens about the world through the media turned their sight towards people of other nations that suffer from wars.

Interest groups' mobilization in the US foreign policy decision-making witnessed a remarkable increase after the end of the Cold War. Nevertheless, interest groups remain influential organizations in American society. They existed since the early years of the American Republic because of the many constitutional rights they enjoyed. Assessing their role in the foreign policy-making process is not an easy task because their role did not gain a sufficient scholarly attention in the past. We have attempted to provide the causes that led to interest groups' mobilization in foreign policy, and emphasized that, indeed, the role of interest groups in foreign policy from the early years of the Republic until the Cold War was limited due to the issues presented in the international agenda; as crisis issues, and the

hierarchical order of the decision-making in foreign affairs.

The next move will be an attempt to show how the change in the area of the decision-making contributed to the great growth and influence of interest groups beginning from the 1990s. In the main process, we will deal with some policy issues in which interest groups played an important role and exerted convincing influence to guide these foreign policy outcomes toward their interests.

Endnotes

¹According to James Madison, interest groups should share the decision-making process as they are a special part from US politics. The existence of interest groups in any society, according to Madison, justifies its ability to share the political power within its people. For that the persuasion of democracy comes from the participation of individuals in decision-making. For further reading on this point see: “Interest Groups Participation in American Democracy”.n.d.Web.13 Feb.2011.<<http://ablohgman.com/sapmlechapter/0321155262.pdf>>.

²Alexis De Tocqueville is among the earliest researchers who were struck by the formation of factions. In his book, *Democracy in America* he mirrored in details the role of these factions. He owed this to the nature of the United States political system and to the conditions surrounding people. He rather claimed that the social circumstances contribute to the formation of organized groupings. He added that this phenomenon is the outcome of the development in the social conditions of Americans in which they became aware to demand their rights and share policy process with their representatives. For further reading on this issue see: Ashebee, Edward *US Politics Today*. Manchester University Press, 2004. Print.

³Evidently here, the notion of lobbyists or lobbying encountered a negative meaning. From early years when American citizen hear the word lobbyist it comes to his/her mind those strange persons, holding big cigars and waiting after the doors of Congress committees. This is because of the bad behaviour since lobbyists offer their services for those who pay much. However, nowadays lobbying took off that bad attitude and became an integrant part of the US government. For further reading on this issue see: Richard, C. Remy Elowitz, Larry and Berlin, William. *Government in the US*. New York, 1984.Print.

⁴In the United States, society is always supreme, individuals have power to challenge

decision makers and this would be better mirrored in interest groups. This is why decision makers always afraid from public polls. For further reading on this issue see: Bowels, Nigel. *The Government and Politics of the USA. Comparative Government and Politics*. Palgrave. Mac Milan, 1993. Print.

⁵Corwin illustrated that the U.S system of checks and balances and the shared power between legislative and executive branches over foreign policy issues, involved each system to check the power of the other and then this would cause conflicts and competitions between the three branches of government and much more between Congress and the president. For further reading on the foreign powers of the President and Congress see: Edward S, Corwin; *The President: The President: Office and Powers 1787-1957*. 4th rev.ed. New York: New York University Press, 1957. Print.

⁶In this logic interest groups' participation to influence the judicial branch considered them as "friends of the court". This means that interest groups establish a good relationship with judicial officers. Moreover, interest groups testify courts hearings to provide truthful information to judicial officials; in turn they get the access to witness judicial hearings. Besides, interest groups at courts are like third parties. For that their functions and roles on courts share a vital importance and most of judicial officials rely on their investigations and help in drafting any decision. For further reading on this issue see: Collins, Paul M. Jr. and Solowiej, Lisa A. "Interest Groups Participation, Competition and Conflict in the U.S Supreme Court" todoc.com. Fall 2007. Web. 27 Apr. 2010.
<<http://www.psci.unt.edu/~pncollins/20solowiej%20007.pdf>>.

⁷ Schlesinger had attributed an excellent representation in which he claimed for the increasing power of U.S president. This extending power through time turned to endanger the security of the United States. From the post second world war U.S presidents were exercising

an unusual power over foreign policy in which Schlesinger called it the new imperial presidency. For further reading on the issue of contemporary imperial presidency see: Schlesinger, Arthur Mier. *Imperial Presidency*. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2004. Print.

⁸ The relationship between executive and legislative branches is an invitation to struggle in which each one of them wanted to exercise more prerogatives than the other. For further reading on this mysterious relationship see: Crabb, Cecil V. Jr. and Holt, Pat M. *Invitation to Struggle: Congress, the President, and Foreign Policy*. 4th ed. Washington, DC, Congressional Quarterly Press, 1992. Print.

⁹ In her research paper Linda S. Jamison explained the relationship between US foreign policy actors and initiated the shift of this power after the distrust caused by the Vietnam war and Watergate scandal. Congress after the increasing imperial powers and threat of national security began to take a series of emergency measures; this was of course after the end of the Vietnam War. For further reading on this issue see the research paper of Linda s. Jamison Executive- Legislative after the Cold War in American Defence Policy in Hays Peter L., Vallance Brenda J. and Baltimore, Van Tussal Allan R. *American Defence Policy*. Greenwood Publishing Group, 1990. Print.

¹⁰ U.S public's rally to the president's foreign policy decision-making particularly in hard times. They trusted totally any presidential action in foreign policy affairs starting from Truman administration through Johnson and later Nixon. This shows more that the US public opinion rallies the president specifically in times of crises, when they knew that all the president's actions are in the benefit of the whole society and the national security of the state comes first. For further reading on public support to the president over times of crises see: Hirshberg, Matthews C. *Perpetuating Patriotic Perceptions: The cognitive Function of the Cold War*. Greenwood Publishing Group, 1993. Print.

Chapter Two

Interest Groups' Influence on the Making of US Contemporary Foreign Policy

The history of the United States foreign policy making has been entrenched with the President as the first politician in the country. However, this practice noticed a great shift of power from President to Congress when the latter declared a re-assertiveness of its powers regarding foreign affairs by means of the War Powers Act of 1973. This change occurred because of the increasing prerogatives of the President over foreign policy, in addition to the misuse of presidential powers which threatened the wellbeing of the American presidency as a political institution.

This shift of power from the executive to the legislative process gave rise to new actors within the political environment that wanted to share and influence the foreign policy process as well. Interest groups emerged and mobilized in great numbers at the foreign level and became influential actors in the foreign policy-making. This fact enhanced the public rally on decision makers, in addition to their support in whether providing information, advice or monitoring elections. Their greater influence attracted many scholars who stressed that these organizations would both benefit the American foreign policy and be a threat to future policies as well.

Following the end of the Cold War, the United States emerged as the only superpower that took the torch of world dominance with Americanism being the only measure to world development. The post-Cold War scene of American foreign policy making caused the emergence of new strategic and structural issues in which the US security was no longer threatened by a foreign government. This new scene drove the US

to take care of new issues like its relations with foreign governments such as China, or interfering to end wars in protection of human rights, and promotion of democracy in other states like East Timor. As far as these new issues are concerned, they led to the rise of dozens of interest groups that intended to lobby at the foreign level to advance their interests. For example, business interest groups showed active mobilization and pressure within Congress, especially concerning the future of US relations with China. This fact enabled these groups to develop new techniques in order to reach their aims.

However, the shift of locus in the decision-making process from the President to the Congress was not absolute, because the President regained his power on the political arena immediately after the tragic events of 9/11. This shift in power was described as the ‘new imperial presidency’. In addition, from that period onward, the President has been able to control foreign policy with the support of partisan politicians within the White House. The events faced by the US were so horrific that the United States entered into a new foreign policy agenda shaped by “war on terrorism”. As a result, the US Congress and public opinion totally supported the President to punish those who tried to threaten US national security and the lives of its people.

Ironically, the US War on Terror and the decision to invade Iraq have been taken as an immediate response to prevent future attacks. However, these measures led to the emergence of many interest groups. But most of them lobbied on behalf of their supporters whether to wage or end this war. Thus, the 9/11 attacks shifted US policy-making to a more pluralistic one in which special lobbies and interest groups directly targeted the President and his close advisors in addition to Congress.

It is the main intention of this chapter to shed light on the US post-Cold War foreign policy as the crucial element. To do so, we will go through the crisis events that impacted

and reshaped US foreign policy decision-making, and extensively deal with interest groups that increased into dozens to lobby within foreign policy using different techniques to get access to decision makers.

I. US Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War and Contemporary History

The post-Cold War US foreign policy making has been marked with different changes. New policy issues eroded the relative autonomy of the President in foreign affairs and opened the formulation and implementation of foreign policy to domestic forces. Thus the US political foreign policy atmosphere was seen like the domestic one which opened time and space for external actors to share the decision making process. Moreover, the absence of particular coalitions between major political parties within Congress and the Executive during the Clinton administration made foreign policy issues like the domestic ones (Qtd. in Ambrosio 10).

Consequently, interest groups inside this political atmosphere started to grow steadily according to the opportunities presented by a divided government (10). In addition to this political change, other global and societal changes also contributed to the rising influence of interest groups in the contemporary policy making. Global changes signify the new trading issues and societal changes combined with the increasing public awareness of the importance of foreign affairs. Indeed, because of this new era that offered plenty of issues, interest groups implemented new techniques and principles that paved them the way through foreign policy matters. The 9/11 events offered another challenge to interest groups that of defending the US national security.

I.1. US foreign Policy from the Post-Cold War Period to the 9/11th Attacks

The end of the Cold War marked a turning point in US history. Political power and decision-making in foreign affairs reached their zenith because of the Vietnam War and the Watergate scandal. Foreign power that was under the control of Presidents declined and the relations between the executive and legislative branches came at the 'water's edge' (Lindsay11). For that purpose, Congress no longer engaged with the executive branch, it rather passed a series of assertive acts and resolutions in order to redefine the foreign policy powers of the President.

I.2. US Foreign Policy Decision-Making in the Post-Cold War Period

The post-Cold War era also brought many new issues in which the American public at large became engaged. The collapse of the Soviet Union made the United States as the only superpower in the world, and security issues relegated to a second order. As a result, strategic issues became then more different and connected the foreign and domestic policies of the country. The changing issues intertwined US policies at home and abroad.

Accordingly, this increasing importance of issues brought public attention to decision-making. Public opinion was rather driven by special powers called interest groups that used different means to shape public opinion according to their attitudes. Basically, the post-Cold War scene saw remarkable changes in the US foreign policy, particularly the relationships and roles of the legislative and executive branches in the formulation of foreign policies. As stated earlier, the distrust of this relationship was the outcome of the Vietnam and Cold Wars, but certainly there were other causes, mostly related to domestic politics that also contributed to Congressional assertiveness.

Among the causes stated for the resurgence of Congress was primarily the continuing unlimited power in the executive which in fact started to increase from the Second World War. For decades the executive process enjoyed many prerogatives over foreign policy with the consent of Congress and public opinion. This coalition and bipartisanship was the result of the constitutional prerogatives, and a general consensus of both the US federal government and the American public to delegate and give the President the ultimate power so that their rights would be protected and they would appear as a single voice in the international arena.

To appear as a single, united nation, the US government delegated its powers on international affairs to the President with total acquiescence from Congress. But the situation reversed after the horrific scenes of the Vietnam destruction. The American public started to criticize the situation and became afraid of a nuclear war. Eventually, the situation got worse after a series of losses in war battles in Vietnam and the dual ideological conflict with the Soviet Union that tended to create a third World War.

In all these circumstances, US Presidents, particularly from Truman to Nixon, all expressed foreign prerogatives more than any other President in US history. Moreover, as James Lindsay noted: “the wake of the Vietnam War split-ticket voting got ascendancy in American politics” (Lindsay 27). This meant that the loss in the Vietnam War marked mistrust between the Congress and the President in which the former wanted to curb the latter’s prerogatives in foreign affairs. The end result was the divorce between Congress and the President.

In addition, during the Vietnam War, President Nixon claimed unlimited powers, more than any previous US President, to face Congress which was dominated by the opposition party (Lindsay 27). President Reagan also claimed the same powers and used

to refuse most of Congress's foreign policy preferences as they came from a dominant Democratic party at that time, especially the case of the military intervention in Nicaragua.

The resurgence of Congress was due to the collapse of the text book¹ Congress (24). After the reassertion, any foreign bill had to pass through a number of new committees that were created for such process. As a result, this practice opened the space for interest groups to share decisions and influence their directions over foreign policy. This means that Congress's decisions over committee chairs increased and involved new actors over foreign powers which offered new debates and reformation in any legislative process. Thus, the increasing debate in Congress and the creation of new permanent committees enhanced the long debate of any legislative law especially within the permanent staff committees in military decisions. In other words, floor debate on defence and foreign policy has grown enormously since the 1970s. Often, the challenges were led by junior members with no committee assignment in foreign affairs (28).

Besides, the fall of the text book Congress was simultaneously empowered with the rise of thousands of foreign policy interest groups that are the main concern of our present study. These groups get their way in foreign policy by means of various factors like the inter-domestication of foreign policy, the relationship between decision makers and the changing of the international political agenda. In addition, public opinion was also important in the shift of the decision-making process. Because of Cold War events, the mass public was no longer able to trust the President, despite President Nixon's promise that the executive branch will shrink its power over foreign policy and, that there will be no other Vietnam.

But public attitudes were struck enough and no longer trusted the President's actions in foreign affairs, even though his military actions fulfilled success as it happened in the first Gulf War in 1990. President Herbert Bush at that time tried to convince the public with the necessity of such a war and that Vietnam will not occur again, and despite the public opposition to it, its success did not matter a lot. It rather witnessed many new groups who tried to influence decision makers, especially business interest groups who were not in favour of the war.

With regard to this point, journalist Anna Quindlen of the *New York Times* said that the Gulf War let Americans to see themselves as the leaders of the world again, assured of their inherent basic greatness and the essential evil of the enemy (Qtd. in Hillstorm and Hillstorm 287). This, however, justifies that even the success of the first Gulf War was not able to absorb public opposition to US foreign military engagement.

In short, the post-Cold War era brought a new dimension to the US foreign policy-making process. The Vietnam war, the changing relationship between the executive and legislative actors at the foreign policy level, in addition to the widening increase of public opinion opposition to any future foreign struggle that would endanger US security in another Vietnam, led to a new US foreign policy in which different actors appeared on the stage of the policy-making process. Those actors mainly represented public attitudes and opinions toward their nations. The creation of new interest groups that were interested in foreign policy was the magic outcome of the US post-Cold War world.

The US foreign policy became more pluralistic, one in which the powers of Presidents shrunk over military aggression and the powers of Congress renewed and widened with the creation of new committees that opened the debate between different legislators and provided time for interest groups to interfere and increase their influence.

The changing issues brought US public into greater awareness about foreign policy decisions. This occurred when they turned their attention toward foreign policy matters because of the agenda affairs. Thus, American citizens no longer enjoyed any President who wanted to increase US military operations abroad. This fact caused the defeat of President Herbert Bush by the Democratic president Bill Clinton, and most political scientists attributed his failure to get re-elected to his declined popularity after the First Gulf War (Hillstorm and Hillstorm 287). One may assert that in all this, the most noticeable change is that US public opinion started to have a greater participation in the foreign policy process.

While the post-Cold War years brought Congress, public opinion, interest groups and other groups as new actors of foreign policy, the twenty first century, however, has brought another different dimension to US foreign policy actors. The new actors who emerged in the realm of foreign policy process intended to shrink the power of the President, and make decision-making more pluralistic in a new environment where domestic and foreign policy issues intertwined with interest groups' mobilization.

In view of that, the US Foreign policy-making process witnessed many changes within the period going from the post-Cold War era until 2001. The new actors in US foreign policy-making started to put some pressure on the Presidents' decisions in order to open more space to debate and influence, respectively from Congress and the different committees as well as from various interest groups (289). This new practice was followed mainly to limit the President's power. However, the situation soon reversed when the US security was once again threatened by external actors.

I.3. US Foreign Policy in the Aftermath of the 9/11

The 9/11 events struck a violent blow to US national security in a way that led to the restoration of the President's ultimate power over foreign policy decision-making. The atrocities of the events also pushed the public opinion to rally behind the President to enable him take the necessary measures in order to protect the nation. As commander in chief of the armed forces of the United States, the President was able to control and decide firmly and unilaterally.

Due to this domestic and foreign dilemma, the decision-making over foreign policy matters became pluralist more than any time before, rather an elitist one. The impact of the 9/11 events was sufficient enough to US policy-makers to shift their power decisions and restate new priorities at the foreign level, particularly with regards to the future of the national security of the United States. New actors in the foreign policy decision-making influenced by various interest groups were able to reshape and dominate the US political scene.

The domestication of American foreign policy provided the American public with the ability to share foreign policy decision-making through representative interest groups. The creation of the Department of Homeland Security, as well as the increasing role of other new staffs such as the NSC (National Security Council); in addition to the President's close advisors, all worked together to guarantee the national security of the nation. Foreign policy decision making took a new dimension in the post 9/11 attacks. These decisions rather returned to a policy-making which is presidential centred. It was similar to the process that was designed during the 1950s by President Truman and which

he called 'The Buck stops here'.² This system is shown in the graph below:




Figure 3.1. US foreign policymaking

US Foreign policy in the aftermath of 2001 stemmed its power from its domestic actors, like the public opinion, the mass media, and interest groups. The new political scene after the 9/11 attacks took a new dimension, especially within the executive-legislative relations. These relations witnessed a strong disagreement during the 1960s as a result of increasing presidential actions without Congress's approval. This practice led to an imperial presidency and brought the relationship between the two major state actors at stake. Besides, the national security of the nation was threatened by Communism, the Vietnam War and the Watergate scandal. However, this relationship changed again and moved back toward a more presidential centred practice in foreign affairs. Thus, from the 9/11 attacks onward, the US foreign policy shifted again to one that is presidential dominated; but this time with stronger state actors sharing political powers.

Moreover, the 9/11 was an extraordinary turning point in the US domestic and foreign policies. It restored US executive and legislative relationships in a number of facts and issues. Presidential prerogatives over foreign policy erupted during the 1970s with the Gulf Token Resolution and reached a peak of threat during the Cold War. While the end of

the Cold War up to the late 1990s witnessed limited foreign policy issues on which the President and Congress diverged; especially in periods when the President was from a different dominant party in Congress (Fortier and Ornstein 155).

However, this state of affairs made it difficult for the executive to renew its power and re-establish a permanent reconciled relationship with the legislative branch. In addition, after the 9/11 attacks the US found itself in a new dilemma that threatened its security and endangered its future decisions. This threat began with the new challenges of the Republican President George W. Bush who brought greater strength and vigour to US foreign policy which he entitled: ‘the North Star’ or ‘the War on Terror’ to punish those who were responsible for such deadly deeds. Shortly after the attacks, the Republican President started to formulate his foreign policy which was based on the ultimate decisions to fight and punish all those criminals who committed this intolerable damage.

The first reaction was the decision of President George. W. Bush to wage an unprecedented “war against terrorism” and “act pre-emptively” to make the aggressors pay for what they did so that to prevent any future aggression. In fact, President Bush would not do this alone if there were not a sufficient support from both the US Congress and the public opinion. A new coalition took shape and both US Congress and the public opinion returned to the scenario of the Vietnam War and the Cold War in which the national security of the nation took ample priority and the President was allowed the necessary power to act in order to save the nation.

The first few months after the attacks were the difficult ones in this old/new executive-legislative relationship. Writing about this uneasy association, Fortier and Ornstein remarked that,

The four months after September 11 were extremely rare in presidential-Congressional relations, a period of hyper-bipartisanship, a period of nearly unanimous consent in votes on the final passage of any important pieces of legislation. (156)

Perhaps the authors exaggerated in describing this relationship as hyper bipartisanship since the meaning of the word itself indicates that there was a real extraordinary relationship, a special coalition more than normal. As a result, this shift in power between the President and Congress was initially the outcome of public support behind President Bush which, in fact, recalls us with the Cold War years when the President used to have the final word. This popular support demands a strong leading executive and an appropriate Congressional deference.

Despite the fact that the events of the 9/11 started a good relationship between the Congress and the President, there was still some fear of the legislative from the comeback of the imperial presidency that had prevailed during the 1960s. Nevertheless, Congress did not waste time and responded in the same way it had done during the Vietnam War by issuing a number of legislative decisions to overcome the casualties and to prevent and/or punish any future aggression. Just like the Gulf Token resolution, Congress only three days after the attacks, that is on 14 September 2001, passed a resolution by a vote of 98 to 0 in the Senate and 420 to 1 in the House in which it was clearly stated that the President has the ability to "...use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on 11 September 2001" (Parmar 85).

This compliance of the executive-legislative relations extended to other issues that intended to protect the nation from terrorist aggressions such as the withdrawal from the

Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) (85). Another important fact that clearly shows the legislative-executive compliance was the US Patriot Act of 2001, which was drafted by Democratic Senator Patrick Leahy to give more power and new prerogatives to the Republican President. It empowered the President to use military force whenever necessary to protect the US national security. But on the other hand, it did not allow the President to unlimited powers out of fear that absolute freedom to act could lead to the past imperial presidency that emerged in the 1960s. In short, though the presidential-congressional acquiescence expanded the powers of the President in dealing with foreign states as well as in declaring wars, it did not give the executive branch “Carte Blanche” (Mc Keever and Davies 350). In other words, the foreign powers of the President were governed by ‘sun set clauses’ in which Congress and its different committees would participate in the process of the decision making.

At this stage, one can infer that the 9/11 events reshaped the US decision-making process after long and bitter relations between the executive and the legislative powers. The events rather reconciled decision makers to appear as one man and one voice to defend the nation’s sovereignty against foreign aggressors. More importantly, the US decision- making process in foreign policy polarized and took a new direction under presidential leadership, but with the involvement of increasing actors in the decision-making process, that is to say a pluralist process in which the public attitude was the central approach (Hoff 112), as well as the new committees and departments that dealt with foreign policy to protect the US from any future terrorist aggression.

Few weeks after the attacks, President Bush started to act by using a number of executive orders to increase protection measures. He created new departments and expanded others. For instance, the Department of Homeland Security was created and

extended with a new and an effective programme. The former Republican governor of Pennsylvania, Tom Ridge, was nominated at the head of the designed department with the elaboration of new agencies and the doubling its budget so that it would be able to work skilfully in the process of implementing future plans (Eraser 64).

The extension also reached the security level. The National Security Council (NSC) was attributed vital importance under its agencies especially the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in order to further the investigations and advise the President at the foreign level. The Pentagon is also among the initial norms of making foreign policy and its effective intelligence agencies widened their roles after the attacks (40). All these state actors, in addition to the Secretary of Defence and Vice President, became the President's close team after the 9/11 attacks to decide what for the future of the nation, investigate the events, and rebuilt the damages caused by the attacks.

I.4. US Foreign Policy after the Iraq War

The decision to wage a war against Iraq was one of the chief decisions that were taken after the 9/11 attacks. The pluralist process which rallied with President Bush issued the reaction to punish all those persons and states that were responsible for the attacks. Besides, the result of pluralism after the attacks enabled President Bush to get an ultimate majority to attack Iraq in 2003. This war was issued by Congress within just a year after the attacks to show its total support to the President with a "vote of 296 to 133 in the House and 77 to 23 in the Senate" (Mc Cormick 62).

In addition, Congress authorized the President to use force as it determined it to be necessary and appropriate in order to defend the national security of the US against the continuing threat posed by Iraq and enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council

Resolutions against Iraq. The decision to invade Iraq with a majority agreement in the House and Senate was for the quest to find Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and provoke a regime change.

Nevertheless, it is important to note that the partisan rally around President George Bush to attack Iraq shifted again only few months after the invasion compared to what it had been during the post-Cold War era.³ Criticisms to the Iraq War started to take different directions; all stated that the war against Iraq had to stop. Public opposition also took part in this dilemma and refused any further participation in such war. Then, most of the public demands tended to remember the President with his promise that the war would not last too long.

The war lasted more than it was expected. Both Congress and the public opinion expressed that the war against Iraq was a great mistake. What is important is that the Bush administration's war against Iraq turned to be no longer approved. Wittkoft and McCormick argued that 9/11 changed all the relations whether between the President and Congress or between the executive and the public opinion at least for a time. Congressional criticism became muted and public enthusiasm for the President's agenda blossomed. By early 2003, however, the tides once again appeared to shift as war with Iraq loomed (7).

Another estimate justified this point of view. In his, *American Foreign Policy and Process*, Scott James wrote that starting from the year 2003 the "Bush's approval ratings declined to 50 percent. In one poll in September 2003, his level of support on the question of whether the Iraq War was worth fighting reached a similar level (485). In this logic, the US foreign policy making-process witnessed another direction with the new concept of the war on terror, neo-conservatism, or the Bush Doctrine. Washington faced a new

dilemma in the decision-making process as new actors emerged at both the domestic and foreign policy levels; and attempted to shape US policy to their own benefits (Mc Keever and Davies 356).

This state of affairs soon shifted to the President as the lonely decision-maker able to react and protect the nation. The events of 9/11 became a turning point in US foreign policy because they reshaped the latter's priorities and gave great importance to the domestic policy as well. These events also returned the President's prerogatives to its heyday of the 1960s; which in return resulted in a great fear from the return of the imperial presidency because of the public total submission to any future action that would be taken by the President to protect the nation from any attacks.

The immediate reaction was the passage of a series of resolutions to punish those countries and persons who hiked terrorists and encouraged their works. The Patriot Act was the link between Congress and President for a reconciled relationship based on the ultimate agreement between the two. Basically, the declaration of the war on Iraq witnessed a great coalition from both of Congress and the public opinion. Furthermore, there were many demonstrations which supported such an action.

Nevertheless, the hyper- partisanship that existed in 2001 soon began to change as a result of the heavy costs, and the failure of US troops to find any hidden weapons of mass destruction. This led to an immense opposition to the ongoing war, and demands to withdraw from the Iraqi soil increased. What came next was that US foreign policy decision-making returned to partisan differences, and President Bush faced a strong opposition in both houses and even from the public opinion who believed that this war was a mistake (Fortier and Ornstein 158).

Despite the fierce opposition to the Iraq war, the US foreign policy decision-making process witnessed the emergence of more domestic actors who tried to shape foreign policy toward their preferences. During the period from 9/11 attacks until the beginning of the Iraq War, interest groups gained many points of access to influence decision makers, both in support or opposition to the war. The post-1990s witnessed the creation of thousands of interest groups that used different means to ensure access to policy making. Besides, the events of 2001 supported those groups to find more gaps to influence important decisions, especially those who were in favour of invading Iraq.

Effective lobbying became the important measure to interest groups who found many occasions to interfere with huge numbers and great support. The procedures, techniques and occasions that helped interest groups to emerge in the contemporary era, and particularly from the 1990s until 2001, will be discussed next. We have specifically chosen this period in order to show how the ultimate change that occurred in the US during this period helped these domestic actors to enter the foreign policy environment and attain more power and easy access. Moreover, the post-2001 period witnessed the strong emergence of powerful interest groups that dominated the foreign policy scene and did not leave place to any other groups to share the struggle. In short, being an important character of US foreign policy, interest groups turned to achieve great importance both from the legislative actors and the public opinion too.

II. Interest Groups' Influence on Decision Makers

Being an essential component of American political life, interest groups entered US foreign policy decision-making to achieve different objectives. Their impact over decision makers was quite measurable, particularly within the domestic policy. These organized

groups were able to influence policy-makers, and former President Harry Truman was among the very active US politicians who recognized and noticed the importance of pressure groups in the US political life. He noted:

Significant amounts of power are wielded in American politics by those formations known as “Pressure groups”. Most of people recognize...that these groups dispose is evolved at every point in the institutions of government. Partly because the diversity of relationships between groups and governments is bewildering, we have no inclusive working perception of the general political role of ‘pressure groups’ or as I prefer to call the, interest groups.⁴

With respect to this, it is important to notice that the impact of interest groups on policy-making in general is difficult to measure due to the complexity of issues, as well as to the absence of scholarly attention to their role. Interest groups in the contemporary period have witnessed a sharp increase, especially within the foreign policy process simply because of the many circumstances that we mentioned in chapter one. The post-Cold War era brought a new pluralist approach in foreign policy, one in which interest groups remain an important actor the political approach.

The sheer growth of these organizations in foreign policy enabled them to take a wide range of issues and to talk to many state actors about foreign decisions. After the 1990s, interest groups saw an immense increase in shifting principles aimed to influence legislators. Furthermore, new and effective techniques were used by these organizations to gain access in the decision-making process. The policy issues that emerged after the 1990s were an important attribution to pressure groups to enhance their role and, hence, these powerful organizations remained at the top.

The 9/11 attacks were also very important to interest groups in the sense that they helped to increase their voice at the foreign policy level. The decision to invade Iraq was essential for these new groups to attain their power both, in opposition or in support of the war. Therefore, it is necessary to explain and justify the importance of interest groups in US foreign policy and their access to policymakers in the contemporary era. It is also significant to tackle some important issues that opened the way for lobbying interests to show how and why these groups succeeded in shaping the foreign policy decision-making.

II.1. Interest Groups Access to Policy Makers

Interest groups started to get their way in foreign affairs more assertively in the post-Cold War. This was, of course, due to a number of reasons that we have dealt with in chapter one. The contemporary era brought new thoughts and principles and new possibilities of access to US interest groups. These new ideas were the result of the changes in the country's foreign and domestic policies, in addition to the change in the locus of the decision-making process. The end of the Cold War and its consequences compelled people to be aware of the importance of their nation's foreign policy. Then, most of the public felt that they must participate in foreign policy to decide their future.

II.2. New Principles in the New Century

Indeed, after the end of the Cold War the US started to give more attention to domestic policy. However, at this point domestic and foreign policies intertwined and public opinion increasingly wanted to share the decision-making. The changing nature of issues furthered interest groups' mobilization, and thus, they were allowed to enter the

foreign policy arena. Their pretext was embodied within pluralism which began to shape US foreign policy, and widened the participation of interest groups in foreign policy.

These principles or characteristics as introduced by Robert G. Shutter⁵ are as follows:

- A much greater range of agencies within the executive branch involved in foreign policy, with the rise of economic agencies (Commerce, Treasury and U.S Trade Representative [USTR] of particular importance.
- A seeming reallocation of power within government, away from the executive branch and toward Congress.
- Much greater participation by non-governmental organizations and lobbying groups, which attempt to shape foreign policy to conform with their interests.
- Much less consensus within Congress and within the border public over foreign policy. (11)

What is remarkable is that among the most important foreign policy priorities in the contemporary period are the increasing actors in the foreign policy decision-making process. This fact led to the creation of different types of interest groups that shared the decision-making process as a part of its lobbying techniques. Besides to the new principles that were embodied in pluralism, interest groups found their way due to the many changes that characterised the political environment.

Briefly, because of the increasing importance of the domestic affairs interest groups were able, more than any time before, to act and share foreign policy decision-making at every point. And as it has been mentioned earlier, the reformation and widening role of Congressional committees also allowed time and space. Moreover, the relationship

between the legislative and the executive branches over foreign policy remained the norm (Shutter 12). As a result, these new principles increased the number, space, and time to interest groups to actively involve themselves in US foreign policy decision-making.

II.3. The Growth of Interest Groups from the 1990s Onward

From the 1990s onward, US interest groups started to grow due to many reasons, particularly security issues in addition to some changes in the social environment. The latter's contribution was remarkable because of the nature of the different classes in society, the different attitudes and importantly the different origins of Americans. This diversity forced individuals to join particular organizations that professed to defend their rights, and achieve their needs at the foreign policy level. This total new social atmosphere helped to boost the role of interest groups in US foreign policy.

According to the following estimate, the number of interest groups registered after the 1990s, and mainly those that dealt with foreign policy, was about 12.500 (Scott 175). Another evidence estimated the number of interest groups to have reached about 25,000 in the contemporary period, and a third source puts the total at 100.000 in the global area (Mc Comrick 63). What is of pivotal importance to us here is not the exact number but the increasing role of such new organizations that took the torch of foreign policy as its primary concern (63).

Nevertheless, this growth did not last long because of the nature of US foreign policy issues particularly after the terrorist attacks in 2001. The latter showed that the impact of interest groups and the new issues that existed before lost pride of place on the foreign policy agenda; and traditional security issues came to the fore front instead

(Wittkoft and Mc Cormick 19). As a result, despite their great numbers interest groups lost their livelihood issues (19).

Unlike before, foreign policy issues after the 9/11 attacks saw interest groups mobilization. For instance, the decision to invade Iraq and the subsequent failure in the war witnessed a wide activity and different organized groups were alienated, but still the number of these groups doubled increasingly. In this regard, Wittkoft R. Eugene and James Mc Cormick noted:

Some interest groups too lost the prominence that they had gained following the collapse of the Berlin wall and the implosion of the Soviet Union immediately after the events of 9/11, but the number and kind of foreign policy interest groups are currently greater and more vocal than in perhaps many recent periods, especially with American foreign policy failures in Iraq. (5)

This does not mean, however, that interest groups no longer engage in the foreign policy process. They do and always try to attribute policy agenda and decisions according to their favourite policies.

The growth of ethnic interest groups in the contemporary and their existence in the foreign and domestic policies realm is not new, but their impact and policy preferences have grown tremendously in the post-Cold War era which Yossi Shain called “multicultural foreign policy” (Qtd. in Ambrosio 8). Thus, ethnic identity groups are a logical outgrowth of US multiculturalism. Their aim, of course, is to lobby behind their mother countries. The increasing number of ethnic lobbying groups started enormously in the post-Cold War era because of the increase of domestic interest groups in the foreign policy level too. For this reason, their obvious growth in the 1980s was considered as a

clear sign that ethnic identity groups were playing a more significant role in US foreign policy and would continue to do so in the future. As a result, the end of the Cold War served as a catalyst for a profound change in the relationship between American national interests and the interests of American ethnic identity groups (7). Ethnic interest groups became strong rivals with the other groups as they sought to obtain power and interest.

Smith Tiny noted that the outset of the Cold War led to the rise of ethnic group internationalism; but unlike before ethnic organized groups wanted to advance the national interest of their mother countries so that they could gain more support (5). Examples of ethnic lobbies include the AIPAC (the American Israel Public Action Committee), CANF (the Cuban American National Foundation), and the Arab Lobby. We have mentioned only these three organizations because they are considered among the most influential ones.

Unsurprisingly, the role of some ethnic lobbies increased primarily after the 9/11 attacks, especially for those pro-Arab lobbies, but also increased support of anti-Arab lobbies like the AIPAC (The American Israel Public Affair Committee, or the Jewish Lobby). All in all, it is important to stress that the growth of interest groups in the contemporary period has become remarkable, and this can be attributed to the access points provided by the domestic and foreign policy processes as well as to the new roles of the key decision makers.

II.4. The Impact of Interest Groups on Foreign Policy Making

In addition to the domestic and foreign policy environments which helped interest groups to emerge and influence the foreign policy decision making, the new techniques and measures used by interest groups after the Cold War enabled them to have more

impact. These new procedures were established by interest groups in order to get their easy way to policy-makers, as well as to provide themselves with the necessary access. The new techniques came as a result of the interconnection between the domestic and foreign policies in addition to the development of many new means of communication in recent decades and the new perceptions of public opinion.

II.5. Interest Groups' New Techniques in the Contemporary Era

To get an easy access to decision makers, interest groups use a wide range of techniques. In addition to keeping the old techniques, they created new techniques using the new developments of science and technology to widen their opportunity to share and gain political power. Further, to implement these techniques pressure groups realized that they must be well funded. Shutter G. Robert summed up the new principles developed by interest groups in the contemporary era as follows:

- Be Active not Reactive: This first principle is regarded as an important parameter for the survival and success of an interest group, in addition it remains of a vital political power to the organization. The “domestication” of the American foreign policy process as Eric Uslaner called it after the Cold War provided Interest groups with the appropriate way to link their interests with both policies domestic and foreign (Wilson III 126). The gist of this important technique is that interest groups had to use what happens abroad to affect foreign policy in connection with the domestic one.

In other words, the post-Cold War era saw much more care of domestic politics after the US became the only remaining superpower. Thus, those interest groups with the attitudes to affect foreign policy had to involve and push policymakers, tackle the issues before they arrive at the Congressional or presidential floors (as we know that interest

groups provide decision makers with information about any legislation and most of the time influence them when drafting bills or taking the decision). For this reason, being active, not reactive in itself would create and shape policies before they occur in the foreign policy process.

- The Message: To affect policy-makers, interest groups must choose a clear message.

The significance of the message is too important to decision makers as well as to the interest group. It is so, because on the one hand it can interpret their points of view concerning the decision; and on the other hand, if the message was delivered easily and if it came temporarily with the event that leads to the decision making, it would succeed to maintain the interest groups' objectives.

- Amplifying the Message: In amplifying the message; most interest groups are subjected to gain a wide media coverage. Media remains the initial support of interest groups to define their objectives toward a certain issue. If the organization knows how to deliver its message to the public opinion, it will gain too much public support which in turn affects the decision-maker to follow the wishes of the interest group. Media coverage is a necessary point to an interest group because it affords them with the necessary support to advance their issue from the public and also to sway the decision makers. In order to amplify the message interest groups use also other ways like outside lobbying or grass roots to sway local officials and government. Grass roots use many techniques to gather public and decision makers' support.

- Entry Points: The best target provided to interest groups through entry points is Congress. The Post-Cold War era and the Congressional changes which widened Congressional staff and committees enabled interest groups with various entry points, in addition to the long processes of decision-making after Congressional assertion of power

over foreign affairs. The role of this process, in which many committees were created, is to review any bill before it becomes a law. However, this process will take time, and thus, interest groups can interfere and seek influence. Regarding this process, interest groups and their lobbies have a long period to participate in the decision-making by providing Congressional staffers with the necessary information. This is why Senator John F.

Kennedy once noted that:

Lobbyists are in many ways expert technicians and capable of explaining complex and difficult subjects in a clear, understandable fashion. They engage in personal discussions with members of Congress in which they can explain in detail the reasons for position they advocate...because our Congressional representation is based on geographical boundaries, the lobbyists speak for various economic, commercial and other functional interests of this country serve a very useful purpose and have assumed an important role in the legislative process. (Qtd. in Smith et al. 2)

Through the new techniques discovered in the new era, interest groups buy access points to themselves by using fund raising or Political Action Committees (PAC). This is not something new in the process of allowing interest groups new entry points, but the new thing is that PAC contribution which is increasing each year despite the severe regulation from the government. PAC contributions are provided as donations which can be divided into types as Professor Thomas L. Brunel noted in his work on “The Relationship between Political Parties and Interest Groups”: ‘sincere’ since they serve the purpose of helping interest groups gain access and ‘strategic’ since they give interest groups the ability to control the seat (684). This means that the interest group can provide

sincere donations without getting access. While within strategic donations, the interest group raises funds in return of access and power in the political party.

The relationship between Congressmen and interest groups could not be measured because lobbyists have special ways to achieve Congressional access, particularly by developing personal relationships. This strategy is not new since it had existed along with the existence of interest groups. They offer decision makers with special gifts, invite them to expensive restaurants; provide them with free trips and staying in luxurious hotels in beautiful places.

Even the strong demands for lobbying regulation did not prevent lobbies from providing themselves new key entries to reach Congressional staffers. The latest lobbying regulation came in 2006 as a result of the lobbyist Jack Abramoff's Scandal who was convicted of defrauding his clients with expensive trips and golfing trips to Scotland, and the Congressmen of California 50th District who accepted \$2.6 million in price of his contribution. Among the demands of severe regulations as advanced by William Storey one can invoke the following:

- A ban on members of Congress, or their staff, accepting gifts or meals from lobbyists,
- Disclosure of who paid for travel,
- Not allowing former members of Congress to use private areas within the building such as the gym which present opportunities for discreet lobbying,
- More detailed disclosure of lobbyist activities, especially expenditure,
- Heavier penalties for breaking the rules (216). But still, despite the heavy demands on regulating lobbyists they remain essential in the decision-making partially because they represent the best link between individuals and their society.

Foreign policy decision-making is not only the responsibility of Congress but also of the Executive branch as well. An entry point here is also offered to interest groups at the Executive level within which foreign policy decisions are taken in the cabinet. Local and state government officials are also important targets to interest groups because they can advise their Congressional delegation toward a particular foreign policy issue. In short, it can be said that the new entry points and the ability to choose the target from decision makers provided interest groups with new access in foreign policy.

- Strategies: The new technique for strategies is the ability of key decision makers of special interest representatives to choose the right decisions. As a result, interest groups delegate skilful representatives and send them to help decision makers issue the right decisions. Whenever there is a certain foreign policy issue at stake, interest groups have to define their policies, objectives and strategies either to support or to be against. Within each one of these they will try to impose and influence their favourite policies. Defining strategies is basically important to decision makers who need interest groups to make their decisions work.

The way to improve this is through affording interest groups with the necessary access and they will in turn advance decision makers and their policies. In the contrary, if the legislator refuses to respond to the interest group demands, he/she will face opposition which may cost him/her too much. An example of such phenomenon happened in 2006 when the Republican Senator Mike DeWine of Ohio opposed certain legislation of a particular interest group. The later punished him and contributed to his defeat during his re-election (Storey112). Generally, the choice of the right strategies to deal with foreign affairs would enhance the ability to increase the interest groups' chance of swaying decision makers as well as public opinion.

Although the new parameters, used by interest groups to affect foreign policy decision-making, offered a priced strategic success because the contemporary era has witnessed a sharp increase in interest groups' ability to change foreign policy directions at the Congressional level, these techniques made legislators afraid of the representatives of those organized groups to the extent that most of the times they rely on their information to draft legislation and on their contribution for re-election. Nevertheless, interest groups remain the best feature that shapes a pluralist society.

II.6. Interest Groups' Influence on Decision Makers

The impact of interest groups on the US foreign policy decision-making is not an easy thing to be measured because of the lack of a scholarly attention to this segment of society which tends to influence foreign policy directions. Our next endeavour is to show how these organizations attempt to shape foreign policy decisions toward their aims and concerns inside the political process.

The post-Cold War period revealed another truth about interest groups. Their sheer growth and wide-open new techniques showed that they were now more powerful than any time, able to affect foreign policy decisions even though the matter dealt with the US national security. Several factors that contributed to the increase of the role of organized interest groups were mentioned before, starting from the nature of foreign policy decisions, the locus of decision making, reformations in Congress, and the increasing of trading issues (James 177). These occurrences helped pressure groups to sway their interests with different techniques.

The policy influence of interest groups in the contemporary period deals mainly with trading issues. These policies witnessed much growth after the Cold War, one in which

the United States became a member of each association (177). The debates over trading issues NAFTA during the Clinton administration saw the emergence of business interest groups. The dominant and powerful interest groups are business interest groups simply because they are the best financed and well developed with key technological resources. Robert Falkner shares this evidence about the power of business interest groups and says:

Business of course is not the sole influencing factors in the making of U.S foreign policy, but it does occupy a privileged position among the variety of interest groups involved in the process because of its command over “technological power” [he further justify that] also through its key role in giving direction to investment and technological innovation, business is able to set parameters for the regulatory option available to policy makers.⁸

It must be said here that business interest groups are classified in the first range within interest groups. Several cases, mentioned in the US foreign policy agenda, were under control and influence of business interest groups which affected and shaped policies to their interests, before these policies went to committees for debate (Ellis 3). In other words, Congress and the President compete for the first move in foreign policy while interest groups act on their special interests by promoting support from Congressional counterparts and the general public (3). In this logic, it is significant to deal with business interest groups’ influence on US contemporary foreign policy-making in various contexts.

II.7. The Impact of Interest Groups on US Foreign Policy toward China

The case of US foreign policy toward China and how to normalize US-Sino relationships witnessed the emergence of a set of interest groups, each with a particular

foreign policy objective. The establishment of new trading policies with the Most Favoured Nations, and the advocacy of the Sino-American relationships were of vital interest during the Clinton administration. Various domestic interest groups within the societal context actively tried to influence US policy toward China. These groups can be divided into two types: economic interest groups and human rights groups (Rourke and Clark 2006). China's debate was the time issue during the Clinton administration; both opponents and supporters used different ways to interpret their visions which dominated the media with its different types. Both views dominated the media reports for the 60 days during which the house deliberated on this issue (Erikson 46).

Different lobbying efforts were engaged during the debates over China in which two opposing views existed. Supporters wanted to increase and normalize trade relations with China; mainly business groups which supported the opinion to give China membership in the World Trade Organization. Therefore, business organizations like the US Chamber of Commerce and Business Roundtable spent more than \$12 million to target members of Congress in a biggest business lobbying campaign since the NAFTA was passed in 1993 to reach a Permanent Normal Trade Relation (PNTR) (Zhiquan 82). The dream of business interest groups in the case of China was great as they saw it an open era to wealth and free trade since it had emerged as a great large market in global affairs in addition to the evolution of crucial stability and prosperity to both nations. In this essence, China PNTR status may well be one of the most significant Congressional votes of the first half of the 21st century.

However, the opposition to PNTR with China was conducted by human rights and religious groups like: Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and The International Campaign for Tibet and the US Conference of Catholic Bishops (Rourke and Clark 209).

These groups opposed PNTR relations simply because they believed that it would cause income disparity, child labour and environmental degradation. They also saw China as a country unable to preserve human rights conditions due to its allegations of espionage of US nuclear weapons technology, illegal campaign finance and its long-standing political strife with Tibet and Taiwan (209). Moreover, human rights groups were joined also by labour activists who saw PNTR with China and its membership of WTO as a mistake because it would create domestic competition and a loss of thousands of jobs. Labour interest groups' activists like Teamsters Union and the AFL-CIO led a massive campaign to oppose China's membership to the WTO and described it as a "grave mistake" (Zhiqum 85).

The China's issue involved many interest groups' mobilizations that lobbied Congress either to normalize or cancel relations with China. The results of such lobbying efforts ended the struggle to the powerful. Thus, in 1999 Congress decided to normalize relations with China and allowed it to be a member of the WTO by a vote sailed through the House with a margin of 260-170 in favour of NTR (Normal Trade Relations) extension (Erikson 46). After that decision, it was established that interest groups' participation in foreign policy decision-making became of vital importance. In fact, our hypothesis that interest groups yield power in Washington especially within Congress is justified through China's case. In addition, the contemporary foreign policy is also shaped by different domestic actors within which interest groups are the crucial part.

Another case that saw immense lobbying efforts from both business and agricultural interest groups concerned the US and Chile trading issues. Powerful business groups especially those who are involved in the production and sale of military goods also yield much power at foreign policy issues. These groups are a source of danger to the national

security policy in particular if the country's foreign policy does not fit their interests (Mc Keever and Davies 334).

Business military elites took profit from the military spending to increase their pressure, created new jobs for individuals and used their money to help Congressmen being re-elected so that all benefited in the end. Taking this into account, interest groups, as Denzau and Munger explained, "provide resources in response to policies" (Qtd. in Deardorf and Hall 7). For example, during the Cold War years an estimated number proved that one analysis of defence spending concluded that 1 in 10 jobs in the US relied either directly or indirectly on federal defence spending (Smith et al. 634).

The case of Chile in 2002 illustrated that foreign trade is not immune from interest groups' influence. Trading interest groups like the National Association of Manufactures powerfully lobbied Congress to pass a trading agreement between the two countries. The lack of such agreement between the United States and Chile resulted in a great sum of money of about \$800 million in exports. Congress, however, responded to lobbying efforts on July 2003 by enacting a bilateral agreement which reduced the tariff on tractors and other machinery items (Qtd. in Smith et al. 634). In sum, it can be said that business interest groups hold too much power which is related to their ability to pressure Congress to enact legislations that would protect their interests. And as illustrated in the cases provided above, they are also important and powerful.

II.8. The Impact of Interest Groups on US Funds to Combat AIDS in Africa

The case of the US funds aid to Africa to fight the virus HIV or Aids became an important one in the Congressional debate within the George W. Bush's administration. But at that time, it was not business interest groups which took the challenge but were

rather religious organizations or Christian organizations. They took up a great burden to improve and increase US funds to those developing countries in Africa to fight mortal diseases like AIDS, malaria and other illnesses (“Foreign Policy ...”635). This issue had been introduced during the Clinton administration but did not gain too much influence due to the weak pressure from those groups at that time.

Different figures joined the rally in order to gather sympathized individuals and groups to lobby Congress in order to help African people from such dangerous diseases. In February 2002, sympathetic religious heads like Franklin Graham, the son of evangelist Billy Graham and founder of the Charity Samaritan's Purse; were among the supporters of this case and expressed their sympathy toward Africans who suffered from these diseases. Conservative politicians also took part in this case. Senator Jeff Sessions held two Congressional hearings to explain the danger of the spread of these illnesses, and Senator Bill Frist also sponsored a bill offering millions of dollars to stop the spread of such viruses between mothers and children. Key legislative officials in the George Bush administration also were supporters of this pressure as chief of staff Josh Bolten and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice (635).

Under this strong pressure, exerted by different interest groups, President George W. Bush announced his country's sponsorship of over \$1 billion in aid to African countries in help to end widespread AIDS. In addition, in 2008 the figure exceeded to add another \$4 billion for the same funds (636). However, the heavier extension of the funding levels under different pressures in recent years was among Bush's plans to counter terrorist countries, which was one of his key policies.

Accordingly, this case indicates how much powerful interest groups are in their efforts to impact foreign policies. It also justifies that interest groups can use different

techniques even though they can reach key President's advisors to seek influence and sympathy toward their cases. In addition, they can even influence the President himself to help them. This occurred when President Bush expressed his moral support in AIDS funds to Africa. In short, the impact of interest groups depends on their ability to advance and gather policy sympathizers in addition to the nature of the issue itself. The case of African AIDS can affect any legislature since it touches moral and strategic policies on foreign relations.

II.9. Think Tanks' Impact on US Foreign Policy

Think tanks or advisory groups are another kind of interest groups. They seek to influence American Foreign and domestic policy processes by providing decision makers with the necessary advice concerning policy issues. The rising influence of think tanks came simultaneously with the rising influence of interest groups. In other words, after the Cold War the impact of think tanks on foreign policy decision-making was remarkable and was similar to that of interest groups. Think tanks offer a great contribution to interest groups due to their critical thinking about policy decision-making and due to their publications, conferences, and research programmes. This is so, simply because think tanks yield a number of powerful institutes formed to obtain help and advice to decision makers.

To speak about the assistance think tanks provide to policy makers, it is necessary to say that, as their name indicates, their essential role is to offer advice to certain policy makers. This advice is the output of dual research and thought of member policies who are mainly political scientists and experts within the realm of policy making. Offering advice to policy makers is of vital importance, since think tanks interfere in policy making

processes at earliest stages, and/or rather when the matter is introduced and strayed to gather information (Abelson 127). This is, however, their difference from interest groups which appear after the policy is introduced and debated. At this stage, they interfere and seek pressure just a little time before the drafting of the legislation.

Research is necessary to any think tank to effect effectively. Different institutions registered in Washington as think tanks and work to obtain certain policy matters. But it is also important to notice that the role of think tanks is difficult to measure because of their ambiguous participation to shape public opinion and decision-makers, too. The Brookings Institution, the Heritage Foundation, the Hoover Institution, the American Enterprise Institute, the Centre for Strategic and the New York based Council on Foreign Relations (CRF) are examples of think tanks. International studies are also examples of think tanks whose primary role is to search and provide advice to policy makers.

But unlike interest groups, think tanks appear on the first steps of decision making. In this respect, Abelson E. Donald⁷ writes:

Given the emphasis that interest groups place on influencing governmental policies, it is expected that they will draw on wide range of lobbying tactics to achieve their goals...[he added] By contrast, the objectives and priorities of think tanks are far less predictable and, as a consequence, are not always easy to discern. (128)

Accordingly, the effect of think tanks is hard to measure and their points of access cannot be predicted like interest groups.

From a historical perspective, however, the impact of think tanks was predictable. For example, after the end of the First World War they provided President Woodrow Wilson with advice and contributed in his fourteen points' peace plan. In addition, they

were essential actors and advisors in bringing the idea of the League of Nations to maintain peace in the world. Furthermore, after the Second World War the Council on Foreign Relations brought the idea of policy containment to the Soviet Communist aggression –the idea was introduced by George Kennan who was a member and State Department official in the Council of Foreign Relations (CFR)- (“Foreign Policy ...” 634). Hence, we can say that during and after the Cold War, think tanks powerfully emerged and participated well in advising political decision makers.

Another example of think tanks participation in political decision making occurred in 2007, when the Brookings Institution organized an eight-day visit to Iraq in order to testify the military position of the United States. Their results were of vital importance since they drew attention to many improvements that numerous observers had overlooked. And because it was written by critics of President George Bush before the Iraq invasion, the opinion piece had a dramatic influence on Washington debates about the war (635). Nevertheless, what is important about think tanks and foreign policy is that their role and means of advising decision makers remain an essential part in legislation. It is also so difficult to imagine the process of policy making without think tanks important research and proposals.

As far as interest groups and think tanks are concerned, they divide the policy making operation. The latter is subjected to interest groups at the first stage, then to the think tanks when it comes to debate. As a result, it is essential to say that interest groups with their different types are involved in the decision-making process from its beginning to its end.

II.10. The Impact of Ethnic Lobbies on US Foreign Policy

As noted earlier, the growth of interest groups with foreign policy concerns after the 1970s was remarkable. One important type of these groups was ethnic lobbies. The word ethnicity is not something new in the United States as the country is a nation of immigrants and ethnic diversity. But the emergence of ethnic interest groups in foreign policy brought new advantages to the decision making process. Like all interest groups, ethnic lobbies try to influence foreign policy toward their mother country, or simply influence US Foreign policy toward a particular issue to take a hard line against other states.

The impact of ethnic interest groups on US foreign policy-making witnessed an immense increase after the Cold War. Even before this, they yielded an important influence which was almost on domestic policy. The best case of ethnic interest groups' lobbying took place in 1964 when the civil rights movement reached its momentum. The role of ethnic interest groups in foreign policy was generally evident when some ethnic interest groups tried to support their country of origin or pressure the United States foreign policy toward the national self-determination of some states.

Yossi Shain asserts, among other things, that some ethnic groups have been able to pressure US leaders to adopt supportive policies toward national-self-determination movements. He also contends that US ethnic groups often influence which side the US will support. According to him the Croatian-American lobby had an impact on that US decision to recognize the independence of Croatia in 1992 (66).

Furthermore, political scientist John Shea claims the same opinion about the power of ethnic groups in US foreign policy. His view was about the Greek lobby which succeeded in preventing the United States from extending full diplomatic relations to

Macedonia in 1994 by convincing President Clinton to reverse his opinion (Qtd. in Ambrosio 3). Lucio Abrocio also shares the same opinion and argues that the efforts of the Irish-American interest groups were fruitful in pushing the Clinton administration to engage in the Northern Ireland dispute, which dogged US British Irish relations for decades (Qtd. in Ambrosio 3). Thus, again pressure from an ethnic interest group could reinforce an action to a dispute that has existed for decades.

Another example of powerful ethnic interest groups is the Cuban-American ethnic lobby which greatly contributed to the US policy toward Cuba during the Cold War and during the Cuban Missile Crisis. However, this ethnic group tried to exert much pressure during the economic embargo imposed on Cuba in 1962, and did not succeed to end the embargo until 1996; but the relations between the two countries are still at stake (4). Essentially, it clearly appears from the three cases we have reflected above that ethnic interest groups do impact US foreign policy in particular if the case advances the interests of their country of origin.

Thus, the influence yielded by interest groups whether business, labour, religious or ethnic is growing steadily and this is basically due to the simplicity and plurality of the US political decision-making. As a result, the domestication of the US foreign policy was fruitful to those organized groups. It enabled them to seek relationships with decision makers, to involve pressure, and to get access. The 9/11 attacks also made many groups involved and enabled them to share different views about the source of these attacks, in addition to mobilizing the reaction.

Contrary to the post-Cold War period when interest groups were not able to interfere because of the difficulty that characterized the security of the American nation, the 9/11 attacks did not prevent interest groups from getting inside the policy-making and offering

advice. Once again, interest groups proved that even with the security issues, they could influence the public and convince it with their views. The decision over the invasion of Iraq has also seen much debate among different organizations, inside those who favoured it and those who were against. Along this process, it was revealed that the national security issues and military engagement became subjected to interest groups' pressure.

The Iraq War portrayed the best example of interest groups lobbying and its outcome could justify their pressure and power among policy decision makers. It also provided a wide open agenda to ethnic interest groups to get involved by offering different tactics. Ethnic interest groups were regarded as the first influential organizations due to their powerful lobbying strategies. However, we do not mean all ethnic groups because certain ethnic lobbies were rejected especially after the 9/11 attacks, and particularly after condemning some states as being responsible for that catastrophe.

Third World ethnic interest groups like the Arab Lobby were not able to seek pressure or gain access like other interest groups. However, such lobbies were skilful and able to get influence within important issues like international aid, international trade and other issues ("Foreign Policy..." 633). In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, many things changed in US foreign policy agenda. The latter concentrated on the fight of terrorism and any person, state or organization which may have any relations with terrorism.

Nevertheless, the attacks proved to be very positive to some ethnic lobbies. The American Israeli Public Affair Committee (AIPAC) is among the first ranked lobbies in the US foreign policy due to its position and strength (Scott188). The 2001 events paved the way to the Israel lobby and its supporters to seek influence and realize the Jewish dreams in the Middle East. As a result, the US foreign policy agenda took a new dimension under the pressure of this powerful American Israeli lobby.

It can be deduced that the domestication of the US foreign policy after the Cold War led to immense changes. Emerging as the only superpower, Washington turned its sight to domestic policy. This priority increased the role of domestic actors especially after Congress reasserted its power. This fact gave time and space to interest groups to enhance their participation in the foreign policy decision-making.

The events of 2001, however, were a real strike to US policy makers. They unfortunately proved that the US national security was under danger from outside actors. Unlike the Clinton administration, the Bush government faced great challenges. Intensive pressure, at home and abroad, put the President in a dilemma that obliged him and his advisors to be more cautious. As a consequence, under the influence of some policy-makers the Bush administration took a new dimension in foreign affairs: Washington redefined its grand strategy and policy preferences, and changed the course of American foreign policy.

The new foreign policy agenda defined many new strategic issues. The latter selected specific targets to be fought through the War on Terrorism. This war was waged in order to punish those who were responsible for the attacks as well as to prevent any future terrorist acts that may harm people and nations. A group of rogue states or the 'axis of evil' as President Bush called them were the first targets. The war on Iraq was the ultimate action which was undertaken to solve the problem. Being suspected of owning Weapons of Mass Destruction made Iraq a subject of regime change and democracy promotion; a set of policies that aimed to rid the Iraqi people from the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein and his allies from Al-Qaeda.

The redefinition of the US foreign policy priorities did not mean that interest groups would not participate in any matter that deals with the security of the country. Their role

was remarkable and fruitful. They exemplified the best connection between the United States and the public. Most of interest groups dealing with foreign policy attempted to convince the public with the legitimacy of the war being the only solution both to end terrorism in the world and to cut up the important sources of Al-Qaeda connections. Interest groups played a great role after the 9/11 attacks. They served as policy initiators to the aims of the President and Congress. By contrast, not all of them gained the appropriate access to policy making since they differ in the kind of power and issues.

All that said, the next move is to deal with the role and impact of interest groups during the US War on Iraq. We will attempt to uncover the real role played by organized groups, their efforts to reach policy makers and influence foreign policy during the Iraq War, as well as their policy outcomes. In short, we shall assess their role in the foreign policy process, and reveal the role and influence of other lobbies which had an impact on decision makers. All of these queries and others will be dealt within the next chapter, in which the Iraq War has been selected as an example to assess the role and impact of interest groups before, during, and after the end of the war. The period assessed extends from 2003 to 2008, and was the period that surrounded the Iraq War under George W. Bush administration.

Endnotes

¹The demise of text book congress has its historical roots. Text book congress means that foreign policy bills were taken inside a small number of senior members and few chairs of the various committees concerned with foreign policy. However, after congressional resurgence due to the Vietnam and Watergate scandal, congress expanded its committees and senior members too, in which many of the latter share foreign policy decisions. On more details on the demise of text book congress, see: Lindsay M. James. *Congress and the Politics of US Foreign Policy*. Baltimore and London: Hopkins University Press, 1994. Print.

²President's Truman distribution of power within foreign policy became more familiar and has been adapted to the United States foreign policy making in the post 9/11 attacks. President Truman had encountered this distribution of power in the foreign policy process with the participation of domestic actors, but it seems not useful until the fall of 2001. For further reading on the case of US foreign policy redistribution after 2001 and the role of each process involved in the decision making process see: Cameron Eraser, *US Foreign Policy after the Cold War. Global Hegemon or Reluctant Sheriff*. 2nd ed. Routledge, 2005. Print.

³Partisan differences returned as soon as the heavy costs of the Iraq war emerged and the failure of finding weapons of mass destruction. For further reading see: Fortier, John C and Ornstein, Norman J. *The George W. Bush Presidency: An Early Assessment*. E.d. Greenstein, Fred I. The Hopkins University Press. Print.

⁴President Truman is among the first earliest political scientists who had studied the phenomenon of interest groups in details, their approaches, techniques and theories in his book *The Government Process*. He viewed them as essential part in decision making and

they should yield more political power in order to promote benefits of all individuals within society. For further reading on this point see: Grant Jordan and William A. Maloney: *Democracy and Interest Groups. Enhancing Participation?* Palgrave Mc Milan, 2007. Print.

⁵Historians and political scientists claim that the United States foreign policy is based upon a number of theories in which may define the actions of decision makers and classify those actors according to certain theories. But in the post-Cold War era many new concepts emerged on the poetical arena and particular school of thoughts explained the process according to particular vision. To know more about these theories see: Robert G. Shutter: *US Foreign Policy toward China: An Introduction to the Role of Interest Groups*. Rowman and Littlefield, 2008. Print.

⁶John.F.Kennedy wanted to state that lobbying is an essential part in Congressional decisions and they are of vital importance because of the role they play to advice and help decision makers drafting their bills. For a more detailed reading about the different ways of lobbying process see: Smith, S. Steven, Robert, Jason and Wielen, Ryan Vander. *The American Congress*. 3rd ed. Department of Political Science and Weidenbaun Centre on the Economy, Government and Public Policy. Washington University in St. Louis, 2003. Print.

⁷Robert Falkner has conducted a research to improve the power provided to business interest groups to exert influence on foreign policy. He also conducted statistics and theories about the role of environmental interest groups are able to yield more power than environmental ones. For further reading on this issue see: Falkner, Robert. "Business Conflict and International Environmental Policy, Climate and Biodiversity". *The*

Environment-International Relations and US Foreign Policy. Ed. Harris Paul G. George
Town University Press. Washington DC. 2001, Print.

⁸Indeed, think tanks remain something ambiguous since most of the political
scientists found it difficult to detect or to measure. They rather, relate it to the theoretical
approaches as well as theories of policy making. Donald E. Abelson, *A Capitol Hill Idea*.
Mc Gill-Queen's Press MQUP, 2006. Print.

Chapter Three

The Role of Interest Groups in the US Decision to Invade Iraq

For many years the US foreign policy has been subjected to different challenges which brought the country into a new era out from the state of isolationism. With the turn of the 21st century, US foreign policy developed new procedures to deal with international relations. Leaving the policy of isolationism due to its involvement in the first and second World Wars as well as the Vietnam and Cold Wars, the country adopted new preferences and directions. All these shifts in foreign policy directions brought forward new issues and new actors over to the policy making procedure. Up to the policy of containment and the big loss in Vietnam, the US felt its internal homeland security unbalanced but not to a great value.

The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 were horrific enough to lead the country to reshape its foreign policy initiatives toward a global fighting of terrorism. The new foreign policy agenda in the post 9/11 took the challenge to fight global terrorism. Acting as a self-defender, the United States redefined its foreign policy priorities to promoting peace and democracy in addition to acting pre-emptively in order to prevent any future attacks. Accordingly, George W. Bush administration declared war on terrorist groups and rogue states to put an end to all terrorists' actions and their cruel ambitions.

Reports of new established intelligence committees to investigate the attacks found that a number of threatening countries which were called 'rogue states' were directly or indirectly involved in acts of terrorism . These states were named so because it was proved that they have connections with terrorists belonging to Al Qaeda networks. They

include: Iraq, Iran, Syria, Afghanistan and North Korea, states which ranked at the top of a list containing dangerous countries in the world.

Defeating the Taliban regime reinforced the United States' conviction to engage in another war against Iraq. The latter, as it was argued, was a must to make a regime change because of its possession of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and its assistance to Al-Qaeda networks. Key officials in the Bush administration, the most enthusiastic ones, were convinced of the necessity to wage this war claiming the pretext of the responsibility of the Iraqi regime over the 9/11 attacks and its connection to global terrorism.

Political analyses seemed to indicate that the decision to invade Iraq was the outcome of the neo-conservative ideology that prevailed even before 2001. The 2003 Iraq invasion carried many hidden purposes which were not openly stated and were mainly strategic benefits for the United States and its allies. Essentially, the Iraqi war was fought in order to gain control of the world largest oil supplies, dominate the Middle East and protect Israel.

At that time, the US foreign policy was basically subjected to different policy actors inside and outside the government. Interest groups as it was already stated tended to hold great power in the foreign policy decision-making, especially from the end of the Cold War up to the 9/11 attacks and the Iraq war. Obviously, interest groups played a very important role in the US foreign policy during the process of the decision-making to invade Iraq.

The main intention of the present chapter is to examine the impact of interest groups on the US foreign policy decision-making taking the Iraq war as a case study. It also deals with all the circumstances and outcomes that led to the Iraq war, in which interest groups proved that they really yielded enough power upon the foreign policy decision-making,

particularly the Israel Lobby: one of the most influential ethnic interest groups in the United States. It will be also illustrated how the 9/11 attacks led the US to call for a regime change in Iraq as well tracking all the key actors who were found responsible for those acts; taking into account public opinion perceptions to show how the Bush administration was able to convince the public with the legitimacy of this war.

Furthermore, particular emphasis will be put on the Israeli lobby efforts to shape US policy toward Iraq and pushed it to act pre-emptively to prevent future attacks and to promote democracy in the region. However, insuring Israel's security and many other hidden purposes were crucial factors that led to the invasion that was planned a long time ago.

I. US Foreign Policy after 2001 and the Decision to Invade Iraq

The US foreign policy after the 9/11 attacks have been shaped by different changes, all intended to protect the nation from future attacks. The post-2001 foreign policy led the George W. Bush's administration to pass certain measures and reforms so as to expand safety measures within the national security. Toward that purpose, new intelligence agencies were created to widen US investigations on those responsible for the attacks and in order to face future challenges.

Yet, after the attacks, President George W. Bush went on condemning AL Qaeda and some states in the Middle East as being behind such a catastrophe and for harbouring terrorists. Thus, it was estimated that those states needed immediate change to end terrorism and get rid of their tyrant rulers. Iraq was among those states which investigations concluded as being connected to terrorists and owing a nuclear programme. Indeed, within a short period of time, the United States declared war on Iraq.

Despite these fabricated reasons which led to the invasion of Iraq, the Bush administration succeeded in convincing public opinion with its legitimacy. However, after the war took place and the disastrous damage it left, new realities were revealed. The invasion was the outcome of an immense pressure on the President's cabinet as well as the impact of the pro-Jewish officials in the government.

I.1. The Post 9/11 US Foreign Policy

The circumstances that characterized the beginning of the 21st century and the Bush administration brought a new world order in which the United States became the dominant power in the world. During the first months of his administration, George Bush directed his policies toward domestic affairs. However, the unexpected 9/11 attacks led to the emergence a new world order in which new foreign policy issues were at stake. The attacks were so dangerous that they led to a new policy direction which basically aimed to protect the American nation from future attacks.

The immediate response to the attacks was the creation of new homeland security policy in order to widen the protective measures of the state. As a result, it was declared that the first priority of the US foreign policy was to keep its peace and security by acting pre-emptively against threatening states. By reshaping American counterterrorist policies, Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld presented on 31 January 2002 six transformational goals which he had established earlier to keep the peace and defend freedom in the 21st century. They were mentioned by Jarvis Pal Grave in his book, *Times of Terror* in the following order:

- First, to protect the US homeland and our bases overseas.
- Second, to project and sustain power in distant theatres.

- Third, to deny our enemies sanctuary, making sure they know that no corner of the world is remote enough, no means is fast enough to protect them from our reach.

- Fourth, to protect our information networks from attack.

- Fifth, to use information technology to link up different kinds of US forces so that they can in fact fight jointly.

- And sixth, to maintain unhindered access to space and protect our space capabilities from enemy attack (76). This declaration and others were part of US policy intended to protect the country from future attacks and to show that the responsibility of the United States is to investigate and punish the doers.

Initially, the response to the attacks was to condemn Al Qaeda network and the Middle East. The Bush administration was totally convinced, even before doing any kind of investigations, that Al Qaeda under the leadership of Bin Laden was the only responsible over these attacks and that it had to pay the price. Starting from this ‘magic’ evidence, the United States started to prepare itself to a great war against terrorism in which the Middle East was the only target.

A few days later, the American public ceded to the government rhetoric and became also totally convinced that Al Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden were responsible for the attacks. This conviction became obvious after Bin Laden’s declaration on the Arabian News Channel ‘Aljazeera’ in which he gave the impression that he was extremely happy about the destruction he had done to the US; stating that he and “Al Qaeda networks had organized these attacks” (Eraser 141). After this confession, the hypotheses of the Bush administration happened to be true, and as a result, new measures had to govern the US foreign policy. Thus, in the post 9/11 the Bush administration took on the direction toward the fighting of global terrorism. The aim of that war was to search for those countries and

persons that hid terrorists and helped them. Basically, the axis of evil and the most wanted 'Bin Laden' became the world's unwavering evil that must be fought from that time onward.

I.2. US Declaration of the War on Terror

The US immediate decision was to wage a war against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in order to put an end to the tyranny of fanatical Muslims there and also to try to capture Bin Laden and destroy Al Qaeda bases. Many efforts were made by the US military forces to overthrow the Taliban regime in 2001, but all were doomed to failure. Thus, using a military campaign became part of the country's immediate response after the 9/11. In this regard, many scholars and political scientist like Beverly Milton, Edwards Hinchcliffee and Peter Hinchcliffee argued that the attacks were mainly the result of anti-Americanism, which had been growing for many decades. They also stated that "the 9/11 attacks brought and revived a 'clash of civilizations' between the West and Islam facing each other across an ever-widening chasm" (Hinchcliffee et al. 122).

They portrayed this conflict as a traditional growing evil in which Muslims could not believe that they were not controlling the world ideas, it was only Americanism. Indeed, as the Italian Prime Minister Berlusconi declared "we must be aware of the superiority of our civilizations, a system that has guaranteed well-being respect for human rights and –in contrast with Islamic countries- respect for religious and political rights" (122).

Moreover, President Bush further added that the war against terrorism was not the responsibility of the US only but that the whole world. He argued: "This is not, however just America's fight. And what is at stake is not just America's freedom. This is the

world's fight, this is civilization's fight. This was the fight of all those who believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom" (122). Furthermore, the noticeable cause for anti-Americanism was defined as the only pressure that led Al Qaeda to organize those attacks. Retired air force General Chuck Boyd noted several causes that bore anti-Americanism sentiment in four points which he considered as the leading points behind the attack against the United States.

First, a lingering hatred in some parts of the world as result of anti-American propaganda during the Cold War. Second, US support for corrupt and/or anti-democratic regimes. Third, the leading American role in international institutions that 'dominated the globalized world' such as the IMF, WTO and World Bank. Fourth, the antipathy to the global influence of American culture (Eraser 140). In the wake of all of these events the United States needed to redefine its policy toward the Middle East or at least toward Islamic countries.

The origin of the war against terrorism was not a new notion on US foreign policy agenda. It rather originated 20 years earlier during the Reagan Administration. However, the war on terror was just described as an ideological conflict between civilized and non-civilized nations, and also a fight between modernism and barbarianism. This is typically what the linguist Noam Chomsky advanced. The latter claimed that both the Reagan and Bush administrations shared the same foreign policy attitude which was the confrontation of terrorism.

President Bush added a more violent attitude to the notion of terrorism in which he considered those who opposed Americanism as plagues. He believed that it was a duty to change their behaviour as well as their attitudes before they could act once again against Americanism using terrorism. He described it as "the evil scourge of terrorism", a plague

spread by “depraved opponents of civilization itself” in a “return to barbarism in the modern age”. The campaign was directed to a particularly virulent form of the plague: state-directed international terrorism (Chomsky 2).

Consequently, the war on terror during the Cold War was conducted under the policy of containment, but it was renewed after 2001 under the policy of pre-emptive strikes which involved military campaigns. At the outset, as Bush argued, the fight became the civilization’s fight in a modern way and the attacks were just like an assault on the American people and American way of life. This will lead us to conclude that from an American point of view the war on terror was the result of a clash of two civilizations between modern barbarism and the West that took place under the global fighting of terrorism.

Muslim and Arab countries were always part of the President’s speeches, particularly those of the Middle East. The latter were considered as the only responsible for that attacks and it was their duty to help the United States to use military campaigns to end the horrors of modern terrorism. Thus, the United States entered a new cycle of global conflicts and opened the way for ethnic interest groups to exert their power and influence for the interest of their countries of origin.

II. US Foreign Policy Decision Making and the Invasion of Iraq

Immediately after the attacks, President George W. Bush put forward his doctrine which essentially aimed to act pre-emptively against those states which were supposed to hide terrorists or help them. This has been applied firstly on the Taliban regime but at the same time investigations started on Iraq. Different implications started to argue that Iraq had connections with terrorism and that it possessed WMD. Significantly, these

accusations were convincing enough to provide the Bush administration with a strong pretext to declare war on Iraq. The post- 9/11 left the opportunity to George W. Bush administration to convince public opinion with the legitimacy of the war under the pretext of preserving the security of the nation.

II.1. Factors, Committees and Justifications of the War

In his State of the Union Address, President George Bush informed that the United States entered a new era of conflict in which it “will not make distinction between the terrorists and those who harbour them” (Eraser 150). US Deputy Secretary of Defence Paul Wolfowitz also noted the same measure to the House and Senate Armed Services on 3 and 4 October 2001, and indicated that those attacks were just the beginning of an open conflict:

As we prepare for the battles ahead we must recognize that these attacks were an assault on our people and our way of life; but they were also a wake-up call- one that we ignore at our peril.....the September 11th strikes caught us by surprise. We must prepare ourselves for the virtual certainty that we will be surprised again. (Jarvis 68-69)

Consequently, the US security environment as Wolfowitz stated was threatened, but those responsible were expected to pay unprecedented battles and conflicts until a world order of peace and security would be established out of terrorist threats.

Investigations on the attacks started as soon as the order of the creation of a new Department of Homeland Security, and the Office of Special Plans (OSP) which was the first step to widen the investigations. The National Security Council (NSC) and the CIA

also were a part of this process. As a result, a new Patriot Act was ratified to give President Bush all the necessary parameters to act in the voice of all Americans.

The George W. Bush administration connected the 9/11 attacks to Iraq and those 19 hijackers as being aided by Saddam Hussein. Owning WMD was the first pretext initiated by the administration to condemn Saddam of terrorist actions. Indeed, the United States vehemently pushed for the war on terror which started against the Taliban regime then reached Iraq. This move was planned even before the advent of the Bush administration since it did not even wait for the results of the investigations to condemn Iraq.

In reality, the matter was introduced by the neoconservatives in the Clinton Administration in 1998, primarily from Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, and Richard Perle. These figures were claimed to be responsible of the war in the Bush era, too. They signed a letter to President Clinton calling for military action to ensure regime change in Iraq. They wrote:

The only acceptable strategy is one that eliminates possibility that Iraq will be able to use or threaten to use WMD. In the near term, this means a willingness to undertake military action as diplomacy in clearly failing. In the long term, it means removing Saddam Hussein and his regime from power. That now needs to become the aim of American foreign policy.²

Yet, Bush and his fellows started the propaganda to attack Iraq as the best solution to end terrorism in the world and prevent future attacks under the pre-emptive strike doctrine. The Iraq invasion signalled the beginning of a global war on terror where the United States started to act as the world protector.

Thus, the decision to invade Iraq in 2003 founded its pretext on the 9/11 events which was primarily based on untrue arguments. In reality the decision originated from an

old dream which aimed to control oil and the Middle East. Drawing the way to invade Iraq was something easy to justify during the George W. Bush administration. Based on past and historical preferences, the President wanted to overthrow the Saddam regime, but the difficulty was in the justifications of the war. But when the 9/11 came, the chance appeared once again.

At the outset, President George W. Bush alone would not reach such a decision if there were no surrounding pressures. Internal emphasis in the Bush administration which took place even before he became President was the first seed to the coming war of the 21st century. In fact, the dream to invade Iraq was realized as soon as the 9/11 attacks occurred. In those sad moments, the President appeared on the media to say that his first foreign policy priority was to make those responsible to pay for their terrorist deeds. In addition, Bush always put emphasis on the WMD as being given to those terrorists from particular nations which had strong connections to Al Qaeda networks.

Evidently, the road map of the Iraq war was the outgrowth of 'Group think'. The latter was described as:

A small group's tendency to seek concurrence rather than information, critical appraisal, and debate. It is the complacent over confidence in the face of vague uncertainties and explicit warnings that should have altered the members to the risks". (Qtd. in Matystik 3)

As a result, the 'Group think' can be defined simply as key actors and close advisors on whom the President relied in every issue and by which they can easily influence his decisions even without a sound proof. What became true within the George W. Bush administration was that the Iraq war was the result of the group think advice which the

9/11 made easier. The reason behind this is that the Iraq war was planned a decade ago to which the 9/11 offered the occasion.

With regard to this, key advisors in the administration created the “Office of Special Plans” (OSP) which existed from September 2002 through June 2003. The OSP was a division of the Pentagon and was created by US Deputy Secretary of Defence Paul Wolfowitz, led by Under Secretary of Defence of Foreign Policy Douglas Feith and mandated by former Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld. The purpose of the OSP was to provide the “Bush administration officials with alternative inventor ‘raw’ intelligence about Iraq” (Matystik 7). The underlying purpose of the OSP was to directly compete with and circumvent the CIA and the Defence Intelligence agency. It was controlled by the conservative network that permeated the inner sanctum of the George W. Bush administration.

Thus, the creation of the OSP was a new measure in US security and intelligence strategy. It was designed to further the investigations on the 9/11 attacks and to emphasize on finding evidence about Iraqi’s nuclear arsenal. The coalition of Wolfowitz, Feith and Rumsfeld to find a reason to invade Iraq was fruitful. This would be typically true only if we considered its shortcoming period, which lasted only ten months and indicated that the alliance was created to find a cause to the war. Encountering the OSP in a historical background indicated that its members were part of the Project for the American Century (PNAC). Wolfowitz, Bennet, Bush, Rumsfeld, Cheney, Perle and Rove all were members of the PNAC (Donnelly et al. 2).

The PNAC was a neoconservative think tank created in the spring of 1997. As a Washington based institution, its demands and desires were one thing: the best

establishment of a global American empire to bend the will of all nations. Its principles as quoted by Lindsay Grant were as follows:

To strengthen America's unique role in preserving and extending an international order to our security, our prosperity, and our principles. But it is necessary if the United States build the successes of this post century and ensure security and our greatness in the next. (*The New...1*)

Consequently, the creation of the PNAC was not so powerful until the presidential elections of 2000 and the 9/11 attacks. Yet, the men who created and “nurtured the imperial dreams of PNAC became the men who run the Pentagon, the Defence Department and the White House. When the attacks hit the US twin towers, these men saw at long last their chance to turn their White Papers into a substantive policy.³ As a result, the occasion was then justified through the attacks to build the US Empire in the Middle East.

Besides, it became clear that invading Iraq in 2003 was a part of an old agreement dated in 1997, and which mirrored the neoconservative ideology and dreams. Jane K. Cramer and Thrall A. Trevar argued in their survey entitled: “Why the United States Invade Iraq” that the US used the attacks and the presence of WMD to invade Iraq. This fact that was only an old tactic that had been planned in the George H. Bush and the Clinton administrations. More than this, the fact that “the whole policy was misconceived, mishandled and counterproductive, should not hide the fact that it was part of a clear and systematic world view by those leaders and that they consciously decided to use Iraq as the first step” (10).

All in all, the neo-conservative plans to get rid of Saddam and his country were part of an ideology designed by George W. Bush and his key advisors who found the way and

the cause after the Towers Fall in 2001. Indeed, the fabricated investigations quickly concluded that Iraq had WMD, had connections to Al Qaeda and provided help to terrorists (10). This made-up evidence led President Bush to declare on 19 March 2003 that Washington was going to invade Iraq because of the damage it caused “using chemical, biological or, one day nuclear weapons” that could destroy humanity in the future. President Bush and his key advisors also argued that Iraq retained hundreds of tons of weapons, had a hidden chemical and nuclear programme which included “hard-to-detect mobile weapons laboratories and perhaps it had constituted its nuclear programme and was developing the most capacity to enrich uranium and soon thereafter to build nuclear bombs” (Qtd. in Zimmerman 2).

Explicitly, with these ongoing arguments the Bush Cabinet decided to invade Iraq because of its nuclear arsenal, although it knew that there were other nations that evidently had nuclear programmes. Israel, Pakistan, and North Korea are best examples. Pakistan had the capability to deliver several dozens of nuclear warheads. It was also suspected of processing chemical weapons. North Korea was believed to possess sufficient plutonium and could produce few nuclear devices along with a capacity for many more. It was also believed to have huge stockpile of dangerous chemical weapons and many ballistic missiles (“Chemistry of...” 1). Moreover, Bush dubbed many times these states as “the axis of evil”, but he saw Iraq as the first imminent threat which should be cleaned.

The George W. Bush administration decided to invade Iraq due to a number of causes. First, the 9/11 attacks that threatened US security and the administration would not wait for another attack to occur. The second cause was the country’s suspected stockpiles of WMD; and third was the belief that the sanctions would breakdown in the near future,

above all because of opposition from Russia and France. Fourth, was the reason that Iraq's WMD had to be captured after the sanctions, because if they left with it, it would develop a nuclear programme. Fifth, was the assumption that if WMD were not captured, they would help terrorists in their future plans. Sixth, was the conviction that if the nuclear programme were to begin, no country would be able to limit it. Seventh, was the supposition that the Middle East suffered from tyrannical rulers who must be stopped with the help of the US in its efforts to promote democracy. Eighth, was the notion that the success of the Afghan War against the Taliban regime gave a better boost to liberate Iraq and its people from the tyranny of the Saddam regime. Finally, was the certainty that the military intervention in Iraq was necessary and that it would not take too much time because the regime would disintegrate easily and the Iraqi people would welcome the invaders and the US would be able to put in place a new, more or less, democratic and pro-US regime in a relatively short period of time (Cramer et al. 24). Despite all these convincing causes, President Bush could not succeed to invade Iraq without the prior approval of his public. Hence, the incumbent set out in a crusade to convince US public with the legitimacy of the Iraq war.

II.2. American Public Opinion before the Iraq War

American public opinion has always been a very important pillar in the success of certain policy-making. Public perceptions during times of war rally the President's actions that are intended to save the nation (Moore 2). However, from the years of the Vietnam War, Americans did not experience a foreign attack, and the 9/11 were so terrifying that there were demands for quick a response to punish the doers, especially after the President's state of the union rhetorical addresses (Wolfe 53).

When the Bush administration decided to call for a regime change in Iraq it found the way easy to convince the public opinion using the pretext of WMD and the protection of US national security. It was stated that President Bush was able to invade Iraq because of his rhetoric to create resolutions. The first step in the President's oratorical addresses came after the attacks where he spoke to US citizens using illusions of future attacks. This fact made the public more apprehensive from future attacks and demanded his actions to punish those responsible. Then, after deep investigations Iraq became under target. In this logic, the President's State of the Union Address of October 2002 presented an important introduction to the American public about the necessity to go to war against Iraq. He declared:

Iraq continues to flaunt its hostility toward America and to support terror.

The Iraqi regime has plotted to develop anthrax, and nervous gas and nuclear weapons for over a decade... this is a regime that agreed to international inspectors, then kicked out the inspectors. This is a regime that has something to hide from the civilized world...those regimes pose a grave and growing danger, they could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them means to match their hatred...we'll be deliberate, yet time is not on our side. I will not wait on events, while dangers gather. I will not stand by, as peril draws closer and closer. (Wolfe 62-63)

In this essence, the need to test public opinion support of the war was important. For example, the ABC News/*Washington Post* conducted a survey from 27 November 2001 to May 2003. The results stated that the majority favoured the war (between 68 and 78 percent) while the minority opposed it (between 24 and 30 percent) (Public Opinion 3). Another survey conducted between December 2002 and January 2003 by the *Pew*

Research Centre estimated that 62 percent of Americans supported the war. When asked if they viewed Iraq as a threat to the US national security, 81 of the respondents said ‘yes’ (Wolfe 71).

In short, due to the President’s rhetoric, the US public opinion was convinced with the necessity of the war. Besides, the war rhetoric has raised expectations that a “complete victory” is not only possible, but in fact necessary (Power 2). For this reason, the Iraq Resolution was approved within Congress on 22 October 2002. It is important to say that the Iraq invasion in 2003 was the outcome of different circumstances, most importantly the Iraq nuclear arsenal. However, the call for a regime change in the country was a part of an old vision which the PNAC, the neoconservative dream, and the 9/11 realized; in addition to the public support that strongly feared future terrorist attacks.

That said, few years after the invasion many questions arose on the political landscape. The most important one concerned the WMD, and Iraqi arsenal and biological weapons which the George W. Bush administration claimed to detain the proof of their existence. After all, all those claims and justifications turned to be not true, so why? Why did the US government want to get rid of Saddam and his regime? Who benefited from this war? Why soon people knew that the reasons were fabricated to an extent that the public started to appeal its end? These questions and others were asked shortly after the beginning of the war. In reality, different secret reasons were behind the Iraq War. These reasons were the product of the decision-making actors within the Bush administration who worked to advance the US interests in the Middle East, and to promote the security of their allies, primarily Israel.

III. The Big Lie and the Role of Interest Groups in the US Decision to Invade Iraq

The absence of WMD, and of credible evidence connecting Iraq to the 9/11 events, gave new dimensions to the Bush administration. The great losses inside US troops led public opinion to doubt about the current reasons of the invasion. Soon the fabricated causes that triggered the war were uncovered and the real hidden facts behind the war which US officials in the George W. Bush planned a long time ago became known.

The secret plans of the war heaped attention on the President's Cabinet that was pressured by the Jewish lobby and Israeli officials in the government. The special relationship that existed a long time ago between the US and Israel established a permanent connection within the two countries. The nature of this relationship has great importance in managing particular US policies through its lobby.

The Jewish Lobby, as the most influential one in the US, could gain access to policymakers because of its power and strength in addition to its major money investments in all the domains, especially in election cycles. As a result, the lobby gets access to policy makers whether in the executive, legislative or media and particularly public opinion. The Israel lobby, too advantage of the 9/11 attacks which served as a strong motive to influence US officials and the President in order to press for the invasion of Iraq which seemed to pose a great threat to Israel.

III.1. The Iraq Gate: The Big Lie

After gathering enough pretexts and justifications to go to war against Iraq, the US called, on March 2003, for a regime change in Iraq. Few months after the invasion, particularly on 1 May 2003 President Bush declared “Mission Accomplished” but this,

however, did not mean the end of the war. In that short period of time, it was estimated that about 100,000 Iraqi civilians lost their lives, and that a total chaos threatened the stability of Iraq. Moreover, 3,000 US soldiers, and over 22, 000 were wounded, and war expenditures amounted to \$300 billion, roughly \$5 billion a month; shredding of the US credibility as a protector of human rights; and crippling the US Constitution (“Bush’s War ... “ 1).

Given this high number of casualties, a number of critics started to question the Bush administration. Those critics condemned Bush and his key advisors for their ‘Big Lie’.⁵ After a few months of investigations, no real proof was found. Iraq had no nuclear programme, no WMD, and no connections to Al Qaeda networks. The war appeared day after day as an unravelling fraud to the whole world: the invasion rested on fabricated information, false assumptions and a dubious analysis. Balosh Bakhsh Qadar criticized it as the greatest US self-inflicted blunder simply because the war planners were wrong on all counts (52).

Therefore, the war plans did not carry any post-occupation strategy. The US policies toward Iraq were ignorant of local conditions and ended up alienating the population. In other words, the way to Iraq was just to end terrorism and save the world from nuclear programmes (*US Foreign...*52). Other critical assumptions provided that Ibn Al-Shaykh al-Libi⁶ was likely internationally misleading his briefers when he said that Iraq provided Al Qaeda associates with chemical and biological weapons (CBW) training in 2000 (Morison 9). However, another source claimed in 16 November 2006 that al-Libi had deliberately misled his interrogators in order to entice the US into attacking Iraq (*The Guardian*).

Besides, post-war findings supported the April 2002 Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) assessment that there was no credible reporting on Al Qaeda training at Salman Park or anywhere else in Iraq (Morison 9). In fact, the real motives behind the Iraq War were a set of strategic issues which were drawn by the Bush administration and neoconservatives. At the outset, most experts readily combined interests in both oil and Israel as major motives behind the US invasion. A significant minority emphasized one set of issues over the other, and even insisted that the other interests were not influential (Cramer et al. 30).

III.2. US-Iraq-Israel Zionist Connection and the Impact of the Israeli Lobby on the Decision to Invade Iraq

The Bush administration attempted several times to convince both Americans and world public opinion that the war on Iraq was a part of the global war on terror. By ignoring the result of the investigations which did not find any link between the attacks, WMD, and Al Qaeda connections, soon the 'Big Lie' which covered the conduct of the war was unravelled. People all around the world realized that the US strong desire to get cheaper oil resources and to save the Israeli interests became the genuine causes and the driving force behind the invasion.

At first, many scholars strongly hesitated to write about the real reasons of the US invasion of Iraq, or at least about the hidden hand of the Israel lobby in the United States. In this regard, Jane Cramer and Trevor A. Thrall noticed in their work: *Why the United States Invade Iraq* that many experts expressed sincere concerns about professional and other risks associated with speaking candidly about why the US really invaded Iraq (3).

Due to its post-Cold War foreign policy orientation, the US foreign policy decision making became a more open stage to influence from external factors; especially interest groups. The tragic events of the 9/11 led the US under the efforts and influence of particular interest groups to declare war on terrorism and to invade Iraq. The Israel lobby was the first among others in the United States to pressure and participate in the decision to invade Iraq due to its crucial interests in the Middle East.

At this stage, it is imperative to shed light on the importance and influencing power of Israel on the US foreign policy decision making, specifically in the decision to invade Iraq. Besides, it is also of utmost importance to deal with the special relationship between the United States and Israel as well as the latter's lobby in the process of declaring the war against the Saddam regime.

III. 3. The US-Israeli Special Relationship

The relationship between the United States and Israel has been described and viewed by many political scientists as a special one. From the early establishment of the Jewish State in 1948, the US, under President Harry Truman, was the first country to recognize it. Besides, from that time on, the relations between the two countries have been progressively growing warmly with the exceptions of bitter relationships during the Eisenhower and George H. Bush administrations. Nevertheless, the US most important foreign interest has been its relationship with Israel. For this reason, from the 1960s onward, every American President as well as Congress promoted the importance of maintaining Israel qualitative edge over its potential adversaries. This privileged policy has been the cornerstone of the unwavering US/Israel relationship (*US Assistance... 1*).

As a result, it had become an established custom that every American President had to take into consideration the specificity of the US/Israeli relationship.

It has been estimated that the US/Israeli relationship reached an almost total commitment first during the Cold War, when Israel took the necessity to fight communism in the Middle East next to the US. Then, during the George W. Bush administration where fighting terrorism and strategic interests between the two countries became the special norm. For that reason, President Bush once said: “we will speak up for our principles and we will stand up for our friends in the state of Israel” (Hinchcliff et al.195).

The US/Israeli special relationship developed through many issues which were part of US most important strategic and security interests. Aid to Israel has always been the first catalyst between the two countries. As it was estimated, Israel ranked many times as the top foreign country that received significant US military and economic aid. Since 1976, Israel has been the largest annual recipient of US foreign assistance, and it has been the largest cumulative recipient since World War II and it has received about \$1 billion through philanthropy and \$1 billion through short and long term commercial loans (Mark 1).

Furthermore, during the first term of George W. Bush administration Israel received more in US military aid than it had in the past US arms’ deliveries. Over this time period, “Israel received \$10.5 billion in foreign military financing- the Pentagon biggest military aid programme- and \$ 605 billion in US arms’ deliveries” (Frida and William 1). This aid continued to the administration’s second term when Bush announced in August 2007 that during “the fiscal year 2008 Israel received \$ 2.4 billion in Foreign Military Financing

(FMF). The agreement called for incremental annual increases in FMF to Israel receiving \$3.1 billion a year by fiscal year 2018” (Sharp 2).

Military and economic aids are not the only assistance provided by the US strategic and diplomatic supports. Since 1982, the US vetoed 32 Security Council resolutions critical to Israel (“The Israel...” 82). The US also opposed any efforts of the Arab States to put the case of Israel nuclear weapons on the International Atomic Energy Agency. In addition, the US protected and aided Israel from the Soviet intervention during the Nixon administration. In return, Israel served as the US proxy during the Cold War when it helped the US to contain the Soviet expansion in Arab countries.

The US also backed Israel in the Oslo accords in October 1993. Actually in 2000, one American participant at Camp David talks said: “far too often, we functioned...as Israel’s lawyer” (“Israel...” 82). Despite all this support, Israel did not affirm any commitment to the United States, but most of the time opposed its decisions. In fact, the two countries had very different strategic interests which were united in the post 9/11 attacks and Israel always appeared as “America’s Best Friend” (Mahmood 132).

It has been estimated that Israel was highly dedicated because of its espionage stories within the US government. This was mainly prior to 9/11 where the country detained or arrested in a secret investigation of large scale, long-term Israeli espionage agents who have strong roots within the US government (Petras 34). The *Fox News* also reported that “Israeli agents targeted and penetrated military bases, the Drug, the IRS, the JNS, the EPA, the Marshalls Service, dozens of government facilities, and even secret office and unlisted private homes of law enforcement and intelligence personnel” (34).

Nevertheless, despite these espionage facts and others, the US has never adversely reacted against Israel. In the contrary, it always provided it with an unconditional support.

Thus, the special relationship between the two countries became stronger especially after the terrorist attack when they started to view the global fighting of terrorism as a part of their strategic interests in the Middle East, and for other hidden purposes that became the norm of the dual relationship that was the result of the pressure of Israel and the Jewish Lobby over US foreign policy decision makers.

IV. The Impact of the Israeli Lobby on the US Decision to Invade Iraq

The US decision to invade Iraq in 2003 was subjected to different influences whether inside or outside the cabinet of decision-makers and most obviously from the Israeli Lobby. Being the best financed and popular interest group, the Jewish Lobby with its variants like the American Israeli Public Affair Committee (AIPAC) was able to convince the Bush administration to go along this invasion. Besides, the Lobby did not start its mission only during the presidency of George W. Bush, but had already tried to do this task earlier during the Clinton administration.

In that period, political scientists claimed that “the Lobby [during the Clinton years] has become a part of the policy making apparatus in the persons of Israeli advocates Dennis Ross and Martin Indyk, when both entered the government service from the lobby organization” (Bill 6). As a result, the Lobby extended its power on the US decision making and was able to have a say in the decision to invade Iraq. It is the main aim of the next section to provide the necessary justifications to illustrate how the Israeli Lobby was the first US conductor in the Iraq invasion.

IV.1. The Jewish Lobby Access to Decision-Makers

As stated earlier, the Jewish Lobby is defined as “the loose coalition of individuals and organizations who actively work to shape US foreign policy in a pro-Israel direction” (IBP USA 77). The most important interest of the lobby is of course to sway US foreign policy to Israel interests. This is done through different points of access that are available to the lobby. However, not all the Jews in the United States are members in the Lobby. The non-members do not believe in its principles and they roughly represent 36% according to the result of a 2004 survey about Jewish attitudes to the lobby (77).

The Israel Lobby included different organizations and institutions that actively work to advance its interest in Washington. Some of these associations include the American Public Affair Committee (AIPAC), and the Conference of Major Jewish Organizations (CPMJO). The common sense which unites such institutions is its support to pressure US foreign policy toward Israel, especially its policy toward the Middle East in a way that Israel would get its aims in the Occupied Territories.

Ranked as top two among US interest groups, the AIPAC is the best financed lobby on Capitol Hill. Yet, according to the *Fortune Magazine*, in 1997 AIPAC was ranked second behind the American Association of Retired People (AARP), but ahead of heavy weight lobbies like the AFL/CIO and the National Rifle Association. A *National Journal* study reached in March 2005 a similar conclusion, placing AIPAC in the second place (tied with the AARP) in the Washington’s ‘muscle rankings’ (78). In addition, it was also estimated that the Zionist Power Configuration has over two thousand full time functionaries, more than 250,000 activists, over a thousand billionaire and multi-millionaire political donors who contribute funds to both political parties, and secures more than “20% of the US foreign military aid budget (Petras 56). Therefore, these

characteristics have enabled the lobby to rank as the first among other lobbies in the US and provided it with an extreme power to sway decision-makers as well as its strategies for success and sources of power over the executive and legislative branches in addition to public opinion and the media.

IV.1.1. Influencing the Executive

The key success of the Jewish Lobby is its ability to reach the executive process in the US foreign policy. Members of the AIPAC rank among US top key decision-makers. George W. Bush's Cabinet members are almost supporters of the AIPAC, namely Eliot Abrahams, John Bolton, and Douglas Feith, Lewis "Scooter", Libby, Richard Perle, Paul Wolfowitz and David Wursumer.

The executive cabinet was not the only target of influence, but Presidents themselves are also subjected to AIPAC pressures. This can be done through campaign funds which are considered as the crucial element needed to any candidate. This happens simply when candidates in campaigns raise their money funds. Despite the fact that Jews are just a small minority in the US (about 3 percent), they are ranked as the first interest group that raises high funds during presidential elections.

Because of its ability to raise enormous funds, Presidents have always depended on Jewish funds during their election campaigns. Moreover, presidential candidates also concentrate not only on Jewish funds but also on Jewish votes. This reality denotes the existence of severe campaigns in American-Jewish states like California, New York, Illinois and Pennsylvania. The *Washington Post* has also estimated that the Democratic presidential candidates depend on Jewish supporters to supply "as much as 60 percent of the money" needed to finance their electoral campaigns (80).

Funding public campaigns may also offer the lobby more prerogatives from its supported candidate. It is assumed that their financed candidate win the election while those who remain critical will almost loose. For this reason, the lobby's first step to pressure US officials starts from electing candidates, primarily foreign policy advisors to the Middle East. The *Hustler Magazine* provided a similar example during the Obama administration in 2009 where Veteran diplomat and Middle East expert Charles Freeman was chosen to chair the National Intelligence Council which is a key position formulating US foreign policy. However, the Israel Lobby went on the attack. "Freeman's 'crime' was offering a damaging assessment of Israel's controversial behaviour in the Occupied Territories and its negative impact on US standing in the Arab World. Stephen Rosen had the opportunity to spearhead the attack on Freeman who, in March 2009, resigned from the post with Barak Obama saying nothing in his defence" (Ketcham 74). Freeman's case would ironically remind us of another one in which we can say that history repeated itself.

The same case happened during the Carter administration when he wanted to make George Ball his first Secretary of State, but he knew that Ball was received as critical of Israel and that the Lobby would oppose the appointment (Qtd. in Mearsheimer and Walt 76). A similar case also happened in 2004, when presidential candidate Howard Dean called for the United States to take an "even-handed" role in the Israeli conflict. This led him to be accused as hawkish to Israel when Senator Joseph Lieberman accused his statement as 'irresponsible'. This, however, cost Howard Dean too much damage; he lost the support of the Israel Lobby which meant the loss of elections. These two cases are just examples among thousands of others of the influence of the Israel Lobby on the US foreign policy, which became more and more a subject under the rule of campaign contributions.

IV.1.2. Influencing Congress

As the best floor for debates and interest groups' managements, the US Congress became the important target of the Israel Lobby. Similar to the executive, the legislative officers are subjected to lobbying activities. Campaign contributions to Congressional candidates are also important. At this level the Lobby offers great rewards to Congressional staffers so that to make supporting Israel the right decision. Political scientists like Steven Walt and John Mearsheimer argue in their book, *The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy* that the key success of the Lobby within Congress is that "some key members are Christian-Zionists like Dick Armey, who avowed in September 2002 that: "My No.1 priority in foreign policy is to protect Israel" (17). This, however, had raised many critics since the first duty of any American official is to advance his country's interests not those of Israel.

The AIPAC as an important association within the Jewish Lobby remains the core of its success. This is simply because of its ability to provide costly campaign contributions through PACs in addition to guarantying any candidate victory. Furthermore, Congressional staffers are also subjected to AIPAC's pressures so that to pass appropriate legislations toward Israel's benefit whose relation with the US has never been discussed or criticized. Former AIPAC staff member once described the Lobby's power over Congress s follows:

It is common for members of Congress and their staffs to turn to AIPAC first when they need information, before calling the library of Congress the Congressional Research Service, committee staff or administration experts... AIPAC is often called upon to draft speeches work on legislation, advise on tactics, perform research, collect co-sponsors and

marshal votes. The bottom line is that AIPAC which is a defacto agent for a foreign government, has a stronghold on the US Congress. (Mearsheimer and Walt 18)

This was confirmed by former Senator Earnest Hollings when he observed that any Congressional staffer could not have an Israeli policy other than what the AIPAC gives him or her.

Despite the fact that that the power of the Israel Lobby, particularly the AIPAC in Congress could not be accurately measured, and one must acknowledge that Congress is Israel's occupied territory; just like any colonial expansion. This is so simply because it can elect, ratify and draft legislation. Hence, one may venture to assert that Congress is AIPAC's pillar source of power.

IV.1.3. Influencing the Media

The Media is the first based target that portrays Israel as the small fresh country that needs aid, power, and strength. The Media with all of its forms are a key success to the Israel Lobby through its various functions as journals, news, TV programmes, or any other form. The US foreign policy in the Middle East is the main corner of the Lobby. For this reason, the media in the United States is mostly shaped by it. This is the continuation of the Lobby's policy within campaign funding, influencing the presidency and Congress. The AIPAC or the Jewish Lobby owes strategic US news stations like "*CNN* and Editorials like the *Wall Street Journal* and the *Washington Post*" (Kristopher 73).

Moreover, major US journalists and editors, who best exemplified the Israeli total control of US media, were much enthusiastic to support Israel; and those who tried to criticize its policy toward the Middle East; particularly the Occupied Territories, were

muted or simply accused of anti-Semitism. Examples of these reporters were Thomas Friedman and Columnist Frank Rich. The former was condemned as a “self –hating Jew” due to his unacceptable reporting that was described as “stereotypical images of Jews, conspiring to manipulate world leaders and events.

Because Friedman accused the US of invading Iraq, the Lobby took the necessary measures to mute the reporter and his rhetoric of accusing Israel and its supporters. By the time Friedman’s reporting became no longer critical to Israel but rather praising it, he started to receive “\$75.000 per talk to Jewish organizations, and acquired a \$9 million mansion in Maryland”. Frank Rich was also described as a self-hating Jew because he reported Goldstein scandals in Palestine, the fact that cost him too much. Thus, he learned the lesson and no longer wrote any anti- Israeli columns (Weircounter). These are only few examples that would justify our claim that the Israel Lobby controls US media.

IV.1.4. Public Opinion, Academia and Think Tanks

The influence of the Israel Lobby does not only touch the key actors of decision-making, it is rather rooted to shape public opinion and the US culture too. The role of the media at this point plays too much, since Israel is always being portrayed as a country that suffers from oppression of foreign Middle Eastern countries to a great extent that it becomes a US duty to protect and help the Jewish state. The phenomenon of helping Israel is not new. It was an essential measure of several policy preferences during many presidential administrations especially after the Cold War. As former President Ford stated in the 1970s, “Israel and the Israelis are the best people and we should give them the best treatment and a place where they should establish their settlement” (Terry 10).

It must be noted that political and financial help to Israel has always been the outcome of US public culture. Popular culture inside the United States is as much shaped with the media. The latter is of vital importance because it plays the essential role in educating the public about the different events in the world as well as shaping their attitudes and responses to future events. It has been argued that the US media coverage in the last 20 years used to condemn and hide different realities especially toward US policies in the Middle East.

As it is the best way to pressure public opinion, the media with all of its forms have always made stereotyping and assaults to Arabs and Islam. People who are dedicated to report news usually belong to a certain pro-Israeli group, so that the reports are shaped and managed toward the benefits of Jews. In addition to this, their programmes intended to convince public opinion about the Arab extremism are also controlled by those who attribute themselves to the Jews or belong to their side. But those who claim the opposite and want to share the truth would simply get out from the list like the reporters we referred to above.

Indeed, hiding the truth about Israel's practices in the Middle East in order to win US public support is just as waging a war against Arabs and Muslims. Hatred toward Muslims started many years earlier through much criticism of Arabs and false propaganda. Muslims have always been portrayed as extremists who opposed American people and the American way of life. They were portrayed as barbarians who held views against modernism and modern civilization. Skilfully monitoring these negative stereotypes against Arabs and Muslims for many decades made the American public ignorant about the true qualities of Arabs and Muslims.

Consequently, since the way has been already established the war against Arabs would not get adverse criticism. This is what, in fact, happened in the Iraq War. The Bush administration found the way easy to convince the whole public about the legitimacy of the war. The scene was set, and just a big lie that their lives were seriously threatened by those terrorists and barbarians in the Muslims world would certainly work. Terry J. Janice argued in her book, *US Foreign Policy in the Middle East* that, “Bush’s war on terror does not convey the term itself or his nation’s security, it is rather the way that opened the gates of the Arab world and the Middle East in particular for US interest in Iraq which has been started and planned by the media six years earlier” (16). This is again a proof that the Bush administration did not really wage the war on Iraq to fight terrorism but to promote its interests in the first place.

In this way, the stage had been already prepared to the Bush administration six years earlier in addition to the fact that public opinion could not refuse or doubt about the legitimacy of the war despite its weak and non-justified causes. American public opinion believed in perceptions rather than reality which governed their deeper thoughts.

Public perceptions are the outcome of the influence of popular culture and the latter is driven by media and its different forms. Public opinion directly and unconsciously responds to the different cycles of media which are then drawn by lobbies and special interest groups. As a result, when the public is already cultivated, shaped and monitored by such attitudes, believes and responses, the outcome is public pressure on decision makers to act immediately and directly. Israel has done all that it could to shape the US public opinion in a way to hate Muslims who then became an easier target to the US hegemony after 9/11.

Influencing popular culture to invade Iraq and fight terrorism in other countries of the Middle East was not the only road experienced by the lobby. Other effective means included the direct control of fresh popular culture, which means impacting fresh minds whether at schools or universities. Policing the academia is also a great target won by Israel over US policy. In this essence, Israel tries to touch sensitive minds such as those of students in universities and campuses. For this purpose, new groups sprang up, like the Caravan for Democracy, which brought Israeli speakers to US colleges (Qtd. in IBP USA 82). In addition, the established promoters of Israeli groups as the Jewish Council for Public Affairs and Hillel groups, and Israeli funding to universities so as to monitor their programmes (82).

The Israel Lobby also tried to influence Americans in their studies. This means that they used different means to pressure what should be taught. This was planned in order to teach American students that Israel deserves help and to mute all those who wanted to criticize it. Thus, Israel did its best in rewarding US campuses through philanthropic activities so that to win the sympathy of professors and students alike. In contrast, the method practiced against opponent journalists and reporters was the same with university professors. In this regard, the best example was that of the Palestinian scholar 'Edward Said'. He was hired by the University of Columbia, but when pro-Israeli forces heard the incident; they published different journal articles and e-mails showing their dissatisfaction about his nomination and urging his ban from the Campus (83).

The Lobby also tried to influence university professors, who were condemned as anti-Semitic, at times when they remained critical; and campuses that hired such professors were denied federal funding. All of these practices and many others are ways

used by the Jewish lobby in order to win support and these means worked well in changing the minds of students and shaping their future responses.

Academic lobbying is not the only practice. The Jewish lobby also attempts to influence different institutions that work in the form of think tanks. The latter are part of the Jewish lobbying activity that works to provide advice and reference to pressure the decision makers. The role of think tanks in decision making is difficult to measure. Political scientist Abelson E. Donald viewed that think tanks attribution to policy process is less predictable and that they are not always easy to discern (128). Such pro-Israeli organizations include: the WINEP, the American Enterprise Institute, the Brookings Institution, the Centre for Security Policy, the Foreign Policy Research Institute, the Heritage Foundation, the Hudson Institute, the Institute for Foreign Analysis, and the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA) (83). These variety of institutions do the same role that of providing help to Israel.

Using all these means, to pressure the President, Congress and public opinion, the Israel Lobby gets its way through the United States foreign policy decision making, particularly its policy toward the Middle East. The 9/11 attacks provided the adequate pretext, the one Israel was waiting for. By getting access to decision makers and the President's Cabinet the Israel Lobby was able to get to the war planners. Due to its ability of winning support from both the legislators and public opinion, Israel gained its dream that of driving the United States to declare war against Iraq.

V. The Jewish Lobby and the Iraq War

The points of access provided to the Jewish Lobby in addition to its close relationship with the US foreign policy decision makers gave it great success and

enormous influence. The perfect organization of the Jewish Lobby is among the key parameters that led to its great success in influencing American decision makers. The Lobby's success also depended on the power it yields. This power came from different sources, and generally appears whenever there is a case that involves the US foreign policy toward the Middle East.

In response to the critiques raised after the publication of their book, *The Israel Lobby and the United States Foreign Policy*, John Mearsheimer and Steven Walt claimed that the power of the Lobby is not something created but it came as a result of the efforts made by its members. They claimed that the Lobby did its job as any interest group but it did it perfectly. As a consequence, the scholars argued that:

Anyone familiar with U.S Middle East policy knows that the Lobby wields great influence [as former president Clinton says] the AIPAC is as better than anyone else Lobbying in this town [just as former house speaker Newt Gingrich called it] “the most effective general interest group...across the entire planet”. And former Democratic Senator Ernest Hollings noted upon leaving office, “you can’t have an Israeli policy other than what AIPAC gives you around here. (64)

Hence, the unlimited influence of the Israel Lobby over US foreign policy was exemplified through many policy options in which the Iraq invasion on 2003 was an important part. Janice J. Terry claimed that the impact of Jewish lobbies played a crucial role in shaping US foreign policy toward the Middle East. This claim turned the sight to the role of the Israel Lobby as a key actor toward that policy (16).

The Jewish lobby greatly contributed to the Bush administration's decision to invade Iraq in March 2003. Though the Lobby did not directly influence the decision over Iraq, it

helped on selling it to the American people and the world at large with different means. It was argued that prominent neoconservative officials who were primarily pro-Israelis had the great influence on the Bush administration to invade Iraq in favour of Israel's protection and other US interests in Iraq, above all its hydrocarbon resources. The neoconservative band as Mearshimer and Walt observed were:

Prominent officials in the Bush administration such as Paul Wolfowitz and Douglas Feith, and three civilians in the Pentagon: Richard Perle, Kenneth Adelman, and James Woolsey, members of the influential Defense Policy Board; Scooter Libby, the vice president's chief of staff; John Bolton, David Wurmser; and Elliott Abrahams, who is in charge of the Middle East policy at the National Security Council. It also included a handful of well-known journalists like Robert Kagan, Charles Krauthammer, William Kristol, and William Safire. (Mearsheimer and Walt 65)

All these prominent figures were members of the Bush best influential advisory team who represented the pro-Israeli lobby. They were also key representatives of the neoconservative ideology, which used to dream of the Middle East under its control. The dream which came as an immediate response to the 9/11 attacks starting with Iraq, then moving to Iran, Syria and finally Lebanon. These and other hidden plans were objectives of the neoconservatives who aimed to offer Israel absolute security as an important US ally in the Middle East.

The points of access provided by the neoconservatives enabled the Jewish Lobby to reach to key Bush advisors who were subjected to the Lobby's pressure and were used to convince the President that the Iraq War was an inevitable station in order to secure the

United States and its allies from the terror of the extremists who were backed by the regime of Saddam and the Taliban.

The principles of neo-conservatism, the PNAC rules, looking for oil or having control of major oil resources were all secret purposes that led the US to invade Iraq. While the response to the 9/11 attacks, that aimed to bring security to the world, put an end to Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction, and end terrorism, were the perfect visual conditions for the war.

These principles were endorsed through ready pro-Israeli officials like the major theoretical strategist of US World Empire from the time of the George Herbert Bush administration, namely Paul Wolfowitz (Petras 48). The latter was joined by Vice President Dick Cheney who was heavily influenced by the neoconservatives in his staff; especially Eric Edelman, John Hannah and the Chief staff Libby (IBP USA 89). Co-Bush advisors joined together to press the President for war.

The theoretical strategist mentioned above, started already to set the stage and planned to convince the President and “together with Lieberman immediately proposed a war against Iraq demanding that the intelligence agencies find the connection and accusing the military of being cowards for not engaging in war “to protect Israel” (Petras 55).

Under the influence of the Jewish Lobby and the neoconservatives the war took its way on the American foreign policy agenda. Members of the PNAC including Rove, Perle, Cheney, Rumsfeld, Walker Bush, E. Bennet and Wolfowitz joined the side of the pro-Israel in favour of the war. The Office of Special Plans members also endorsed the decisions and joined the Iraq invasion which was declared in March 2003. It goes without saying that the invasion of Iraq was greatly influenced by pro-Israeli officials within the

Bush administration who led the war and realized an old American-Israeli dream that of protecting its borders and dominating the oil wells of Iraq.

Endnotes

¹These points and others were introduced by several US key decision makers as a response to 9/11th attacks and in each time they try to convince public about the horror and destruction caused by them. In addition US policy makers appeared in each time to provide public about the recent foundation of the investigations emphasizing that it is necessary to punish who were responsible. For further reading on this point and other see: Jarvis, Lee. *Times of Terror: Discourse, Temporality and the War on Terror*. Palgrave Mac Millan, 2009 Print.

²This indicates that the dream to call for regime change in Iraq was not new, it had traditional roots from the first Gulf War. it is also important to say that key advisors in the Clinton administration were already prepared to call for regime change in Iraq and its future plans of WMD. As Clinton refused and preferred the dual containment, the neoconservatives started to search for another cause which came on September 11th, 2001. For further reading on this point see: Eraser Cameron. *US Foreign Policy after the Cold War. A Global Hegemon or a Reluctant Sheriff*. London and New York: Routledge .Second Edition, 2005 Print.

³The Project for The New American Century was established to promote the imperial dreams of the United States. To control the Middle East and primarily Iraq, this was a part of an old dream that has been portrayed in the official papers of the PNAC. Attacking Iraq and overthrowing Saddam has been already introduced during the Clinton administration as we have noted previously which then became real under the Bush administration. For further reading on the PNAC foundation, principles and future believes see: *The Project for the New American*

Century.01/08/2005.toodoc.com.07/07/2011

<http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article1665.html>.

⁴President Bush rhetoric in the post 9/11th attacks remains an important fact which has persuaded public opinion to gather behind his administration to invade Iraq. Because the president knew how to attract people and leave them believing what he wants them to. About all the president Bush rhetoric before, during and after the Iraq war it is mentioned in: Mckiewz Wolfe Wojtek. *Winning the War of Words. Selling the War on Terror from Afghanistan to Iraq*. Praeger Security International, West port, Connecticut: London, Library of Congress Cataloging –in publication Data. 2008 print.

⁵Lies behind the war on terror and the Iraq invasion was clear after the failure to find any kind of WMD. It became clear that the Iraq war was based on unreal pretexts and contains hidden benefits were the dreams of neoconservatives and big heads in the Bush administration. For further reading on Iraq's Big Lie see: Bush's War on Terror: "the Unravelling of a Fraud".

⁶Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi is called Ali Mohamed al-Fakheri (1963-10 May 2009) was a Libyan captured and interrogated by the American and Egyptian forces for the false information he gave under torture by Egyptian authorities was cited by the Bush administration in the months preceding the Iraq invasion in 2003 where he said that there were a connection between Al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein, that information that was repeatedly many times by Bush and his official to justify the Iraq invasion. For further reading on the Libi and this case see: Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi. Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia. Aug.20.2012. Sep. 5. 2012. < http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ibn_al-Shaykh_al-Libi> .

Conclusion

The basic element that underlies the importance of this study is to know that a key relationship exists between interest groups and foreign policy makers, mainly the President and Congress. In fact the findings of the study dealt with the crucial elements of the assumption analyzed, that it the comprehensive view between the new relationship between interest group activity and foreign policy making in the post-Cold War era. The latter, remained the starting point of the research, to which we aimed to find the relation of interest groups in connection to the country's foreign policy and more specifically to the locus of decision making.

One of the main pillars of the American society is its relation with the President. The United States political history offered the President immense power as he should keep the nation in strength and harmony. However the nature of American politics enabled the President to share his power among his fellow legislators in Congress, and often with the public opinion. The latter marked the essential tenant of society. From its earliest stages of independence, the United States stayed far from foreign affairs and kept in a policy of isolationism in order to unify its states and concentrate on the nation' development in all domains.

That policy gave Washington stability till the first and second world wars, where it was at some stages obliged to enter foreign conflicts. Indeed, during these political changes the President was always the only responsible for foreign decisions with the help of his Cabinet, often Congress but far from the public influence. The latter was not interested in foreign matters due to many circumstances. However, following the political changes that occurred during the Cold War, the public started to be aware about the events

happening around him, in particular when the security of the nation was threatened. As a result, the public rallies to back the President whenever there is a foreign aggression.

The study investigated the events of the post-Cold War era whose findings justified that the new changes particularly in the United States foreign policy decision-making which offered more access to the interference of external pressures on foreign policy decisions. This was done through the assessment of public opinion perceptions and awareness to foreign affairs which recently increased. With the reforms and changes passed to curb the President's power over foreign affairs, Congress also opened time and place to interest groups to share policy making in foreign decisions. During this critical era, interest groups rose in number and scope and their main intention was to back public attitudes as they symbolize the best connections between the government and the society. The post-cold War American foreign policy was similar to the domestic one. In other words, challenges of international trade and economy challenged the domestic issues and this issue widened the activity of interest groups on foreign policy decision making.

The attacks again marked a new era in the United States, one which was under imminent threat from terrorists. The United States public was terrified enough that extensive protection measures were necessary. The Patriot Act enabled President Bush to act in this case and save the nation from external threats. But unlike before the shift in US foreign power and the new challenges met in addition to external actors in foreign policy making, all underwent through one direction that is to convince American society and the world with the legitimacy of the Iraq war.

Efforts by the Bush administration to convince the public and the world about the Iraq War were the outcome of new intentions and hidden purposes that were not prevalent from the beginning. After the end of the war and no Weapons of Mass Destruction

founded, many doubts occurred. At this stage the study examined the different hidden reasons that pushed toward the invasion. The work further investigated that the Iraq War decision has been in fact subjected to external influences inside the locus of policy making. Access points to decision makers were mostly given to the Israel lobby as the best financed lobby in the US. The Jewish lobby was able to draw its way through American foreign policy especially towards the Middle East.

The 9/11 attacks were a limited pretext to invade Iraq, but they in fact were the mask of hidden greedy reasons to a big coalition of the Israel lobby and pro-Israeli officials in the US, particularly the neoconservatives within the Bush administration. The realization of the old dream to attack Iraq was worthwhile under two major reasons: the protection of the best ally, Israel and the strategic benefit of the region, oil. In fact the two reasons recapitulate each other as Petras James concluded that pressure from the Israel lobby together with 9/11 attacks made the US officials enthusiastic to invade Iraq and benefit from its oil. As a result, our findings show that this is what the US planned to fulfil one of the most important strategies of the PNAC.

We attempted to show in this study, that the post-Cold War events shifted US foreign policy in a new direction where the locus of decision making was shattered to external influences. We shed light upon the influence of the Israel lobby as an ethnic interest group that played a preponderant role in the Iraq war, simply because many reasons justified that Israel was the most active and powerful interest group that favoured the war and used different means to sway decision makers, even the public. Yet, the lobby's ability to gain huge access was not gained at once, but was arrived to after so many years ago of planning.

What is of broad concern to us is that the foreign policy making was opened to outside pressure from the realm of policy makers unlike the pre-Cold war period where foreign policy making was limited to particular persons in power. The new relationship between interest group activity and foreign policy in the contemporary period was the outcome of the new American political agenda. The latter which opened time and space to external actors mainly interest groups and particularly the Israel lobby justified our assumption that the US foreign policy making is not what it used to be.

In short, the main objective of this research work has been to identify and evaluate the strategic and political importance of interest groups in the making of US foreign policy in the post-Cold War era. More precisely, the study sought to explore, and analyze the actors, issues, processes and political conditions involved in the making of American foreign policy. At a time when international circumstances were ostensibly in a state of flux, when the relative status of American political and economic power was changing, and when new national priorities were replacing old ones, understanding the complexities of national policy making became a necessary challenge. Hence, this work is ultimately expected to deepen our understanding on the role played by interest groups in shaping and affecting foreign policy decision making and their implication in transforming policy preferences.

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